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ABSTRACT
The thesis considers the process of adjustment in the supply side of the economy, 
discussing factors which might influence (nominal and real) wage and price 
responsiveness, and investigating these empirically using data for the UK. This contributes 
to the analysis of the macroeconomic consequences of supply side inflexibilities, and 
policy implications are drawn out
Two themes recur throughout the thesis. The first is an emphasis on the 
institutional detail of the supply side which suggests reasonable sources of adjustment 
costs and explanations for rigidities. The second is an emphasis on disaggregation in the 
analysis. It is argued that the interactions and interdependencies between sectors of the 
economy play a central role in determining the responsiveness of the supply side to 
shocks. In order to investigate these ideas, the empirical work makes use of data available 
at the industrial level.
Econometric analysis of the variability of wage growth across industrial sectors 
and of the frequency of wage negotiations over time provides clear evidence that the 
speed of adjustment of nominal wages is influenced systematically by supply side 
conditions. Comparison of price responsiveness across industries in the UK demonstrates 
that the extent of product market competition is an important determinant of the speed of 
price adjustment. A model of the UK supply side is also described, modelling 
employment, price, wage and output determination in each of 38 industrial sectors plus 
their interactions. The model provides insights on the theoretical debate on supply side 
behaviour, and, through simulation methods, shows the importance of inter-sectoral 
feedbacks in the determination of the speed and direction of adjustment in wages and 
prices in the face of shocks. In particular, the simulations emphasise the role of 
expectation formation in supply side adjustment, illustrate the presence of unemployment 
hysteresis, and highlight the structural implications of wage and price rigidities.
2
Contents
Abstract 2
List of Contents 3
List of Tables 6
List of Figures 7
Acknowledgements 8
Chapter 1 The Scope of the Investigation 9
Chapter 2 Review of the Literature 13
2.1 The macroeconomic background 13
The macroeconomic significance of rigidities 
The role of wage-setting institutions
2.2 On the nature and causes of price inertia 19
Modelling firms’ response to adjustment cost 
The source of price adjustment costs 
Alternative causes of price inertia
2.3 On the nature and causes of nominal wage inertia 26
Sources of costs in adjusting nominal wages
Open-ended contracts
The influence of uncertainty
2.4 Labour market models and real wage rigidity 32
Sources of pressure on the real wage 
Explanations of real wage rigidity
2.5 The contribution of disaggregation 40
Modelling the time paths of aggregate prices and wages 
Wage-wage comparisons and wage leadership
2.6 Concluding remarks 57
Chapter 3 An Indirect Investigation of Nominal Wage Inertia 62
3.1 Testing for labour market adjustment 63
3.2 The U.K. experience 65
3.3 Conclusions 78
3
Chapter 4 A Direct Investigation of Nominal Wage Inertia through the 79
Frequency of Wage Negotiations
4.1 Some exploratory analysis 80
4.2 Modelling the decision to renegotiate wages 86
The microeconomic theory 
Operationalising the model
4.3 The empirical work 93
Introduction 
Linear analysis 
Non-linear analysis
4.4 Conclusions 119
Chapter 5 A Disaggregated Model of the U.K. Supply Side 128
5.1 A description of the model 129
5.2 Estimating the model 137
Modelling disaggregated supply side relationships 
Operationalising a model 
The empirical work
5.3 Discussion of the results 160
The labour demand, price and output equations 
The wage equations
5.4 Concluding comments 172
Chapter 6 Investigating Price Rigidities using the Industrial Dimension 177
6.1 Quantifying industrial characteristics 178
6.2 The analysis 187
6.3 Summary of results and concluding comments 196
Chapter 7 Wage and Price Rigidities in a Dynamic Disaggregated
Model of the UK Supply Side 200
7.1 The simulation method 201
7.2 Identifying sources of inertia in interactions between industries 209
7.3 Feedbacks between unemployment rates and wages and prices 223
7.4 The structure of industrial feedbacks 233
7.5 Concluding comments ' 243
4
Chapter 8 Conclusions 245
Notes 252
Appendix 267
Data Appendix 292
Bibliography 296
5
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Variability of wage growth across industrial sectors 66
Table 3.2 Brief description of pay policies; 1964-1982 68
Table 3.3 Regression results. Dependent variable: 100*var(wjt) 71
Table 3.4 Regression results. Dependent variable: 100*var(Wj.) 
Proportion of workforce involved in new wage settlements
75
Table 4.1 84
Table 4.2 Equations explaining renegotiation frequency 94
Table 4.3 Regression results. Dependent variable: 7tj. 
Brief description of pay policies; 1964-19/5.
100
Table 4.4 102
Table 4.5 Regression results. Dependent variable: 7tIt 104
Table 4.6 Regression results. Dependent variable: 109
Table 4.7 Regression results. Dependent variable: p 114
Table 5.1 Industrial classification based on 1968 SIC 138
Table 5.2 Aggregate price and aggregate wage equations (1956-1981) 149
Table 5.3 Industrial labour demand equations 151
Table 5.4 Industrial price equations 152
Table 5.5 Industrial wage equations 153
Table 5.6 Industrial output demand equations 154
Table 5.7 Estimated equation diagnostics 155
Table 5.8 Tests on restrictions in industrial systems 157
Table 6.1 Dynamic properties of industrial price equations 183
Table 6.2 Contingency table analysis of price inertia 190
Table 63 Correlation between k and explanatory variables 192
Table 6.4 Regression results. Dependent variable: price inertia (n) 194
Table 6.5 Contingency table analysis of price inertia 195
Table 7.1 Industrial labour demand equations 202
Table 7.2 Industrial price equations 203
Table 13 Industrial wage equations 204
Table 7.4 Industrial output demand equations 205
Table 7.5 Estimated equation summary statistics 206
Table A4.1 Regression results. Dependent variable: 7Cjt 274
Table A4.2 Value of SIC-specific dummies in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 276
Table A4J Regression results. Dependent variable: %  
Value of time-specific dummies in Table 4.6
277
Table A4.4 278
Table A5 Industrial employment, price, wage, and output equations 281
Table A6.1 Measures of industrial characteristics 287
Table A6.2 Intervals for classification of industries by characteristics 288
6
List of Figures
Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.2 
Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.2 
Figure 4.3 
Figure 4.4 
Figure 4.5 
Figure 4.6 
Figure 4.7
Figure 4.8
Chart 5.1 
Chart 5.2 
Figures 5.1-53  
Figures 5.4-S.7 
Figures 5.8-5.10 
Figures 5.11-5.16 
Figure 6.1 
Figure 6.2 
Figure 7.1 
Figures 1,2-73 
Figures 7.4(a),(b) 
Figures 7.5(a),(b) 
Figures 7.2.1-7.2.4 
Figures 7J.1-73.4 
Figures 7.4.1-7.4.4 
Figures 7.6 
Figures 7,7-73 
Figures 7.9-7.10 
Figures 7.11 
Figures 7.12 
Figures 7.13 
Figure A2 
Figure A7
Impact of a 10% reduction in the money stock (a=-1.22,b=5) 50 
Impact of a 10% reduction in the money stock (a=-1.47,b=15) 51 
Length of period between industrial negotiations 82
Average contract length for contracts by industry 83
Proportion of workers achieving wage settlements 1955-1974 85
Inflation and price level uncertainty 99
Time dummies relating to Table 4.6 column (1) 112
Time dummies relating to Table 4.6 column (3) 117
Impact of a 20% reduction in money stock with
different costs of adjustment 122
Impact of a 10% reduction in money stock with
and without policy 125
Summary of variable definitions 142
Summary of industrial systems 161
Long run employment elasticities 163
Long run price elasticities 165
Long run output demand elasticities 167
Long run wage elasticities 170
Time paths of prices in selected industries 185
Histogram showing distribution of iz across industries 189
Feedbacks initiated by an imposed incomes policy shock 211
Aggregate nominal wage and price inflation 213
Aggregate real wages 214
Aggregate unemployment rates (actual and simulated) 215
Simulated aggregate nominal wage inflation 217
Simulated aggregate price inflation 218
Simulated aggregate real wage inflation 219
Equilibrium in a disaggregated wage/price model 225
The natural unemployment rate 231
Price inflation and price surprises 232
Simulated relative wage movements across 4 sectors 234
Simulated employment changes across 4 sectors 237
Simulated relative wage movements across 4 sectors 238
Time paths of aggregate wage level 272
Fortran programme used in the generation of simulations 289
7
Acknowledgements
The research reported in this thesis was started at the Centre for Labour Economics, and 
that institution should be thanked for motivating my interest in labour economics. My 
supervisors Charles Bean and Sushil Wadhwani provided important suggestions and 
expertise. Helpful discussions were also had with Richard Jackman, David Metcalf, Steve 
Nickell, Andrew Oswald, Vani Borooah, Willy Brown and Hashem Pesaran. Useful 
comments were received from referees of Economica and of Driver and Dunne’s 
Structural change in the UK volume, at seminars at the Centre for Labour Economics, at 
Labour Economics Workshops in Cambridge and Oxford, and at the 1987 and 1988 
European Econometric Society Conferences in Copenhagen and Bologna.
The research work was carried out at the Centre for Labour Economics in the London 
School of Economics and at the Department of Applied Economics in the University of 
Cambridge. The work has undoubtedly benefited from my involvement with various 
research projects carried out in these institutions, and I am indebted to my colleagues for 
providing a stimulating background.
Financial assistance from the ESRC for a two-year studentship at the Centre for Labour 
Economics is gratefully acknowledged.
8
CHAPTER 1
The Scope of the Investigation
One of the remarkable features of the past decade has been the very rapid rise in 
unemployment throughout the industrial world. This increase has been especially marked 
for the countries of the European Community, with the United Kingdom finding itself 
among those that have been particularly badly affected. The emergence of widespread 
unemployment in the UK and elsewhere, has, in turn, excited considerable interest among 
economists as to the causes of the problem, and a great deal of research effort has been 
devoted to a study of the functioning of labour markets and the supply side in general.
Much of this research built on the debate of the 1970’s on the effectiveness of 
government policy in influencing real events. This debate caused a shift in emphasis in 
many European governments’ economic programmes away from direct intervention in the 
economy and towards liberalisation of market mechanisms. In the UK this shift in 
emphasis meant that the defeat of inflation was given priority over other policy objectives, 
while the government advocated, and remains strongly committed to, policies designed to 
facilitate the free adjustment of the labour maricet in order to reduce the problem of 
unemployment. Although unemployment rates in the UK fell towards the end of the 
1980’s, after almost a decade in which unemployment has been in excess of two million, 
it is clear that the process of free market adjustment is at best a slow one. Moreover, this 
process has turned out to be rather more complicated than might have been thought in the 
mid-1970’s. Despite high levels of unemployment, the UK experienced a strong rate of 
growth in real wages during the 1980’s, so that fears of inflationary pressure in the labour 
market continue to be expressed in the arguments against expansionary economic policies. 
The coexistence of high unemployment and strong real wage growth represents a scenario 
which simply was not envisaged in the policy prescriptions of the mid-1970’s, and the 
search for an explanation of this phenomenon has become one of the key areas of 
research among economists in recent years.
The woik presented in this thesis provides some empirical evidence on the 
process of adjustment in the supply side of the economy, aiming to develop further some 
of the insights that have been made recently in this field of research. More specifically, 
the work focusses on the advances made in our understanding of the institutions involved 
in wage and price determination, and the explanations these provide for less-than- 
instantaneous adjustment of wages and prices to changes in their determinants. These 
advances are investigated empirically using data available for the UK, providing insights 
on the extent to which governments may be able to influence the causes of inertia, and to
9
moderate its consequences in the UK.
It should be stated at the outset of the thesis that "inertia" is a phenomenon which 
is only ambiguously defined. Clearly, inertia in a variable cannot be identified if there is 
no change in the circumstances determining the size of the variable. A useful working 
definition of the concept might therefore be a lack of responsiveness of a variable in the 
face of changes which would warrant a response. So, for example, while the concepts of 
inflation and price level inertia are clearly related, they are quite distinct: the price level 
could increase at 5%, 10%, or 20% per annum with no price inertia if there is a one-to- 
one correspondence between prices and some other variable also growing at 5%, 10% or 
20% per annum. Inertia would exist if the one-to-one correspondence were to break down 
over some period so that the price level response is less than that warranted by changes 
in the influential variable. Of course, this means that any definition or measure of inertia 
requires as a base some model (either theoretical or empirical) of the process determining 
the "warranted" level, and the definition or measure cannot be seen independently of the 
model. Similar comments apply to the related idea of "rigidities", although a distinction 
can be made between the two concepts in terms of the time span involved in adjustment: 
the presence of a "rigidity" implies that a warranted response may never occur, while 
"inertia" implies that the response will take place, but with a delay. (In fact, inertia can be 
thought of as a particular class of rigidity in which the speed of adjustment is 
emphasised. Given that this is question of emphasis, however, the two terms can be used 
interchangeably in many circumstances). In this work, I shall consider a variety of means 
of measuring and defining the extent of inertia and rigidities in prices and wages, and on 
each occasion I shall make explicit the model underlying the analysis. However, while the 
models chosen for this purpose will be as general as is possible, and have been supported 
both theoretically and empirically in the literature, it is recognised that alternative theories 
or econometric specifications may suggest alternative measures and definitions to those 
employed here.
The labour market models underlying the macroeconomic debates of the 1970’s 
and before were highly stylised, generally based on a one-good economy with 
instantaneous price adjustment It is this latter assumption which I shall primarily wish to 
investigate, looking at the causes of less than instantaneous adjustment in prices and 
nominal wages, and the macroeconomic implications of any inertias or rigidities that are 
found. However, such an investigation will also need to consider the possibility of many 
sectors since the interactions and interdependencies between different sectors- of the 
economy will clearly play an important part in determining the responsiveness of the 
economy as a whole to any exogenous shocks. Throughout the thesis, therefore, I shall
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emphasise the importance of disaggregation in looking at supply side adjustments, and the 
empirical work will make use of data available at the industrial level. Working at this 
level of disaggregation means that we are closer to the level at which decisions are 
actually made, so that it may be possible to capture aspects of labour market behaviour 
which are lost in a more aggregated study. Moreover, this level of disaggregation allows a 
comprehensive coverage of the whole economy, so that I can undertake to study the 
interactions between sectors.
The choice to work with disaggregated data illustrates a belief that inertia and 
rigidity may be generated in a number of stages. As we shall see in the next section, the 
justifications for inertia and rigidity are generally presented at the level of the decision­
maker, based around particular views of the wage-setting, pricing and employment 
decision of the individual firm. So, for example, it might be argued that there are 
adjustment costs incurred by the firm in changing nominal wages or prices which directly 
inhibit their flexibility. However, in this work it is recognised that beyond these 
influences, there may be information lags and uncertainties generated by the inter-play 
between sectors which also result in less-than-instantaneous adjustment. Further, 
inflexibilities generated in these ways in any one sector could have cumulative effects on 
the economy as a whole as price responses are passed along the production chain, and as 
agents look to wage settlements outside their sector in deciding on their own wage claims. 
The structure of the thesis reflects this view of the build-up of inertia and rigidity, with 
the first chapters concentrating on the inflexibilities generated at the individual level, and 
the later work taking up the possibility of interactions between sectors.
Specifically, the thesis continues in the next chapter with a review of the literature 
in this area, discussing in more detail the macroeconomic debate on the consequences of 
inertia, and considering in turn the possible sources of inertia in prices, in nominal wages, 
and in real wages. Much of this discussion focusses on the institutional framework of the 
supply side; for example, we look at the internal organisation of the parties to wage 
negotiations, at the wage bargaining framework, and at the structure of product markets in 
order to provide an explanation for inflexibilities in wage and price setting. We also 
consider in this chapter the significance of allowing for more than one sector for our 
understanding of (nominal) wage and price inertia, and illustrate this through an algebraic 
model of wage setting in a two sector economy. Although highly stylised, this algebraic 
model captures some important features of a multisectoral model with less-than- 
instantaneous adjustment in prices, and provides a useful focus for many of the ideas that 
are subsequentlty investigated. In particular, the model illustrates some of the arguments 
for government activism, both directly through the manipulation of wage- and price- 
setting procedures, and indirectly, in the area of demand management.
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Chapters Three and Four exclusively consider nominal wage inertia, providing 
empirical evidence on the extent and causes of the phenomenon in the UK. Both chapters 
focus on the fact that in reality wages are re-set at discrete intervals, and explore the 
possibility of modelling this fact through ‘renegotiation probabilities’ which may be less 
than one in any period. This method of modelling inertia is precisely that incorporated in 
the algebraic model in Chapter Two, and in so far as the empirical work of chapters 
Three and Four provides evidence to support the method, this gives an additional 
resonance to the properties of the algegraic model, and the policy prescriptions suggested 
by it.
Chapter Five broadens the discussion by presenting a comprehensive model of the 
supply side of the UK economy based around 38 industrial sectors. This model aims to 
examine the process of wage and price formation in a general macroeconomic context, 
and is able to investigate the possibility of there being different degrees of inertia in 
different sectors of the economy. In so doing, the model provides evidence on the 
empirical reasonableness of various theoretical views of wage and price formation and the 
explanations of rigidities that are associated with them.
Chapters Six and Seven take up the results of the disaggregated supply side model 
and makes use of the industrial dimension to investigate the causes and consequences of 
rigidities in prices and wages. In the analysis of Chapter Six, estimated price equations 
are used to obtain measures of price inertia in the different industries. These are then 
incorporated in further statistical analysis in an attempt to identify the industrial 
characteristics associated with price inertia. In the analysis of Chapter Seven, the entire 
model estimated in Chapter Five is employed in simulation exercises in an attempt to 
identify the interactions between industries that are important in affecting the time paths, 
and speed of adjustment, of prices and wages to an exogenous shock. More specifically, 
three simulation experiments are considered in this chapter: in the first, the highly 
complex nature of intersectoral interactions are elaborated, with particular emphasis placed 
on the formation in each industry of expectations of wage and price movements taking 
place elsewhere in the economy; in the second, attention concentrates on the (lack of) 
responsiveness of wages and prices to unemployment rates, and considers what is meant 
by a ‘Natural’ rate of unemployment in the context of a multisectoral dynamic model of 
the type estimated in Chapter Five; and in the third simulation experiment, we consider 
some of the structural implications of wage and price rigidities, noting the usefulness of a 
coordinated industrial strategy on pay and employment, and the difficulties involved in 
constructing such a policy in the face of wage and price rigidities.
Finally, in Chapter Eight, we draw together some of the conclusions derived from 
the preceding chapters, focussing in particular on the implications of the analysis for 
government policy.
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CHAPTER 2
A Review of the Literature
In this chapter I will review some of the work carried out in the study of 
rigidities in the pricing and wage-setting processes, and in particular I will discuss some 
of the proposed explanations for the existence of these rigidities and the problems that 
these create in the functioning of the macroeconomy. For this, I will consider in turn the 
nature and causes of price inertia, of inertia in nominal wages, and of real wage rigidities. 
Finally, I will note how the existence of more than one sector has been accommodated 
into this woric, and discuss the implications that this has for econometric analysis, and for 
the design of macroeconomic policy. However, in order to elaborate on the significance of 
nominal and real rigidities, and to put these studies into context, I first briefly note some 
of the recent developments in macroeconomic debate in which the issue of wage and 
price rigidities have played a role.
2.1 The macroeconomic background
The macroeconomic significance of rigidities
The experience of accelerating inflation alongside rising unemployment in the late 
1960’s began a round of debate which profoundly influenced the way in which 
economists thought about the labour market. The Phillips curve, which had formed the 
basis for analysis upto that time, had been seen to break down, so that new concepts were 
explored in an attempt to find theories of the labour market which could accommodate the 
experience of stagflation. In these efforts, Friedman’s (1968) presidential address to the 
AEA was particularly influential, and raised many of the ideas which occupy labour 
economists today. The ‘Natural Rate Hypothesis’ (NRH)^ set out in the paper became 
widely accepted as a reasonable description of the functioning of the labour market, at 
least in the long run, and the important themes of this description were quickly recognised 
and became the centre-piece of macroeconomic debate in the 1970’s. In particular, 
questions on how agents form their expectations, on the information that is available to 
them, and on the extent to which markets are able to clear in each period were widely 
debated.
The policy implications of Friedman’s view of the labour market were made most 
strongly in a series of papers by Lucas (1975), Sargent and Wallace (1975,1976), (LSW), 
and Barro (1976) in which it is further assumed that expectations are formed "rationally",
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in the sense of Muth (1961). This assumption has the result that Friedman’s long run 
view comes to pass immediately: with agents forming expectations rationally, systematic 
government policy becomes ineffective even in the short run as agents, knowing the 
government’s policy rules and the structure of the economy, react to offset the effects of 
such policy as soon as it is conceived. Since (only) unanticipated policy can influence real 
magnitudes in these circumstances, these commentators argued in favour of constant "x%" 
money growth rate rules on the grounds that this would reduce uncertainty and any 
undesirable variability around the economy’s natural level of activity and employment.
Some empirical support was provided for these arguments, first by Lucas (1973) 
and then by Barro (1977,1978) for the US, and by Attfield, Demery and Duck (1981a, 
1981b) for the UK.@) These arguments did not go unchallenged, however, as policy- 
activists looked for theoretic and empirical evidence to counter the LSW policy 
prescriptions.^) Perhaps the most convincing argument against the LSW models was that 
which challenged the assumption that prices adjust to clear markets at every point in time. 
Early papers on the importance of nominal wage and price rigidities in the functioning of 
the supply side have developed into a more complete research programme in which the 
microfoundations of wage and price setting decisions have been considered, and the 
"policy-is-ineffective" proposition attacked from this base (see, for example the recent 
survey article by Rotemberg (1987)). In particular, it has been noted that the dynamic 
effects of policy-induced aggregate demand shifts on output are influenced both by 
nominal wage and price rigidities, and by the responsiveness of wage and price setting to 
output change. Blanchard (1988) provides the following simple illustrative model to make 
the point:
p = pp(-l) + (l-p)w + ay (2.1)
w = tjw(-I) + (l-ri)p + py (2.2)
y = m - p (2.3)
Variable are in logarithms, with y, p, w, and m representing output, prices, nominal 
wages, and nominal money supply respectively. The price equation at (2.1) gives the price 
level as a function of its own lagged value, of wages, and of output. The wage equation 
is expressed similarly at (2.2), while (2.3) gives aggregate demand as a simple function of 
real money balances. In this model, nominal inertia in prices and wages are represented 
by (non-zero) values for \l and r| respectively. Parameters a  and p capture the 
responsiveness of price setters and wage setters to demand, and represent in Blanchard’s 
term "real" rigidities. Hence, a low value for a  implies that the markup of prices over
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wages remains unchanged over the cycle, while a low value for (3 means that real wages 
are unresponsive to demand change.
Clearly, in the absence of any nominal inertia (ji = T| = 0), prices, nominal wages, 
and money supply move in parallel, and money supply manipulation leaves output 
unaffected. More generally, however, the speed of adjustment of nominal wages and 
prices to a change in the money supply depends (negatively) on (I and rj, while such 
effects are compounded by high values for a  and p . ^  So long as prices lag behind the 
money supply, output in this model is expanded through the real balance effect. As 
Blanchard points out, standard neoclassical assumptions assert that \i and r| are both zero, 
while a  and P would be positive and large. One element of the policy activist’s research 
programme can therefore be viewed as providing evidence and theoretical support for 
non-zero values for p. and rj, and for low values of a  and p.
The earliest papers in this line of attack concentrated primarily on nominal inertia. 
Papers by Phelps and Taylor (1977), Fischer (1977), Taylor (1980), Canzoneri (1980), 
Buiter and Jewitt (1981), Rotemberg (1982), and Parian (1986), among others, have each 
questioned the assumption of nominal flexibility, and demonstrated how the introduction 
of nominal wage/price inertia can generate a path through which government policy can 
influence real magnitudes. A variety of justifications for the existence of inertia in these 
models have been put forward. In some, inertia is simply imposed on the grounds of the 
observed real-world phenomenon of multi-period, staggered contracts, while in others the 
frequency of wage or price change is endogenously determined within the model, deriving 
inertia from (unspecified) costs of adjustment. In the models, the effectiveness of policy is 
established on the basis of two complementary elements. On the one hand, there is an 
"information-based" argument, put forward in the Phelps and Taylor paper for example, in 
which prices and wages are sticky in the sense of being predetermined from period to 
period. In this paper, it is assumed that firms set their prices one period in advance of the 
period over which they will apply, on the grounds that "there are disadvantages in too- 
frequent or too-precipitate revisions of price lists or wage schedules" (op.cit., p i66). In 
this case, the government has an information advantage over individuals, and is able to 
use its broader information set to react to disturbances as they arise, thereby reducing 
fluctuations of output around its normal level. The second strand to the inertia argument is 
based on the presence of long-term contracts, as in the Fischer paper for example. Here, 
although workers are aware that the government will be able to respond to news every 
period, they enter contracts which limit their own responsiveness over a number of 
periods. Here there is no asymmetry in the availability of information between workers 
and government, but again, the extra flexibility in response to change provides 
government policy with its potency.
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Empirical evidence on the importance of allowing for slow adjustment has also 
been presented. Leiderman (1980) and Mishkin (1982a,b) both provide methodologies 
which can be used to test the two component hypotheses of the LSW models, i.e. the 
Natural Rate Hypothesis and the Rational Expectations Hypothesis, jointly and separately 
to find the contribution each makes to the joint result. Both Leiderman and Mishkin 
(1982a) take Barro’s (1977) analysis as a base, but while the former finds that both the 
components are jointly and separately supported by the data, Mishkin finds that the joint 
hypothesis fails to hold, with there being little contribution to this rejection from the 
rationality constraints. The major difference between the two studies is in the choice of 
lag length, Leiderman choosing to enter money growth into the unemployment equation 
lagged upto five quarters, following Barro’s work, while Mishkin finds that coefficients on 
lags as far back as twenty quarters make a significant contribution and are therefore 
included. Mishkin’s results not only provides encouragement for those interventionists 
who accept rational expectations as a reasonable assumption, but also highlights the length 
of time over which any policy may take effect, raising doubts on the empirical validity of 
the assumption of instantaneous market adjustment made in the LSW models.
Gordon (1982a) and Demery (1984) provide further empirical evidence on the 
importance of price inertia in the macroeconomic debate, estimating for the US and UK 
respectively a model which allows for the long run neutrality of money, as expressed in 
the NRH, but which also accommodates a gradual adjustment of prices (GAP). The 
empirical work involved the two-stage procedure developed in the Barro papers, obtaining 
explicit estimates of the anticipated and unanticipated components of nominal income 
growth and then using these in a second regression analysis, this time explaining 
deviations of output from its normal level. The relationship that is estimated in the 
Gordon paper in this second stage includes a series of lagged price terms in addition to 
the standard LSW explanatory variables, so that the NRH-GAP model encompasses the 
instantaneous-adjustment model. Analysis not only shows that these lagged price terms 
contribute to the estimated fit, so that the inclusion of a GAP process provides a 
statistically superior model, but also demonstrates that both unanticipated and anticipated 
nominal income growth influence output significantly when these terms are included.
However, despite the literature documenting the theoretical implications of 
nominal wage and price inertia, and the empirical evidence given to establish its practical 
relevance, there has been, and remains, an aversion to the incorporation of wage/price 
stickiness into macromodels by some economists. This aversion is often justified on the 
grounds that if nominal inertia causes significant real costs, then agents would have the 
incentive to reset wages and prices more frequently to eliminate the inertia and the 
associated costs (the "Barro critique"). Despite the widespread acceptance of the fact that 
wages and prices do not adjust instantaneously, there still remained a need for
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interventionists to establish theoretic explanations for the existence of nominal price and 
wage stickiness. In sections 2.2 and 2.3, I turn to some of the attempts that have been 
made in the literature to establish such explanations.
The role of wage-setting institutions
The second front on which policy activists have progressed in the debate on the 
effectiveness of government policy is through the analysis of the causes of real rigidities 
that may exist in pricing and wage setting behaviour. Theoretic explanations for a lack of 
responsiveness in the markup of prices over wages and in wage level determination for a 
given price in the face of output fluctuations provide further support for the contention 
that policy can have significant real effects (these relate to low values of a  and p in the 
Blanchard illustration above). The literature in this area has also developed rapidly in 
recent years, especially on the explanations for real rigidities in wage setting (low p ) .^  
Much of this interest developed through the seventies as economists searched for 
an explanation for the observed fact that, following the oil shocks, some economies 
suffered more in terms of higher unemployment and higher inflation than others. Attention 
focussed on the flexibility of the labour markets, and the differences that exist between 
the supply-side institutions of the different countries. In this way, economists hoped to 
identify the means by which the consequences of recession were incorporated into 
decisions in some countries to ensure supply side adjustment could take place relatively 
painlessly. A good example of this approach is provided by Gordon (1982b, 1983) in 
which a comparison of the macroeconomic performance of Britain, Japan, and the US is 
made in the light of the historical development and institutions of the countries. This 
comparison emphasises the dual role of wage setting in the achievement of 
macroeconomic efficiency and the resolution of conflict over income shares; while highly 
responsive wages are conducive to efficiency, they can also result in high negotiation and 
strike costs. A variety of sociological and historical differences are presented to explain 
the differing extents to which one of these objectives is subordinated to the other in the 
three countries. It is argued that the greater degree of equality, the tradition of hierarchical 
social relations, the homogeneity of the workforce, and the degree of integration of 
economic and social life has enabled Japan to develop institutions geared to efficiency 
rather than the resolution of disputes, in contrast to Britain and the US. Gordon also 
considers the development of unionism to be important; the gradual formation of many 
small craft unions in the UK contrasts with the US experience in which intensive 
unionisation (after the 1935 Wagner Act) generated large industrial unions in key 
industries. Gordon argues that this process has contributed to higher perceived costs of 
negotiation in the US and the development of three-year contracts, resulting in slower 
wage adjustment in the US than either Japan or Britain.
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Similar themes are to be found in Flanagan, Soskice, and Ullman (1983), 
McCallum (1983), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Newell and Symons (1986), Bean, Layard 
and Nickell (1986), Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and in Freeman (1988). In these, it is 
argued that the institutional setting of wage negotiations can magnify or dissipate the 
conflict caused by the pursuit of different objectives by different groups. In turn, this will 
influence the structure and the intensity of bargaining experienced across the economies, 
and this feeds through to their overall economic performance. From these studies, it is 
also clear that it is the inter-relations between different institutions within each economy 
which are important in determining the macroeconomic performance of the countries. For 
example, while strong labour organisations are frequently cited as a contributory factor in 
the relative economic success of Austria and West Germany, economies such as the 
Netherlands and the UK performed less well despite the existence of strong unions in 
these countries also. In fact, it is the interaction of this strength with employers’ power, 
the degree of centralisation, the extent of political and social consensus, and so on, which 
has resulted in the diversity in the economies’ achievements. Clearly then, labour market 
institutions which contribute to the successful macroeconomic performance of one country 
may not be helpful if exported in isolation to another. However, the literature does serve 
to focus attention on aspects of the labour maiket which contribute to real rigidities, and 
may suggest areas in which governments can improve the resilience of the economy to 
shocks, through the establishment of formal or informal lines of communication, through 
labour relations legislation, and so on.
In section 2.4 below, I review some of the recent work on wage setting, 
concentrating on union-based models of the labour market since these seem particularly 
pertinent to the UK. These models have been used in the literature to illustrate a number 
of potential sources for real rigidities in the UK, and these are also described. Section 2.5 
then turns attention to the issue of disaggregation and notes the impact of decentralisation 
in wage and price setting decisions on nominal rigidity. The related issue of expectations 
and inter-sectoral communication is also addressed in this section, while the significance 
of corporatism and the coordination of decisions is discussed once more in the concluding 
comments of section 2.6. Together, the literature in these areas provide a useful insight 
into the features and institutions of the labour market which might generate real 
inflexibilities in the UK, and perhaps suggest a combination of supply side policies which 
would help to eliminate them. First however, in the following two sections, I return 
attention to the causes of nominal inertia in prices and then in wages.
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2.2 On the nature and causes of price inertia
As mentioned above, many of the macroeconomic analyses carried out involving 
nominal inertia have simply imposed the phenomenon on the grounds that empirically 
agents arc not observed resetting prices or renegotiating wages at every instant. In others, 
the inertia is derived endogenously, assuming there to be costs involved in adjusting 
prices. In this section, I consider in more detail the possible sources of price inertia 
suggested in the literature. To begin, I shall look at the inertia generated by adjustment 
costs, noting how these might affect price responsiveness and the possible sources of such 
costs. Next, I shall turn to some alternative sources of price inertia not based around 
adjustment costs. In each case, I shall comment on the extent to which governments can 
influence inertia generated in these ways.
Modelling firms’ response to adjustment costs
Bano (1972), and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) (BSW) provide clear illustrations 
as to how adjustment costs (of whatever source) make instantaneous adjustment of prices 
sub-optimal and reduce responsiveness. In the Barro paper, price adjustments, of whatever 
size, incur a lump-sum cost, perhaps corresponding to the simplest notion of adjustment 
costs in which there is a fixed administrative cost in changing price lists and catalogues, 
informing dealers, etc. Assuming that the firm adopts the strategy of adjusting prices 
when demand achieves chosen ’’ceiling” or "floor" levels (termed the "(s,S) rule"), Barro 
demonstrates that, in the face of random demand shocks, the expected value of price 
change is proportional to any shock, with the coefficient of proportionality (inversely) 
related to the size of the adjustment cost Sheshinski and Weiss extend these ideas to the 
case where there is general price inflation which is fully anticipated. In this paper, the 
firm chooses both the timing of price change and the price level through the maximisation 
of an objective function involving the (discounted) stream of future real profits. Real 
profits are themselves dependent on the price of the firm’s output relative to the aggregate 
price level (which rises according to the known constant rate of inflation), and on a fixed 
(real) lump sum cost of adjustment incurred whenever prices are altered. The optimal 
strategy for the firm in these circumstances is again of the "(s,S)" variety, with the firm 
raising the real price to S whenever it falls to the floor of s. Given that the general price 
level is rising at a constant rate, price adjustment occurs at regular but discrete intervals, 
following finite periods during which price is held constant. Again the size of the 
adjustment cost is shown to be (inversely) related to the frequency of price adjustment, 
while changes in the rate of inflation are seen to have an ambiguous effect on the 
frequency. (An example is provided to illustrate how higher levels of inflation can be 
associated with reduced price adjustment, although it is noted that a positive association,
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which is perhaps more intuitively reasonable, might be more likely in practice).^) As we 
shall see in Chapter 4 (section 4.2), the optimality of the (s,S) rules for price adjustment 
can also be established in a stochastic framework; see, for example, Sheshinski amd 
Weiss (1982) or Danziger (1984). Although the mathematics of the analysis become more 
complicated in these circumstances, this generalisation provides the model with more 
practical relevence. Indeed, it is precisely this model which underlies the empirical 
analysis of nominal wage adjustments in chapter 4.
The assumption of lump-sum adjustment costs is realistic in the sense that their 
presence can explain the discrete jumps in prices (and wages) that are seen to occur in 
practice. However, some economists may prefer to incorporate adjustment costs in a more 
tractable way through the use of a quadratic cost function. Here, a firm is penalised by 
both deviations of actual levels from target levels, and by rapid adjustment. The 
popularity of this form is based on the fact that, although the desirable property of 
discrete price movements is lost, the standard Partial Adjustment Mechanism (PAM) can 
be derived from this base. In this, the size of the influence of the (one) lagged dependent 
variable (ldv) will depend on the cost of adjustment relative to the cost of being out of 
equilibrium.^) Pagan (1985) provides an interesting review of the usefulness of the PAM, 
and in particular considers the relevance of the ordinary (one ldv) PAM when the target 
variable itself exhibits growth. Working from an alternative quadratic cost function in 
which adjustment of the control variable is penalised when it deviates from a given rate 
of growth, Pagan argues that the ordinary PAM will often need to be augmented by a 
term reflecting this trend growth, and goes on to consider various options for doing this. 
As an illustration, it might be argued that an industry which experiences frequent price 
change might set up institutions which facilitate these changes, so that costs of adjustment 
will be incurred only when extraordinary price adjustments have to be made. If we 
imagine that mechanisms are installed progressively to keep adjustment costs low as 
increasingly larger shocks are experienced (in times of rising inflation, say), then it might 
be sensible to model the rate of price change over which costs are incurred as that which 
was experienced last period. In this case, the cost of adjustment, C, are given by
C = a( pt-pt*)2 + b( pt-pt.j-gt)2 
%
where pt is the target level of the control variable, pt, and gt = trend growth = (pt_j- 
pt_2). Minimising C with respect to pt gives
pt = (a/(a+b)).pt* + (2b/(a+b)).pt_j - (b/(a+b)).pt_2
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Here it is clear that the relative size of the adjustment costs (given by b/(a+b)) is 
still important in determining the extent of inertia, but that a second ldv must also be 
included to capture the complete dynamics of adjustment. This follows from firms’ 
recognition that they can set up institutions to reduce the cost of successive price 
adjustments, and therefore shift the burden of adjustment to earlier periods. This shift 
introduces a cyclical element to the time-path of prices which would be picked up only 
with two lagged dependent variables in applied work. In the empirical work of chapter 6, 
we use the size of the estimated coefficients of price equations estimated for 39 industries 
to obtain measures of price inertia in those industries in exactly this way. As the 
discussion above indicates, although the PAM approach to modelling costs and dynamics 
can be justified at the level of the firm through the firm's desire to minimise quadratic 
adjustment costs, its main advantage is in its tractability. Moreover, when working with 
more aggregated data, this approach seems more reasonable than the (s,S) approach, 
which perhaps models the decision making of an individual firm more realistically. 
Certainly the PAM approach provides a very reasonable interpretation of the coefficients 
which can be obtained in industrial analysis, however, and it is for this reason that it is 
employed in the analysis of industrial price inertia in chapter 6.
These papers not only provide a rationale for less-than-instantaneous price 
adjustment, then, but also suggest that complicated dynamic time-paths can be generated 
by these costs, according to the (algebraic) form in which costs are incurred.Moreover,  
the extent to which these costs are firm- or industry-specific may provide a possible 
justification for desynchronisation of price-setting ( giving a justification for staggered 
price- or wage-setting, as in the wage contract papers noted earlier). To understand which 
of these algebraic forms is most likely to be true in the real-world, and whether costs are 
predominantly sector-specific, it is clearly necessary to know the source of the adjustment 
costs, and it is to this that I now turn.
The source of price adjustment costs
The idea that price rigidities can adversely influence macroeconomic performance 
is not original to the "policy-effectiveness" debate of the 1970’s. The discussion on the 
importance of "administered" prices, associated with the US economist Gardiner Means, 
centered around exactly the same argument applied to the recession of the 1930’s. The 
precise nature of "administered" prices has been only ambiguously defined, although they 
have frequently been contrasted with prices determined by the forces of supply and 
demand, so that administered pricing has been generally linked with less than perfect 
competition, and specifically oligopoly, in the product market.
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This possible link between price responsiveness and the degree of market power 
enjoyed by price-setters has been widely discussed, although the form of this relationship 
remains to be fully explored. So, for example, Okun’s (1981) description of ~ the 
administered price hypothesis explains price unresponsiveness in terms of an informational 
system among oligopolists that allows them to engage in tacit collusion. Here, competitors 
want to maintain some degree of profitability over the pure-competition level, and make 
an implicit agreement not to react to demand change with price responses. The more 
competitors that there are in a market, the more likely this arrangement is to break down, 
so that under this description we expect there to be a positive relation between market 
power and price inertia. Domberger (1983), on the other hand, considers the degree of 
inertia to be dictated by the costs of being in disequilibrium set against the costs of price 
change (as described above to obtain a (one ldv) PAM). He argues that the most 
important element of the adjustment costs is the subjective evaluation made by the firm of 
the consequences of adjusting its price, and that this element will be lower for firms 
operating in highly-concentrated industries than those competing against many rivals. The 
idea here is that firms in highly-concentrated industries are likely to enjoy higher 
profitability,and that such industries are therefore more likely to exhibit price-leadership 
than more fragmented ones. Equally, firms in tightly oligopolistic industries will be better 
able to inform competitors of their pricing policies by means of pre-notification schemes 
and press announcements. These characteristics of oligopolistic industry represent 
institutionalised modes of behaviour which reduce the subjective costs of price adjustment 
to the firms in that industry because of the ease of disseminating information on prices, 
and the associated reduction in uncertainty. Hence Domberger suggests that price response 
might be expected to be more rapid in highly-concentrated industry than in industries with 
many competitors.
In fact, Domberger (1979) provides some empirical support for his view of the 
way in which industrial concentration effects price responsiveness in an investigation of 
pricing in twenty-one manufacturing sectors of the UK economy. In this study, price 
equations containing one lagged dependent variable are estimated for each of the sectors, 
and the estimated coefficient on the lagged dependent variable used as a measure of price 
inertia in that sector. A second regression analysis is then undertaken to investigate the 
association between price inertia and the level of industrial concentration in these sectors, 
and a significantly negative relation between these factors is identified. Some discussion 
on the appropriate econometric methodology to be employed in a two-stage analysis of 
this kind followed in Winters (1981) and Domberger (1981), but the main conclusion of 
the study was upheld, thereby confirming Domberger’s view of the (positive) impact of 
concentration on price responsiveness. It is noted that Mean’s advice to the US 
government to implement strong anti-trust legislation in order to increase the
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responsiveness of prices would, according to Domberger’s results, have had quite the 
opposite effect.
While the administered price hypothesis, and the associated link between market 
power and price inertia, have been historically important, the contribution of Okun (1981) 
has probably been most influential in raising the question of the determinants of price 
inertia at the microeconomic level in recent years. In this book, many price-setting 
practices, observed in the real-world but often abstracted in economic theorising, are 
explicitly noted, and a theory of price-setting put forward to accommodate them. For 
example, Okun explicitly notes the effects of the firm’s internal structure on the price- 
setting decision, recognising that many of the elements involved in this process are 
simplified and mechanised so that they can be "monitored and enforced by top executives 
and taught and delegated to subordinates" (p. 170). These considerations are used to 
explain a variety of observed behaviours, such as the use of backward-looking information 
in the construction of cost measures or the use of a "normal cost" yardstick, which appear 
anomalous in models which do not take Okun’s more global view as "pricing as the 
product of an information system". More importantly here, this view also provides 
insights into the causes of price unresponsiveness. In the market, Okun’s view emphasises 
the extent of heterogeneity in goods and services, and notes the complex nature of the 
purchase of many goods, often involving a variety of delivery, repair, and other post-sale 
servicing arrangements. Okun notes that there are some commodities that are traded in 
markets which can be subjected to "standard" economic analysis: goods for which there 
are many buyers and sellers, which are homogeneous or easily-gradable, and which can 
be stored at low cost are frequently traded in "auction" markets in which agents take the 
price set by a market-clearing auctioneer. But much more prevalent are goods whose 
prices are set by the seller, and which are sold to the buyer after some sort of shopping 
process. In these "customer" markets, the heterogeneity of products and the costs incurred 
by the buyer become most important, so that some means of reducing search and 
information costs will be introduced. Okun argues that, in a situation where many 
purchases are likely to be repeated subsequently, firms will have an incentive to keep 
prices unchanged, even in the face of variations in demand, in order to encourage repeat 
customers. The high search and information costs involved in shopping, and the 
information obtained from previous purchases, mean that repeat purchasers are likely to 
have a discontinuous elasticity of demand for a firm’s product, so that firms will 
rationally maintain price levels in the face of demand change. Moreover, by pledging 
continuity of an offer, sellers encourage buyers to become more reliant on the information 
contained in previous purchases. Through this reliance, repeat shoppers become more 
common and sales become more predictable, thereby reducing difficulties in production
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scheduling and minimising inventory costs for the firm. Such a view of the sale and 
purchase of products provides a rational for a variety of observed behaviour in which 
firms simply attempt to convince consumers of their dependability and reliability. 
Examples of such behaviour include the widespread use of after-sales service 
arrangements, fixed-time price scheduling, pre-notification of price change, commitments 
to "match" competitors prices, and the setting of prices as a mark-up over costs. 
Moreover, this view suggests that the prevalence of price unresponsiveness is widespread, 
and generated by the very process of shopping for goods. This means of course that there 
is little scope for government intervention for its reduction.
Alternative causes of price inertia
The ideas suggested in the paragraphs above provide an explanation for rigidities 
in a wide range of industries based on realistically-described adjustment costs, but 
explanations also exist which are not based on these costs. These explanations can be 
grouped into three broad categories, all of which call on the fact that output is not 
homogeneous and is produced by many uncoordinated units. The first group of 
explanations takes up this fact to note that individual firms' decisions are made against a 
background determined by an aggregation of outcomes of other firms’ decisions. These 
feedbacks constitute what many economists would consider the effects of disaggregation, 
and the inertias generated in this way are considered in section 2.5. The second group of 
explanations is closely related to the first, but concentrates on the uncertainty associated 
with disaggregation, while the third group emphasises the interrelations that exist between 
firms in the process of production and the inertia that results from here. I elaborate on 
the latter two groups in the paragraphs below.
The importance of uncertainty in price inertia is well described in Gordon (1982, 
1983). Here it is noted that, in an economy with many heterogeneous products, there may 
be difficulties simply in interpreting economic "news". The heterogeneity of products, and 
the resultant multiplicity of markets, means that information on any shocks will be 
imperfect. An individual firm will be unable to perfectly distinguish between aggregate 
and local shocks, but will have some information available to them in the form of 
changes in input prices and changes in the demand for its output. Gordon demonstrates, 
using an analysis similar to that of Lucas (1973), that in such a situation the 
responsiveness of a monopolist to any observed demand shift will depend on the ratio of 
the variance of past local demand shifts to the sum of the variances of past local and 
aggregate demand shifts, and on the equivalent ratio for cost shifts. This argument 
emphasises the ease with which information can be extracted from observable shocks and 
incorporated into pricing decisions when there is uncertainty; relatively high uncertainty 
will be associated with relatively sluggish price adjustment. Similar arguments are found
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in Nishimura (1986) where the problem of incomplete information is compounded in a 
monopolistically competitive market, where "erroneous" price responses are further 
penalised by a loss of demand to competitors. Here, it is shown that prices will become 
more unresponsive as the elasticity of demand becomes more elastic. Gordon argues that 
this source of inertia complements that suggested by Okun, providing an explanation for 
the existence of different degrees of inertia at different times for the same economic 
agents. Hence, the price responsiveness of firms in Israel or in various Latin American 
economies has been seen to rise rapidly during recent experiences of hyperinflation, and 
this Gordon explains with the idea that firms increasingly interpret observed nominal 
demand increases as the result of economy-wide shocks.
Clearly related to the difficulties involved in interpreting "news" are the 
difficulties involved in planning production to meet uncertain future demand. On this 
issue, Blinder (1982) recognises the importance of inventories as another possible source 
of price inertia. Here it is noted that when output can be stored, firms make a joint 
decision on how much to produce for inventories, and how much to sell out of 
inventories. In these circumstances, a negative sales shock can be met partly by reduced 
production and partly by accumulating stocks; prices will remain unchanged according to 
the extent to which output is storable, and to which the shock is expected to be only 
transitory.
Another group of explanations for price inertia which are not reliant on costs of 
adjustment involves the interaction between firms in the production process. So, for 
example, Gordon (1981) also comments on the possible influence on price responsiveness 
of an industry’s position in the chain of production. In this he argues that the producers 
of final goods will obtain information relevant to price-setting (eg. expansionary policy) 
first, and that these will therefore be more responsive than others earlier in the production 
chain, who learn about events only with a delay as the information filters down the 
production chain. Equally, those sectors which directly supply goods and services 
demanded by the government sector might be expected to respond most quickly to 
government policy; so, for example, an expansionary fiscal policy aimed at improving the 
economy’s infra-structure might be expected to show first in the price responses of the 
construction industry. This suggestion is in contrast to that presented in Blanchard (1987) 
where the price equation of the output of the final stage of a production chain is shown to 
exhibit considerable inertia, as the individual lags at each stage of the process accumulate. 
As an illustration, Blanchard considers a process where the price of output from each 
stage of production is related to the current and lagged price of output from the last stage. 
In this set-up, although adjustment is complete within two periods in any single- step of 
the chain, the price of final output will depend on the cost of inputs to the first stage from 
many periods previous, with the mean lag linearly dependent on the number of links in
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the production chain. These suggestions do not provide an explanation for the original 
source of the inertia (introduced through the lag term), although if the period in question 
lasts just one month, say, then the fact that production takes time may help justify this 
assumption. However, the paper does make clear the fact that small degrees of inertia 
generated by the individual decision-maker can result in significant and long lags in 
adjustment in the economy as a whole.
Similar conclusions are derived in a related model in Blanchard (1982). Here, 
prices from each stage of production are dependent on the current price of output from 
the previous stage. However, it is also assumed that all prices are fixed for two period, 
with firms in alternate links in the production chain resetting prices at the same time (i.e. 
firms at stages 1, 3, 5,... reset prices at time t+1, t+3, t+5,..., while firms at stages 2, 4, 
6,... reset at t+2, t+4, t+6,...). Inertia here is imposed on the model through this 
mechanical structure, although Blanchard argues informally in his (1983) paper that the 
presence of many sector-specific shocks (relative to the number of aggregate shocks) 
could justify a structure of this sort in a world such as that described by Sheshinski and 
Weiss (see earlier). The solution to this model is very similar in form to those to be 
discussed in section 2.5 below in which firms interact indirectly via economy-wide 
aggregates rather than directly through the provision of intermediate inputs as here. This 
solution shows that in these circumstances even small departures from perfect 
synchronisation can generate substantial price level inertia. Further, given the timing 
decisions of others, no agent has an incentive to change his own timing decisions. In this 
sense then, the mechanical desynchronised structure imposed on the model is a stable one, 
and the conclusions reached are therefore more robust.
These explanations of price unresponsiveness are again based very much on the 
characteristics of the production and of the selling process. Like the earlier justifications 
for adjustment costs, there seems to be little scope for direct government action to 
influence the degree of price inertia generated from these sources. Given that price inertia 
appears to be an economic fact of life then, it is natural to ask whether governments can 
influence nominal inertia through wages? It is to the sources of this type of inertia, and to 
the answer to this question, that I now turn.
2.3 On the nature and causes of nominal wage inertia
In many ways the following discussion on the causes of nominal wage inertia 
minors that of the previous section and many of the arguments related to price level 
inertia are applicable here too. So, for example, I begin this section with a brief
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description of the literature examining the process of wage bargaining and the costs 
involved in adjusting nominal wage levels. This is followed by a comment on the 
institution of open-ended contracts in which it is argued that the (s,S) framework 
discussed above is relevent also to nominal wage adjustment. These two subsections raise 
again the idea of adjustment costs, the former concentrating on lump-sum costs, and the 
latter emphasising the costs of being out of equilibrium, showing the introductory 
comments of section 2.2 to be equally valid here. Finally I note the potential impact of 
uncertainty on wage adjustment as described in the literature on wage indexation, and 
again parallels with the price adjustment literature can be drawn.
Sources of costs in adjusting nominal wages
To understand the nature of adjustment costs incurred when wages are reset, we 
need to have some understanding of the process of wage-setting and pay negotiation. 
Clearly, wage negotiations, whatever the type of bargaining arrangement, will involve the 
collection of relevant data, the co-ordination of representatives of all the parties to the 
negotiation, and the general maintenance of a bargaining machinery, all of which will 
generate costs according to the frequency with which negotiations take place. Further, 
whenever new settlements are made, the dissemination of the news, the adjustment of the 
payroll, and the effort expended in implementing the changes will generate additional 
costs. The resources consumed in the negotiation process, and the administrative costs 
associated with implementing a new settlement described above are relatively clearly 
defined. More ambiguous, however, are the issues which relate to the bargaining process 
itself, and which centre around the fear of, and the expected costs involved in, negotiation 
breakdown and the possible deterioration of industrial relations incurred through resetting 
wages.
A basic requirement for a bargaining process to occur is a lack of knowledge on 
the part of one or both of the parties; perfect knowledge means that both parties will 
immediately choose their optimum positions, and no bargaining need actually take place 
at all. Some insights on how economists have attempted to approximate reality in the 
introduction of imperfections in information collection and processing is given in the 
literature on strike activity. For example, Turk (1984) recognises two main approaches to 
the explanation of strikes: the "bargaining approach" and the "institutional approach". In 
the bargaining approach, associated with Zeuthen (1930), Nash (1950), and Cross (1965, 
1969), there is explicit consideration of the bargaining process as agents form wage 
claims in successive rounds of negotiation according to the (discounted) value of utility 
over the contract. This utility depends on the size of the eventual settlement, the financial 
cost of each new round of negotiations, expected concession rates, and the financial cost 
of a strike to each party. From such a framework, conditions can be derived under which
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one or both of the parties believe it to be in their interest to call a stoppage, via a strike 
or a lock-out. These conditions emphasise the importance of differences of opinion 
between the parties about the variables relevant to the wage bargain, arguing that 
stoppages will occur more often when the degree of uncertainty about these variables 
rises. In addition, those variables affecting the size of the bargaining zone and the rate at 
which each party expects the other to concede will also be influential.
The above approach develops stoppage behaviour from an information structure 
which treats the parties symmetrically; in contrast the "institutional approach", associated 
with Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969), works from an information structure which 
sacrifices symmetry to incorporate features into the theory which its proponents believe to 
be more realistic. Here, an initial aspiration wage is set down by the rank and file 
members of the union at the beginning of negotiations, based on a less-than-full 
information set. Both the union leadership and the management face a full information 
set, so that both recognise the extent to which the initial aspiration wage diverges from 
the optimum wage. Of course, the union leadership can try to persuade the rank and file 
to alter their aspiration wage, but if persuasion fails, then rather than risk a decline in 
their political appeal and power by signing an agreement at odds with the aspiration 
wage, the union leadership will incur a strike. The effect of the strike, according to this 
approach is to lower the rank and file’s expectations, a process which will continue until 
the leadership feels that the aspiration wage has fallen sufficiently close to the optimum, 
when an agreement can be signed and the strike ended. From the management’s point of 
view, negotiation involves a simple choice at the beginning of the process: accept the 
initial aspiration wage and avoid a strike, or reject this wage, thereby incurring strike 
costs, but lowering the eventual wage settlement. Assuming that the management makes 
this choice according to the principle of profit maximisation, the propensity to strike will 
be positively related to the gap between the initial aspiration wage and the optimum 
wage, and to the rate at which rank and file expectations decline, but negatively related to 
the costs of a strike to the management
The two descriptions of the bargaining process explained above suggest a wide 
range of possible influences on the costs of wage setting. So, for example, given the 
above discussion we might expect the internal characteristics of an industry to influence 
the financial costs of negotiation and the expected breakdown costs. Features such as the 
use of payments-by-results, the operation of shift work, the recognition of unions in 
bargaining, the number of trade unions involved, the use of formal agreements or joint 
consultative committees in agreements, the existence of a closed shop, and the size of the 
work unit will all be important, affecting communication between bargaining parties and 
the size of the bargaining zone.^)
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Factors affecting the union’s propensity to strike, through their effect on the 
union’s concession rate during the bargaining process or on the rank and file’s initial 
aspiration wage, for example, might include the availability of job opportunities elsewhere 
in the economy, as illustrated by the unemployment rate, the level of unemployment 
benefits, or the level of strike funds (measured, for example, through trade union 
membership). Despite reservations as to the feasibility of a strategy of leaving a firm to 
become unemployed (see Binmore, Rubenstein and Wolinskey (1985)), it seems 
reasonable that high unemployment rates, low levels of benefit, or small strike funds 
could reduce unions’ desires to negotiate.
Also, the extent of recent strike action elsewhere in the economy may affect a 
union’s propensity to strike in any one industry. The "institutional” view of negotiations 
stressed the importance of political appeal to the union leadership; union officials may not 
want to be seen as less active than those in other industries, so that during periods of 
militancy they may be more inclined to respond to differences between the rank and file’s 
aspirations and the optimum wage by calling a strike, rather than by attempting to 
persuade members to alter their aspirations. The effect that this would have on negotiation 
frequency is ambiguous, however, because while the leadership may feel that it also ought 
to be more active in wage negotiations at these times, it may take the attitude that 
negotiations should be avoided so as not to put itself into the position of having to call a 
strike to maintain prestige.
The cost of a strike to the employer will be well described by profit levels, so 
that unions may engage in more negotiations when profit levels are high and the employer 
is least inclined to incur a strike. In a similar way, we may expect inventories (as a 
proportion of sales, say) to be influential too, with low inventories raising the cost of a 
strike to employers, and reducing the expected cost of a strike to unions, while variation 
in the demand for the industry’s output over the year (and indeed in worker’s expenditure 
commitments) will introduce seasonality to negotiation costs.
Finally, the importance of incomes policies in affecting the frequency of wage 
settlements should be noted. Accommodating the type of incomes policy used in the UK 
over the last twenty to thirty years within the context of the bargaining process described 
above is not difficult. The fear of losing government contracts during voluntary "twelve­
month", or "freeze" policies, or the direct costs involved in breaking the law during 
compulsory policies raises the cost of negotiation during periods of policy directly. 
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the idea put forward in Turk (1984) that "ceiling" 
incomes policies, insofar as they are successful, may work to reduce the bargaining zone, 
and thereby reduce expected strike costs, increase negotiation frequency, and improve 
wage responsiveness. If this is true, it is clear that incomes policy may serve to 
coordinate wage setting across different sectors of the economy and, to the extent that the
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success of corporatist economies described in section 2.1 is associated with coordination 
of wage settlements, this point highlights one of the potential gains to be achieved from 
an active government policy on incomes. We return to this issue in section 2.5, and 
subsequently in the empirical work of chapter 4.
Open-ended contracts
The above considerations on wage setting describe the possible sources of lump­
sum adjustment costs in negotiations over pay, but equally relevant to the decision to 
renegotiate are the costs involved in being out of equilibrium. As the conditions under 
which the previous wage was negotiated change, it is likely that the wage achieved in the 
negotiations may become increasingly inappropriate. As we saw in the previous section, 
control theory tells us that in these circumstances, a state-contignet rule should be 
followed in which the contract expires when relevent variables reach a critical limit (the 
(s,S) rale). If these relevent variables change stochastically over time, then contract 
lengths will also be stochastic, and wages will be set in a system of open-ended contracts. 
Once more we refer to chapter 4 for more details of this framework, but here we note 
that this approach is well illustrated in a paper by Pencavel (1982). In this, micro-data on 
the frequency and the size of wage change in the British coal industry from 1948 to 1975, 
is used in an attempt to first explain the probability that wages will change in any period, 
and then, given that change occurs, to explain the magnitude of the change. The 
methodology employed by Pencavel was to estimate the probability of wage change 
taking place through a Probit equation, and then to insert the reciprocal of the Hill’s ratio, 
obtained from the Probit estimation, into a standard regression of the rate of change of 
wages on a set on regressors over those periods when wages were negotiated.(^) No 
theoretical explanation is given over the choice of regressors (namely, the percentage 
change in retail prices, the unemployment rate, some incomes policy dummies, the 
percentage change in coal prices, and percentage change in coal output per man shift) 
except that these represent "the variables most often used to account for wage changes at 
the aggregate level, augmented with two industry-specific variables" (p. 151).
In fact, while the methodology employed here constitutes a significant advance on 
previous work, the results obtained are a little disappointing. Of the variables used, only 
inflation and the dummy relating to "wage-freeze" incomes policies were shown to 
significantly influence the probability of renegotiation, although it is shown that the 
omission of the Hill’s ratio from the wage equation noticeably altered the other estimated 
coefficients. Possibly by limiting analysis to just one industry, and especially a 
nationalised industry, the explanatory powrer of the model is lost beneath industry-specific 
factors. Alternatively, the choice of a relatively unsophisticated set of explanatory 
variables may be the problem. In either case, while these specific results are not
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heartening, Pencavel’s paper does highlight the simultaneous nature of the decision to 
enter negotiations over wages and the choice of a wage bid. Further, the method is able 
to accommodate (indeed, is based around) the notion of wage-setting through open-ended 
contracts, and given the widespread use of such contracts, in the UK at least, this will 
provide a useful base for future empirical investigations.
The influence of uncertainty
Finally, mirroring the arguments presented on the causes of price inertia, it is 
noted that the difficulties involved in wage setting decisions when faced with imperfect 
information may also generate unresponsiveness. Many of the efforts in this strand of the 
literature have been inspired by Gray’s (1976, 1978) papers on indexation and contract 
length. In these a simple macroeconomic model is developed incorporating a labour 
market in which employment is demand determined and in which wage rates are set in 
contracts alongside an indexing parameter and a termination date for the contract. 
Woridng on the assumption that agents will want to minimise a loss function dependent 
on a fixed (and unspecified) cost of recontracting and the (squared) deviation of output 
from the level obtained in a frictionless economy, Gray establishes that, for a given 
degree of wage indexation, increased variability in either real or monetary shocks will 
reduce the optimal contract length. This "variability in shocks" is interpreted as 
uncertainty. In addition, increases in the costs of negotiation will increase contract length, 
while increased use of wage indexation will reduce the need to renegotiate and lengthen 
contract duration.
A variety of papers have appeared in which Gray’s model has been modified, and 
her conclusions on the effects of indexation updated (see, for example, Cukierman (1980), 
or Blanchard (1979)), but the results on contract length have generally been accepted. One 
exception to this is the work by Fethke and Policano (1982, 1984) in which Gray’s 
analysis is taken further, describing the determination of contract length in a model in 
which the extent to which contracts in different sectors will be staggered over time is also 
examined. Gray’s conclusion that the variability of monetary or real shocks, the degree of 
indexation, and the costs of negotiation all influence the optimal contract length is 
supported, although here sector-specific shocks between sectors are also seen to be 
influential (an increase in the variability of these shocks again reduces contract length.) 
Further, it is demonstrated that while these conclusions hold whether or not staggering of 
negotiations occurs, when staggering is present, then the optimal contract length will be 
positively related to the degree of desynchronisation that exists.
As pointed out in Canzoneri (1980) and McCallum (1983), the effect of 
uncertainty on contract length, and hence, wage flexibility, will feed back into the policy- 
effectiveness arguments noted earlier: with the existence of wage inertia, the government
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is able to stabilise output around its natural level via appropriate policy; however, this 
policy will also stabilise prices and encourage longer contracts to be drawn. On choosing 
between policy options, therefore, the stabilisation of output must be weighed against the 
introduction of further wage inertia to the system.
These first attempts at a theoretical explanation of negotiation frequencies have 
received some empirical validation in the work of Christofides and Wilton (1983), and 
Christofides (1985). In these, data on the length of contracts struck by a sample of 
bargaining groups in Canada is analysed from the mid-sixties and through the seventies. 
Uncertainty over prices, measured on the base of sliding regressions on the rate of 
inflation and on the rate of change of Ml, is entered into (linear) regression equations 
explaining these contract lengths, and is shown to have a significantly negative effect, 
providing "clear and convincing evidence that contract lengths shorten as inflation 
uncertainty increases." (1983, p.319) Certainly these results demonstrate that there are 
systematic movements in the length of contracts to be explained, and I shall return to this 
empirical work later, in chapter 4, to ask whether the methodology employed could be 
improved, and whether the conclusions reached are justified.
To summarise then, in the literature there have been three relatively distinct 
approaches to explaining the frequency of wage negotiation (and hence the extent of 
nominal wage inertia). The first emphasises the perceived costs of negotiation, the second 
highlights the simultaneity of the decisions of when to alter wages and by how much, and 
the third emphasises the importance of uncertainty. In fact, all three of the approaches 
have the concept of cost minimisation at their core, and later in the work (in chapter 4), I 
hope to demonstrate that these "distinct" approaches can be accommodated within a single 
theoretical framework. First, however, I complete my overview of the causes of inertia at 
the level of the decision-maker by considering what we mean by inertia in real wages, 
and what might cause this phenomenon.
2.4 Labour market models and real wage rigidity
In section 2.1, it was noted that the effectiveness of policy that can be derived in 
simple macromodels involving nominal wage and price inertia would be enhanced if there 
were also real rigidities in pricing and wage setting decisions. Specifically, in the simple 
model set out in expressions (2.1)-(2.3), policy is more effective for given nominal wage 
and price rigidities as a  and p become smaller. These represent respectively circumstances 
where the price markup over wages is unresponsive to demand change, and where real 
wages, set in bargains over nominal wages for a given price level, are unaffected by
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demand. The significance of these issues is made particularly clear in Blanchard (1983, 
1986), where a model of a similar structure to that at (2.1)-(2.3) is derived, but with 
inertia introduced mechanically through staggered wage setting and pricing decisions (so 
that wages are set in t, t+2, t+4,... and prices at t+1, t+3, t+5,...). In this, an increase in 
money supply generates a desire in price setters to raise the markup. Equally, however, 
wage setters desire a higher real wage. Both of these desires can be fulfilled in 
Blanchard’s framework, as the average markup and the average real wage are higher in 
turn as the decision taking alternates between the two groups with a stagger. Nominal 
prices and wages are pushed up in turn, in a wage price spiral, until they have both 
increased in proportion to nominal money, so that real money balances, and output, are 
back to their previous level. The adjustment process is quicker the more responsive 
pricing and wage setting decisions are to the increased demand at each stage.
As the above description makes clear, rigidities in pricing and wage setting 
decisions can be treated symmetrically, both helping to explain adjustment speeds and, 
hence, the extent of policy effectiveness. Much of the recent literature on the supply side 
has concentrated on labour market issues, however, not least because there appears to be 
more scope for policy manipulation here than in the product market For these reasons, I 
shall also concentrate on the causes of real inflexibilities, or rigidities, in wage setting, 
leaving discussion of the effects of demand on prices until the empirical work of chapters 
5 and 6.
Sources of pressure on the real wage
Many of the labour market models underlying the macroeconomic debates of the 
1970’s had relatively unsophisticated micro-foundations, with the market for labour often 
treated like a commodity market, and the equilibrium real wage given by the intersection 
of the demand and supply curves for labour, assumed to be of normal shape. In looking 
at the causes of real wage inertia, we clearly require more realistic models of the labour 
market, and in recent years, there has been a great deal of research effort invested into 
just this area. It is to this literature that I now turn, noting some of the recent 
developments before looking at the ideas that they suggest on the causes of real wage 
rigidities.
Nickell (1984) observes that "work on wages has been dominated by the Phillips 
curve paradigm with the labour market firmly in the background", and argues that in fact 
wages, and the forces that influence them, can only be sensibly considered with their 
"natural market partner", employment, and in a framework based around the workings of 
the labour market Of course, Lipsey (1960) had given some theoretical backing to the 
Phillips curve relationship, and Lucas and Rapping (1969) set out an analysis in which 
labour market relations are derived from individuals’ optimising behaviour. Equally,
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efforts to model explicitly the microeconomics of the labour market were made in the 
"implicit contracts" literature of the mid-1970’s, and further insights were obtained 
through the "search" literature and the "efficiency wage" models of the labour market. 
(H) However, the absence of a central role for unions in these approaches continued to 
raise doubts in some economists’ minds over their relevance, at least in Europe, to the 
observed developments in wages and unemployment. Prompted by the rapid growth in 
unemployment levels, a body of literature has now developed to meet Nickell’s criticisms, 
and raised the optimising behaviour of agents in the labour market, and specifically of 
unions, to the fore in establishing models of employment and wage determination. Of 
course, the description of the labour market provided by these union-based models is not 
exclusive, and elements of the earlier theories are found in many parts of the labour 
market Nevertheless, these models seem particularly pertinent to the UK, and it is for this 
reason that I concentrate attention on them.
The work on union-based models has been well documented in Oswald (1985, 
1986) and Pencavel (1985), so I shall only briefly mention some of the issues raised in 
this literature here in order to clarify the determinants of real wage pressures, and the 
sources of unresponsiveness, suggested by this literature. In this work, unions are 
characterised by means of a utility function in which real wage and employment levels, 
usually expressed relative to some fallback level, are factors. Justification for this 
characterisation ranges from simple intuition to more formal interpretations in which 
individual workers’ preferences are aggregated in some sense
One broad area of debate has concentrated on the distinction between models in 
which firms locate on their labour demand curve, and "efficient bargain" models, and 
there has been some first attempts to identify which of these is empirically most relevant 
(see Ashenfelter and Brown (1987), and MaCurdy and Pencavel (1987), for example). In 
the former set of models, employers choose employment levels unilaterally, so that they 
always locate on the labour demand curve, while wages are set either by unions alone ( 
the "monopoly-union" model) or in bargains between unions and employers (the "right-to- 
manage" model). While these models have the advantage that, in practice, employers do 
indeed appear to retain the right to set employment levels, it has the disadvantage that 
such combinations are generally inefficient. In McDonald and Solow (1981), for example, 
a firm’s objectives are represented by iso-profit contours, so that the locus of points of 
tangency between these and the union’s indifference curves in fact trace out the efficient 
"bargaining contract curve" in employment/real wage space. Only in special circumstances 
will this contract curve coincide with the labour demand curve (as in, for example, 
Oswald’s (1986) seniority model), so that in general gains can be made by both parties by 
moving off the labour demand curve.
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Clearly, in the efficient bargain models, and indeed in the "right-to-manage" 
models, we require some additional labour market institution to determine precisely the 
choice of the wage-employment combination from the available alternatives. This 
institution is usually interpreted in terms of relative bargaining strength, or militancy, as 
in de Menil (1971), Newell and Symons (1986), or Svejnar (1987) for example, but 
equally the institution can be based on concepts of equity, such as that in McDonald and 
Solow (1981) in which the concept of "fair shares" means that wages are a fixed 
proportion of the average revenue product of labour. Whatever, the incorporation of 
labour market institutions which are in some sense "uneconomic" clearly provides these 
models with a justification for an extremely broad range of possible influences on wage 
and employment determination even beyond the many economic variables that will 
directly affect these magnitudes through their inclusion in the firm’s or the union’s 
objective functions.
The translation of these very broad model guidelines into an empirically useful 
form, as in Nickell and Andrews (1983) for example, generates three broad categories of 
influence on the real wage set in this framework. First, there are all of the potential 
influences on the firm’s demand for labour, which might be termed "internal" pressures, 
such as productivity changes or exogenous demand shocks, which alter the position of the 
constraints imposed by the firm and faced by unions in their wage setting decisions. 
Second are the components of the "wedge" between the producer price, which is the 
deflator of interest to the firm, and the consumer price, which is of importance to the 
worker. Elements affecting this wedge include taxes and the price of imports. Finally, 
there are the variables which affect wage rates either through their inclusion in the union 
objective function, such as those which affect the level of the fallback wage over which 
utility is derived, for example, or through their influence on the imposed institution 
necessary to determine wages and employment in the efficient bargain or right-to-manage 
models as described above. These might be termed "external" influences. Of particular 
interest in this final category, given the historical significance of the Phillips curve, is the 
influence of the unemployment rate. In this framework, as is shown in Nickell (1982), one 
possible path of influence of the unemployed on real wages, which are set here in the 
main by decision makers who are themselves employed, is through their (depressing) 
effect on the opportunities available to these "insiders" should they choose, or be forced, 
to leave the firm. This is of course just one possible means by which the level of 
unemployment can influence wage setting, but the fact that a realistic justification of a 
Phillips curve-type relationship can be accommodated within the framework of the union- 
based model provides a good illustration of the flexibility of this framework.
Given the model we have used to describe the process of wage setting, there are 
clearly a number of ways in which aggregate demand expansion might generate upward
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pressure on the real wage in any sector (and hence in the aggregate). First, aggregate 
demand expansion will raise the demand for industrial output, and hence the demand for 
labour in each sector, generating "internal" pressures on the real wage. Further, as 
employment rises, there may be "external" pressures on real wages due to the effect of 
falling unemployment on the fallback wage of each union. Alternatively, demand 
expansion may influence inflationary expectations, either directly as agents recognise 
expansionary policy or indirectly as the (un)employment consequences of the policy are 
observed. Such expectations may also raise the fallback wage and create upward pressure 
on real wages. In studying the responsiveness of the macroeconomy, we are interested in 
whether these paths of influence are relevant in practice, or whether in fact labour market 
institutions and conventions serve to close down these paths and thereby generate real 
wage rigidities. The theoretical issues involved in the determination of this responsiveness 
are discussed below, while the empirical validity of these suggestions are examined in the 
empirical work of chapters 5 and 7.
Explanations of real wage rigidity
As is clear from the discussion above, in this analysis it is extremely difficult to 
distinguish between model properties and any mechanisms which might cause wages to be 
unresponsive to pressure (this being our definition of inertia). For example, if a union’s 
preferences are sufficiently well defined, and are known to be completely unaffected by 
the unemployment rate, then we should not expect the unemployment rate to influence the 
real wage, and the lack of responsiveness of wages to unemployment would not constitute 
real wage inertia as I have defined it. In this analysis then, I take a less restrictive view 
of inertia, concentrating on the elasticity of the real wage with respect to the various 
potential pressures described above. This merges the effects of the labour market model 
employed (describing which developments warrant a change in wages) and the influence 
of inertia-generating mechanisms (which reduce the responsiveness of wages to the 
warranted pressures). Given the difficulties involved in choosing the "correct" model of 
the labour market, this seems the best we can d o .^ )  Moreover, in the light of 
Blanchard’s (1986) paper described above, it is precisely these inflexibilities in which we 
are interested since both "internal" and "external" pressures, and indeed those operating 
through the wedge, reflect the impact of demand change on the labour market. The 
responsiveness of the real wage to these pressures indicates the extent to which demand 
shifts feed into real wage setters’ decisions (to give a large value for (3 in (2.2)), and 
hence determine the magnitude of real responses.
One type of mechanism which might exist to generate real wage rigidities in the 
face of the "internal" pressures mentioned above is described in McDonald and Solow
(1981). Here, as explained earlier, it is noted that one possible institution for choosing
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between wage-employment combinations on the efficient bargaining contract curve is that 
of "fair shares". In this case, if the labour demand curve has constant wage elasticity, then 
the wage set in the bargain is shown to be insensitive to demand fluctuations: an increase 
in demand shifts the contract curve and the "fair shares" loci to the right in wage- 
employment space by exactly equal amounts, increasing employment but leaving wages 
unaltered. While this explanation clearly relies on fairly restrictive assumptions, the fact 
that labour demand institutions, such as the equity requirement of the fair shares rule or 
the influence of relative bargaining strength, may react to offset the impact of the cycle 
on wages remains a possible base for the generation of some degree of rigidity; certainly 
the cyclic responsiveness of these institutions warrants further attentioa
A second mechanism, raised in Oswald (1986), is the possibility of "kinked" 
indifference curves. If utility is derived according to the gap between actual real wages 
and some aspiration real wage (set at a "fair" or "normal" level on the basis of past 
experience perhaps), and if there is an asymmetry between responses to under-payment 
and overpayment, then a (representative) individual’s indifference curves would be kinked 
at this aspiration wage. In these circumstances, increases in demand, unless very large, 
will be associated with employment responses only, with the real wage constant at the 
aspiration level. Oswald argues that there is some support among psychologists for this 
view of the formation of attitudes towards pay. Of course, this is not a new idea and is 
closely related to the Keynesian notion of a "wage floor". Wages not only provide a 
means of allocating resources but also greatly influence the distribution of income, and to 
the extent that Keynes provided a behavioural justification for the wage floor, it is around 
this latter function of wages that it is based. Downward movements in the wage level of 
one group in isolation will generate for them an impoverishment relative to other groups, 
and it was the effort to avoid these distributional losses on which Keynes based his 
justification for the wage floor. Such an argument might be extended into areas beyond 
the scope of economics, involving questions of ethics and morality/*^ However, it is 
clear that the possibility that the aspiration wage may be based on other workers’ pay 
again raises the potential importance of relativities and the interplay between wage-setting 
decisions across sectors of the economy. Certainly, the "kinked" indifference map appears 
to be a potentially significant source of real-wage inertia.
A third, and perhaps the most frequently cited, set of explanations for real wage 
rigidities follows from the idea that "insiders" who influence the wage-employment 
decision are in some way insulated from the employment consequences of their wage- 
setting actions, and therefore do not respond appropriately to pressures exerted on the firm 
and the workers as a w h o le /^  This immediately raises the question of what provides 
these agents with their insider power, for which some ideas are given in Lindbeck and 
Snower (1986). In this, the "insiders" are employees on whom the full range of hiring and
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training costs have been expended, and whose dismissal would incur significant firing 
costs. These are contrasted with "outsiders", who are untrained and unemployed, and an 
intermediate group of "entrants". In this framework, it is demonstrated how the existence 
of these costs may make it unprofitable for a firm to replace insiders with entrants even 
though they are offering their labour services at lower wages (indeed, it is possible that 
this will be true even if wage differentials are greater than the corresponding productivity 
differentials). Moreover, it is noted that insiders may themselves be able to influence the 
firm’s attitude towards taking on entrants or outsiders by being unfriendly or 
uncooperative to entrants (which would work to raise the entrants’ reservation wage), and 
by being unhelpful with on-the-job training (thereby reducing entrants’ productivity). 
Further, it is argued that this influence will be amplified if individual insiders are 
organised within a trade union.
This union/non-union distinction is used in an explanation of wage rigidity 
described in Carruth and Oswald (1986b) in which a utilitarian union becomes indifferent 
to increases in employment once everyone in the union has a job. Experiments with 
various functional forms for individuals’ utility functions, and with different profit 
function properties, showed there to be a number of scenarios in which wages would be 
unresponsive to changes in product demand for at least some ranges of employment. 
While it is noted that the reliance of the results on specific functional forms and 
restrictive assumptions reduces the impact of the results, these experiments serve to 
formalise the intuitive explanations often put forward to explain inertia, and to illustrate 
their likely practical relevance.
The possibility of insider power generated through the accumulation of on-the-job 
experience and training may be compounded by the internal workings of a union. 
Certainly, young workers are less likely to become members of a trade union, and if they 
do, they are less likely to become involved in union activities, so that more senior 
workers may derive some further insider power from this source. Such arguments may 
underlie the widespread use of the "last-in, first-out" (LIFO) rule for redundancy, which 
has also frequently been cited as a possible source of rigidities. Again the idea is that the 
median voter, whose job is unlikely to be threatened in all but the most severe recession, 
will not respond to a reduction in product demand by lowering wages, rather allowing 
less senior members to bear the burden of adjustment through job losses. Oswald (1986) 
points out that there are gains to be made by both the firm and the median voter in 
sharing the profits and risks involved in cyclic variation, so that seniority in a world 
where all of the employed are paid the same wage may not provide a convincing 
explanation of wage inertia. On the other hand, as is argued in Borooah and Lee (1987), a 
situation in which the more senior workers are able to positively discriminate against less 
senior workers may provide an explanation for rigidities. Again the possibility that more
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senior workers might be uncooperative in providing training is noted, but a still more 
direct influence would be through the setting of youth wage rates. By raising the wages of 
youths relative to adults, unions may be able to insulate its adult members (who it might 
value more highly) from the worse employment and wage consequences of a demand 
shock using young workers as a buffer. Certainly, given the fact that youth wages rose 
steadily during the 1970’s and have now stabilised at relatively high levels in the face of 
extremely high rates of youth unemployment, even relative to that of adults, this 
explanation might be able to provide some insights into recent experiences.
Of course, many of these ideas have also been raised in the recent "hysteresis" 
debate (see, for example, Blanchard and Summers (1986), or Jenkinson (1987)), where 
attention is specifically concentrated on the pressures exerted on the real wage by the 
unemployment rate. The discussion here is based on the idea that, working in a wide 
variety of labour market models incorporating the concept of the natural rate, rises in the 
level of unemployment would be expected to be temporary, offset through market 
pressures on the real wage which would fall to reestablish equilibrium in the labour 
market at its previous level in the long run. Historically, however, this scenario does not 
appear to conform with the facts; rises in the unemployment level persist over long 
periods, as though the natural rate of unemployment, beyond which the real wage 
adjustments might be expected to be initiated, has risen itself, following (and being 
determined by) the time path of actual unemployment rates (hence the term "hysteresis"). 
The lack of responsiveness of the labour market, and specifically the real wage, to high 
unemployment is clearly central to this debate, and the comments made above on the 
sources of real wage rigidities are obviously relevant in this discussion. For example, the 
Blanchard and Summers paper provides a clear description of the hysteresis concept 
employing the insider-outsider ideas raised above; here in one illustration, it is assumed 
that outsiders exert no influence on the decision-making of the employed, and that 
workers lose all of their insider power the instant they cease to be employed in a firm. In 
these circumstances, as any workers lose their jobs, the insiders set the wage to ensure 
that they retain their own jobs at the new, permanently lower, level of employment; there 
exists no mechanism by which the previously employed can encourage wages to be set at 
a level low enough for them to be reemployed, and the level of employment follows a 
simple random walk process over time. These ideas are expanded in a more realistic 
setting in the paper, but the potential importance of insider power is clearly established 
once again.
A second explanation for the hysteresis effect has been strongly advocated in 
Nickell (1987), and follows from the comments made earlier when discussing the way in 
which the unemployed might be expected to influence wage-setting in the union-based 
models of the labour market. Here it was noted that this influence might be exerted
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through the effect of higher unemployment rates on the opportunities available to insiders 
should they choose or be forced to leave their current positions. However, this effect will 
be different for different groups of the unemployed, so that the total number of 
unemployed might not adequately reflect the extent of the downward pressure on wages 
from this source. Specifically, Nickell argues that the long-term unemployed gradually 
become less attached to the labour market, and therefore exert less downward pressure on 
the wage than a corresponding number who have been unemployed for a short time. This 
effect comes from two sources: first, it is possible that the long-term unemployed become 
less desirable to employers as they get out of the habit of working, and as their skills and 
knowledge become out-of-date; and second, there is the possibility that these workers 
become less enthusiastic in their search for work as unemployment effects their morale. 
Clearly in these circumstances, only those members of the unemployed who have recently 
lost their jobs will exert a downward influence on wages, and to the extent that we do not 
account for the (lack of) influence of the long-term unemployed, the real wage will appear 
unresponsive to the unemployment rate.
To conclude then, we note that the recent interest in union-based models of the 
labour market has not only provided an insight into the pressures that might influence real 
wage determination, but has also provided a framework that enables real world labour 
market institutions to be incorporated into the analysis. Armed with these tools of 
analysis, economists have been in a better position to identify the potentially important 
paths of influence from demand and supply shocks to real wage setting, and the labour 
market institutions that facilitate or impede responsiveness in real wages to these shocks. 
While there have recently been some efforts to make use of this taxonomy empirically 
(see Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1987) survey evidence on the relative importance of 
internal and external influences on pay settlements, or Nickell and Wadhwani’s (1989) 
analysis of insider forces in firm-level settlements, for example), this work is still in its 
infancy. It is hoped that the industrially-disaggregated analysis of the supply-side of the 
UK economy presented later (in chapters 5, 6 and 7) may shed light on some of these 
issues.
2.5 The contribution of disaggregation
In this final section of the chapter, I shall consider explicitly the role that 
intersectoral interactions play in wage and price movements. Although the discussion so 
far has concentrated in the main on nominal and real rigidities generated by individual 
firm/union decisions taken in isolation, I have already mentioned various paths of
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influence through which such decisions may interact In section 2.3, for example, I noted 
the significance of the direct contact established between firms in the same chain of 
production and the inertia that this could generate in prices at the aggregate level. Also, in 
section 2.4, it was noted that real wage aspirations, around which union indifference 
curves might be "kinked", could be important in real wage determination. The "going 
rate" in settlements achieved elsewhere in the economy may well help establish such 
aspirations, so that wage comparabilities would enter union utility functions directly.
In this section, however, I shall concentrate on the indirect interactions that take 
place between firm/union units as each unit makes its decisions against a background 
foimed by the aggregation of the decisions of all other units. These interactions were at 
the heart of the early papers on nominal inertia and its consequences for the effectiveness 
of policy, and a model of the type promoted in this early literature is set out below to 
illustrate some of its properties. As we shall see, the solution to these models leads 
naturally to a discussion of the process of expectations formation under decentralised 
decision making. The section concludes with a brief comment on the form of information 
imperfections that characterise the supply side in the real world, and the expectation 
formation processes and wage setting institutions that these encourage. This provides 
some insights for policy formulation and these are described in the concluding comments 
of section 2.6.
Modelling the time paths of aggregate prices and wages
The model presented here is an adaptation of that in Jackman (1983) in which 
there are two industries in the economy, each consisting of many firms operating under 
perfect competition. All workers in each industry belong to a single union, and wages in 
the industry are determined by the union and common to all firms. Labour is the only 
factor, and is homogeneous. Production takes place under constant returns so that, by 
choice of units, output from an industry is equated with employment in the industry (i.e. 
yat = lat in industry A), and product price equated with money wage. We define the 
average money wage (wt) and general price level (pt) as a geometric average of the 
Gogarithm) of the money wage in the two industries, wat and w^t, and the (logarithm) of 
the product price in the two industries, pat and p^t, respectively. Hence,
wt = i (Pat + Pbt) = Pt (2-4)
The demand schedule for each sector is similar to that suggested by Rotemberg
(1982), with demand dependent on real aggregate demand and the price elasticity of 
demand for the product. Hence,
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yat = a + (mt+ v + a t - pt) - y (pat- pt)
= (mt+ a t) - pt - Y (Par  Pt>
by choice of units.
(2.5)
where mt = (logarithm) of the nominal money supply, and o t is a measure of exogenous 
demand common to both sectors. Equation (2.5), under our simplifying assumptions, can 
be written as the following labour demand equation:
lat =mt + ot -wt -Y(wat-wt)
= mt + a , - j  (1+Y)wat - 1 (1-Y)wbt (2.6)
While obviously a very simple model of the demand side, this formulation enables us to 
generate a labour demand equation for each industry which highlights the dependence of 
employment in one industry on negotiated wages elsewhere in the economy; the aggregate 
price level, substituted out in (2.6), acts as the transmission mechanism.
The model differs to that of Jackman in its approach to the timing of negotiations. 
Here, rather than impose the institution of staggered two-period contracts, we assume that 
both industries are able to renegotiate in every period, although they do not have to take 
up this option. Rather, for each industry, i, there is a probability of negotiation occurring 
in each period, 7Cjt. In this way, inertia is introduced in a less mechanical way than 
through fixed contract lengths, and one that may represent reality more closely, in the UK 
at least. Later, in chapter 4, we will consider what might affect the size of the n-lV but 
here we simply note that: (1) contract negotiation will be desynchronised if any of the 
factors influential in the determination of 7qt are industry-specific; (2) since the 7qt can 
change over time, the (expected) period of time between negotiations, and hence the 
degree of inertia, can also alter over time; and (3) if = 1 V i, t, then we have the case 
of instantaneous adjustment and zero inertia.
It is important to make explicit the information held by the unions when deciding 
on whether to negotiate in each period; in particular, we recognise that unless union A 
commits itself to a decision before knowing B’s decision, and vice versa, then decisions 
can be coordinated and the two sector structure of the model is unnecessary. Here then 
we assume that the decision to set a new wage in period t is made at the instant at which 
the values of mt and a t are known, but neither union knows the outcome of the other 
union’s decision on negotiation; instead, each union has to form expectations about the 
behaviour of the other.
On the supply side, we assume that each union, when striking a bargain,-aims to 
maximise a function of the real wage and the employment levels that it expects to 
experience before its next negotiation. The specific functional form chosen to represent
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the unions’ objective functions is the Stone-Geary form, as in the Jackman paper. Hence, 
when renegotiating in period t, A will maximise uat where
Uat = [ECx-tt-x^ 9 Efl^-lo)1'6] s.t (2.6) (2.7)
where E(xat-xQ) = excess of real wages over fallback level x0 expected to be obtained 
over the period before renegotiation, and EQat-l0) = excess of employment over fallback 
level 1q over the same period.
Now consider industry A at time t. In what follows we shall distinguish between 
wat = actual money wage paid to union A in time t, and zat= money wage that union A 
could negotiate if it enters into negotiation in time t (wat = zat only in periods when 
negotiations take place). The real wage obtained by union A in any period, xat, depends 
positively on its own nominal wage and negatively on the money wage obtained in 
industry B since xat = wat - pt = wat - \ (wat+w^t) = \ (wat-w^t). Hence, assuming that 
union A negotiates in time t, the real wage expected to be obtained over the period before 
it next negotiates over wages will depend on the wage expected to be obtained in industry 
B over all future periods as follows:
E(xat - xQ) = |  (zat - wgj)
+ \ (zat - w |t+l) x (expected probability A does not negotiate in t+1) 
+ \ (zat - w^t+2> x (expected probability A does not negotiate in t+2)
= s (zat - wbt> + 5 (za t '  w§t+lX1-*!t+l> + 5 <zat ‘ wbc+2X1-^ |t+2>
where the "e" superscript denotes expectations formed by A at time t, and where 7i®t+j 
denotes the expected probability that A negotiates in time t+j. Of course, union B has the 
choice of whether or not to renegotiate wages at any time (t+s), (s=0,l,2,...), so that union 
A’s expectation of wage paid in industry B at time t+s is given by
wbt+s = wbt+s-l^ '7Cbt+s) + ^t+s^bt+s 
Taken together, these expressions illustrate the idea that the real wage to be obtained in A
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over the period before renegotiation depends on the negotiated nominal wage in industry 
A, of course, but also on the wage observed in B last period and the expected negotiable 
wages in B for the current and all future periods. The relative weight given to the wage 
in B at different times depends on the nft+j and ^bt+j determine the relevance of 
the future periods to union A’s current wage negotiation. For example, if A knows with 
certainty that it will renegotiate every period, then 7t | t+j = 1, (j = 0, 1, 2, ...), and x®t = \ 
( zat - (l-7i^t)wbt-l ” ^b^bt )• T*ie wa8e that is negotiable in B at time t+1 and beyond 
are given zero weight in union A’s current wage settlement since union A will negotiate 
next period, while the observed wage in B at time t-1, wbt_j and the negotiable wage, z^t 
are given weights according to the likelihood that union B leaves its wage unchanged at 
time t or enters into renegotiation.
A similar expression can be derived for E(lat - 10), using (2.6), in which the level 
of employment determined over the period depends (negatively) on z |t and (positively) on 
w^t_j and z |t+j (j = 0, 1, 2,...), with weights again attached to these according to the 
relevance of the future periods to union A’s current negotiation (i.e. depending on the 
7cat+j and 7c^ t+j). The precise form of the expressions for E(xat-xQ) and E(lat-10) are 
provided in the Appendix. Here we simply note that maximisation of uat with respect to 
wat subject to the labour demand schedule at (2.6) gives us the following expression for
za t :
zat = 2 (1 - 9)(1 + y)x0 - 201o 
(1 + i)
+ 29 [ (mt + ot) + (1 - rcft+lXmt+l + °t+P  + -  ]
(1 + Y) P(D
+ (1 - 29 + y) [ P(2)wbt. 1 + P(3)zgt + P(4)zgt+1 + ... ]
(1 + y) P(D
(2.8)
where
p(d  = { i + (i - jt|t+1) + (i - it|t+1x i  - rcft+2) + .....}
p(2) = i a - «&) + a - «8tXi - 4t+ixi - 4+i) + )
p(3) = {4 + 4o - 4+iX1 - 4+i>+ )
and so on.
The negotiable wage in union A therefore depends positively on current and expected
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future values of the level of aggregate demand and on the lagged level of wages and the 
expected current and future negotiable wage in B. Growth in aggregate demand increases 
demand for labour, as does a rise in industry B’s wage (through its impact on the 
aggregate price level and the demand for A’s output), and some part of this improvement 
in demand conditions is taken by the union in terms of wage improvements. Increases in 
wages in B have the further effect of reducing real wages in A through their impact on 
the aggregate price level, and this engenders further rises in nominal wages in A.
The weight given to the terms in (2.8), summarised in P(l), P(2), P(3),..., capture 
their relevance to union A’s current wage negotiation, and illustrate clearly the way in 
which wage inertia is introduced through the inclusion of renegotiation probabilities: 
directly, if rcat+j * 1 V i, as union A is faced with a positive probability of not 
renegotiating in each period; and indirectly as unions recognise that it may not be to their 
advantage to adjust wages fully in response to a nominal shock even when negotiations 
are entered into (since (2.8) shows that even if 7Cat+j = 1 V i, so that A enters 
negotiations every period, and P(4) = P(5) = P(6) = 0, there will be a backward-looking 
element in its wage determination if there is any possibility that B will not also 
renegotiate in the current period).
The form at (2.8) also illustrates the fact that wage change at the aggregate level 
will depend on both the proportion of industries currently altering their wages and on the 
proportion expected to renegotiate in the future. If these proportions are changing over 
time then so too are the relationships between the wage level and its explanatory 
variables, and in these circumstances econometric work becomes very difficult and 
estimated relations must be interpreted with care. These difficulties are succinctly put by 
Pencavel (1986), who writes that, under circumstances when the timing of collective 
agreements in different sectors is not synchronised "there is no reason to expect any 
stability in the parameters of the sort of macro wage equation that is invariably specified" 
(p. 214). Other economists have also noted the problem: Hamermesh (1970), Johnston and 
Tumbrell (1973), Ashenfelter and Pencavel 0975), and Smith and Wilton (1978) have 
each in their turn pointed out the inadequacies of using the aggregate rate of change in 
wages as the dependent variable in a wage equation without making some adjustment to 
take into account the proportion of workers who are, or will be, negotiating a new wage 
over some relevant future time horizon. These authors recognised that the rate of change 
in the aggregate wage will underestimate the rate of change of wages actually negotiated 
in each period as any such changes are distributed over all workers, including those who 
have not altered their wage. This will become important if the proportion of workers 
negotiating in any quarter varies over time, in which case the extent. of the 
underestimation will also vary. Moreover, the papers also note that any changes 
negotiated by a particular industry should be scaled according to the time span over
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which the newly negotiated wage will hold, so that the frequency of future wage change 
is also influential in the specification of a wage equation. These are precisely the issues 
raised in the solution to our model presented at (2.8).
In order to investigate the macroeconomic properties of the model, we need to 
analyse the evolution of economy-wide wages, and we have to aggregate over the two 
sectors therefore. For this, we first note that there will be an expression for the negotiable 
wage in industry B of exactly the same form as (2.8) (with expectations derived on the 
basis of union B’s information set at t). Next, we make the simplifying assumption that 
7t^ t+j = ^bt+j’ j = 0, 1, 2,..., (i.e. the expected probability that negotiation occurs in 
industry A in time t+j is equal to the expected probability that negotiation occurs in 
industry B in t+j for all future periods), where expectations are formed on the basis of the 
relatively impoverished information set in which the outcome of neither union’s decision 
on whether to negotiate in the current period is known (we shall call this the 
government’s information set). Such a simplification allows aggregation over the sectors 
to take place, and is not unreasonable given the symmetry of the m o d e l . I n  particular, 
if the decision on whether to negotiate in each industry depends only on aggregate 
parameters, such as the aggregate inflation rate, for example, then this assumption is 
easily justified. With details of the aggregation relegated to the Appendix, (2.8) and its 
equivalent expression for B, can be used under these assumptions to derive the following 
aggregate wage equation:
wf+i = Ewt. j  + Fwf + G(m, + ot - [ 10 - (1 - e ^ O  + 7) x0 ]) (2.9)
where
F = ^at+1 { P(l)+ (l-tt|t+i)(P(l)-l) - (l-29+y) )
P(l)-1 rcft jc| t+1 1+7
E = -4 + 1  ( q -4 )P ( l)  ) and G = - *ft+129
P(D-1 icft (P(l)-l) (1+7)
and where expectations are again formed on the basis of the government’s information 
set.
In view of the earlier discussion, in section 2.1, it is of some interest to examine 
the responsiveness of (aggregate) wages to money growth in this situation. Specifically we 
have already established in (2.8), that there is a backward-looking element in wage setting 
so long as %t+j or ftbt+j * 1 V j = 0, 1, 2,...; i.e. there is some inertia. Hence, in view of 
(2.4)-(2.6), there will be a role for government policy as wages fail to respond 
instanteously and equiproportionately to changes in mt and c t if there is inertia in either 
of the sectors of the economy. Moreover, if there is inertia in both sectors, then this
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inertia accumulates to effect wage/price movements in the economy as a whole/*®) It 
remains of interest, however, to consider the macroeconomic implications of the model if 
we endogenise the decision to negotiate, allowing the 7Ujt to vary over time and to be 
influenced by the development of the macroeconomy. In particular, we noted in section 
2.2 some of the causes of inertia in wages and prices, and we specifically recognised the 
potential impact of wage inflation on the frequency of wage negotiations. In what follows 
therefore we shall assume that at time t the expected probability of negotiation in time
t+j, rcft+j »is given by
7i(Aw®) =7c|t+j = exp( a + bAw®) , j = 0, 1, 2,... (2.10)
1 + exp( a + bAwf)
Obviously, the assumption that ic®t = 7c^ t+j = rcjjt+2 = — is a simplification, and 
contradicts reality in the sense that, under this assumption, the majority of negotiations are 
expected to occur one period after the previous one (with probability 7 c), with a 
geometrically declining proportion expected to negotiate in subsequent periods (the 
proportion expected to negotiate for the first time s periods after the previous negotiation 
is Jt(l-7t)s’* ). On the other hand, this assumption accommodates the notion that the 
expected probability of negotiation (in the current and all future periods) relates to current 
wage inflation. Clearly 7C lies in the interval [0,1], and increases as Aw® increases if b > 0.
Incorporating (2.10) into (2.9) provides an extremely non-linear difference 
equation in aggregate wages, which is difficult to work with. However, a Taylor series 
expansion of this non-linear difference equation around a fixed point w provides a 
linearised version of (2.9) with the following parameter values [details of the expansion 
are given in the Appendix]:
F = 2( 1 + 0e2a + 6b e2a(2+ea) {w-mt-at+[ 10 - (1 - 0)e‘1(l + y) x„ ]) ) 
(l+Y)(l+ea) (l+y)(l+ea)2
E = -1 - 20b e2a(2+ea){w-mt-at+[ 10 - (1 - 0)0'I(1 + y) x0 ]) )
(l+Y)(l+ea)2
and G = - 0e2a (2.11)
(l+y)(l+ea)
The general solution for wt of this difference equation depends on the expected evolution 
of mt over all future periods, with the speed of response of wt to changes in mt 
dependent on X^  and X ^  the roots to the characteristic equation of (2.9); i.e. X^, = \ (
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F +/- V(F  ^ + 4E) ). The derivation of the unique solution to the difference equation in the 
presence of a general process determining mt is provided in the Appendix, and shows that 
the time path of wages may be extremely complicated when this forward-looking element 
of wage determination is taken into account. In order to highlight the macroeconomic 
properties of the model, however, we assume here that the money supply grows at a 
constant rate, g, per period and that c t is constant. Further, we assume that at time tg, 
there is a once and for all reduction in the money stock so that an alternative trajectory of 
prices is appropriate. Denoting the change in the money stock by ‘Am’, we find that for 
reasonably small values of Am and b the general solution for wt is given by
Wt = g(t-to+l) - [ 10 - (1 - e)0 ', (l + y) X 0 ] + + Am (1 (2.12)
t = tg, tg+1, tg+2,...,
where = |  ( F - V(F  ^ + 4E) ), and where we linearise around the level of wages that 
would have occurred in the absence of the unexpected increase in money growth, that is,
*= sik) - [ b  - (i - w ' a  + 1> x0 ].
In Figures 2.1-2.2 we illustrate the features of wage dynamics in this context. 
Money is assumed to grow at 2.5% per period throughout, but in period 10 there is a 
10% fall in the money stock (if we consider these to be quarterly observations, the annual 
growth rate is 10% pa, and the money stock reduction constitutes a reasonable, if 
significant shock). Values for y, the price elasticity of demand, and for 0, the relative 
weight of wages and employment in union utility, are arbitrarily set at 0.8 and 0.5 
respectively. In Figure 2.1.1-2.1.3, the parameter ‘a’ is set to -1.22 and the parameter ‘b’ 
is set to 5, so that the probability of negotiation is 0.25 (and the expected length of time 
between negotiations is 4 periods) at the original (and ultimate) rate of wage inflation. 
Setting the parameter ‘b’ to 5 provides a moderate positive feedback from wage inflation 
to renegotiation probabilities. In this case, the time path of wages is given in Figure 2.1.1; 
wage inflation runs at 10% pa up to period 9, but decreases with a jump in period 10 (to 
an annualised rate of around 3.5% pa) and converges to its ultimate trajectory (growing at 
10% pa, but at a level 0.1 lower than previously) by about period 25. Note that 
convergence takes around 15 periods which is well in excess of the average length of any 
single contract. This illustrates clearly, therefore, the buildup of inertia that ensues from 
the disaggregated nature of the model and establishes again the possibility of effective 
government policy in this framework. Figure 2.1.2 illustrates the effects of these 
developments in wages on renegotiation probabilities. Here, given the choice of parameter 
values and given wage inflation of 10% pa, the negotiation probability is constant at 
around 0.25 up to period 9. There is a jump in negotiation probability in period 10, down 
to around 0.235, matching the jump in wage inflation, and then a gradual increase back to
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\0.25 by period 25. Finally, Figure 2.1.3 shows the inflationary effects of endogenous 
negotiation probabilities by plotting the difference between the wage level shown in 
Figure 2.1.1 and that which would be obtained if a = -1.1 and b = 0 (so that there is no 
feedback from wage inflation to negotiation probabilities, which remain fixed at 0.25). As 
is clear from the Figure, the ultimate effect of the unexpected reduction in the money 
supply is the same in both cases, as one would expect. However, in the initial periods 
following the shock, wage inflation is higher in the presence of endogenous negotiation 
probabilities, as the reduced frequency of renegotiation slows down the adjustment 
process.
Figure 2.2.1-2.2.3 illustrate the same features of wage dynamics, but with 
parameters ‘a’ and ‘b’ set equal to -1.47 and 15 respectively. Here the probability of 
renegotiation is still 0.25 at the initial rate of wage inflation, but these probabilities are 
more sensitive to the rate of aggregate wage inflation than previously. As is to be 
expected, convergence of the wage to its equilibrium rate of growth is less rapid in this 
case (now having taken place by about period 35 in Figure 2.2.1), while renegotiation 
probabilities fall more dramatically (to around 0.22 in period 10) in Figure 2.2.2. The 
inflationary effects of endogenising negotiation probabilities are again illustrated in 2.2.3, 
with wages running approximately 1% higher over the periods 14-22 than would be 
observed if there were no feedbacks from wage inflation to negotiation probabilities. 
Hence, the increased sensitivity of renegotiation probabilities to wage inflation reduces the 
speed of adjustment of wages to the unexpected shock, with relatively small changes 
taking place immediately following the shock. The results shown in Figure 2.2 are more 
extreme than those of Figure 2.1, although even with b set equal to 15, the frequency of 
renegotiation is not unreasonably sensitive to changes in wage inflation (since the 
expected length of time between wage settlements immediately following the shock still 
only stretches to 4.5 quarters in this case). However, while the results are qualitatively 
unchanged from those in Figure 2.1, there is an even clearer role for effective government 
policy in this case, as the duration of the adjustment period for the economy as a whole 
is considerably extended.
To conclude the discussion of the model, let me summarise the points that it has 
helped to illustrate. First, we noted that in a world with less than instantaneous wage 
adjustment, the inertia generated directly as individual unions fail to negotiate each period 
is compounded by an indirect influence as unions fail to adjust fully even when they do 
enter negotiations as each recognises the inflexibility of wages elsewhere in the economy. 
This means that wage adjustment in the fact of shocks may take substantially longer than 
any single wage settlement lasts, providing the potential for relatively long-lasting 
effective government intervention. Note that the government is assumed to know no more 
than either industry at any time, so that policy effectiveness derives from their relative
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\Figure 2.1 Impact of a 10% reduction in the money stock (a=-1.22, b=5)
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Figure 2.2 Impact of a 10% reduction in the money stock (a=-1.47, b=15)
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flexibility in response rather than from any (unrealistic) informational advantage.
Second, attempts to understand aggregate wage movements will involve an 
analysis of the extent of current and expected future wage inertia in all sectors of the 
economy. The recognition that wage negotiations will occur only periodically in the future 
provides an important forward-looking element in wage settlements which may generate 
complicated wage dynamics which are difficult to model econometrically. These will be 
further complicated if there are feedbacks from the evolution of wages to the decision on 
when to negotiate. However, apart from the extreme cases in which the sensitivity of 
negotiation probabilities to wage movements is very high, the fact that negotiation 
probabilities may be endogenously determined does not alter qualitatively the properties of 
the model.
Peihaps the single most important insight to be gained from the above model, 
however, is the importance of expectations in the evolution of the economy. The two 
central features of the model are that it involves more than one sector (disaggregation) 
and that there is some element of inertia involved. As such, there is scope for information 
imperfections and for less-than-instantaneous adjustment, so that the need to form 
expectations is sure to be a characteristic of the model solution. The precise nature of this 
solution depends on the way in which information imperfections are accommodated within 
the model, and the assumed expectations formation process. In the illustration above, 
expectations were assumed to be formed rationally, and symmetric information on the 
model structure and on the nature of the expectational errors £jt and &2t was assumed 
known by both sectors. Alternative assumptions on the information structure of the model 
and on the process of expectation formation would of course provide different solutions 
and the policy implications of disaggregation and inertia would be altered.
One example of this line of analysis is given in Taylor (1983a) in which the 
degree of wage inertia generated under alternative wage-setting rules is considered. These 
wage setting rules in effect define the information set used in wage setting and the way in 
which the information is used. In the paper, a two-sector economy is described in which 
wages are set for two periods with a stagger. Agents are assumed to set wages relative to 
a "reference wage" given by the average of existing wages outstanding at the time that 
the wage is determined. In this context, Taylor shows that extrapolative wage-setting mles 
are sure to lead to real output loss under a a disinflation programme. Two examples of 
such rules are specifically noted: the first sets wages under the assumption that the 
reference wage will grow at the same rate over the next year as it did over the past; the 
second assumes that the wage will be raised relative to its previous level by the same 
amount as the reference wage was most recently raised. These rules have "reasonable" 
properties in the sense that under them agents will retain a constant relative position so
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long as wage inflation is constant, and represent reality in so far as wage differentials are 
seen to be of over-riding importance in wage negotiations. On the other hand, if a 
monetary disinflation programme is undertaken, even if it has been credibly announced 
prior to its implementation, then these properties are lost, and the inability of wages and 
prices to respond to the reduction in the money growth rate means that real balances will 
fall, interest rates will rise, and aggregate demand and output will contract. This is shown 
to be in sharp contrast to the position when expectations are formed rationally, where 
wages are able to jump to a position in keeping with the announced money growth rate, 
and all adjustment is completed within the length of the longest contract (two periods), 
without the corresponding output and employment costs.
The ideas expressed in this paper are further illustrated in Taylor (1983b) in 
which actual data on union wage settlements in the US is used in a simple model to 
simulate the time path of wages during a disinflation. Although recognised as a 
simplification, it is assumed that unions negotiate one, two, or three-year contracts, and 
that they can be assigned to one of twenty-four groups according to the length of their 
contract and the timing of negotiations over the quarters of a three-year cycle. Having 
aggregated the data in this way, a model is presented in which a union’s wages are set 
equal to the average aggregate wage expected to prevail during each one-year period, with 
expectations formed on the information available at the time the contract is negotiated by 
the union. Assuming forecasts of future wages are made rationally, and constraining real 
GNP to equal a trend (fiill-employment) level, the joint influence of future and past wage 
decisions on the current wage is demonstrated in a simulation of a disinflation from a 
previously-steady rate of wage inflation of 10% to a new one of 3%. Since expected 
future average wages affect any current wage decisions, the behavioural equations of the 
model are forward-looking, and the disinflation can occur even with full-employment 
given. The staggering of wage contracts generates a backward-looking element to wage 
decisions, and the disinflation is shown to take five years to work through, with extremely 
gradual changes in the first two years of the disinflation program. Through this simulation, 
then, Taylor demonstrates the importance of both current and future levels of inertia 
(imposed through the use of fixed-length contracts), and the complexities of the time path 
of wages as the degree of inertia alters as different combinations of the twenty-four 
groups negotiate in any period.
The main proposition of the work described above is that the process of 
disinflation can be greatly influenced by the way in which wages and prices are set, and 
in particular, it is argued that the costs of reducing the rate of inflation can be much 
reduced if agents set wages with forward-looking parameters in mind, rather than basing 
them on backward-looking predetermined v a r i a b l e s .^ )  It is on the basis of these 
illustrations that Taylor argues that governments might undertake to make the process of
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expectation formation in wage setting more "rational". Noting that the use of sophisticated 
forecasting procedures involves externalities for the individual firm or worker, this 
argument implies a clear role for government-backed agencies in the provision of of a 
credible and widely-available forecasting service. Certainly, Taylor’s work highlights the 
potential gains to be achieved from an active pay policy which attempts to improve 
coordination of wage setting by influencing agents’ information sets in a disaggregated 
world involving inertia . In order to establish whether these suggestions are of any 
relevance in the real world, we turn now to a brief reflection on the empirical literature 
describing disaggregated wage setting in the UK.
Wage-wage comparisons and wage leadership
A recurring theme in the literature on wage setting in the context of disaggregate 
models of wage determination in the UK has been that of wage-wage comparisons in pay 
bargaining, and the concept of wage leadership. So, for example, Sargan’s (1971) paper 
presents estimates of industrial wage equations which incorporate terms to capture the 
belief that a union, when it puts in its wage claim, "will have an eye on wage bargains 
struck earlier in the annual sequence of wage settlements" (p. 59) both generally and with 
particular industries. Again, in Ashenfelter and Layard (1983) it is noted that the ultimate 
breakdown of incomes policies in the UK has frequently been ascribed to the erosion of 
differentials that the incomes policies have entailed. Meade (1981) argues that the 
"keeping-up-with-the-Joneses syndrome" has generated substantial inflationary pressures 
for the UK in the past: here, groups’ attempts to maintain (or improve upon) past 
differentials mean that they continually "leap-frog" each other as pay claims are put 
forward, getting larger in each occasion to offset in advance the counter-claims of other 
groups. Through the 1960’s and 1970’s, successive governments took distinct policy 
stances on the role of pay relativities and differentials (see Addison (1979), for example), 
and a large academic literature was generated investigating these influences on wage 
settlements (see Dearden (1979) for a survey of the literature on wage leadership, and 
Brown and Nolan (1987) for a survey of the industrial relations contributions). Beyond 
the work of Sargan, recent studies by Foster, Henry and Trinder (FHT) (1984, 1986), 
Holly and Smith (1987), and Mackie (1987) have each provided empirical support for the 
interdependence of wage settlements. In the first of these, it is shown that settlements in 
the public corporation sector help explain wage behaviour in the general government 
sector, and in the private sector (both manufacturing and non-manufacturing), while the 
Smith and Holly work provides support for the idea that "settlements of the large 
manufacturing groups determine the "going-rate" in the wage round" (p. 98)., finding that 
wage change in this sector help explain wage movements in private non-manufacturing. 
Mackie’s work finds evidence for a two-way influence between manufacturing and ’non­
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manufacturing* (including non-manufacturing in the private and public corporation 
sectors), and that wages in both of these are influenced by public corporation wage 
settlements. From this literature then, it is clear that policy makers and academics alike 
have taken very seriously the importance of wage-wage comparisons and wage leadership 
in wage determination. However, while many investigators have found evidence for these 
effects, there does not appear to be a single clear pattern across the results as to what 
forms the basis of comparisons or of what constitutes a wage leader.
One clear difficulty involved in studies of this type is that of choosing the 
appropriate level of disaggregation at which analysis should be carried out. The FHT 
article, for example, notes a related work by Zabalza (1984) in which evidence is 
presented of a causal link from wage settlements in the private sector to those in the 
public sector. FHT explain this in terms of the merging of the general government and 
public corporation sectors into one public sector group, the behaviour of which is 
dominated by the larger general government sector. But this raises the question of 
whether a further degree of disaggregation, while complicating the analysis, might not 
provide more insights into the true process of wage-wage comparison bargaining. So, 
while FHT (1984) point out that the wage bill in the public corporation sector as a whole 
increased considerably during 1974, the miners’ pay settlement of that year, obtaining a 
47% increase, far outpaced the rest of the sector (27%), and, because of its high profile, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that this one settlement had a disproportionate influence on 
wage setting both in its own sector, and in the rest of the economy (with this influence 
likely showing up in 1974 and 1975).
It remains doubtful, however, whether a clear pattern to describe wage leadership 
and pay comparabilities would emerge even if we had extremely disaggregated data. 
These doubts are raised simply because of the wealth of the literature on the topic of 
wage leadership, and the wide variety of hypotheses that have been put forward to explain 
the phenomenon. As an illustration, Dearden (1979) notes seven different classes of wage- 
leadership hypothesis, with leading industries defined in each according to such different 
factors as their industrial structure, or their rate of productivity growth, their international 
competitiveness, their responsiveness to demand shifts, and so on. In fact, while these 
hypotheses are often looked at as alternatives, it seems reasonable that any of these 
factors might become more or less relevant over time, so that the structure of the wage 
round would alter. These problems show clearly in the disaggregated data described in 
Elliott (1976). Here, on the basis of the timing and size of settlements in the major 
negotiating groups in the UK between 1950 and 1973, Elliott found no evidence for the 
existence of a stable wage round defined in terms of similarities in the timing of 
settlements, in terms of subsets of negotiating groups settling together systematically, or 
in terms of similarities in the size of settlements. The changing nature of wage-leadership
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would indeed make it very difficult to identify the any simple causal relationships 
although the wide acceptance of the practical relevance of wage-wage comparisons 
suggests that there does exist a known structure to wage emulation.
One suggestion that might help explain the difficulties experienced in identifying 
any simple pattern of wage-wage comparisons revolves around the sort of information 
imperfections discussed in the papers by Taylor mentioned above. This suggestion is put 
clearly by Okun (1981) who argues that if "it is difficult and costly to define and sample 
objectively a universe of "reference wages", firms and workers may focus on a few key 
indicative wages as the basis for a pattern of emulation" (p. 94). In this case, wage 
leaders are likely to be simply those whose wage negotiations, and their settlement, are 
particularly well publicised. While some industries may be more susceptible to leadership 
than others on these grounds (possibly linked with features associated with public or 
private sector ownership, whether the industry is in the manufacturing or non­
manufacturing sector, its rate of productivity growth, and so on), it seems unlikely that 
the complexities of the process could be captured accurately even by an analysis 
conducted at a low level of disaggregation since these key settlements may not remain 
constant over time, and may be highly localised. Hence, the miners’ pay settlement of 
1974 mentioned above would provide a good example of an instance of wage leadership 
of this sort. Equally, however, the (private-sector) bargaining in the engineering and 
shipbuilding industries in the late 1950’s, the activities of the energy and transportation 
(public corporation) sectors during the Heath administration during the early 1970’s, and 
the (general government) pay settlements of the nurses, local government workers, and 
school teachers in 1975 were all significantly well-publicised to affect settlements 
elsewhere.
These reflections suggest that while wage-wage comparisons are important in 
wage determination, it may be difficult to predict precisely the form that these 
comparisons will take at any time. In practice, where wage setting is carried out through 
decentralised decision making, as in the UK, information imperfections may dominate the 
process. We have seen that "reference wages" may be important in individual wage 
setting decisions, both indirectly if they play a significant part in the process by which 
agents form expectations on future aggregate outcomes, and directly if they influence 
unions’ aspirations (recalling the earlier "kinked indifference curve" argument). The 
informationally-inexpensive elements of the reference wage might be those which are 
simply well-publicised, or those which are known and backward-looking (emphasising 
relativities in pay negotiations). In both cases, Taylor’s argument that governments might 
act positively to influence individuals* information sets to improve the "rationality" of 
wage setting decisions would be upheld. The practicalities of such a policy are considered 
in the final section below, where we conclude the chapter by summarising the discussion
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of the preceding sections and drawing together the implications for policy.
2.6 Concluding remarks
The debate on the effectiveness of government policy discussed at the outset of 
this chapter centred attention on rigidities in nominal magnitudes, concluding that their 
presence provides a path through which government policy can exert an influence on real 
phenomena, so that, for example, we would expect severe deflationary policy to incur 
significant costs in terms of output loss and unemployment. This is true even when 
agents* expectations are formed rationally and are based on information sets which 
include all available data, so that systematic errors are not made, and there is no potential 
for any agents to be "fooled" by a government holding additional information. In these 
circumstances, however, the question of the source of inertia is naturally raised, since, if 
the output costs of a disinflationary programme, for example, are generated purely through 
the presence of inertia, then there are clear incentives for agents to eradicate this inertia. 
In sections 2.2 and 2.3, we discussed explicitly the source of costs in adjusting prices and 
wages. The discussion showed that these costs are in many ways intrinsic to the processes 
of shopping, of production, and of pay bargaining, so that their continuing presence can 
be easily understood in terms of the institutions of the supply side. It is clear that 
government intervention in these circumstances needs to concern itself with the 
microeconomics of adjustment costs. As we shall see in Chapter 4, there is evidence that 
governments have been able to influence these costs in the past, and there remains scope 
for such influence to be used to good effect in a macroeconomic context in future policy 
formulations.
The effects of inertia generated at the level of the individual unit taken in 
isolation can be exacerbated in two ways, and these were discussed in sections 2.4 and 
2.5. Section 2.4 noted that the impact of nominal inertia is greater in the presence of real 
rigidities, and various explanations for inflexibilities in the real wage in the face of 
demand shocks were elaborated in the context of labour market models involving trade 
unions. These explanations were each concerned with the responsiveness of individual 
(real) wage settlements to conditions outside the bounds of the settlements. Hence, the 
potential importance of notions of "equity" or "wage aspirations" was raised, both of 
which are possibly formed with reference to wage settlements and labour market 
conditions outside the sector in which the fiim/union unit may operate. Equally, the 
circumstances under which decision makers are insulated from the influence- of the 
unemployed were considered in the discussion of insider-outsider models and explanations 
of unemployment hysteresis. Each of these explanations can therefore be seen in terms of
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the feedbacks between the decision making of individual, uncoordinated decision makers 
and the consequences of their joint actions. Similar ideas are encountered in section 2.5 
where the issue of disaggregation is addressed explicitly, and where it was noted that the 
nominal inertia generated by the individual may accumulate as each individual assesses, 
and forms expectations on, the likely behaviour of others. To the extent that governments 
can influence the coordination of decisions across individuals, these arguments provide a 
potential for active government policy in improving the responsiveness of the supply side 
and the economy’s resilience to shocks.
The recent literature on cross-country performances discussed in section 2.1 
provides some useful insights into the practicalities of such policies. We recall that many 
commentators have noted the success of some economies, in terms of the maintenance of 
low inflation and low unemployment rates, relative to others in the face of the supply and 
demand shocks of the seventies and early eighties. In particular, this success has been 
associated with particular supply-side characteristics, and more specifically, that of 
"corporatism". While this concept is only loosely defined, it is clearly related to the 
problem of coordination discussed above, and some insights may be gained through some 
of the detailed analysis of these studies. For example, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have 
recently attempted to identify the important characteristics of corporatism in order to 
establish the extent to which policy can help to improve labour market institutions within 
a country. They argue that three interrelated concepts appear to be important in defining 
corporatism: the first is the possible presence of an institutionalised bargaining framework; 
the second is the existence of "consensus" between different parties to the bargaining 
process over the goals of economic activity; and the third is a high degree of 
centralisation in bargaining. Calmfors and Driffill concentrate on the third of these 
elements, presenting evidence of a "hump-shaped" relationship between centralisation and 
economic performance over seventeen developed economies. In this, countries with highly 
centralised and highly decentralised bargaining appeared to have done well over the last 
two decades, while intermediately centralised economies did less well. The authors’ 
explanation for this stylised fact is that increasing centralisation of bargaining, assumed to 
mean the progressive amalgamation of sectors producing closely related products, would 
generate two forces working in opposite directions: first, individual unions would gain in 
market power as centralisation increased, and second, the effect of their wage setting on 
aggregate prices would be progressively increased. As centralisation rises, there is 
pressure on real wages in each sector to increase as increasing market power allows the 
output price of the sector to rise (hence, unions take advantage of the fact that the rise in 
the product real wage due to a given money wage increase is reduced if the wage rise can 
be passed on in a price increase). At the same time, however, a rise in wages also leads
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to an increase in the aggregate price level, and as unions become larger the real wage 
gain of a given money wage increase is progressively reduced through this feedback. 
Calmfors and Driffill argue that the market power influence is most important at first as 
amalgamation takes place between small unions producing close substitutes. As larger, 
and less closely related, units amalgamate, however, the aggregate price effect dominates. 
Real wages rise and then fall as the extent of centralised bargaining rises because the two 
effects dominate in turn. In terms of policy prescription, then, government is faced with 
the apparently dichotomous choice of either encouraging decentralisation in bargaining, so 
that real wages are reduced through the rigours of product market competition, or of 
encouraging further centralisation so that the economy-wide externalities incurred through 
individuals’ decisions are progressively internalised.
The analysis described above provides a useful insight into the sphere of the 
economy that government may need to manipulate if it wishes to influence supply side 
responsiveness. However, it is clear that such policies will be difficult to implement The 
encouragement of more or less centralised bargaining in an economy is at best a slow 
process, and would be associated with the evolution of new bargaining frameworks (with 
more or less formal structures), and the development or abandonment of "consensus" on 
economic goals, depending on the direction that government policy takes. Moreover, 
progress on any of these fronts would depend on the historical and political climate in the 
country, so that it may be simply not possible to construct a single set of policy 
prescriptions that would achieve a given desired state. Having said this however, there 
may be policies which can be introduced piece-meal in order to encourage developments 
in a desired direction.
An illustration of such a policy for the UK might be Meade’s (1981) suggestion 
of "not-quite-compulsory arbitration". In this, the vast majority of wage settlements would 
continue to be set without outside influence, as employers and employees make use of 
their detailed knowledge of their own labour market to settle at a "reasonable" rate of 
pay. In this sense, the policy suggestion works within the UK context of disaggregated 
and decentralised decision making. When a settlement cannot be achieved, however, 
external influence would be exerted through a single Arbitration Body to whom either 
party to the negotiations could refer the dispute. This Body would make an award which 
put a premium on the generation of employment in the sector, while also taking into 
account the needs of the sector in attracting (or losing) labour in the face of structural 
change. It is through this Body therefore that the externalities of a decision are brought to 
bear on the negotiating parties. "Pendulum arbitration" might be incorporated into the 
scheme, where the Arbitration Body supports the position of one or other side, and avoids 
compromise decisions. In this way, both parties are forced to set their claims relatively 
close to what they believe will be the Arbitration Body’s preferred position, thereby
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encouraging consensus. Parties would retain the right to strike or lock-out following the 
settlement of an award, but should they do so, they would be penalised in ways chosen to 
reduce their bargaining strength. Such a scheme might help to improve supply side 
responsiveness in two direct ways. The first involves the elimination of some of the 
information imperfections that we have suggested may dominate current wage setting 
practices in the UK, since Meade’s Arbitration Body would be in a good position to 
provide forecasts of future innovations that should be accommodated within wage setting 
decisions. Their implications for wage setting could be announced, or inferred from 
decisions on disputes taken to the Body. These forecasts would emphasis the forward- 
looking factors that should be incorporated within wage setting decisions, and insofar as 
these replaced backward-looking variables and high-profile settlements as indicators of 
future changes in the aggregate economy, this would result in "more rational" expectations 
and speedier nominal adjustment.^*) The second direct gain to be achieved through 
Meade’s scheme would be that it allows the economy-wide implications of decisions to be 
explicitly incorporated into the process of wage bargaining at the individual level. The 
responsiveness of real wages to aggregate demand shocks should be correspondingly 
quicker, so that some element of real wage rigidity would also be eliminated.
Meade’s suggestions have the advantage that they could be introduced in the UK 
without the abandonment of the current decentralised bargaining structures. Indeed, to 
some extent they circumvent the dichotomous choice posed by Calmfors and Driffill in 
suggesting a means of improving coordination of wage settlements without the need to 
move to a more centralised bargaining structure, which may not be politically viable in 
the UK.@2) There may be side-effects to Meade’s arrangements, of course, if consensus 
over the aims of economic policy developed, or if the scope for centralisation of 
bargaining altered. However, these would evolve out of the political and economic 
consequences of the legislation and could not be easily manipulated by government 
policy. Nevertheless, the benefits that would be obtained through the direct routes 
mentioned above provide a good illustration of the sort of policies that could be pursued 
by government through legislation.
The discussion of this chapter has provided a background to some of the 
theoretical issues involved in the discussion on wage and price inertia, and has hopefully 
illustrated the potential significance of the issues in terms of macroeconomic performance, 
and the scope for government policy intervention. In the remainder of the thesis, I shall 
present some empirical work carried out to investigate the extent of the rigidities found in 
the supply side of the UK economy in practice, and to identify their causes. In this I shall 
first concentrate on nominal wage inertia, considering the influences on the speed of 
adjustment in nominal wages in chapters 3 and 4. The influences on the speed of price
60
adjustment are considered in chapter 6, building on the results obtained through the 
estimation of a disaggregated model of the UK supply side elaborated in chapter 5. These 
results are also employed in an analysis of real wage and price rigidities in a sequence of 
simulation exercises described in chapter 7. In these, particular attention is paid to the 
issue of pay comparability, and to the argument that settlements in one sector might 
influence those elsewhere not only through their ultimate effect on the price level, but 
also more directly through their influence on sectors’ "reference" wages, as discussed 
above. The precise nature of the reference wage is only ambiguously defined, and may 
change over time, making it difficult to model econometrically. Nevertheless, as we have 
seen, its significance in wage determination could be high, given the disaggregated nature 
of wage setting practices in the UK, and it could be important to distinguish the 
significance of this influence, as compared to the internal and external influences more 
commonly explored, if policy prescriptions are to be found.
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CHAPTER 3
An Indirect Investigation into Nominal Wage Inertia
Throughout the previous two chapters, I have emphasised the definition of inertia 
as being the lack of responsiveness of a variable in the face of changes which would 
warrant a response. Given this definition, it is clear that the variability of a particular 
variable, looked at in isolation, will not provide much information on the flexibility of 
that variable. This argument is put forward in Jenkinson and Beckerman (1986), who 
point out that an economy which experiences great variability in the factors which 
determine wage growth, say, would be expected to show greater variability in the rate of 
wage growth over time than another economy, whose institutions are equally responsive, 
but who have not experienced such variability in the underlying driving variables. While 
this is true, it is not accurate to say that the variability in wage growth cannot provide 
some insights into the determinants of wage flexibility if this information is supplemented 
with details on the underlying driving factors. This point is made clearly in Hamermesh 
(1985) who suggests a test for the existence of nominal, and ex-ante real, (Keynesian) 
wage rigidity based on the variability of wage growth across sectors, and its relation with 
inflation. Hamermesh’s idea is based on the asymmetries generated by the presence of 
Keynesian nominal wage rigidities, in which money wages cannot be reduced, and by ex- 
ante real wage rigidities, in which money wages cannot rise at a lower rate than the 
expected rate of inflation. In a world with nominal wage rigidities, for a given degree of 
variability in labour demand conditions across the different sectors of the economy, the 
variability of wage growth will be greater during periods of high inflation as fewer agents 
are constrained by the zero-growth lower bound. If nominal wage rigidity is absent, 
Hamermesh argues, no association with inflation should be found (the test for ex-ante real 
wage rigidity is the same, except here the level of inflation over the anticipated rate 
would provide the range over which agents are unconstrained).
Hamermesh applies these tests to U.S. data over the period 1965-81 and discovers 
a negative relation between the variability of wage growth and inflation (particularly the 
unanticipated component). Two scenarios are proposed which are consistent with this 
finding. The first is that inflation uncertainty causes workers and employers to focus more 
on inflation when wage increases are determined; while Hamermesh’s estimations take 
into account the fraction of the labour force whose wages are formally indexed, so that 
this cannot provide an explanation for the observed relation, this informal indexing might 
be associated with reduced wage growth variability exactly as explicit wage indexation 
would be. The second explanation is that increased inflation is associated with an
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\increased frequency and synchronisation of settlements which could generate the results.
In the next section, I look more closely at Hamermesh’s test for the existence of 
wage rigidity, and consider a more general approach to its derivation which can explicitly 
incorporate the second of these explanations into the theoretical model. On this basis, I 
will demonstrate that wage growth variability may be positively associated to inflation 
even in the absence of simple Keynesian wage rigidities (so that Hamermesh does not test 
for their existence). I will then present some results for the U.K. which run counter to 
those obtained for the U.S., indicating that, for the U.K. at least, the extended model may 
provide a reasonable description of the influence of inflation on labour market 
responsiveness.
3.1 Testing for labour market adjustment
As the discussion in chapter 2 indicated, there are a variety of possible reasons 
why wages might not change in each period, and the simple notion of downward 
Keynesian rigidities is just one of these. In deriving his test, however, Hamermesh 
concentrates exclusively on this one element of wage adjustment, so that the basis for the 
test is given by the wage setting equation
wit = max{ pf+ p}*+ ayi t , 0 } (3.1)
where i is an economic unit, w is the instantaneous rate of wage increase, p® and pj* are 
instantaneous rates of expected and unexpected aggregate price inflation, and yj is the 
level of excess demand in the i 1^ sector. This equation clearly incorporates a zero-growth 
lower bound, as implied by nominal wage rigidity. By assuming y^ to be a random 
variable with density function g(y) and distribution function G(y), we can write:
var(wit) = f°° [ pf+ p”+ <xyit ]2 g(yit) dy
y*
- { f°° [pf+ P?+ ayit] gCyit) dy }2 (3.2)
y?
where y* = - ( pf + p^ 1) = minimum level of excess demand associated with 
a  non-zero wage growth
This provides the result (see Appendix):
var(wit) = [l-G(yJ)] a 2var(yit) + G(yj5[l-G(yj5] E(wit)2 (3.3)
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\where var(y^) = variability of excess demand among those units with non-zero growth, 
and E(wjt) = average wage growth in the same units.
Written in this way, the basis for Hamermesh’s test of the existence of wage 
rigidity becomes apparent; with G(yj5 constant, var(wjt) is positively related to p® and pj1 
via the term E(wjt) in (3.3). As p® or pj* rise, then so does the average level of wage 
growth among those who are not constrained by the zero-growth lower bound, and the 
variability of wage growth rises. Note that because E(wjt) has a coefficient of G(yj5[l- 
G(yj5], this influence is greatest when the division between the units with zero and non­
zero wage growth is at its keenest; i.e. where G(yj5 = §. Further, the influence exists only 
*when G(y t) lies strictly between zero and one; if the level of excess demand is 
sufficiently low for G(yj$ = 1, so that all agents are on the zero-growth lower bound, then 
no renegotiations occur, and clearly, the variability in wage growth is zero. On the other 
hand, if the level of excess demand for labour is sufficiently high for no agent to be 
constrained by the lower bound, so that G(yj5 = 0, than the variability in excess demand 
for labour over the sectors is the sole determinant of wage growth variability. This is 
clearly also true if the lower bound does not exist, i.e. there is no nominal wage rigidity.
Hamermesh’s test for the existence of wage rigidities is a natural one given the 
wage-setting process described at (3.1). However, this captures only one of the features of 
the labour market which might contribute to imperfect wage adjustment, and a 
generalisation of (3.1) is therefore given in (3.4):
Wjt = J  max{ p®+ pj*+ ayjt ,0} with probability (3.4)
10 with probability (1-%)
The probability 7Cjt can be thought of as the probability of renegotiating beyond 
the influence of simple Keynesian rigidities, and because it can alter from period to period 
and from agent to agent, it provides the means of incorporating any number of labour 
market features into the wage adjustment process. For example, a freeze incomes policy 
might reduce the probability of renegotiation for all agents to zero, while Hamermesh’s 
proposition that increased inflation might raise 7Cjt directly can also be accommodated.^)
Ignoring for simplicity the possibility of industry-specific influences on 7Cjt (so that 
TCit = 7tjt = TCt Vi, j),(2) the variance of wjt, given the same description of the distribution 
of yjt as before and the wage-setting process at (3.4), is:
var(wit) = tc*a2 var(yit) + 7$ l - 7$  E(wit)2 - (3.5)
where tcJ* = 7^ (1 - G(yj5)
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This form is clearly very similar to that at (3.3), although the proportion of agents 
negotiating here is given by the more general term tc£ Again, p^ and p|* will affect 
var(w^) positively so long as this proportion lies strictly between one and zero, with the 
influence greatest when the division between those agents negotiating and those leaving
$ iwages unaltered is greatest, i.e. where 7  ^= *
The important feature to note about (3.5) is that if excess demand is sufficiently 
high that no agent is constrained by the Keynesian rigidities, or equivalently, if no
rigidities of this sort exist, then we can write G(yj5 = 0, and (3.5) simplifies to
var(wjt) = 7ia2 var(yjt) + t c (1-7c ) E(vqt)2 (3.6)
Even if simple Keynesian rigidities are absent, var(wjt) will still be related to E(wjt), and 
hence p® and pj1, so long as tc e ]0,1[, so that the empirical search for such a relation 
cannot provide a test of their existence.
Further, the responsiveness of var(wjt) to pt is shown in the following:
8var(w:t) = jc* . 8var(yit) + 8tc* a 2var(yit) (3.7)
+ 87C* (l-27C*)[E(wit)]2 + 7C*(1-7C*) 8[E(W:t)]2
Given the evidence of, for example, Pencavel (1982) or Christofides (1985), on the
;Je
positive impact of inflation on the frequency of negotiation (i.e. 8n /8pt > 0), the 
contribution of the last three terms of (3.7) is most likely to be positive: even if n 
exceeds |, so that the third term in (3.7) is negative, this will be dominated by the second 
and fourth terms which are unambiguously positive. In this model, then, it is clear that a 
negative relation between inflation and var(wjt) would require inflation to exert a very 
strong (negative) influence on vaity^).^ In the absence of a justification for such an 
influence, an economy with any features likely to impede instantaneous wage adjustment 
would therefore be expected to demonstrate a positive relationship between inflation and 
wage variability.
3.2 The U.K. experience
In the previous section, I not only asserted that the method employed by 
Hamermesh would not allow us to test the hypothesis that nominal, or ex-ante real, wage 
rigidities are a feature of the wage adjustment process, but I also argued that the presence 
of any impediment to instantaneous wage adjustment would be likely to generate a
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Table 3.1
Variability of wage growth across industrial sectors
Date 100*var(wjt)
1964(2) .158
1965(1) .178
(2) .091
1966(1) .126
(2) .089
1967(1) .060
(2) .129
1968(1) .149
(2) .158
1969(1) .098
(2) .121
1970(1) .046
(2) .150
1971(1) .167
(2) .063
1972(1) .108
(2) .092
1973(1) .059
(2) .071
1974(1) .165
(2) .927
1975(1) .689
(2) .115
1976(1) .048
(2) .036
1977(1) .021
(2) .078
1978(1) .345
(2) .235
1979(1) .102
(2) .108
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positive link between inflation and wage variability. Given this, it is of interest to find 
whether similar results to those obtained with U.S. data are to be found for the U.K., so 
that below I present exactly equivalent estimates using U.K. data.
Table 3.1 presents the variable to be explained in the study; namely, the 
variability of wage change across industrial sectors over time. These figures are derived 
from data on average earnings in 23 industrial groups, covering the whole economy, and 
based on the 1968 SIC, and are calculated according to the formula used by Hamermesh:
var(wt)=  Zj
where Wj is the ratio of the average hourly earnings in sector i to a weighted average of 
earnings among all sectors, and Ejt is the i 1^ sector’s share of total employment at time 
t . ^  As in the U.S., this variable shows no particular trend over time, although it should 
be noted that there are two outliers in the periods 1974(2) and 1975(1) where variability 
is very high. This was, of course, a period of very high inflation, which reached a record 
level of 30% in 1975(1).
The measure of expectations of inflation rates employed here is a ‘rational 
expectations’ measure of anticipated rates of change in the consumer expenditure deflator 
generated by the macromodel at the National Institute. Anticipated inflation rates over a 
variety of horizons were available, although I have concentrated on the 12-month forward 
expectations series.
Again following Hamermesh, consideration of incomes policy effects has also 
been made, although given the variety of forms of incomes policy experienced in the 
U.K. over the period, more attention has had to be paid in this area. In particular, it is 
noted that while guide-posts of the form "£x per annum" (i.e. flat-rate incomes policies) 
can be expected to reduce the variability of wage growth during their implementation, 
those of the form "x% per annum" (i.e. proportional guidelines) will not.^) Table 3.2 
presents a brief summary of the aims of the various periods of incomes policy regarding 
acceptable increases in earnings (see Ashenfelter and Layard (1983), Pudney (1984) or 
Whitley (1986) for more detailed expositions of these aims). As is clear, there have been 
a number of periods during which incomes policies could have had a dampening effect on 
wage growth variability; the period of ’Wage Freeze’ and ’Severe Restraint’ of 1966(iii)- 
1967(H), and the ’Standstill’ of 1974(H) to 1973(i) both attempted to reduce the number 
of negotiations over wages to zero; phase two of the Heath administration between 
1973(ii) and 1973(iii), the ’threshold payments’ of 1974(ii) to 1974(iii), and phase one of 
Labour’s ’Social Contract’ each involved a lump-sum wage limit, of £1, £4.40, and £6 
respectively; and finally, the policies of 1973(iv)-1974(i) and 1976(iii)- 1977(H) (phase two
Wit -  1
Wit-2
i t (3.8)
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\Table 3.2
Brief description of pay policies ; 1964-1982
Period Description
Wilson’s Labour Government
1965ii-66ii Ceiling incomes policy; target increase of 3.5% 
enforced in public sector only
1966iii-67ii (FI) "Wage Freeze" and "Severe Restraint". Statutory.
1967iii-68i Ceiling policy; voluntary restraint with zero norm
1968ii-70ii Ceiling policy; statutory 3.5% limit
Heath’s Conservative Government
1972iv-73i (F2) Wage freeze during "Standstill". Statutory.
1973ii-73iii (Cl) Pay increases restricted to £1+4% (£5 maximum). 
Statutory.
1973iv-1974i (C2) Pay increases restricted to 7% or £2.25 if higher. 
Statutory.
1974ii-74iii (C3) Above augmented by £4.40 paid for "threshold" 
agreements.
Labour’s "Social Contract"
1975iii-75iv (C4) Ceiling policy with limit equivalent to £6. Statutory
1976iii-77ii (C5) Pay limit of 5%, subject to £2.50 per week minimum 
and £4 per week maximum. Statutory.
1977iii-78ii Statutory limit of 10%
1978iii-1978iv New statutory limit of 5%; rejected by TUC and 
statutory powers removed early 1979.
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of the Social Contract), while stated as proportional policies, also included maximum and 
minimum bounds for wage change. The influence of these seven periods of policy on 
wage growth variability will therefore be investigated.
Equations (3.1) and (3.4) incorporate the effects on wage growth in sector i of the 
real excess demand for labour in the sector, yjt. This is a natural explanatory variable to 
include in the determination of wage growth, but it is by no means clear how it should be 
measured at the sectoral level. In his study, Hamermesh used changes in sectoral output 
as the measure of the level of excess demand. This measure has the advantage that 
sectoral output is a well defined concept that is easily measured. However, it is clear that 
changes in sectoral output provide, at best, only an indirect indication of the state of the 
sectoral labour market. A more usual measure of labour market slack, following the 
Phillips curve literature, is the sectoral unemployment rate. However, even this measure is 
not a perfect proxy for the excess supply of labour, and there are a number of problems 
associated with its measurement.
The difficulties involved in the use of unemployment rates as a measure of excess 
demand for labour have been widely discussed, especially in the literature on frictional 
unemployment and the effects of structural change on sectoral labour markets.^) For 
example, it is widely recognised that the level of unemployment understates the degree of 
labour market slack to the extent that there are people who are ‘partially unemployed’. 
These people may be employed part-time, but may prefer to work full-time, and may be 
searching for full-time employment. Equally, some people classified as ‘not-in-the-labour 
force’, in the sense that they are neither employed nor looking for work, may be simply 
‘discouraged workers’, and have ceased to look for work as they do not think that there is 
a reasonable chance of finding it. Even assuming that the measure of the unemployed in a 
sector accurately represents the numbers of workers equipped and looking for work, it is 
clear that a growth in the numbers unemployed which is matched by a corresponding 
growth in the number of job opportunities available would not constitute an increase in 
labour market slack in the sector. This suggests the use of data on vacancies, as a 
complement to the unemployment data, to obtain a more complete picture of the state of 
the sectoral labour market However, there are similar problems involved in the use of 
vacancy data. For example, employers may not advertise vacancies which they do not 
believe they have a reasonable chance of filling, so that there is an element of unsatisfied 
labour demand excluded from the vacancy data (an element which will grow as the extent 
of unsatisfied labour demand grows). Alternatively, employers may use the adverisement 
of vacancies in different ways according to the state of the labour market: for example, in 
recession, employers may become more selective in the recruitment of new employees for 
any given number of advertised vacancies (so that the number of vacancies again 
overstates the degree of unsatisfied labour demand).
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In practice, these conceptual problems related to the interpretation of 
unemployment and vacancy data are compounded by the problems of data availability and 
reliability. Jackman and Roper (1987) note that in the U.K., only about one third of 
vacancies are recorded, and that the extent of non-notification is unlikely to be uniform 
across sectors (industrial, regional, or occupational). Further, in the U.K., the unemployed 
are generally assigned to the industry in which they last worked. This procedure not only 
leaves many of the unemployed unclassified by industry (some 24% of the unemployed 
were unclassified in 1981, for example), but also understates the excess supply of labour 
in any one sector as many unemployed are available to work in several different 
industries. This latter point highlights the fact that the tightness of the labour market can 
be affected over many different dimensions; for example, there may be upward pressure 
on wages generated through excess demand for skilled labour, for labour in the South, for 
female labour, or for adult labour, while demand for unskilled labour, for labour in the 
North, for male labour, or for youth labour remains unchanged. Some of these pressures 
may be reflected by the shedding of labour in particular industries, and by increases in the 
number of vacancies in others, but it is clear that the published industrial unemployment 
and vacancy data cannot be expected to capture all of the pressures generated across the 
many dimensions of the labour market.
Despite these reservations, the published figures do provide some information on
the conditions in sectoral labour markets, and in the absence of better data, output change,
unemployment rates, and an unemployment rate measure adjusted for vacancies will all be
used in the following analysis to capture the pressure on wage growth variability
generated by excess demand for labour. Moreover, it is recognised that in moving from
the static relationship of (3.5) to a time series analysis, the description of the distribution
of excess demand has to be amended to take up movements in excess demand pressure
over time. Hence, we might write
yjt = aggregate excess demand for labour in i at time t 
*
= yt + yit
9|C
where yt = aggregate level of excess demand at time t, and yjt has the distribution and 
density functions described earlier. From this, it is clear that yt should figure in the 
determination of var(wjt) in exactly the same way as (p®+ pj*); positively with coefficient
3|e ajc
k (1-7C ). Consequently, both the variability in excess demand over sectors and its 
aggregate level will be used in our regression analysis.
The results of the econometric analysis of the variability of wage growth across 
sectors are given in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Table 3.3 presents the results of the estimation of 
equations for the U.K. corresponding to those of Hamermesh, covering the period 
1964(2)-1979(2) using semi-annual data. Three sets of results are reported in columns (1)-
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Tabic 3.3
Dependent variable: v(Wjt) = 100*var(w^
yit = Aoutputjt yjt = (unem-vac)it% yit = unemit%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -0.056
(0.589)
[0.552]
-0.016
(0.193)
[0.199]
0.028
(0.412)
[0.525]
-0.004
(0.058)
[0.058]
-0.016
(0.418)
[0.401]
0.011
(0.289)
[0.279]
0.095
(1.096)
[0.906]
0.156
(2.560)
[1.688]
0.144
(2.227)
[1.803]
P 0.025
(2.622)
[2.303]
0.031
(5.820)
[3.352]
0.032
(5.603)
[2.964]
Pf 0.026(3.172)
[1.318]
0.024
(3.806)
[3.267]
0.038
(10.116)
[8.113]
0.034
(8.533)
[5.447]
0.039
(9.254)
[6.192]
0.035
(8.344)
[5.109]
P? -0.002(0.163)
[0.180]
-0.001
(0.121)
[0.176]
0.001
(0.116)
[0.119]
0.008
(1.075)
[1.262]
0.001
(0.124)
[0.112]
0.006
(0.779)
[0.820]
v(yit) 0.705
(0.688)
[0.596]
0.369
(0.405)
[0.410]
-0.056
(0.077)
[0.094]
0.610
(1.242)
[0.773]
0.914
(2.805)
[1.715]
0.610
(1.962)
[1.267]
0.190
(0.407)
[0.299]
0.502
(1.527)
[1.014]
0.298
(1.092)
[0.737]
yit 0.030(0.163)
[0.158]
-0.079
(0.475)
[0.426]
-0.115
(0.888)
[1.076]
-0.136
(2.045)
[1.341]
-0.190
(4.259)
[2.537]
-0.143
(3.087)
[2.006]
-0.074
(1.117)
[0.835]
-0.134
(2.830)
[1.751]
-0.101
(2.278)
[1.499]
Cl -0.145
(0.927)
[2.418]
-0.030
(0.207)
[0.4032]
-0.202
(1.538)
[3.932]
-0.100
(1.140)
[3.087]
-0.170
(1.223)
[2.732]
-0.047
(0.471)
[0.875]
C2 -0.175
(1.167)
[3.102]
-0.233
(1.735)
[3.714]
-0.284
(2.098)
[3.739]
-0.423
(4.504)
[7.943]
-0.213
(1.541)
[3.259]
-0.316
(3.234)
[6.529]
C3 -0.252
(1.569)
[2.193]
-0.301
(2.108)
[2.729]
-0.416
(2.849)
[3.132]
-0.554
(5.608)
[8.232]
-0.338
(2.307)
[2.675]
-0.453
(4.354)
[5.827]
C4 -0.401
(2.661)
[2.531]
-0.240
(1.639)
[1.908]
-0.441
(3.432)
[2.373]
-0.310
(3.550)
[3.929]
-0.413
(3.030)
[2.539]
-0.290
2.983)
[6.297]
C5 -0.415
(2.901)
[2.455]
-0.339
(2.621)
[3.168]
-0.391
(2.728)
[2.005]
-0.391
(4.173)
[3.676]
-0.323
(2.263)
[2.319]
-0.318
(3.228)
[3.095]
CINC -0.222
(3.088)
[3.022]
-0.321
(5.742)
[3.780]
(cont...)
-0.269
"(5.228)
[3.909]
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\FI -0.029
(0.219)
[0.403]
0.008
(0.073)
[0.166]
0.024
(0.240)
[0.485]
0.091
(1.388)
[2.130]
-0.012
(0.114)
[0.451]
0.045
(0.635)
[1.238]
F2 -0.125
(0.729)
[1.206]
-0.075
(0.490)
[0.772]
-0.001
(0.005)
[0.008]
0.034
(0.367)
[0.476]
-0.073
(0.530)
[1.474]
-0.058
(0.618)
[1.455]
HNC -0.009
(0.108)
[0.236]
0.034
(0.531)
[0.696]
-0.012
(0.185)
[0.297]
R2
SSR
0.599
0.420
0.705
0.309
0.648
0.368
0.701
0.313
0.879
0.127
0.795
0.215
0.670
0.345
0.851
0.156
0.779
0.232
DW
SC
ADD
1.429
4.579
6.236
0.854
9.177
5.945
1.149
3.703
4.090
1.810
6.744
6.988
1.667
2.554
6.809
2.006
6.125
3.129
1.807
5.533
7.324
1.516
0.970
4.346
1.939
2.774
2.047
N
H
14.644
11.418
13.418
11.689
7.522
15.151
3.679
7.117
0.692
0.383
0.428
5.645
11.933
5.915
0.238
2.549
2.032
5.851
Notes:
Standard absolute t-statistics in ( ); absolute t-statistics based on White’s heteroskedasticity- 
consistent estimate of the error variance-covariance matrix in [ ].
SSR is the sum of squared residuals; DW is the Durbin Watson statistic; SC is a Lagrange 
Multiplier test of serial correlation (two periods), cf. % (2); ADD is a test of the null hypothesis 
that (he addition of two lagged dependent variables does not contribute to the fit of the eqaution, 
cf. X?(2); N is a test for Normality of residuals, cf y}{2)\ and H is a test for heteroskedasticity, 
cf. 3?(1).
When excess demand is measured through output change, equation (3.3) is employed to obtain its 
variability over sectors. The standard variance measure is employed when the unemployment rates 
(adjusted and unadjusted) are used.
Define
yjt = (unem-vac)jt% = (no. unemployed in sector i - no. vacancies in sector i)
total employment in sector i
yjt = unem% = no.unemploved in sector i 
total employment in sector i
Data source:
See Data Appendix
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(3), (4)-(6), and (7)-(9) in which the three alternative measures of excess demand are used 
(the growth in sectoral output, the sectoral unemployment rate adjusted for vacancies, and 
the unadjusted unemployment rate respectively). The clearest result to emerge from all of 
the equations is the strong positive relationship that exists between wage growth 
variability and inflation, as predicted by the model of the previous section. This holds true 
with excess demand measured by any one of the three alternative variables. Splitting this 
effect into its expected and unexpected components significantly improves the fit, as given 
in (2), (5), and (8), with expected inflation showing significantly, and unexpected inflation 
insignificantly, in each case. The results of the tests, with excess demand measured by 
output change, (unemployment-vacancies) rate, and the unemployment rate respectively, 
give F-statistics of 6.81, 27.93, and 23.02, each compared to Fj This provides strong 
evidence to support the use of separate variables to capture the effects of unanticipated 
and anticipated inflation in subsequent analysis.^
Restricting attention to columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), and (8)-(9), then, it is clear that 
the results obtained are also influenced by the choice of the excess demand measure. In 
columns (2), (5), and (8), for example, it is noted that although var(yjt) exerts a positive 
influence in all cases, as predicted, this influence is statistically significant only when 
excess demand for labour is measured by the adjusted unemployment rate. Further, while 
the aggregate level of excess demand exerts influence on var(wjt) in the predicted 
direction in each case (positively for output change, and negatively for the adjusted and 
unadjusted unemployment rates), this influence is insignificant when output change is the 
measure used. Taken with the diagnostic test statistics presented, and to be discussed 
below, these results suggest that the more direct measures of excess demand, i.e. the 
adjusted and unadjusted unemployment rates, are to be preferred to the less direct 
measure employed by Hamermesh.
The direction of influence of the incomes policy dummies are, by and large, 
negative, as we would expect. In particular, incomes policies C2, C3, C4 and C5 
consistently show significantly, although Cl and, suiprisingly, the periods of freeze 
incomes policy fail to do so. (The fact that in each case the freeze policies were only 
operative during a part of the consecutive 6-month periods for which FI and F2 were set 
to one may provide some explanation for these results.) Columns (3), (6), and (9) display 
similar results to those of (2), (5), and (8), but with the effects of all of the periods of 
flat-rate and freeze policies captured by the two variables CINC (=C1 to C5), and FINC 
(=F1 + F2). Tests of the restrictions involved here indicate that apart from column (6), 
where there is weak evidence against the restrictions, the analysis is unable to adequately 
distinguish between the impacts of the separate periods of policy. This is demonstrated 
through F-statistics of 0.72, 2.64, and 1.84 (cf F^ j^) for equations (3), (6), and (9) 
respectively. Having said this, however, the diversity of estimated coefficients on the
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incomes policy dummies suggests that the separate periods of policy were more or less 
influential in the development of sectoral wage growth, and the unrestricted equations of 
columns (5) and (8) therefore represent the preferred equations in Table 3.3. Finally on 
the impact of incomes policy, it should be noted that the use of additional dummies to 
capture the influence of the remaining ‘proportional guidelines’ policies was also 
considered. These did not contribute significantly to the fit of the equations, however, the 
joint significance of dummy variables C65 (1965(1)-1966(1)), C67 (1967(2)-1968(1», C68 
(1968(2)-1970(1)), C77 (1977(2)-1978(1)) and C78 (1978(2)) in equations (3), (6), and (9) 
is given by F-statistics of 0.20, 1.01, and 0.96 respectively (cf. F^ 19) . ^
Given that the dependent variable, as noted previously, has no particular trend 
over time, the obtained in the regression analysis, and given at the foot of the Table, 
are reasonable, with around 70% of the variability in the dependent variable explained. 
The set of equations with least explanatory power is that in which output growth is used 
as the measure of excess demand, and this set is also the one in which the Normality 
assumption is most clearly rejected. This provides further support for the use of the direct 
measures of excess demand over Hamermesh’s measure. The test for homoskedasticity in 
the errors is also most clearly rejected in the equations in columns (l)-(3), although this 
finding is not restricted to these columns. In fact, although there is no evidence of 
heteroskedasticity in the preferred equations of columns (5) and (8), it is clear that this 
may be a more general problem. It is for this reason that a second set of t-values are 
presented (in square parentheses) in the Table which use adjusted White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. Inferences based 
on these statistics will be more reliable in the presence of heteroskedasticity, although in 
fact the inferences made are qualitatively unaltered form those described in the paragraphs 
above: the influence of expected inflation, while less pronounced, remains highly 
significant, the direct measures of excess demand remain superior to the output change 
measure, and the significance of the incomes policy dummies is, if anything, emphasised.
Finally, here, the statistics denoted ‘DW’, ‘SC’, and ‘ADD’ all consider the 
dynamic properties of the regressions, and suggest that the original specification 
considered by Hamermesh may not be sufficiently general to accomodate all of the 
influences on var(wjt) over time in the case of the U.K.. Specifically, the Durbin Watson 
statistic (DW) is rather small, and although the statistic lies in the region of 
indeterminancy in all cases, this of course provides some evidence of (first order) serial 
correlation in the errors. The statistic denoted ‘SC’ is the Lagrange Multiplier statistic 
testing for serial correlation in the residuals for two lags jointly, while the statistic 
denoted ‘ADD’ is a joint test of zero restrictions on two lagged dependent variables 
added to the reported equations. These are of obvious interest, given that the data 
employed here is semi-annual, so that two lags are necessary to capture any annual
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Table 3.4
Dependent variable: v(wjt) = 100*varCwjt)
yjt = Aoutputjt yjt = (unem-vac)jt9& yjt = unemjt%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -0.008
(0.074)
[0.078]
-0.002
(0.024)
[0.024]
0.009
(0.126)
[0.139]
0.125
(1.459)
[1.305]
0.030
(0.507)
[0.568]
0.006
(0.147)
[0.126]
0.157
(1.704)
[1.345]
0.159
(2.413)
[1.837]
0.127
(1.788)
[1.813]
P 0.027
(2.578)
[1.532]
0.033
(4.706)
[2.272]
0.034
(4.475)
[2.021]
Pf 0.026(3.172)
[1.936]
0.021
(2.725)
[1.990]
0.034
(7.553)
[4.076]
0.029
(5.601)
[2.695]
0.036
(6.737)
[3.312]
0.032
(5.553)
[2.510]
P? -0.002(0.163)
[0.474]
-0.009
(0.659)
[0.952]
-0.003
(0.309)
[0.300]
-0.001
(0.057)
[0.057]
0.001
(0.075)
[0.067]
0.002
(0.142)
[0.133]
v(yit) 0.704
(0.688)
[0.573]
0.535
(0.686)
[0.744]
0.541
(0.071)
[0.086]
0.222
(0.429)
[0.294]
0.773
(2.197)
[1.849]
0.662
(2.014)
[1.412]
-0.219
(0.435)
[0.344]
0.303
(0.789)
[0.749]
0.300
(1.048)
[0.783]
yit 0.132(0.163)
[1.031]
-0.021
(0.120)
[0.127]
-0.083
(0.605)
[0.698]
-0.096
(1.379)
[1.030]
-0.166
(3.532)
[2.673]
-0.141
(2.846)
[1.944]
-0.022
(0.312)
[0.260]
-0.098
(1.815)
[1.560]
-0.091
(1.951)
[1.412]
Cl -0.169
(1.091)
[2.448]
-0.012
(0.085)
[0.166]
-0.233
(1.775)
[2.864]
-0.085
(0.948)
[1.823]
-0.212
(1.543)
[2.457]
-0.051
(0.483)
[0.797]
C2 -0.187
(1.256)
[2.033]
-0.218
(1.713)
[2.761]
-0.308
(2.235)
[2.615]
-0.383
(4.256)
[4.973]
-0.259
(1.856)
[2.316]
-0.303
(3.018)
[3.916]
C3 -0.300
(1.773)
[1.436]
-0.285
(1.982)
[1.903]
-0.463
(2.965)
[2.197]
-0.512
(5.072)
[4.220]
-0.414
(2.619)
[1.926]
-0.440
(3.880)
[3.169]
C4 -0.128
(0.435)
[0.544]
0.130
(0.521)
[0.441]
-0.170
(0.565)
[0.550]
-0.015
(0.076)
[0.109]
0.246
(0.761)
[0.782]
0.039
(0.165)
[0.191]
C5 -0.440
(2.905)
[1.866]
-0.311
(2.265)
[1.977]
-0.332
(2.219)
[1.360]
-0.341
(3.534)
[3.209]
-0.275
(1.769)
[1.317]
-0.283
(2.551)
[3.031]
CINC -0.155
(1.988)
[1.505]
-0.274
(4.130)
[2.303]
(conL..)
-0.226
(3.515)
[2.142]
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FI -0.009
(0.066)
[0.106]
0.017
(0.153)
[0.294]
-0.014
(0.145)
[0.225]
0.077
(1.154)
[1.727]
-0.037
(0.366)
[0.777]
0.040
(0.528)
[0.923]
F2 -0.206
(1.186)
[2.399]
-0.114
(0.754)
[1.373]
-0.096
(0.669)
[1.097]
0.001
(0.010)
[0.0166]
-0.151
(1.095)
[2.484]
-0.088
(0.881)
[1.984]
FINC -0.002
(0.027)
[0.052]
0.040
(0.590)
[0.680]
-0.006
(0.082)
[0.125]
v(wi M ) 0.183
(0.867)
[0.559]
0.288
(1.565)
[1.035]
0.314
(1.761)
[1.325]
0.076
(0.411)
[0.280]
0.202
(1.662)
[1.194]
0.2229
(1.543)
[1.239]
0.0682
(0.333)
[0.223]
0.136
(0.923)
[0.650]
0.172
(1.074)
[0.786]
v(wi t_2) -0.878
(2.085)
[2.054]
-0.576
(1.538)
[1.319]
-0.160
(0.902)
[1.019]
-0.835
(2.235)
[2.100]
-0.428
(1.681)
[2.505]
-0.090
(0.694)
[0.754]
-0.898
(2.258)
[2.025]
-0.473
(1.559)
[1.701]
-0.128
(0.937)
[1.164]
R2
SSR
0.696
0.318
0.794
0.215
0.718
0.295
0.775
0.235
0.913
0.091
0.820
0.189
0.754
0.258
0.882
0.124
0.798
0.212
DW
SC
1.941
0.081
1.706
6.379
1.828
0.317
2.038
4.004
2.288
2.431
2.492
10.379
2.091
2.822
2.062
1.046
2.362
6.404
N
H
22.478
6.246
11.506
7.845
26.467
6.201
0.773
6.319
0.370
6.616
5.260
7.436
1.782
6.988
0.127
8.111
5.845
7.626
Notes:
See notes to Table 3.3
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pattern in the residuals. Again the results obtained are not unambiguous in that the null 
hypotheses of no serial correlation is accepted in the preferred equations of columns (5) 
and (8), although the addition of the extra lagged dependent variables is shown to be 
important in column (5). However, the results of these tests in the remaining columns 
indicates further analysis of the dyanamics is warranted.
The results in Table 3.4 take up this issue and present equivalent results to those 
in Table 3.3, but include also two lagged dependent variables in the nine equations to 
allow for a richer dynamic specification. On the main issues discussed above, the results 
again are qualitatively unchanged from those of Table 3.3, although the presence of 
heteroskedasticity is now more pronounced, so that the t-values based on the 
heteroskedasticity-consistent estimates of the standard errors are certainly applicable. The 
positive relationship between inflation and var(wjt) is confirmed, and the distinction 
between expected and unexpected inflation remains statistically important (F-statistics of 
7.185, 23.736, and 16.210 relating to the restrictions imposed on equations in columns 
(1), (4) and (7), are all highly significant, cf. F(l,15)). The output growth measure of 
excess demand is again the least satisfactory, in terms of the performance of v(yjt) and yjt 
and in terms of the diagnostics. On the former criteria, there is now also some support for 
the unemployment rate adjusted for vacancies as the preferred measure of excess demand, 
in preference to the unadjusted one, as the t-values on the unadjusted unemployment rate 
fall below their critical values when the possibility of heteroskedasticity is taken into 
account. The dummies entered to capture the effects of flat rate incomes policies again 
show significantly negative. Further, the F-tests of the restrictions imposed on (2), (5), and 
(8) to achieve (3), (6), and (9) are 1.116, 3.231, 2.129 which are to be compared to 
F(5,15). Hence, there is rather stronger evidence against the simplifying restriction on the 
incomes policy variables than was seen in Table 3.3, and rather more support for the idea 
that the separate periods of incomes policy had quantitatively different effects on sectoral 
wage growth. This, taken with the problem of serial correlation that are observed in the 
restricted equations of (6) and (9), means that columns (5) and (8) also provide the 
preferred equations in Table 3.4.
Turning to the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables (ldv) themselves, it 
is noted that the first ldv takes a positive, but relatively small, coefficient, and the second 
ldv takes a negative, but larger, coefficient in all of the equations. Significance levels 
differ, but in columns (5) and (8), the negative coefficient on the second ldv is 
significantly different to zero, while the first ldv is not. The evidence then is that there is 
an annual pattern in which, other things equal, a high value in the variability in wage 
growth in one year is followed by a low value one year later. This is the sort of dynamic 
pattern that might be observed if the same groups negotiate annually and if there was a
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role for ‘catch-up’ behaviour. For example, suppose that a flat rate incomes policy 
successfully constrains wage growth in high wage sectors relative to those in low wage 
sectors; this results in wage growth variability which is lower than it would be in the 
absence of the incomes policy. If the same groups reset wages one year later, after the 
incomes policy has ended, it might be that the high wage sector attempts to regain lost 
ground and negotiates wage increases in excess of those warranted purely by the observed 
changes that have occurred in the sector over the year. The observed variability in wage 
growth in the year following the incomes policy in these circumstances will be higher 
than would have been observed in the absence of policy. In a regression analysis, this will 
therefore show as a negative coefficient on wage growth variability measured one year 
previous, exactly as obtained in the results of Table 3.4.
3.3 Conclusions
The results provided in the previous section are clearly in sharp contrast to those
obtained in the U.S.; the relations obtained are generally in the direction we would expect
on the basis of (3.5) and are significant. While these results do not prove the existence of
Keynesian wage rigidities, they are entirely consistent with the presence of nominal wage
♦inertia as captured by probabilities of renegotiation (it ) which are less than one in each 
period. Moreover, given the evidence of ‘catch-up’ behaviour provided by the results of 
Table 3.4, the results here appear to be influenced by the annual nature of wage 
bargaining.
These results, along with those for the U.S., provide some information on the 
process of wage adjustment, illustrating the importance of the speed of renegotiation and 
of indexation in explaining this process. However, a more detailed analysis of the wage- 
setting process at the level of the decision maker is clearly necessary to fully understand 
these influences, and to explain the time pattern of wage settlments. Such a study is 
considered in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
A Direct Investigation of Nominal Wage Inertia through the 
Frequency of Wage Negotiations
The preceding chapter provides an indirect means of looking at labour market 
adjustment and nominal wage inertia. The analysis indicates that, contrary to the results 
obtained in the U.S., wage responsiveness in the U.K. is influenced by labour market 
conditions in a way that is consistent with Keynesian rigidities, or more generally, with 
less-than-instantaneous wage adjustment in each period. In so doing, it highlights the
a|(
importance of the frequency of negotiation, as captured by the Kt term. Of course, the 
frequency of negotiations is only part of the story in explaining wage change (since the 
size of wage change, given that negotiation occurs, is also important), but from the 
discussion of the last chapter (and from the algebraic model of section 2.5) it is clear that 
the decision on how often and when to negotiate is important in its own right, and 
provides insights into the process of wage-determination as a whole. This chapter 
therefore concentrates on this aspect of nominal wage change, looking at the timing of 
wage settlements of individual industries in the U.K. in order to investigate more directly 
the influences on the wage-setting decision and the causes of nominal wage inertia.
In chapter 2, we noted three distinct approaches to explaining the frequency of 
wage negotiations; the first underlies much of the literature on inter-country differences in 
wage-setting institutions and in the literature on strike behaviour, and concentrates on the 
costs involved in negotiations over wages (these costs are potentially high because wages 
not only allocate labour resources for economic efficiency, but also determine income 
shares); the second approach emphasises the importance of uncertainty in wage 
negotiations, and is associated with Gray’s (1976, 1978) papers on indexation working 
within the framework of fixed-length contracts; and the third approach considers the 
simultaneity of the decision of when and by how much to alter wages, working within a 
framework of variable-length, open-ended contracts. This framework is most relevant to 
the U.K., and is well illustrated in Pencavel (1982).
While these three approaches have generally been considered separately, they are 
not mutually exclusive, and in section 4.2, I shall consider a model of the decision on 
whether to enter negotiations, working within the U.K. context of open-ended contracts, 
which illustrates that all three influences can be justified within the same optimising 
framework. This raises the question of whether any of these explanations is empirically 
more relevant than the others, particularly in view of the fact that past empirical work has 
also concentrated on the explanations in isolation. These issues are investigated in the
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empirical work of section 4.3. First, however, in the next section, I describe briefly an 
overview of a database containing details of the timing of industrial wage settlements in 
the UK. The main point of this exercise, apart from introducing the data which is to be 
used in subsequent analysis, is to show that although the majority of wage settlements 
take place one year after the previous one, there is considerable variability in the length 
of time between successive wage settlements, and certainly it is not true that wages are 
uniformly renegotiated annually.
4.1 Some exploratory analysis
The Aberdeen wage rates database, constructed at the University of Aberdeen by 
Elliot, Steele and Bell (1977), provides a base from which to study the frequency of wage 
settlements. Collated primarily from the Department of Employment publications "Time 
rates of wages and hours of work" and "Changes in rates of wages and hours of work", 
the database contains details of all the wage settlements of the 191 largest national 
negotiating groups over the period 1950-75 (these being those groups which covered 5000 
or more workers at some point during the sample period. In total, these groups covered 
around 12 million workers in 1975). In particular, the database includes information on 
the bargaining system employed, trade unions involved, weekly and hourly rates of pay 
negotiated for various groups, and the dates of implementation and of settlement for each 
of these wage negotiations.
The availability of data on the timings of settlements enables us to assess the 
variability of periods between negotiations. Before embarking on this course, however, we 
note two reservations. First, in dealing with national agreements we have no information 
on those elements of wage negotiation occurring at lower levels (i.e. we miss the effects 
of "wage drift"). It is difficult to assess the importance of such a loss, although Elliot and 
Steele (1976) have argued strongly to assert the importance of nationally negotiated wage 
rates. Second, interpretation of the data must take into account the definition of a 
"settlement" that has been used in collating the data. In the case of the Aberdeen 
database, wage changes that occur in different calendar-years are treated as separate 
settlements even if they result from one set of negotiations. When more than one wage 
change occurs in the same calendar year but they are the result of separate sets of 
negotiations, they are also treated as separate settlements. However, if more than one 
wage change is made within the same calendar year but they are the result of the same 
set of negotiations, then they are treated as part of one settlement. In this case, 
settlements are aggregated to the last implementation date in that year. While this 
procedure reduces the complexities faced in collating the data, unless care is taken in
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analysis, some of the figures obtained in this way may be misleading, particularly where 
the wage change occurs as the result of an indexation clause. As an illustration, we might 
consider the data for the year 1974; the introduction of the ’threshold’ at the end of 1973, 
allowing for compensation of 40p per week for every one percentage point rise in RPI 
above 7%, led to such payments every week from the second quarter in 1974 to late 1974 
(and indeed into 1975 for some). In the data set these have been aggregated to the last 
payment date, with the consequence that almost all groups reached new ’settlements’ at 
least once in the fourth quarter of 1974. Fortunately, the database specifies where wage 
changes occur as the result of indexation clauses, or as part of long-term or staged 
settlements, so that we can take these features into account. In particular, as we shall see 
later in the paper, the ability to distinguish between those groups covered by cost-of- 
living clauses and those with no protection against inflation is essential in an analysis of 
the determination of the length of time between negotiations.
Elliot (1976) provides a detailed description of the timing of settlements in the 
data set, demonstrating, among other things, that there is little evidence to support the 
stylised view that U.K. wages are invariably renegotiated on an annual basis. Figure 4.1, 
which is based on the entire sample of 191 industries, also provides an indication of the 
variability of periods between negotiations; while the majority of negotiations do take 
place four quarters after the previous negotiation, significant numbers occur both more 
and less frequently than this. The mean duration of the 4 295 settlements covered in the 
data set is 3.85 quarters, but with a standard deviation of 2.06 quarters there is clearly 
some significant variation around this mean.
Figure 4.2 confirms this variability, also demonstrating that industries differed in 
their disposition to negotiate. The constructional engineering industry were seen to 
implement 57 settlements over the sample period, giving a mean contract length of just 
1.9 quarters, while two industries, dock labour and fur manufacture, had mean contract 
lengths in excess of 6.5 quarters. The mean of these average industry contract lengths is
4.07 quarters, and again a standard deviation of 0.94 quarters illustrates the presence of 
some variability.
Finally, Table 4.1 provides an indication of the variability of renegotiation 
probabilities over time; in the table, attention is restricted to industries in the 
manufacturing sector (as it will be in later empirical work), and gives
*t = ^ i t  /  Nt
where = number of workers involved in new settlement i in time t, i=l,... k t; kt = 
number of new settlements in time t; and Nt = total number of workers employed in time 
t.
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Table 4.1
Proportion of workforce involved in new wage settlements
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 TOTAL
0.623 0.604 0.049 0.188 1.455
0.636 0.406 0.089 0.122 1.264
0.421 0.547 0.132 0.126 1.226
0.259 0.385 0.260 0.262 1.165
0.310 0.089 0.141 0.170 0.710
0.465 0.286 0.178 0.274 1.203
0.570 0.107 0.087 0.282 0.976
0.500 0.270 0.418 0.154 1.342
0.462 0.176 0.078 0.349 1.065
0.448 0.234 0.160 0.415 1.257
0.418 0.258 0.350 0.414 1.440
0.665 0.220 0.113 0.027 1.025
0.168 0.355 0.416 0.378 1.317
0.367 0.161 0.324 0.396 1.248
0.172 0.131 0.219 0.263 0.789
0.303 0.125 0.244 0.509 1.181
0.213 0.439 0.136 0.227 1.015
0.206 0.344 0.314 0.062 0.926
0.274 0.538 0.120 0.181 1.113
0.310 0.534 0.180 1.025 2.049
0.402 0.431 0.202 0.368 1.403
84
♦ f
proport ion o f  workers  
m io n oL ia l  inrj
1 . ( )
0 . 9
0.0
0 .7
0.6
0 . 5
0.4
0 . 3
0 . 2
0.1
T T
' F ' in d i c a t e s  wage- freeze incomes p o l i c y  in e f f e c t
'T ' in d i c a t e s  incomes p o l i c i e s  l i m i t i n g  n e go t ia t i on  to one per annum in e f f e c t
P
roportion 
of 
w
orkers 
achieving 
wage 
settlem
en
ts 
1955-74
\
The table clearly shows that these proportions alter greatly over time, although it 
is by no means clear whether this variation is in any way systematic. Figure 4.3, in which 
the proportions are plotted against time, perhaps provides some insights, especially when 
written against the various periods of income policy regimes experienced in the UK; 
certainly the periods during which wage freezes were imposed appear to have fewer 
negotiations occurring, while some annual pattern can be discerned during periods in 
which negotiations were limited to one per annum. We will return to these issues later in 
the chapter.
The Aberdeen wage rates database provides some justification for our proposed 
framework of open-ended contracts of varying length; certainly there appears to be a great 
deal of variability in the length of time between negotiations over wages, both between 
industries and within any industry at different periods of time. In the following sub­
section I will discuss in more detail a model of the labour market and the determination 
of negotiation frequency which will fit into this framework. As mentioned earlier, the 
model provides a justification for all three of the approaches to explaining negotiation 
frequency outlined in section 2.3.
4.2 Modelling the decision to renegotiate wages
The microeconomic theory
The discovery that the duration of wage contracts in the UK is variable is, in fact, 
perfectly in keeping with microeconomic theory. Since it is not possible to accomodate all 
contingencies which are pertinent to workers and firms when wage settlements are struck, 
there will be a loss of welfare generated because the terms of a contract cannot be altered 
during the contract period. Further, if innovations in the variables relevent to firms and 
workers are serially correlated, then the terms of the contract are likely to become 
increasingly inappropriate over time. Optimal control theory suggests that in these 
circumstances a state-contingent rule should be followed in which the contract expires 
when the relevent variables reach a critical limit If the innovations to the relevent 
variables occur stochastically, then the frequency with which the critical limit is reached, 
and with which contracts are reset, is also stochastic. In these circumstances, it is 
appropriate to consider nominal inertia in probabalistic terms, with the degree of inertia 
captured by the probability of renegotiation. This, of course, is precisely the form in 
which nominal wage inertia has been considered so far in the thesis, forming the basis of 
the illustrative macromodel in section 2.5, and providing the generalisation to 
Hamermesh’s model of wage rigidities in chapter 3.
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In fact, we have already discussed in section 2.2, state-contingent rules of the 
form described above in the context of price adjustment. The papers by Barro (1972) and 
Sheshinski and Weiss (1978) illustrate, in a deterministic environment, the optimality of 
so called ‘(s,S) rules’ for price adjustment, while papers by Sheshinski and Weiss (1982) 
and Danziger (1984) extend the analysis to a stochastic framework. These latter papers in 
particular are of direct relevence to the modelling of the decision on whether or not to 
enter wage negotiations since many of the elements of the analysis have direct 
counterparts in the decision on wage negotiation. In the next few paragraphs, we 
summarise these elements and note the counterparts in the wage setting decision.
The analysis in Danziger (1984) demonstrates the optimality of an (s,S) pricing 
policy, in which nominal prices are reset to achieve a real value of ‘S* whenever the real 
price falls to a lower bound of ‘s’. The contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that 
this is true when real prices evolve over time according to a stochastic process of a 
particular (reasonably realistic) form. In the paper, aggregate prices rise over time through 
a sequence of non-zero shocks, ej. The shocks are independently and identically 
distributed with a distribution function F(ej), and each shock q  causes the aggregate price 
to grow by exp(mej). The shocks are assumed to occur according to a Poisson process, so 
that the interval between shocks is independent of time and follow themselves an 
exponential distribution. The intensity of the arrival of the shock is captured by the 
parameter Xt the mean interval between shocks. Having characterised the time path of 
aggregate prices, Danziger is able to evaluate the expected real price of the firm’s output 
in all future periods. Assuming that real profit at any time depends only on the real price 
of output, and that there is a fixed real cost involved in adjusting nominal prices, the 
expected discounted future profit stream can be calculated on this basis. Further, assuming 
that the profit function is of a standard form (i.e. differentiable, strictly quasi-concave, and 
obtaining a unique internal maximum at some real price), the choice of the optimal 
sequence of renegotiation times and price settlements can be shown in these 
circumstances to be provided by the (s,S) strategy, with the ‘s’ and ‘S’ parameters chosen 
to maximise the average expected real profit
A directly comparable framework is contained in the following illustrative 
description of the wage-setting decision. Here, we recall the discussion of chapter 2 and 
assume that wages are set unilaterally by a union which represents all of the workers in 
an industry, and that employers set employment levels in the light of this decision (i.e. we 
assume a ‘monopoly union’ model). Union utility is derived from real wages and from 
employment, and the latter is itself (negatively) dependent on the real wage through the 
labour demand relationship. In addition, the union recognises the real potential costs 
involved in wage negotiation, as discussed in section 2.3. In this situation, the union’s 
decision on when to reset nominal wages, and by how much, minors precisely the
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decision made by firms, and described by Danziger, on when, and by how much, nominal 
prices should be altered. The union’s utility function corresponds to the firm’s profit 
function, both being dependent on real magnitudes, with an exogenously determined 
deflator, and involving fixed real adjustment costs. If the utility function is of a standard 
form, then a unique internal maximum of the utility function can be assumed to exist at 
some real wage. Further, assuming that the union has some idea of the stochastic nature 
of the aggregate price deflator (it may follow the sort of process described by Danziger, 
for example), then the union will choose a wage setting strategy which maximises average 
expected utility. The union does not reset wages at each stage because of the presence of 
adjustment costs. Instead, nominal wages are reset to achieve a real wage of ‘S’ whenever 
real wages have fallen to a level ‘s’. The (s,S) parameters will depend on the nature of 
the stochastic process which provides innovations to the aggregate price level and on the 
size of the adjustment costs, exactly as in the Danziger paper. The intervals between 
negotiations are stochastic, and the probability of renegotiation at any moment is defined 
by the probability that real wages fall to their lower bound.
Of course, in order to keep the mathematics tractable, Danziger is forced in his 
paper to impose a very restricted form on his analysis of price adjustment, which reduces 
its applicability to the real world. Hence, in reality, the firm’s profit function will not 
remain unchanged over time, as changes in demand conditions, for example, complicate 
the relationship between real prices and profits. Equally, the process by which aggregate 
inflation evolves in the model is a very stylised one, and the exogeneity assumption 
abstracts from the important issue of how the pricing policies of individual firms affect 
the properties of the aggregate price level. Similar comments are applicable to the wage- 
setting process, as the relationship between union utility and the real wage alters when the 
demand for labour curve shifts. Industry-specific shocks to productivity, for example, 
affect the labour demand constraint faced by union, and hence the level of utility which is 
achievable. Such effects could be incorporated directly into the Danziger analysis through 
a careful choice of functional forms for union utility and for the labour demand 
relationship so that a composite exogenous deflator (dependent on aggregate price shocks 
and on industry specific productivity shocks) would be appropriate in a union utility 
function which is otherwise fixed over time. Such an exercise would be useful in 
showing, for example, that the probability of renegotiation can differ between industries if 
productivity shocks occur at different times in different industries. However, it is more 
useful to think of the above discussion as providing an explanation for why these 
elements might affect renegotiation frequency, with the recognotion that, in the real world, 
there are many more influences that might play a part in the decision to renegotiate than 
those that can be incorporated into a stylised mathematical model of this sort. Hence, 
while Danziger*s (and our own) discussion of renegotiation concentrates on the effects of
88
\
aggregate price movements, we recognise that a more comprehensive set of variables than 
the aggregate inflation rate alone would effect the decision to reset wages in reality.
Having said this, we note that in the context of Danziger* s model, changes in the 
rate of inflation are obtained if we observe an increase in the frequency with which 
shocks occur (increased X) or an increase in the responsiveness of aggregate inflation to 
shocks (increased ‘m’). As is the case with a firm’s pricing decision, such changes have 
an ambiguous effect on renegotiation frequency and expected renegotiation probabilities. 
Increasing inflation causes the union to reset its (s,S) parameters to widen the band within 
which nominal wages remain unaltered. Hence, although the expected rate of decline in 
real wages over any contract is increased, the extent of the decline is greater, leaving the 
overall effect on renegotiation frequency ambiguous. (Having said this, it is recognised 
that the probability of renegotiation would rise in the face of increases in the expected 
inflation rate if any of a wide variety of functional forms are specified for the union 
utility function). Increases in the real cost of entering wage negotiations unambiguously 
extend the expected interval between negotiations, and correspondingly reduce 
renegotiation probabilities. Changes in the distribution function F(.) which preserve the 
mean size of the shock but which alter the variance of the size of the shocks might be 
interpreted as changes in the level of aggregate price uncertainty. These too have an 
ambiguous effect on renegotiation probabilities, since a mean-preserving spread in the 
shocks can cause the average expected utility to rise or fall, depending on the functional 
form of the utility function, so that the effect on the (s,S) parameters is not generally 
defined.
Despite the ambiguities described above, it is clear that this framework provides 
the justification for the inclusion of all three elements which are generally considered 
important in determining the frequency of wage negotiations:
(i) changes in economic conditions that have occurred since the previous settlement, 
denoted Xt-Xt_s, where X is a vector of influential variables, and where t-s is the date of 
the previous negotiation (this is captured in the Danziger paper by the growth in 
aggregate inflation generated by the accumulation of shocks);
(ii) negotiation costs, Ct; and
(iii) uncertainty over the variables relevent to the wage negotiation, U(Xt).
In the light of the above discussion, in what follows, we simply assume that wage 
negotiations occur at discrete intervals, with the probability of renegotiation dependent on 
these three sets of influences.
Operationalising the model
In order to choose a comprehensive set of variables that might influence the 
negotiable nominal wage, we need to consider not only the wage setting behaviour of an
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industry, but also its output and pricing decisions. This is because these affect the labour 
demand constraints faced by the union when setting wages. Below then, we set out a 
static model of nominal wage determination which accommodates these elements. The 
description of the model is brief since it is derived and discussed in detail in the 
following chapter, which is explicitly concerned with the employment, pricing and output 
decisions of an industry, as well as its wage-setting. Here, we simply wish to obtain a set 
of potentially important influences on the nominal wage. Briefly then, and referring to 
section 5.1 for details, it is noted that a stylised representation of an industry is given by 
the following general forms for its labour demand, price, and output demand equations:
na = n^a* wa’ %’ ka> nltn3>0, n2,n4<0 (4.1)
pa = p(<xa, ya, wa, qa, ka) Pi,p2.P3»P4>0* P5<0 (4-2)
ya = E>i(pa. P, pma, a) DjcO, D2,D3,D4>0 (4.3)
where na = employment in industry A, ya = output in industry A, ka = capital stock in 
industry A, wa = price of labour input to industry A, qa = vector of other input prices to 
industry A (materials), pa = price of industry A’s output, p = aggregate price level, pma 
= price of imported industry product, o= measure of aggregate cyclic variation, and a a = 
oligopoly power in industry A.
In chapter 2, we discussed some of the recent advances made in the study of the 
labour market, and noted some of the ways in which unions are now playing an important 
role in many analyses of labour market behaviour. In the "right to manage" union model, 
unions and firms bargain over wages knowing that employment will be set (subsequently) 
according to (4.1). Both sides to the bargain maximise utility. In the case of the firm, this 
is determined simply by profit levels. In the case of the union, utility depends on real 
wages, possibly in comparison to some reference group, and employment The bargaining 
solution depends on the bargaining strength of the firm relative to the union, and provides 
the following expression (with more complete details given in Chapter 5):
wa = w( w, a a, qa, ka, p, taxes, o, costs) = w(%a) (4.4)
where w = aggregate wages, and ‘costs’ are variables which affect negotiation costs to the 
union, to be identified below. This expression provides us with our vector of potentially 
influential variables in the decision to renegotiate, xa- If nominal wages are set according 
to (4.4) whenever negotiations are entered into, then changes in these variables since the 
last wage settlement provide a measure of the extent to which the nominal wage that was
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\last negotiated has become inappropriate, and provides an indicator of the likelihood of 
new wage negotiations being entered into/*)
It is important to note that the model of wage determination described above is 
static, and that, in a more realistic setting, there will be information imperfections and 
dynamic considerations which necessitate expectations to be formed. For example, as was 
illustrated in the algebraic model of section 2.5, if we allow for many sectors in the 
economy, then individual unions have to form expectations on the outcome of decisions 
by unions in other sectors of the economy made simultaneously with their own, so that 
expectations on current values of aggregate variables have to be formed. Similarly, if the 
union recognises the presence of inertia in its own or in other sectors, then the influences 
affecting the current negotiable wage will include not only expectations of current dated 
variables, but also expectations of future dated variables and past observations on these 
variables. In view of these comments, (4.4) above can be written more realistically as
wat = Xat-1’ # a t’ #at+l* #at+2’~)
= W( tXft ) (4.5)
where tXat+j = ^  Xat+j I j=0,l 1, 2,..., with f)at representing union A’s information 
set at time t, and Xat is the vector of variables, dated at any time (past, present, or 
future), which are influential in the determination of the negotiable wage in A at time t.
Written in this way, two points become apparent. First, changes in the influences 
affecting the current negotiable wage since the previous negotiation, (tXat - t_sX®t_s), will 
depend not only on the changes taking place in variables observed in time t compared to 
time t-s (the date of the previous negotiation), but will depend on changes in the whole 
profile of past, present, and future values of the relevent variables, (txft-l “ t-s^at-s-l^’ 
(#at '  t-s^at-s)’ (#at+l '  t-s^at-s+l)’ and so on- 111 practice, it will be very difficult to 
incorporate these broader horizons into analysis, and in the empirical work we will use
the simple vector of variables (xat - %at_s); however, we should be aware of the
importance of the past and expected future movements, and interpret results accordingly.
The second point to note is the influence of unexpected innovations that occur 
between settlements. This influence is identified by noting that
tx f - t-sx f-s = ( Xt '  x t-s > '  ( x t '  tx t ) + ( x t-s - t-sXt-S )
= ( actual change in Xt ) - ( shock to Xt unanticipated at t ) +
( shock to Xt_s unanticipated at t-s ). 
Clearly, at time t, when making the decision on whether to enter negotiations, the second
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element above is unknown, and assuming that decisions are formed rationally, this 
element will not systematically influence the decision. Growth in the variables relevent to 
wage setting, as captured by the first term, is important, however, as are the observed 
innovations in the variables that have occurred since the previous negotiation. Hence, on 
the basis of the third element, negotiations are more likely to occur if an unanticipated 
shock reduces the real wage below the level that had been anticipated when the previous 
negotiation was struck (since the lower bound is more likely to be reached), while a 
shock that causes real wages to be higher than bargained for will make the occurance of a 
new wage settlement less l ik e ly .^ )  Of course, in practice there will be some difficulty in 
measuring unanticipated shocks, especially when these are based on expectations which 
are different across agents and formed over differing time horizons by different groups. 
The recogntion of the fact that unexpectedly rapid inflation experienced during a contract 
will raise renegotiation probabilities, while unexpectedly slow inflation will reduce 
pressure for wage change will therefore also complicate the empirical analysis of 
negotiation frequency; again results obtained in the empirical work must be interpreted 
with these complications in mind.
Throughout this model description, we have made reference to negotiation costs, 
Cat, as a justification for less than complete wage adjustment in each period; this follows 
directly from the discussion in section 2.3 of chapter 2. In that chapter, we also 
considered some of the sources of negotiation costs, and it is appropriate here to remind 
ourselves of these so that we can consider how to model them in our empirical work. In 
fact, we noted a variety of potential indicators of the level of negotiation costs, working 
from two alternative views of the bargaining process (these having been spelt out in 
Turk’s (1984) analysis of strike behaviour). These indicators are justified according to 
their influence on the ease of communication between parties to the negotiations in an 
industry, on the costs of a strike or lockout to the two parties, and on the size of the 
bargaining zone within which negotiations take place. These indicators included the 
following (with the direction of the influence in parentheses):
(i) Nature of output (?)
(ii) Bargaining system used (?)
(iii) Seasonals (?)
(iv) Aggregate and/or local unemployment rates (-)
(v) Unemployment/social security benefits (+)
(vi) Trade union membership - (+)
(vii) External strike activity (?)
(viii) Profit levels (+)
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(ix) Ratio of inventories to sales
(x) Uncertainty
(xi) "Freeze” and "12-month-rule" incomes policies
(xii) "Ceiling" incomes policies
(-)
(?)
(-)
(+)
Each of these variables will be used in the empirical work on the determination of 
the negotiation frequency which follows in section 4.3.
4.3 The empirical work 
Introduction
The preceding section set out the factors influential in the determination of the 
negotiable wage in an industry, and suggested that the probability that the industry will 
negotiate in any period will depend on the change in the determinants of the negotiable 
wage since the last negotiation, on the costs of negotiation (also specified in the last 
section), and on uncertainty. That is
7Ejt = prob(i negotiates in time t)
where t-s = time of last negotiation for industry i. Here, we also include a term vjt which 
is a stochastic element intended to capture any idiosyncratic behaviour based on non- 
observable costs or shocks.
This formulation is more general than those implied by the empirical work that 
has previously been carried out in this area, and in this section we will provide some 
empirical evidence on its appropriateness and its superiority, or otherwise, over its 
predecessors. Specifically, we will compare estimates of the relationship given in (4.6), 
based on the Aberdeen wage rates database described in section 4.1, with related 
equations reported in the papers by Pencavel (1982), and C+W (i.e Christofides and 
Wilton (1983), and Christofides (1985) ) mentioned earlier. Since we will be using a 
different data set to those used in these earlier papers, direct statistical comparisons will 
not be possible, although tests of some of the restrictions implied in the earlier work can 
be carried out.
Table 4.2 presents some of the relations reported in these earlier papers. It is clear 
from this that the Pencavel model (shown in column (1) of the table) is closest in spirit to 
that of (4.6). In his probit analysis of the probability of negotiation in the U.K. coal 
industry, Pencavel has used changes in prices, in output per man, and in the selling price
(4.6)
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Table 4.2: Equations explaining renegotiation frequency
Dept. ^probability of wage change L=length of 1440 non-indexed contracts
variable in U.K. coal industry = 0 or 1 in Canadian unionised sector(mths)
Pencavel (1982, Tab2, Col.l) Christofides + Wilton (1983, Tabl, Col.2)
(1) (2)
(1) Change in retail price Ap 0.285 (1) Length of previous PL 0.573
since last negotiation: Ap (0.085) contracts: PL (24.30)
(2) Change in output Ax 0.033
per man: Ax (0.036)
(3) Change in setting Ac -0.007
price of coal: Ac (0.045)
(4) Aggregate u -0.301
unemployment: u (0.465)
(1) Constant C -1.077 0 ) Constant plus C 84.529
(0.900) industry-specific (11.93)
intercepts:
(2) Seasonals SI-S3 SI 0.360 C, SIC1-SIC3: SIC1 2.216
(0.442) (1.36)
S2 -0.005 SIC2 4.207
(0.494) (2.79)
S3 -0.373 SIC3 2.732
(0.559) (3.99)
(3) Incomes policy 11 -1.754
dummies 11-13 (0.609) (2) Dummy = 1 if DSIZE -0.074
size of industry (0.11)
12 -0.540 > 1,000 workers:
(0.969) DSIZE
13 0.206
(0.498)
(4) Dummy for structural D 3.280
shift in 1967iv: D (2.770)
UD -1.266
(0.947)
Xj1 (1) Square of UNCERT -12.234
standard error of (8.69)
sliding regression 
on p: UNCERT
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Table 4.2 (cont)
Dept.
variable
L = length of 3,765 non-indexed contracts in Canadian 
private sector (quarters) in Christofides (1985)
Tab 3. Col. 1 
(3)
Tab 2. Col. 1 
(4)
t^ift-s^it-s (1) Length of previous 
contract: PL
PL 1.00 (1) 
(imposed)
Length of previous 
previous 
contract: PL
PL 0.353
(24.89)
(1) Incomes 
policy
dummy: DAIB
DAIB -1.273 (1) Constant plus 
(4.50) industry- 
specific 
intercepts:
C, SIC1-3
(2) Incomes 
policy
dummy: DAIB
SIC1
SIC2
SIC3
DAIB
30.210
(15.74)
1.419
(2.29)
1.791
(3.19)
1.221
(5.19)
-3.028
(8.63)
(1) Square of 
standard 
error of 
sliding 
regression 
on p: UNCERT
UNCERT -5.599 (1) Square of 
(12.19) standard 
error of 
sliding 
regression 
on p: UNCERT
UNCERT -2.847
(8.30)
3,4.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses in cols 1,2; absolute t-ratios in parentheses in cols
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of coal, plus an unemployment measure to capture the influence of (tXjt - t-s^it-s^- 
Dummies for seasonal variation and the impact of incomes policies are included to 
incoiporate the effect of Ct. No reference is made to the effect of uncertainty. In contrast, 
the C+W papers stress the importance of uncertainty in their analysis of Canadian contract 
length. Underlying the results in column (3), for example, is a model of contract length 
which constrains the effects of the variables measured by tXjt - t-s^it-s’ and of those in 
Ct other than those incurred through the imposition of incomes policies to be constant 
over time, so that they can be captured by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable 
(with unit coefficient). The model behind the results in columns (4) and (2) explicitly 
considers the possible industry-specific costs incurred in negotiation by including shift 
dummies, and an additional dummy for incomes policy effects is included in column (4), 
and one for the size of the bargaining unit is included in column (2). However, again, 
uncertainty is cited as the key determinant of contract length, and a lagged dependent 
variable is used to capture the influence of the remaining elements of transaction cost
The empirical work previously carried out, as presented in Table 4.2, can be 
extended on a number of counts. First, having established that the three "distinct" 
approaches to explaining negotiation frequency are different elements of the one desire to 
minimise the net costs of negotiations, we can now include all of these elements in our 
work where previously they had been considered in isolation. Further, since we have 
explicitly set down both a model of nominal wage determination and a list of variables 
which may influence negotiation costs directly, we can consider a far broader range of 
possibly influential variables than that used previously. Second, having clarified the 
theoretical basis of the decision on when to enter negotiations in the previous section, we 
are now better able to interpret any patterns in the timing of settlements over and above 
those explained by our model. For example, having noted the forward-looking element of 
wage determination described earlier, we might expect surges and slumps in the number 
of negotiations to occur prior to policy implementation as agents respond to the release of 
the news of this policy. And finally, we recognise that we have in the Aberdeen wage 
rates database a highly detailed description of the pattern of U.K. wage settlements in 
many industries, using a variety of bargaining methods and in different sectors of the 
economy. Certainly then any relationships found on the basis of this database will neither 
be dependent on, nor spoiled by, the idiosyncratic behaviour of a particular industry or 
sector (as we suggested might be true of the Pencavel analysis). These points will be 
borne in mind during the empirical work reported in the following two subsections.
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Linear analysis
In the first instance, we will consider a relatively unsophisticated regression 
analysis of our database, working with variants of the following aggregated linear model:
ftit= ®I0 + (^it"^It-4^,a + ^it*P + ^ l t  + ^It*^ + eIt (4-7)
where 7Cjt = proportion of agents in grouping I negotiating in time t, Xjt = vector of 
variables influential on the negotiable wage, Ct = vector of direct cost variables, Tjt= 
vector of variables to take into account the time profile of past settlements in I, Xj*t= 
uncertainty over variables in Xjt, and £jt= random element.
The imposition of linearity on a general form when moving from theoretic to 
empirical work is a procedure which is often employed because of the ease of estimation 
of the linear form. It is recognised that, when explaining a bounded variable such as rcjt, 
the error terms will not have the properties assumed to hold to justify an application of 
OLS regression analysis, but we will ignore these problems in this first section, and 
consider a more sophisticated analysis later.
We note too that in using the variable 7Cjt we have moved from an analysis of the 
individual negotiating units to a more aggregate level, so that it is not possible to 
incorporate the time profile of past settlements directly through the change in the 
negotiable wage since the last negotiation. Here we use two sets of variables to pick up 
these effects: the change in variables affecting the negotiable wage over the previous four 
quarters, (Xt-Xt^ ), and Tt which includes the dependent variable lagged by a variety of 
quarters, and dummies to pick up ’catch-up’ behaviour when a once-and-for-all shock has 
altered the pattern of past settlements.^)
Our initial empirical analysis considers the simplest possible specification in 
which all production industries are included in grouping I of (4.7) (and with "I" defined in 
this way, 7Cjt is presented in Table 4.1, and illustrated in Figure 4.3, of this chapter). 
While this specification makes the least use of the information contained in our dataset, it 
provides a useful base for initial exploration. At this level of aggregation, of course, we 
cannot take account of any industry-specific cost elements, although aggregate measures 
of the other cost variables (unemployment, stocks, profits, seasonals, incomes policy 
implementation, etc.) are clearly still appropriate. Regarding the influences on the 
negotiable wage, we note that data on the aggregate wholesale price level, on the tax 
wedge, on the price of materials, and on the replacement ratio are readily available, while 
movements in the underlying capital stock and level of technical progress are, in 
anticipation of later work at the sectoral level, measured by changes in output-per-man 
productivity. Changes in the level of aggregate real demand can be represented
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alternatively by movements in exogenous variables such as world trade, government 
spending, and international competitiveness, or, again anticipating future work at a more 
disaggregated level, by movements in aggregate real domestic output.
Although the model of wage setting of the last section indicates that increased 
uncertainty over any of the variables influencing the nominal wage will cause more 
frequent negotiations, in the following analysis we will concentrate our attention solely on 
price level uncertainty, as is emphasised in the C+W papers, and in much of the literature 
concerned with the effects of uncertainty. Price level uncertainty will be measured in 
three alternative ways:
UNCERT1 is given by the square of the standard error of a sliding regression of price 
inflation on its own lagged values, (as employed in the C+W work);
UNCERT2 is given by the variance of price inflation over the preceding quarters (as 
used in Lucas (1973), for example);
UNCERT3 is given by the (absolute) gap between the actual and expected inflation rate. 
In this latter case, rational expectations of the inflation rate have been generated by 
the NIESR macromodel.
Figure 4.4 demonstrates the similarities between movements over time of all of these 
measures of price uncertainty and with movements in the actual inflation rate. This may 
come as little surprise since the uncertainty generated during periods of inflation is often 
cited as one of the greatest costs of inflation, as in Hayek’s famous (1945) paper, or in 
Friedman’s (1977) Nobel lecture, and a paper by Logue and Willet (1976) has 
demonstrated previously the link between high and volatile rates of inflation. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that none of our uncertainty measures truly capture the inability 
of agents to predict price movements, but rather shows the inadequacies of attempts to 
model these movements statistically, and that the inadequacies become more apparent 
during periods of rapid price increase. In either case, the importance of these similarities 
will become apparent as we now consider some of our estimated relations.
In Table 4.3 the estimation shown in Columns (1) and (2) represents the results of 
a specification search in which all of the influences mentioned in the previous sections 
were considered. In this we find the rate of change of the aggregate wholesale price level 
(Awhpr), changes in material’s prices (Afc), and productivity changes (Aprody) to be most 
influential amongst the variables we have suggested determine the negotiable wage, and 
their influence is in the direction we would expect, although significance levels are low. 
Changes in taxes (direct and indirect) were not shown to be significant, and neither were 
changes in aggregate demand, whether measured by the growth of real gdp or by the joint 
influence of world trade, competitiveness and the government’s fiscal stance. Movements 
in the replacement ratio also made no contribution to the explanation of 7Cjt.
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Table 4.3
Dependent variables =
I = (all production industries); 1964i-75iv (n = 48)
(1) (2) (3)
p Constant 1.109 (1.545) 1.344 (2.455) 0.278 (3.386)
Tt i^t-l -0.353 (2.300) -0.373 (2.547) -0.212 (1.685)
K\t-2 -0.162 (1.251) -0.142 (1.165) -0.183 (1.465)DlAiv 0.603 (3.783) 0.581 (3.842) 0.591 (4.212)
CATFR1 0.037 (0.197) 0.063 (0.360) 0.066 (0.414)
CATFR2 0.218 (1.363) 0.212 (1.353) 0.271 (1.893)
xt-xM Awhpr
Afc
Aprody
2.251 (1.454) 
-1.151 (1.880) 
1.627 (0.780)
2.889 (3.129) 
1.220 (2.013) 
1.498 (0.733)
Ct stocks
urt
-0.042 (0.985) 
-0.044 (0.906) 
0.111 (1.425) 
0.037 (0.476)
-0.053 (1.543) 
-0.036 (0.794) 
0.128 (1.845) 
0.053 (0.750)
0.034 (0.639) 
0.002 (0.032)
0.040 (0.723) -0.050.(0.833) -0.064 (1.183)
dfl -0.133 (1.591) -0.139 (1.708) -0.111 (1.441)
df2 -0.126 (0.947) -0.159 (1.369) -0.146 (1.529)
a 0.125 (1.531) 0.124 (1.540) 0.156 (2.194)
C2 0.182 (1.453) 0.172 (1.411) 0.135 (1.321)
C3 -0.022 (0.363) -0.016 (0.272) -0.068 (1.294)
C4 0.180 (1.040) 0.175 (1.030) -0.072 (1.043)
C5 -0.097 (0.598) -0.042 (0.346) -0.221 (1.609)
I 1 1
UNCERT1 0.160 (0.518) 0.303 (2.234)
RSS 0.330 0.341 0.438
0.114 0.112 0.119
R2 0.761 0.758 0.689
R2(adj) 0.567 0.579 0.528
DW 2.215 2.259 2.354
Notes:
Absolute t-values in parentheses. See Data Appendix for definitions and Table A4.5 for a 
description of the choice of incomes policy dummies.
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Of the cost variables considered, the unemployment level (un), and the level of 
stocks relative to output (stocks), were seen to have a constraining influence over the 
decision to negotiate, although again significance levels are low. Some seasonal variation 
is also distinguished as the proportion of workers negotiating in the first quarter of the 
years is shown to be significantly higher than the rest of the year. (The dummy variable 
ql takes the value 1 in the first quarter of the year, and zero otherwise. Variables q2 and 
q3 are similarly defined). Other experiments with trade union membership, profit levels, 
and strike activity were unproductive, however.^ Incomes policy dummies are provided 
by FI, F2, and C1-C5, and these are described in Table 4.4. The estimates of Table
4.3 demonstrate that while both of the freeze incomes policy over our period reduced 
negotiations, only during some of the ceilings policies is there any evidence of the 
increased propensity to negotiate during these periods that was predicted earlier.
The variables introduced to model more closely the influence of past settlements 
and of once-and-for-all shocks, not captured by the (Xt-Xt_^ ) term, namely Kit-2’ 
d74iv, and CATRF1 and CATRF2, each have coefficients of the expected sign and are by 
and large significant. Hence negative coefficients on 7Cjt_j and capture the idea that 
if there is a jump in the number of negotiations in one period, then there is likely to be 
fewer in the succeeding periods; insignificance of and higher order lags illustrate 
that this effect is relatively short-lived. Positive coefficients on the D74iv dummy and the 
CATRF1 and CATRF2 dummies pick up the influence of the threshold agreements (as 
explained in section 4.1), and of an increase in negotiations immediately following 
periods of freeze incomes policy, as agents attempt to catch-up with movements which 
they had been unable to respond to previously.
Finally we consider the variable UNCERT 1 which has been introduced to capture 
the effects of price uncertainty. Clearly this variable contributes little explanatory power 
to the model over that captured by the other variables in Table 4.3 Column (1). However, 
comparing (1) and (2), in which UNCERT1 is omitted, shows a high degree of 
collinearity between this variable and our inflation measure, as we would expect from our 
earlier observations (and demonstrated by the instability in the estimated coefficient on 
inflation). In fact, if we drop those variables which we have associated with the 
negotiable wage and concentrate instead on the uncertainty measure and incomes policy 
variables alone, as in (3), then we have an equation which is comparable to those in the 
C+W papers and set out in Columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 4.2, and with similar 
results: uncertainty is now seen as exerting a significantly positive influence on 
negotiation frequency, while the effects of the imposition of incomes policies become 
more‘marked. This pattern is replicated if uncertainty is measured by the variability of 
recent inflation rates (UNCERT2), although UNCERT3 (the absolute gap between actual 
and expected inflation) displays little explanatory power either in conjunction with our
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Table 4.4
Brief description of pay policies : 1964-1975
Period Description
Wilson’s Labour Government
1965ii-66ii (Cl) Ceiling incomes policy; target increase of 3.5% 
enforced in public sector only.
1966iii-67ii (FI) "Wage Freeze" and "Severe Restraint". Statutory.
1967iii-68i (C2) Ceiling policy; voluntary restraint with zero norm
1968ii-70ii (C3) Ceiling policy; statutory 3.5% limit.
Heath’s Conservative Government
1972iv-73i (F2) Wage freeze during "Standstill". Statutory.
1973ii-74ii (C4) Ceiling policies; guidelines equivalent to 6.7%, 8.5%, 
and 13% between 1973ii-73iii, 1973iv, and 1974i-74ii 
respectively. Statutory.
1974ii-74iii Cost of living threshold increases (40p per week for 
every 1% point rise in RPI above 7%)
Labour’s "Social Contract"
1975iii-75iv (C5) Ceiling policy with 10.4% limit equivalent to £6. 
Statutory.
Twelve-month restraint
1967iii-70iv (DTI) Voluntary restraint requested
to limit negotiations to one per annum.
1973ii-75ii (DT2) Statutory limit of one new settlement per annum.
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other variables, or in isolation (see Table A4.1 in the Appendix for details of the results 
with these alternative uncertainty measures) .These  results highlight the fact that 
conclusions drawn in earlier work in which only some of the factors relevant to 
negotiation frequency were included in the analysis may be wrong: while inflation 
certainly has an impact on negotiation frequency, it is by no means clear whether this 
influence is a direct one, or one exerted indirectly through its effects on uncertainty, or 
both. Unfortunately, at this level of aggregation, the data is unable to resolve this issue; 
both the F test on the validity of excluding price uncertainty to obtain (2) from (1) and 
that on the joint significance of the variables excluded from (1) in (3) fail to reach 
significance (with F values of 0.268, cf Fj 27^.9) = 2.90, and 1.563, cf F526(0*9) = 
2.07), although the evidence falls in favour of the direct rather than indirect influence 
being significant (if UNCERT2 is used in place of UNCERT1, exactly equivalent results 
are obtained; if UNCERT3 is used, the evidence if unambiguously in favour of the direct 
influence with significance at the 5 per cent level reached in the test of the restrictions 
involved in (3)).
In the hope of improving our understanding of the relative importance of these 
contributory factors a second linear analysis of negotiation frequency was also attempted, 
again with the specified form of (4.7), but this time better use was made of our data as 
7ijt was redefined as the proportion of agents undertaking negotiations in industries in the 
i^1 out of twenty-six industrial groups (corresponding to the classification of the 1968 
SIC). While Ct, X{! and Tt, and many of the variables Xjt are still measured at the 
aggregate level, sectoral productivity measures can now be employed, although the use of 
the aggregate price of materials is made because of the absence of detailed disaggregate 
data. The assumption that the same slope coefficients are applicable to all industrial 
classifications is made so that we can pool the data, although separate intercept 
coefficients are used for each class in an attempt to capture some of the costs related to 
the internal characteristics of the industry mentioned earlier (these are assumed to be 
similar across industries within any SIC classification). Again we ignore the possibility of 
any complexities in the distribution and interrelations of the £jt (although in practice it is 
likely that the £jt are correlated across any time interval, i.e. E(£jt. £jt) * 0, since there 
are likely to be aggregate shocks to negotiation frequency which are not picked up by our 
other explanatory variables).
Table 4.5 presents equivalent results to those in Table 4.3, but based on this 
extended data set. Once more, the inclusion of our other candidates for influence does not 
significantly improve the explanatory power over that shown in Column (1), although the 
relative importance of the variables in this column differ significantly from that in Table
4.3 Column (1 ) .^  In particular, we note that the coefficient on UNCERT1 is now
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Table 4.5 
Dependent variables = 7tIt 
I = (industries in SIC I); 1964i-75iv (n = 864)
(1) (2) (3)
Pio
Tt -^1
D ^iv
CATFR1
CATFR2
Constant plus 17 industry-specific dummies
-0.315 (9.527) -0.314 (9.477) -0.297 (9.128) 
-0.246 (7.609) -0.237 (7.321) -0.243 (7.512) 
0.531 (5.730) 0.484 (5.278) 0.426 (5.191) 
0.010 (0.099) 0.094 (0.957) 0.111 (1.210) 
0.089 (0.974) 0.074 (0.807) 0.210 (2.489)
Xt-Xt_4 Awhpr
Afc
Aprody
0.993 (1.286) 
1.096 (3.330) 
0.167 (0.763)
2.813 (6.013) 
1.184 (3.596) 
0.126 (0.577)
Ct stocks
un
s
-0.013 (0.534) 
-0.009 (0.302) 
0.060 (1.405) 
-0.033 (0.758)
-0.046 (2.132) 
-0.017 (0.623) 
0.097 (2.363) 
0.011 (0.265)
0.034 (1.122) 
-0.047 (1.446)
-0.025 (0.747) -0.043 (1.313) -0.052 (1.672)
dfl -0.076 (1.482) -0.093 (1.825) -0.085 (1.876)
df2 0.006 (0.079) -0.096 (1.439) -0.087 (1.549)
Cl 0.173 (3.472) 0.167 (3.341) 0.173 (4.328)
C2 0.175 (2.794) 0.133 (2.165) 0.098 (1.714)
C3 0.030 (0.827) 0.044 (1.224) -0.010 (0.329)
C4 0.263 (2.578) 0.223 (2.190) -0.061 (1.516)
C5 -0.225 (2.312) -0.042,(0.559) -0.250 (3.162)
X? UNCERT 1 0.513 (2.954) 0.466 (6.316)
RSS 73.7955 74.5761 74.9490
0.299 0.300 0.301
R; 0.259 0.251 0.247
R2(adj) 0.225 0.210 0.218
DW 2.153 2.166 2.188
Notes: See footnote to Table 4.3.
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significantly positive, while that on annual inflation remains positive but with only a low 
level of significance. Further, F-tests carried out on the validity of the restrictions imposed 
on (1) to obtain (2) and (3) this time fall in favour of the uncertainty measure (with 
values of F = 8.727, cf F1 825(0.995) = 7.88, and F = 2.579, cf F5>825(0.975) = 2.57), 
although the evidence here clearly indicates the significance of both paths of influence. 
CThe use of UNCERT2 and UNCERT3 produces similar results; tests on the exclusion 
restrictions in both (2) and (3) are rejected, although with these higher significance levels 
are found in the test on (3 ))^ . On the basis of this extended analysis then, we would 
conclude that inflation raises negotiation frequency both directly and indirectly through its 
effect on uncertainty; however, we shall return to this issue when employing our more 
sophisticated analysis in the next section.
Apart from the developments discussed above, we note that the influence of the 
remaining variables show similarly in Table 4.5 as in Table 4.3: the lagged dependent 
variables, D74iv, CATFR1 and CATFR2, are again of the expected direction, although 
while the significance of the former three variables is increased, the latter two remain 
with low significance. Again our "cost" variables perform disappointingly, although the 
seasonal variation and incomes policy effects show still. In particular, the ceilings 
incomes policies Cl, C2 and C4 now take coefficients which are significantly positive 
(although surprisingly C5 now shows as significantly negative). The SIC-specific intercept 
terms, shown in Table A4.2 of the Appendix, range from -0.138 up to 0.093 in value, 
although only those relating to industries producing "Metal goods not specified elsewhere" 
and the "Construction" industry were significantly different to zero at the 10 per cent 
level.
We conclude this subsection with a brief summary of the ideas suggested by our 
linear analysis. First, we note that the high correlation between the actual inflation rate 
and price level uncertainty make it difficult to distinguish between their relative 
importance in determining negotiation frequency. In either case, however, it is clear that 
inflation, either directly or through its effects on uncertainty, does significantly influence 
this frequency. The significance of our lagged dependent variables, especially in our 
estimations on the basis of our extended data set, provides some hope that moving to a 
more sophisticated analysis, which can properly take into account the pattern of past 
settlements, will enable us to resolve this difficulty.
In general, the variables suggested for affecting costs of negotiation performed 
disappointingly, although the implementation of incomes policies did show up in the 
results as generally having significant coefficients in the expected direction. The 
variability in their estimated effects and the failure of the catch-up dummies to show 
significantly suggest however that there are complex influences behind these results which
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cannot be captured by simple dummy variables covering the whole of each period.
The use of sector-specific proportions, and of SIC-specific intercepts was useful, 
but this still clearly fails to use our database adequately. In the following subsection, we 
will consider a non-linear specification of (4.6) which will enable us to make better use of 
this database, so that a more detailed view of the determination of negotiation frequency 
can hopefully be found, and so that some of the issues raised by the linear analysis can 
be resolved.
Non-Unear analysis
In this section we report the results of a non-linear analysis of the probability of 
negotiation which makes full use of our dataset by working at the level of the actual 
bargaining unit. Specifically we recognise that in our database we have a record of the 
presence or absence of an event (i.e. negotiation) in each period for 191 industries; so that 
the use of discrete choice modelling methods is suggested. In the previous section, we 
noted that the decision to negotiate would depend on (tXjt - t-s^it-s^ on ^it* ^ it vit* 
as these reflect the likelihood of the relevent magnitudes reaching thecritical lower bound 
in the optimal (s,S) framework. In this section, we operationalise this framework by 
writing (4.6) as
7iit= 0 if a(Xit-Xit_s) + pcit+ yXft + vit > 0
1 if " < 0
(4.8)
This translates the (s,S) strategy into a linearised form in which the determinants of the 
(s,S) parameters, and of the evolution of the utility derived from a given nominal wage, 
constitute a continuous latent variable which belies the occurance of the event. 
Negotiation occurs when the latent variable exceeds a zero threshold (reflecting the 
attainment of the lower bound).
Estimation of the parameters of this model involves the maximisation of the 
likelihood of obtaining our data having specified a particular probability distribution for 
vj^ the stochastic component introduced to capture any idiosyncratic behaviour based on 
non-observable costs or shocks, and some consideration must therefore be given to this 
element. In particular, we note first that vjt is unlikely to be described by the same 
probability distribution across all types of bargaining method employed in negotiations; 
even if C includes in it an SIC-specific intercept component, as in the latter part of the 
last section, Vjt may be affected further by whether industry i is in the public or private 
sector, whether a national body (e.g. the Wage Council) influences negotiations, and so 
on. Consequently, in the following analysis we will restrict analysis solely to those
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industries which negotiate in the private sector, and in the absence of external influences. 
Since the majority of wage settlements are made in such an environment, this is clearly 
the main group of interest, while the influence of other non-economic factors (e.g. 
political in the public sector, social in those negotiations in which Wage Councils 
participate) may obscure the economic features of the decision to negotiate in the other 
sectors.
A second point to note with vjt is that these terms are likely to be correlated 
across industries at any point in time; that is E(vjt. Vjt) * 0. i * j. Even if includes 
time-specific variables which fully incorporate the effects of seasonal variation and 
incomes policy implementation, we have already noted that aggregate shocks can 
influences changes in the negotiable wage in a way which will not be picked up by our 
term (Xjt-Xjt.s); jumps in the negotiable wage following the announcement of a future 
policy change have been cited as an example of this. To incorporate these features into 
our model, then, we must split up the error term into a time-specific and a truly random 
component; that is, write
vit = °>t + %
where E(cot.£jt) = 0, E(£jt_s.£jt) =0, Vs * 0, and E(qt^) = a £^ . Of course, in estimation it 
will be impossible to disentangle the separate effects on cot arising from seasonal 
variation, from the effects of incomes policy, and from the other time-specific influences 
on the industries’ decision to alter wages. However, we can investigate patterns in the 
estimated values for co^  to obtain some insights into the effects of policy.
Now, if we accept that having excluded all industries other than those engaged in 
unconstrained negotiation in the private sector and having separated out a time-specific 
element from vjt we have a truly independent random error term e^, described by the 
probability distribution F(e), and density function f(e), say, then the probability that 
industry i negotiates in time t is given by
prob{ a(Xit-Xit_s) + pc it + yXft + > 0 }
= prob{ ejt > -a(Xit-Xit_s) - PC it - yXft - }
= prob{ £jt > -Git } = r°°f(£)
n  J
de
-Git
In what follows, we shall assume that the q t, are described by the sech^ 
distribution, so that f(e) = ee/(l+ee)^, and 7ijt = e^/O+e^O; i.e. we shall employ a Logit 
analysis. Before we set down the results of such an analysis however we make two
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further notes related to the use of our data at this level. First we recognise that, working 
at the level of the bargaining unit, we can now make use of our information on 
implementation of cost of living clauses in settlements. Specifically we note that price 
inflation will be less important in the decisions to negotiate made by firms covered by 
cost of living clauses than those made in firms without coverage, so that a  will be 
different in these groups. Indeed, given the variety of forms taken by cost of living 
clauses, a  may well vary from industry to industry even amongst those employing 
indexing. Again we avoid these problems by simply omitting those industries which make 
use of indexation from the analysis. Secondly we note that while many of the factors 
influencing wage decisions are determined at the aggregate level, some are truly industry- 
specific. However, detailed data at the industry level is difficult to obtain, and in the 
following analysis we have had to use proxies, based on aggregate measures or on SIC- 
level data, for some of the variables. Results should therefore be interpreted with these 
approximations in mind.
Table 4.6 again presents the results of a specification search in which all of the 
possibly relevant variables were considered, with our preferred equation shown in Column 
(1). On the negative side, the search demonstrated that none of our proposed measures of 
the "direct" costs of negotiation, (stock levels, trade union membership, strike activity or 
profit levels) significantly contribute to our explanation of negotiation frequency, with the 
possible exception of unemployment rates. Equally, changes in the replacement ratio and 
changes in aggregate demand, as measured by changes in domestic output, or alternatively 
as captured by international competitiveness and government spending, were not 
in f lu e n tia l.^ )  On a more positive note, however, these results illustrate clearly the 
importance of changes in the negotiable wage on negotiation frequency, with aggregate 
wholesale price inflation, materials’ price change, productivity change, changes in tax 
ra te s^ ) and that component of aggregate demand change captured by growth in world 
trade all entering with coefficients of the predicted direction and at high levels of 
significance. Further, in this analysis, where (Xjt-Xjt_s) actually picks up the change in 
the Xjt since the last negotiation entered into by industry i, we are much better able to 
pick up the direct effect of changes in aggregate prices on negotiation, which show up 
positively and significantly at the 0.01 per cent level. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
uncertainty measure, while positive, is not significant, so that (1) provides good evidence 
in favour of the idea that price level uncertainty in itself has little influence on negotiation 
frequency. These conclusions are supported by the results in Table A4.3 in which 
equivalent relations to that of Table 4.6, Column (1) are presented with uncertainty 
measured by UNCERT2 and UNCERT3.
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Table 4.6
Dependent variable = TCjt = 0 or 1
I = (103 industries engaged in unconstrained negotiations 
in the private sector); 1964ii-75iv (n= 3333)
(1) (2)
p Constant -1.159 (3.059; 0.705) -1.130 (3.076; 0.713)
plus 13 industry-specific dummies
Awhpr 5.608 (2.068; 0.007) 10.760 (2.303; * )
Afc -7.495 (1.505; * ) -8.297 (1.510; * )
Aprody. 11.301 (4.277; 0.008) 8.062 (4.352; 0.064)
Atax -11.647 (6.502; 0.073) -31.102 (7.771; * )
Awdtd 3.442 (1.116; 0.002) 2.228 (1.159; 0.055)
c it un -0.747 (0.577; 0.195) -1.073 (0.581; 0.065)DTI -1.955 (0.219; * ) -1.932 (0.220; * )
DT2 -2.584 (0.328; * ) -2.471 (0.326; * )
Aprofits 5.662 (1.119; * )
XU UNCERT 1 4.386 (7.356; 0.551) 5.844 (7.389; 0.429)
Time Separate dummy Separate dummies
dummies for each period for each period
(see table A4.5 and (see table A4.5 and
Figure 4.5) Figure 4.6)
-21ogL 3216.84 3191.08
FRAC 0.780 0.785
RANK 0.572 0.581
Notes:
U Standard errors; p-values in parentheses. Standard errors estimated by calculating the
square root of the appropriate diagonal element of the estimated convariance matrix. Test 
statistics for each estimate obtained by computing the square of the parameter estimate 
divided by the standard error. Under the assumption of asymptotic normality of 
estimators, these statistics are then compared to the X\ distribution as a test of the 
hypothesis that a parameter is zero. P-vilues indicate the probability that the hypothesis 
is true. * indicates p<0.001.
'L "FRAC" = fraction of concordent pairs of predicted probabilities and responses.
"RANK” = rank correlation between predicted probability and response.
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\Again recognising that by working at this level of aggregation we can explicitly 
incorporate the pattern of past settlements into our analysis, we have included here two 
new dummies, DTI and DT2, to capture the effects of two periods of incomes policy 
during which agents were constrained to negotiate at most once per annum. These 
dummies capture this constraining effect by taking the value one for each observation in 
which the industry has negotiated within the preceding three quarters over the period of 
policy implementation (1967iii-1970iv for DTI, 1973ii-1975ii for DT2), and zero 
otherwise. The high levels of significance on both of these dummy variables indicates that 
these policies were indeed successful; for example, working from a position in which the 
probability of negotiation is 0.278 (the mean proportion of industries negotiating in any 
period over our sample), the implementation of the second of our policy periods 
(estimated to reduce Gjt by 2.584) would reduce the probability of negotiations to 0.028, 
other things being equal (<eP* -  0.27/1-0.27 => e ^ ’2-584 _ 0.02905 => (new) n= 0.028) 
i.e. the policy succeeded in reducing negotiations to close to zero.
Much of the explanatory power of the model described in Column (1) of Table 
4.6 is provided by the time-specific dummies, and so we turn now to a more detailed look 
at these. As previously explained, these dummies will capture the effects of all of the 
aggregate shocks influencing negotiation frequency during any one period. Two sources of 
aggregate shocks have been noted in the discussion above as being potentially important 
(namely incomes policies and unexpectedly rapid inflation), and we will pay particular 
attention to these in inteipreting the pattern of time dummies obtained in the model 
estimation.
In looking at the effects of incomes policy on the time dummies, it is clear that 
while our model is well equipped to capture the effects of policies specifically directed at 
negotiation frequency (i.e. "freeze" and "twelve-month" policies), the effects of ceilings 
policies are captured only indirectly. An effective wage freeze will be captured by the 
model through high negative coefficients on the time dummies which correspond to the 
period of the policy. Catch up behaviour following the freeze will also be accomodated 
explicitly in the model, since any ‘losses’ incurred through the imposition of the policy 
(as wages fall behind prices, say) will be reflected in the variables already included in the 
model which measure growth in the relevent variables since the previous negotiation. The 
significant positive coefficient on aggregate price inflation since the previous negotiation, 
for example, means that any losses incurred as wages fall behind prices will be translated 
by our model into a surge of wage settlements following the end of the freeze policy. In 
contrast, we note that ceiling policies do not directly affect negotiation frequency;, only in 
as far as a policy successfully keeps wages set during the policy below the level which 
would be obtained in its absence will it affect negotiation frequency. Catch-up effects
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\here show up as positive time dummies, the size of which depends both on the success of 
the policies in achieving their aims and on the extent to which the policies’ targets were 
set below the negotiable level. Moreover, the effect of these constraints may have a 
cumulative effect on negotiation frequency so that understanding the pattern of time 
dummies is by no means straightforward.
As noted earlier, for any industry, renegotiation is made more likely if there is 
growth in the determinants of the negotiable wage, (Xjt - Xjt_s), or if there are 
movements in variables which had been unanticipated when the previous settlement was 
struck, i.e high (Xjt.s - t-s^it-s^ ^  examP^ e °f this latter influence would be where 
inflation is unexpectedly rapid in the period following negotiation. In our analysis, we 
have taken the first of these into account explicitly, but given the limitations of data, we 
have not been able to accomodate the effects of industry-specific unanticipated shocks. 
The latter element may contribute to the pattern of the time dummies obtained, therefore, 
and at the least we should consider the impact of unanticipated shocks at this aggregate 
level. For this, we can use the expected rate of annual inflation published by the NIESR 
(described earlier in the discussion on the measurement of uncertainty). This series is not 
directly applicable in the non-linear analysis as it considers expectations formed over a 
fixed time horizon; namely 12 months ahead. However, at the aggregate level, the 
unexpected inflation series obtained on the basis of this data will provide an indication of 
any shocks that have occured to inflation within the previous year, and can be used to 
help explain the number of negotiations observed in the aggregate at any time over and 
above those already covered by the model.
Figure 4.5 provides an illustration of the time specific influences on negotiation 
frequency which we have not yet explicitly explained through our model, plotting the 
(adjusted) estimated coefficients on the time dummies associated with the model described 
in Table 4.6, column 1. The adjustment that has been made aims to take into account the 
precision of the estimate of the time-specific effects by dividing the estimated coefficients 
on the time dummies by the square root of their estimated standard errors. (The actual 
coefficient estimates on the time dummies, and their estimated standard errors are 
provided in Table A4 of the Appendix). This adjustment is that which is necessary to 
eliminate heteroskedasticity in the equation
Looking at Figure 4.5, we note that the period begins with a series of negative 
values which cannot be explained in terms of incomes policy effects, although there is a
(4.9)
where $ are the estimated coefficients on the time dummies, and where E(ut)=at, which 
depends on E[ (Pt - ^)^] and varies over time.
I l l
Figure 4.5 (Adjusted) Time dummies relating to Table 4.6, column 1.
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gradual increase in negotiation frequency over the period 1965ii-1966ii which might be 
associated with the cumulative effects of a ceiling incomes policy. The very sharp decline 
in negotiations occurring between 1966iii-1967ii is associated with the "wage freeze" and 
"severe restraint" policies implemented during this period, although the impact of the 
policy is not uniform over the entire period of its implementation. Immediately succeeding 
the period of severe restraint, the Wilson government implemented a voluntary zero-norm 
policy which appears to be associated with a period of increased negotiation frequency. In 
fact, given the voluntary nature of this policy, the size of the coefficients found during 
this period may be surprising, although they may incorporate some element of catch-up 
behaviour following the period of "freeze policy" and the effects of the 1966 Redundancy 
Act might also be included. The statutory 3\ per cent limit enforced by policy carried out 
between 1968ii and 1970ii attempted to reduce wage inflation by just 2-3 per cent so that 
the sequence of insignificant dummies (upto mid-1969) followed by significantly positive 
observations fits well with the idea that agents engaged in more negotiations as the 
cumulative effect of the policy became large. The Heath Administration, elected in June 
1970, made no attempt at incomes policy until 1972iv (so that we have used this period 
as our baseline), but a significantly positive dummy is found in 1972iii (perhaps in 
anticipation of the forthcoming freeze), followed by a negative, though insignificant, 
observation in the first period of this policy. A series of positive dummies are associated 
with the implementation of (statutory) ceiling policies during the latter part of the Heath 
Administration, exactly as we might expect given that these allowed no scope for agents 
to regain their positions held before the freeze, while a kink at 1974iv can be explained 
by the settlements generated by the "threshold" agreements as discussed earlier in the 
chapter. Finally, we note the two (insignificantly) negative observations at the end of the 
period of analysis, coinciding with the implementation of phase I of Labour’s Social 
Contract.
In Table 4.7, we present results of a regression analysis of an equation of the 
form at (4.9), where appropriate adjustment has been made to accomodate the presence of 
heteroskedasticity (i.e. we regress [ fyWs.e.(j^) ] on [ ZjWs.e.^) ] ). Columns (1) and (2) 
of the Table relate to the coefficients on the time dummies of the model presented in 
Table 4.6 column 1. (Columns (3) and (4) relate to those of the model presented in Table 
4.6 column 2 to be discussed shortly). Column (1) includes all of the variables which 
have been considered above as potentially important in explaining the time-specific 
effects, while column (2) represents the results of a specification search in which variables 
with (absolute) t-values less than one were eliminated from the equation. Following the 
discussion above, four sets of variables are included in the regression analysis:
(i) incomes policy effects: FI and F2 are dummies entered to capture the effects of the 
two periods of ‘freeze’ incomes policy, and are as previously defined. C1INC-C5INC
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Table 4.7
Dependent variable = pt = ( /^Vs.e.(fy.)
= (adjusted) time dummies relating to Table 4.6 
(t = 1965iii-1975iv; n = 44)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.0968 1.3140 0.5395 0.6321
(1.5746) (2.0464) (0.7259) (0.9495)
U(Ap) 0.1401 0.1159 0.1472 0.1093
(1.9025) (1.7256) (1.7115) (1.4292)
C1INC 0.4275 0.4545 0.4434 0.4310
(1.7605) (2.3612) (1.5753) (1.9235)
C2INC 0.8722 0.9083 0.9200 0.9320
(2.7953) (3.1336) (2.5413) (2.7720)
C3INC -0.0537 -0.0861
(0.6940) (0.9563)
C4INC 0.3643 0.3364 0.3048
(1.2248) (1.1824) (0.8865)
C51NC -1.9420 -1.9309
(1.2854) (1.1302)
FI -0.0656 0.2245
(0.0784) (0.2302)
F2 -1.5169 -1.5138 -1.5331 -1.6774
(2.3617) (2.6168) (2.0606) (2.6308
Ql 0.1954 0.1977
(0.8928) (0.7689)
Q2 -0.2718 -0.4087 -0.3207 -0.4389
(1.0168) (2.2455) (1.0240) (2.0721)
Q3 0.0822 0.0315
(0.3543) (0.1155)
Parameter of 0.9312 0.9391 0.8928 0.8923
autoregressive (17.3284) (18.5322) (13.4386) (13.4061)
error
RSS 23.8274 25.8525 31.3304 34.6825
SE 0.8497 0.8248 0.9744 0.9430
R; 0.7214 0.6977 0.6866 0.6531R2(adj) 0.6201 0.6421 0.5726 0.5997
LLF -51.1510 -53.0858 -57.2352 -59.5712
DW 2.0115 2.0347 1.9016 1.9554
Notes■ ajc
Regression estimated assuming that the residuals follow an AR(1) process; i.e pt = ZjOtj + 
ut, where ut = put.j  + and ^  are white noise. The exact inverse interpolation method of 
estimation is employed. See text for variable definitions. Absolute t-values based on asymptotic 
standard errors in brackets.
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relate to the periods of ‘ceiling’ incomes policy previously captured by C1-C5, but in 
place of the simple 0,1 dummies, these variables increase over time, taking the values 
1,2,3,... during the period of policy implementation. In this way it is hoped that the 
cumulative effect of ceilings incomes policies might be captured.
(ii) unanticipated inflation: i.e U(Apt) = Apt - E[ Apt I £2^ ], where the 12 month 
forward forecasts are obtained from the NIESR model.
(iii) seasonal variability: Q1-Q3 are as previously defined.
(iv) autoregressive errors: the regression is estimated assuming the errors follow an AR(1) 
process. This assumption is made to accomodate the persistent effects of the U(Apt) 
variable at the aggregate level. An unexpectedly rapid inflation rate in any period 
may cause an increase in negotiations above the level that would have occurred 
otherwise for a number of periods. This is because the effect on each industry is to 
move real wages closer to the critical lower bound, making negotiation more likely in 
all subsequent periods.
The results obtained in Table 4.7 indicate that both periods of incomes policy and 
unexpectedly rapid inflation were influential on renegotiation frequency over this period. 
Significantly positive coefficients are found on U(Apt) indicating that there is evidence of 
increased negotiating activity following a period of unexpectedly rapid inflation, and the 
strong autoregressive element indicates that these effects do indeed persist over time in 
the aggregate. Clear incomes policy effects are observed during the periods of ‘ceiling’ 
incomes policy captured by C1INC, C21NC, and C4INC, as negotiations occur more 
frequently as wages are held below their desired l e v e l / T h e  second period of ‘freeze’ 
incomes policy also shows as expected, with negotiations occuring significantly less 
frequently during this period. Surprisingly, given the sharp fall observed in 1966iii in 
Figure 4.5, the first period of ‘freeze’ policy does not show significantly in the regression 
results, although as we have noted, the impact of the policy is notably different during the 
4 quarters of its implementation, and the apparent breakdown of the policy in its latter 
stages has clearly influenced this result Some seasonal variation is picked up by the 
regression analysis, as there appears to be fewer negotiations occuring in the second 
quarter than during the rest of the year.
In summary, we recognise that while this two stage approach to explaining 
negotiation frequency would not be the desired one in principle, given the limitations of 
the data, it does provide a reasonable indication of the determinants of negotiation 
frequency in practice. As we have stressed previously, there may be many economy-wide 
influences in addition to those explicitly included in this analysis, which could contribute 
to the influence of the time-specific dummies. In particular, two (related) influences were 
suggested in chapter 2. First, many of the relationships suggested by the literature on 
wage leadership would be picked up here by the time dummies; as an example, consider
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\the effects of a successful wage claim by a veiy high-profile industry (such as the miners 
pay claims in the early 1970’s), which might alter many unions’ fallback wage levels and 
result in a large number of unions pushing for new wage settlements at a particular time. 
And second, a widely-publicised indicator of future wages, generated in a purely random 
way, can significantly influence the time path of wages: if each agent expects all other 
agents to treat the indicator as influential, then it becomes individually rational to use the 
indicator to forecast future wages, and it becomes influential. Statistically, it is impossible 
to show that the indicator is no more than a "will-o-the-wisp". On these grounds, any 
number of possible factors could generate a sequence of periods with large numbers of 
negotiations, upto the point where the "speculative bubble" bursts, and these would be 
picked up here by the time dummies. Having said this, however, the model presented in 
Table 4.7 shows that we have identified some important influences on negotiation 
frequency. This second stage regression analysis explains altogether around 70% of the 
variability in the (adjusted) time dummy coefficients, so that the residual time-specific 
influences are reasonably well explained by the aggregate magnitudes that are considered 
by our model.
The results discussed above provide some good evidence to support the idea that 
incomes policies have strong effects on negotiation frequency, and that these are broadly 
in the direction predicted by our earlier discussion. However, as we have already noted, 
our description of the pattern of time dummies is merely indicative of the likely time- 
specific influences not captured in the original model estimation. In order to try to capture 
the effects of incomes policies more directly, Column (2) of Table 4.6 includes, in 
addition to the other variables of Column (1), the rate of change of profits (Aprofits). The 
idea here is that the extent to which wages are constrained below their "true" market 
value by policies will show up in increasing profits. In fact, the inclusion of this variable 
significantly improves the fit of the overall model (2 log (Lq/L j ) = 25.76, cf Xi^)» 
effects the size of the coefficients on the variables already included (so that "un" now 
becomes significant). Joint significance tests of the variables excluded from Column (2) 
remain i n s i g n i f i c a n t , ^ )  however, and conclusions about the influence of price uncertainty 
remain unchanged. Hence the estimate of column (2) represents our preferred equatioa 
However, as the pattern of Figure 4.6 (and the associated regression analysis of columns 
3 and 4 in Table 4.7) demonstrate, the inclusion of this variable does not significantly 
alter the size or significance of the estimated time-specific dummies, so that the influences 
picked up by this variable are not those on which we had originally based its inclusion, 
and the influence of incomes policies and of unanticipated inflation are still picked up by 
the time dummies.
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Figure 4.6 (Adjusted) Time dummies relating to Table 4.6, column 2.
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Of course, increasing profits will occur for reasons other than the imposition of 
incomes policies. However, being endogenous to the model presented in section 4.2, we 
might expect this variable to add no more to the explanatory power of the model other 
than through the incomes policy effects working beyond the model outlined above. 
Having said this, given the poor performance of our variables used to measure aggregate 
demand movements, a sensible interpretation can be given to the significance of the 
coefficient on (Aprofits) in these terms; certainly profits rise as aggregate demand 
increases so that the direction of influence is as expected, while we note that the inclusion 
of this variable has reduced the significance of the coefficient on the growth of world 
trade (and on productivity growth, which also typically rises and falls with changes in 
aggregate demand), showing some degree of collinearity between these variables. 
Certainly the significance of (Aprofits) supports the idea that wage negotiations occur 
more frequently during upswings on the business cycle, and along with the other 
estimates presented in Column (2), this provides good evidence in support of our 
hypothesis that negotiations occur when the net gains of negotiating are high, even if our 
attempts to identify those variables which might influence the costs involved in 
negotiations, have been disappointing.
Finally in this section we consider the magnitudes of the estimates presented in 
our preferred equation in (2). The simplest way of interpreting these coefficients is in 
terms of the change in the probability of negotiations from an initial point caused by a 
change in one of its determinants, with other things being equal. So, for example, we 
might imagine that at some point, the probability of negotiation for industry i is 0.25, say. 
Now, given the estimated coefficients in Table 4.6 Column (2), we recognise that, had the 
rate of change of wholesale prices since this industry’s previous negotiation been 1 per 
cent higher, then with all other things equal, this probability would be 0.269, since
(original) Jtit =0.25 => eG« =0.25/0.75 =0.333;
eG, e10.76x0.01=0 36g => (new) =0.368/1.368 = 0.269
Exactly similar calculations can be made for each of the influential variables in turn, 
although given the large standard errors estimated for some of the variables, there is 
probably little to be gained in attempting to "rank" the variables in order of influence.
Having said this however, we note that the effects of the incomes policies and 
other influences picked up by the time dummies, as shown by the size of the estimated 
coefficients, are large compared to those of the other factors included in the model. There 
are many dummies with absolute values in the region of 1.5, or more, for example, and
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these will each exert influence on negotiation frequency comparable to that generated by a 
rate of wholesale price inflation of 15 per cent As we have stressed, incomes policies 
constitute an important component of these aggregate time-specific effects, and this 
indicates a clear role for government policy in this area. In the concluding section below, 
we summarise the findings of the empirical work, and consider in more detail their 
implications for government policy.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has concentrated on the decision on how often and when an industry 
chooses to alter its wage, on the grounds that the frequency of negotiations influences the 
speed of wage adjustment directly, and provides some insights into industrial wage-setting 
as a whole. A simple examination of the Aberdeen wage rates database was sufficient to 
show that over the data period there is a good deal of variability both in the length of 
time elapsing between successive negotiations for many individual industries, and in the 
numbers involved in negotiations across all industries at any point in time. The empirical 
work of the subsequent sections provides an attempt to explain this variability, and it is 
appropriate to summarise the findings of the empirical work at this stage before 
considering any possible policy implications.
Working within the context of open-ended contracts, it was shown that a variety 
of factors could potentially influence the frequency of negotiation, and that, contrary to 
the implicit assumptions of previous empirical work in the area, these factors could co­
exist and could be justified on a single decision-making base. In particular, it was shown 
that higher inflation rates and greater degrees of price level uncertainty might both 
increase negotiation frequency, although because of the high correlation between the 
measures of these variables, it might be difficult to distinguish which is the more 
important through a simple statistical analysis of the data. The more sophisticated 
discrete-choice model of the decision to negotiate showed the importance of accounting 
for the pattern of past settlements, however, and demonstrated that, if these are taken into 
account, the rate of price change appears highly influential in the determination of 
negotiation frequency, while price level uncertainty, in itself, fails to show significantly. 
We should be clear that this does not mean to say that unexpectedly rapid inflation does 
not have an effect on negotiation frequency. On the contrary, our second stage analysis 
indicated that as one might expect, unexpectedly rapid inflationary periods have also been 
associated with an increased number of settlements as real wage levels fall behind the 
levels that were bargained for when the settlement was struck.
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The results of the discrete-choice model provide good support for the proposed (s, 
S) framework for wage-setting behaviour in the UK. Here, industry-specific intercept 
dummies were usefiil in capturing some elements of the costs involved in negotiation, as 
was the unemployment rate, although other variables used to capture these costs 
performed disappointingly. On the other hand, variables introduced to measure the 
offsetting gains to be made in negotiations performed well, and many of the intuitively 
sensible variables showed significantly and in the right direction. In this category, 
aggregate price inflation, tax changes, materials’ price inflation, productivity growth, 
profits, and changes in aggregate demand all showed as important. The impact of incomes 
policies was also noted, and, using the estimated time-specific dummies, it was argued 
that many periods of policy have had an effect on negotiation frequency. Most obvious 
amongst these were the effects of the frequency-directed policies ("freeze" and "twelve­
month delay") which reduced the number of negotiations directly. In addition, however, it 
was also argued that some periods of high negotiation activity might have occurred either 
in anticipation of future freeze incomes policies, or because of the constraining effects of 
ceilings policies.
The empirical work described above has interesting implications for policy 
formation. While there is clear evidence that the decision to enter negotiations is 
adequately captured by a model based on utility-maximising agents, it is equally clear that 
the framework within which these agents operate can, and has been, manipulated by 
government. The underlying cause of wage inertia centres around the presence of costs of 
wage adjustment which are not within the control of government. However, it is apparent 
that governments can impose costs of its own which can significantly influence the timing 
of wage settlements. The feasibility of goverment influence on the timing of negotiations 
has been well established; the question is whether this influence can be used to good 
advantage in a macroeconomic context
Throughout this discussion, we have been concerned with the effects of nominal 
rigidities on real magnitudes, and in considering macroeconomic policy formulation here 
it is reasonable to restrict attention to the impact that government can have on the 
economy’s ability to adjust to nominal shocks, ignoring the distributional effects of policy 
(i.e. ignoring issues of whether particular groups within the economy gain more than 
others as policy is implemented). As an illustration, we might refer back to the 
disaggregated model of section 2.5. Here, there is an implicit ‘natural’ level of output and 
employment described by the long run properties of the model, but there are also 
important dynamic elements which mean that nominal shocks have real effects over some 
period because adjustment takes place less-than-instantaneously. In these circumstances 
the aim of policy is to ease the pain of adjustment to exogenous nominal shocks, and
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seen in this light, there are two types of policy which might be useful: the first type has 
beneficial macroeconomic effects because it reduces directly the degree of inertia 
generated at the level of the firm; and the second type is useful because it accepts the 
given level of inertia experienced by individual firms, but attempts to manage this inertia 
to achieve gains at the economy wide level. We will consider each of these in turn below, 
using the framework of the disaggregated model of section 2.5 to illustrate the gains to be 
achieved through policy.
In section 2.5, we set out in equations (2.4)-(2.7) a simple model of the economy 
based around two sectors. We recall that the decision making in the two sectors was 
interrelated because of the influence of the aggregate price level, defined as the average 
price over the two sectors. Specifically, the demand for output (and hence employment 
levels) in each sector depended on the price of its output relative to the aggregate price 
level, and the union’s labour supply decision was based on the sectoral nominal wage 
relative to the aggregate price level. Inertia was introduced to the system by the 
assumption that wage negotiations are entered into in any period with a finite probability, 
with the expected probability of negotiation taking place in the current, and all future, 
periods dependent on the current level of aggregate price inflation. Specifically, in (2.10) 
we wrote that
rc(Awf) =7i®t+j = exp( a + bAwf) , j = 0, 1, 2,... (2.10)
1 + exp( a + bAw® )
where wt is the logarithm of the aggregate wage (so that Awt represents the rate of 
aggregate wage growth). Here, the parameter ‘a’ captures one aspect of the effects of a 
fixed cost of adjustment, while the inclusion of the term ‘ bAw® ’ indicates that there is a 
feedback from inflation to renegotiation frequency; this is of course a simplified version 
of the non-linear model estimated in the previous section.
The first type of policy discussed above, in which government directly increases 
the frequency with which firms renegotiate wages, can be simply illustrated in this 
framework. For example, an increase in the parameter ‘a’ would capture the idea of a 
reduction in negotiation costs, raising the probability of renegotiation at all levels of wage 
inflation. Figure 4.7 illustrates such a change, looking at the evolution of wages and 
renegotiation probabilities over time (each period representing a quarterly observation of 
the series). In this, the money supply is assumed to be rising at 10% per annum 
throughout, but there is an unanticipated 20% reduction in the money supply in period 10. 
We use the model of (2.4)-(2.7) and expression (2.10), taking y= 0.8, 0= 0.5, a -  -1.734, 
and p= 5, so that the probability of renegotiation is equal to 0.166 at the initial rate of 
inflation, and the expected length of time between negotiations is 6 quarters. Under these
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Figure 4.7 Impact of a 20% reduction in money stock with different costs of adjustment
Fig. 4.7.1; Time path of wages
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circumstances, the (expected) evolution of aggregate wages is given by the second order 
difference equation described at (2.12), and is plotted in Figure 4.7.1 (labeled ‘w l’). 
Wages converge to the lower level associated with the reduced money stock by around 
period 30, and as this is some 20 quarters after the initial shock, it is clear that 
adjustment takes place over a period which is far longer than the expected duration of any 
individual contract. The accumulated area between this time path of wages and the 
‘optimal’ wage time path which could be achieved if all agents responded fully and 
instantaneously to the money shock is plotted in Figure 4.7.3, with a substantial 
associated accumulated loss built up over the eight years following the shock. (Note that 
this corresponds to a real output loss since output is reduced, through a real balance 
effect, while prices remain high relative to the nominal money stock). This compares 
unfavourably with the time path of wages denoted *w2\  which corresponds to the same 
scenario, but with the parameter ‘a’ set equal to -1.511. With this higher figure for ‘a’, 
the probability of negotiation at the initial rate of growth of wages is 0.25, and the 
expected length of any contract is 4 quarters. This reduction in inertia is illustrated clearly 
in Figure 4.7.1, as the wage path associated with these parameters moves more rapidly 
towards its eventual growth path, and the accumulated loss associated with this response 
is correspondingly lower (as shown in Figure 4.7.3).
It should be recalled that the underlying microeconomic framework explaining the 
decision to enter negotiation is that of an ‘(s,S) rule’, and that in this framework, the 
reduction of negotiation costs serves to compress the (s,S) band. Another effect of the 
reduction in adjustment costs in our simple algebraic model is through an increase in the 
size of the parameter ‘b’ therefore, so that renegotiation probabilities not only increase at 
any given rate of inflation, but also increase more rapidly as inflation rises. However, it is 
clear from figure 4.7.2 that an increased responsiveness of renegotiation probabilities to 
wage inflation is a mixed blessing. For example, during the disinflation described in wage 
path ‘w l’, wage inflation falls to around 3% per annum in the first year and rises only 
slowly back to a rate of 10% per annum. This has a corresponding effect on renegotiation 
probabilities, which fall from 0.166 to 0.153 (with the expected length of contracts rising 
from 6 to 6.5 quarters). In this way, the degree of inertia is exacerbated by the process of 
disinflation, and clearly this detrimental feedback will be larger as the responsiveness of 
renegotiation probabilities to wages increases. The line denoted ‘w3’ in Figure 4.7.3 
illustrates the gains to be achieved if the feedbacks from wage inflation to negotiation 
probabilities can be severed altogether: here the parameters ‘a* and ‘b’ are set equal to 
-1.609 and 0 respectively. Hence, the probability of negotiation remains at 0.166 at all 
levels of wage inflation, eliminating the detrimental slowdown in negotiation frequency 
observed previously during the period of disinflation. As shown in the Figure, the total 
accumulated loss associated with this final time path is substantially below that
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corresponding to ‘w l\  The point to be made, therefore, is that govenment should 
recognise not only the direct impact of policy on negotiation frequency but also its effects 
on the responsiveness of this frequency to macroeconomic adjustment, and the means by 
which reductions in negotiation costs are achieved through policy should be modified 
accordingly.
The possibility of a government being able to increase the speed of adjustment in 
the economy through a direct reduction in adjustment costs is obviously an attractive one, 
although in practice it is not clear how these reductions can be brought about. The 
empirical work of the previous section shows that goverments have been able to influence 
the timing of wage settlements in the past through periods of incomes policy, but to the 
extent that these have been successful policies, they have generally involved the 
(potential) imposition of higher adjustment costs to reduce the number of settlements. We 
did, of course, also discover important industry-specific intercepts in the empirical work 
which we associated with the costs of adjustment which would differ across industries 
because of differences in the bargaining structures in the different industries. This is the 
area in which governments may be able to exert some downward influence on adjustment 
costs therefore, influencing the level at which negotiations take place through institutional 
reform, for example, or reducing the possibility of costly strike activity through 
legislation, etc. This is an area of some importance, and while the presence of significant 
industry-specific intercepts can be interpreted in this way, it is clear that further analysis 
of wage-setting practices and procedures, using data at the level of the individual firm, is 
required to establish the feasibility of governments to reduce adjustment costs at this 
micreconomic level.
A second strand of policy open to government is one in which the government 
accepts a given degree of inertia at the micro level, but attempts to manage this inertia to 
the benefit of the macroeconomy. A good example of such a policy would be one in 
which the government has intervened to coordinate the timing of wage settlements across 
the different sectors of the economy. In figure 4.8, we illustrate the time paths of wages 
with and without a coordinating policy of this sort. The wage path in Figure 4.8.1 shows 
once more the evolution of aggregate wages if negotiations can occur in any quarter, 
exactly as in the discussion above. This is compared to the time path of wages in Figure 
4.8.2 in which negotiations in all sectors are constrained to take place in a particular 
quarter of each year. Hence, negotiations can take place in the diagram in quarters 2, 6, 
10, 14, and so on, with nominal wages fixed in between settlements. The dynamics of the 
aggregate wage in the context of a coordinating policy are of precisely the same form as 
previously, with renegotiation occuring in any industry in a particular year with a fixed 
probability. The evolution of wages over time will be described by a second order
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Figure 4.8 Impact of a 10% reduction in money stock with and without policy
Fig. 4.8.1; Time path of -wages without policy
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difference equation of the same form as previously, but now showing the relationship 
between wt_ ,^ wt, and wt+^. The speed of adjustment will depend once more on the 
parameters of the model, and in particular on the (annualised) probability of negotiation. 
The parameters for *a’ and ‘b’ in the annualised version of (2.10) are set equal to 0.193 
and 5 respectively in generating Figure 4.8.2. Given this choice of parameters, the 
probability of renegotiation remains equally responsive to wage inflation as in the ‘no 
policy* scenario, while the overall probability of negotiation in any year is 0.666 at the 
initial rate of inflation.
Figure 4.8.3 illustrates the gains to be achieved through the use of a coordinating 
policy of this sort. Once more, the plots show the accumulated difference between the 
real wage under the actual wage and that which would be achieved if adjustment was 
complete and instantaneous (and represents a real welfare loss in that there is 
unemployment while this difference exists). The gains displayed in the Figure are not the 
result of a reduction in the level of inertia in wage setting, but are the result of 
coordination of the timing of the government’s management of macroeconomic policy 
instruments with the timing of the wage setting decisions of the private sector. With the 
probability of renegotiation in the ‘no policy* scenario equal to 0.166 (each quarter), and 
the (annual) probability of negotiation in the ‘with policy’ scenario equal to 0.666, inertia 
is constant in the sense that the average length of wage contracts is the same in both 
scenarios (6 quarters) at the initial (and eventual) level of inflation in aggregate wages. As 
a result, the (backward-looking) characteristic root of the annualised dynamic equation 
achieved in each scenario are the same. In these circumstances, the gains are achieved 
because the government can coordinate any deflationary measures with individual wage 
setters, who can therefore respond relatively quickly. Such coordination is not possible in 
the absence of an annualised wage round as the wage negotiations of different firms take 
place throughout the year. By timing policy to coincide with the quarter in which 
settlements are struck, the government ensures that an early response to government 
policy is achieved, even though the overall degree of nominal inertia is unaltered. On the 
downside, it is clear also that if the government mistimes the implementation of its 
policy, then firms and unions are locked into a wage settlement which is inappropriate for 
the current level of nominal demand, and this framework may be more costly than the 
original one. Having made this warning, however, this seems a fairly straight-forward gain 
to be achieved through the manipulation of the timing of settlements, and one for which 
there is some precedent in the (apparently successful) periods of policy in which wages 
were frozen, or in which the number of negotiations was limited to a maximum of one 
per annum. Of course, if such policies also resulted in a fall in the level of negotiation 
costs, through a reduction in the size of the bargaining zone, for example, then there 
would be a still greater gain (as the expected number of new settlements in each wage
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round would rise).
A final policy option relating to the timing of negotiations, and potentially the 
most practical and powerful option, is based on the possibility of increasing the costs of 
negotiation for individual firms, but in so doing, reducing the degree of inertia at the 
macro level. Once more, the policy’s advantage comes through the possibility of a 
coordinated disinflation of wages across sectors, and again there appears to be some 
precedent for this, as previous examples of incomes policy were able to raise costs to a 
level at which no negotiations took place over a number of periods. As we have noted 
throughout, the length of time taken for aggregate wages to adjust to the nominal shocks 
is considerably longer than the (expected) length of any single settlement flasting around 
eight years in Figure 4.8.1, for example, where the average length of a wage contract is
1.5 years). This is because the contracts set in the two sectors are staggered over time, so 
that no individual sector is willing to adjust fully to the perceived shocks even when it 
enters into negotiations as it knows that there is a finite probability that the other sectors 
will not adjust also in the current period. If the stagger can be taken out of the bargaining 
framework, then this ‘leap-frogging’ will be eliminated, and adjustment will take only as 
long as the longest contract lasts. Hence, if the government can delay new wage 
negotiations by imposing extra costs, it is possible that all new settlements, or at least the 
vast majority of them, will occur simultaneously, and a more complete adjustment to any 
shock that has occured will be achieved. Of course, there is a trade-off between this gain, 
and the loss in adjustment that would have occured in the period of constraint However, 
the illustrative models above (and those of chapter 2) have demonstrated that the build-up 
of inertia that can result from the stagger can be considerable, so that the gains from the 
policy may well offset the losses.
In the stylised framework described above, policies on the timing and frequency 
of wage negotiations can be constructed which would improve the economy’s ability to 
adjust to macroeconomic shocks. The empirical evidence is that such policies could also 
be implemented. However, in the discussion so far, we have concentrated on a particular 
aspect of nominal rigidities only (namely the frequency of nominal wage change), and we 
have abstracted from distributional considerations (eg. firms versus unions, or sector A 
versus sector B) and the broader issues of wage/price determination. In the following 
chapters, we attempt to redress this imbalance. Specifically, in the next chapter, a 
complete model of the U.K. supply-side is presented in an attempt to model the dynamics 
of (real and nominal) wage, price, and employment determination. Subsequent chapters 
will then use the findings of the model in statistical analyses and in simulation exercises 
in an attempt to obtain a better understanding of these dynamics.
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CHAPTER 5
A Disaggregated Model of the UK Supply Side
The preceding two chapters have concentrated primarily on movements in the 
nominal wage. In this and the subsequent chapter, the study is broadened to consider 
supply-side adjustment in general. Of course, the speeds of nominal wage and price 
adjustments provide important parameters in this process, but as the discussion of chapter 
2 made clear, so too are real rigidities, i.e. those involving the (un)responsiveness of real 
wage and price markup decisions to economic conditions. Many of the feedbacks between 
variables involved in establishing these rigidities are complicated, and their practical 
relevance can only be investigated through a detailed analysis of the supply s ide .^  In 
this chapter, therefore, a model of the supply side is estimated based around 38 industries 
which cover the whole economy excluding government sector services. The model 
incorporates employment, price, wage, and output demand equations for each industry, 
plus a series of subsidiary equations to capture the inter-relations between industries. This 
model will enable us to examine the process of wage determination in a broader context, 
allowing for feedbacks between wages, prices, output, and employment/unemployment 
levels, and will enable us to consider the price formation process and the links between 
these and policies designed to defeat unemployment.
The estimation of a model of the supply-side of the U.K. will clearly provide 
information on the extent and importance of nominal inertia and of real rigidities. 
Estimation of the individual relationships will help in the identification of the dynamic 
processes involved for each industry, and, having estimated the model, simulation 
experiments can be undertaken to highlight the dynamic properties of the model as a 
whole and the interactions between industries’ decisions. These ideas will be examined in 
detail in chapters 6 and 7. In chapter 6, we analyse the information gained from the 
model estimation on speeds of adjustment in nominal prices at the industrial level. This 
provides insights into the causes of nominal price inertia which complement those gained 
on nominal wage inertia in the previous two chapters. In chapter 7, we describe various 
simulation experiments to examine the impact of different policy options for reducing 
unemployment and/or inflation had they been attempted over the sample period. Through 
these simulation experiments, we can identify more clearly the source of real rigidities, 
and those paths of influence which are important in determining the speed of supply side 
adjustment.
In this chapter, however, we concentrate solely on describing the model, in 
section 5.1, on estimating the model, in section 5.2, and on describing the results
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obtained, in sections 5.3 and 5.4. This exercise is valuable in itself, providing evidence on 
the reasonableness of a particular model of the supply side at the industrial level. In 
particular, it gives evidence on the relative importance of the various theories of wage- 
setting described in chapter 2, and this in turn provides indirect evidence on the validity 
of the explanations of real wage rigidity also described in that chapter.
5.1 A description of the model
In this section, I set out the derivation of the model which I shall ultimately 
estimate. The model to be used has been recently popularised by Layard and Nickell 
(1985, 1986), and the following description draws heavily from these papers and from a 
related model description in Borooah and van der Ploeg (1986). It is assumed that the 
industry consists of J firms producing an homogeneous product A simple version of the 
model starts with a cost function of the j1*1 firm which takes the form
cj= Cj( yj, w, q, kj) (5.1)
where yj= output of j1*1 firm, j=l,....J, kj= capital stock of the j 1^ firm, w = price of a 
unit of labour input to the industry, and q = vector of other input prices to industry 
(materials).
The demand for the industry’s product is given by
y = D(p, p, pm, o) (5.2)
where y = Zyj= industry output, p = price of industry output, p= aggregate price level,
pm = price of imported industry product, and o= measure of cyclic variation.
The j 1^ firm chooses its output so as to maximise real profits
= ( P(y) yj - Cj( yj, w, q, kj) ) / p (5.3)
The first order condition for solving this problem is
6p.5y.yj+ p(y) = 5Cj 
5y 5yj 6yj
=> p[ 1 + 5p.y.6y.yj] = 6Cj 
Sy p 8yj y 5yj
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\= > p[ 1 - 0|  ] = 8Cj( yj, w, q, kj) (5.4)
e
where 0j = Slog v = firm j ’s conjectural elasticity of total market output wrt own
Slog yj output
and e= -Slog D = price elasticity of market demand 
Slog p
0j provides a means of incorporating market structure into the model, since under
monopoly 0j= 1, and p[l-(l/e)]=SCj/8yj, (5.4.1), and under perfect competition, 0j= 0, and 
p = SCj/Syj, (5.4.2). Under Coumot-Nash assumptions, 5y/5yj= 1, so that 0j= yjy. 0j is
so that oligopoly power will be large if 0j is high, or e low. Also, if the industry’s 
oligopoly power, a, is measured by the weighted average of the ctj, then it turns out to be 
proportional to the weighted average of the individual firms’ output shares, since
It is noted that if (Sy/Syp is constant over all firms, a  is proportional to the Herfindahl 
Index of industrial concentration, H = E(yj/y) , and that under the Coumot-Nash 
assumption, a= H/e.
For the firm, the labour demand equation is given by the application of 
Shephard’s lemma to (5.1) to obtain
The conditions under which perfect aggregation of individual units into a larger 
group can be carried out are stringent, and are rarely likely to hold (see Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980)), relying on the idea that the firms’ cost functions can be represented 
by particular functional forms, having separability properties, or particular inter-firm 
similarities. In this analysis, this issue is ignored, and the firm relationships expressed at
also related to the degree of oligopoly power enjoyed by the jm firm, ctj, where this 
defined as
0 < ctj= markup over marginal cost = p-SCj/Svj = 0j  < 1
a  = I(yj/y).ctj = e"1 £(5y/5yj)(yj/y)2
nj= SCj = nj(yj, w, q, kj) (5.5)
5w
where nj employment in the j 1^ firm.
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(5.2), (5.4), and (5.5) are simply rewritten as industrial relationships as follows:
industrial
demand
y = DjCp/p, p/pm, a) = D^p/p, (p/p.p/pm), a) 
= D(p/p, pm/p, a) Dj<0, D2,D3>0 (5.6)
industrial p = p(a, y, w, q, k)
prices
Pj.P2.P3.P4>0. P5<0 (5.7)
industrial n = n(y, w, q, k) n ltn3>0, n2,n4<0 (5.8)
labour demand
The direction of influence in each case above is unambiguous, although there will 
be some scope for ambiguity in the price equation if we recognise that the markup, a, 
may be influenced by the variables determined endogenously within this system. In the 
case of perfect competition, a=l, and there are no problems. However, under imperfect 
competition, a is influenced by the degree of industrial concentration and (more 
importantly) by the elasticity of demand, as demonstrated in the derivation above. Clearly, 
if the elasticity of demand depends positively on the level of industrial output, then the 
overall impact of demand change on prices becomes ambiguous, as this countercyclical 
pressure on the markup works against the procyclical effect of diminishing returns. More 
generally, there have been various theories of price-setting that would predict that the 
markup, a, is related to output levels (see Domberger (1983), Sawyer (1983) for a 
review). In particular, there has been some interest in theories of price setting in which, 
for various reasons (some of which were discussed in chapter 2), agents wish to avoid 
erratic movements in their prices, rather allowing the markup to adjust and accommodate 
any movements in factor input prices or demand variations that are seen to be 
tem porary . in this case, there may be no simple relationship between the markup and 
output, but it is clear that the countercyclical influence on the markup that this form of 
price-setting behaviour predicts will also work against, and perhaps dominate, the effects 
of diminishing returns acknowledged in (5.7).
Turning to wage determination, it is assumed that there is a single union involved 
in the negotiations on pay in each industry, and that this union can be represented by a 
simple utility function. As the discussion of chapter 2 made clear, such union-based 
models of wage determination have become very popular in recent years because of the 
institutional detail of the labour market that can be incorporated within them, and they 
have been widely examined in the context of the analysis of the rise and persistence of 
high aggregate unemployment rates in the UK and elsewhere. Such models have been less
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intensively examined in the context of disaggregated models of the labour market, 
however, and so it is perhaps worthwhile to examine in a little more detail the nature of 
these models in this context There are two related but distinct aspects of the union-based 
models which determine the properties of the wage outcome. The first concerns the choice 
of the variables of significance to the union and of the functional form with which to 
represent the union’s preferences, and the second concerns the bargaining framework 
within which negotiations are assumed to occur. We shall briefly elaborate on these 
below, stressing the points of particular relevence to a disaggregated model, and then set 
down a specific model of wage determination to illustrate the various influences on 
industrial wages that exist.
On the issue of the choice of the variables of interest in a union utility function 
and its functional form, we note that typically in the literature, the union is assumed to 
value higher real (consumption) wages and higher levels of employment (and 
occassionally, higher levels of union membership identified separately from employment 
levels). These magnitudes are generally measured against ‘reference’ levels of the real 
wage and employment, and it is these ‘reference’ levels through which many of the 
interactions between sectors of the labour market are incorporated in a disaggregated 
model. The precise choice of variables, and indeed the functional form of the union’s 
objective function can be derived explicitly, assuming that individual workers’ preferences 
follow conventional axioms, and aggregating over these workers through assumptions on 
the institutional framework of the union (i.e. it’s voting system and the internal 
organisation through which individuals make their views known to union officials). 
Alternatively, the choice of influential variables, and of the functional form, can be made 
more arbitrarily, hoping simply to capture what the investigator believes to be the most 
important features of the union’s preferences in a general form .^ In the context of a 
disaggregated model of the labour market, it is likely that the latter approach is more 
useful. Clearly, it is possible to accommodate interpersonal comparisons in individual 
workers’ utility functions (see, for example, Becker (1974)), so that the significance of 
wage relativities, or of wage ‘norms’, or of the notion of ‘fair play’ in wage setting can 
be justified. However, in practice, it would be difficult to identify the precise nature of 
these interactions. For example, it is reasonable to assume that an individual’s ultility may 
be influenced not only by his real wage, but also by his wage level relative to the 
incomes obtained by others. However, it is not clear whether his reference group would 
include all workers, or just those in employment, or just those with comparable skills and 
training, etc., or whether the reference group’s income would include non-labour income, 
non-pecuniary ‘perks’, and so on. Equally, we have mentioned previously the possibility 
that a particularly well-publicised wage settlement in an industry can have widespread 
effects on the bargaining behaviour of others throughout the economy at that time, as can
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government announcements of their intentions on public sector pay. These examples again 
illustrate the difficulties that would be encountered in explicitly identifying the social 
interactions within an individual’s utility function, this time because of the difficulties in 
modelling information collection. Of course, all of these difficulties would be further 
compounded in the process of aggregating over individuals to obtain a simple utility 
function with which to model the union representing them. For these reasons, in this 
exposition, we shall simply assume that certain variables are of significance to the union 
without attempting to provide a formal derivation of the model.
The second aspect of the union based models determining the form of the wage 
outcome mentioned above is the bargaining framework assumed to operate in the industry. 
This is potentially of some significance here, given the emphasis placed on bargaining 
costs in the discussion of the previous chapters. For example, the assumption of the 
‘monopoly union* model of wage determination (in which unions unilaterally set wages, 
and firms unilaterally set employment levels) reduces the role of ‘bargaining’ to one 
through which the firm simply reveals to the union the precise position of it’s labour 
demand schedule. More realistically, the ‘right-to-manage* model (in which firms set 
employment, but bargain with unions over wages), or the ‘efficient bargain’ model (in 
which both employment and wages are bargained over) incorporate the act of bargaining 
explicitly into the labour market framework. These models require some further 
assumptions on the bargaining process, therefore, as described previously in chapter 2 
when discussing the sources of costs in adjusting nominal wages.
The following description of a ‘right-to-manage’ model solution illustrates these 
points, and can be used to provide an indication of the important influences on wage 
determination. In this the union is represented by a utility function of the form
u = u( w, p, n, wd ) (5.9)
u1,u3>0, u2,u4<0
where w and n are as previously defined, p = consumer price deflator and wd = the
‘reference’ wage level against which the union judges it’s own wage for comparability
purposes (as discussed above). Note that p = ( p’(l+tl)(l+t3) )/(l-t2), where p’ = (pre-
% %tax) price to home market = f(p, p ), p = aggregate price of imports, tl = rate of 
employers’ tax, t2 = rate of direct tax, t3 = rate of indirect tax. Here, then, the terms (tl,
a|e
t2, t3, p/p ) are the components of the "wedge" between the real producer wage (of 
interest to the firm) and the real consumer wage (of interest to the union). Assuming that 
the firm has a utility function U over profits, and that it makes its employment and 
pricing decisions to maximise profits in the light of the wage settlement (the ‘right-to- 
manage’ institutional assumption), the outcome of the wage bargain solves the following
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maximisation:
max [ U( 7c(w, n, p, y, q, k, p)) ]0 [ u - u ]
w
where n and p are the optimally chosen levels of employment and prices given in (5.8) 
and (5.7) respectively, 0 is a measure of the bargaining strength of the firm relative to the 
union, and u is the "fall-back" level of utility achievable by the union in the event of the 
disaggreement (strike) outcome (a zero fallback level of utility is implicitly assumed for 
the firm here). This solution is a generalisation of the Nash bargaining solution which has 
some appeal because it is possible to derive such a solution from within a game-theoretic 
framework, working with plausible axioms on the bargainers’ behaviour, and at the same 
time provide an interpretation of the solution in terms of the bargaining process that takes 
place between the firm and the union in arriving at the solution (see, for example, Svejnar 
(1986)). Now, assuming that the union’s "fallback" utility level is given by
u = u( wa, p, wd )
where wa represents the level of pay achievable by union members should a strike occur 
(a "fallback" wage), then this provides an expression for nominal wages as follows:
w = g(wa, wd, y, q, k, p, wedge, oc, 0)
gl.g2’g3*g4’S5’S6’S7'S8>0’ S9<0 (5*10>
The terms "y, q, k" in expression (5.10) are present simply because of their influence on 
the labour demand constraint, and correspond to the "internal" pressures on wages 
described in chapter 2. The "external" pressures exerted on wages come via the aggregate 
price level, the wedge term, the reference wage, wd, the fallback wage term, wa, and the 
determinants of firm/union bargaining strength.
Of course, in order to operationalise such a model, we need also some indication 
of the determinants of wa, wd, and 0, and here we will assume the following:
wd = h^( w, INC, un, un, RR, w(-l), p) (5.11.1)
hl,h^,hj,h| > 0, h^ ,h^  <0, h^  < 0 
wa = h^( w, costs) (5.11.2) 
hj > 0, h| < 0
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0= h^( costs, w, p) (5.11.3)
and ‘costs* arc the variables affecting negotiation costs to the union listed previously in 
Chapter 4 (page 92), including
where w = aggregate wage level, INC = a measure of the intensity of downward pressure 
put on wages through incomes policy, un = local unemployment rate, un = aggregate 
unemployment rate, RR = replacement ratio, UP = a measure of union power, and other 
terms are as defined previously. Clearly, these representations are not the only ones 
possible, but they do illustrate the more important of the ‘external* influences on wages. 
Certainly the reference wage, w^, will be influenced by the level of aggregate wages, 
although as discussed above, this relationship may not be a simple one. Further, w^ might 
be influenced also by unemployment benefits and the rate of unemployment since these 
affect the costs and expected duration of unemployment should the union member choose, 
or be forced to leave employment with his current employer. (Note that here aggregate 
and local unemployment rates may both be important, given that the likelihood of 
obtaining a job within the same industry, for which the worker will hold some relevent 
skills, may be higher than that of obtaining a job in any other industry). Equally, the 
effects of incomes policy on the industry relative to the economy as a whole, and of 
previous wage levels (in real terms and relative to other wages) will also play a part in 
the union’s comparability exercises. In (5.11.2), the determinants of the fallback wage 
include those variables listed previously as affecting the costs of negotiation on the 
grounds that these are precisely the variables which we suggested would influence the 
firm’s and union’s willingness to accept and to endure a strike (disaggreement) outcome. 
We also include here the aggregate wage level since this may provide a proxy for any 
earnings to be obtained through temporary work during the strike period. Obviously, these 
variables also influence the relative power of the firm and union, as described in (5.11.3).
We should note at this stage that the disaggregated model of (5.6)-(5.11) differs 
substantially from the union-based models usually considered in the literature relating to 
more aggregated analyses of the labour market. For example, a rise in the aggregate price 
level will exert pressure on industrial wages through a variety of routes in this model: 
directly, through the union’s attempts to counter the reduction in its members’ real wages, 
and indirectly through w^, as this rises in anticipation of rising aggregate wages, and 
through 0, as relative bargaining strengths are affected. Indeed, more generally, we can 
accommodate a variety of paths of influence on wage setting for any of the variables
costs = h^(UP, INC, un, un, RR, bargaining system ) (5.11.4)
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described above because of the extreme flexibility of the union-based models of the 
labour market in the disaggregated context. It is for this reason that the model description 
should be considered as illustrative of the sort of influences working in the labour market 
rather than as a complete description of reality, and is best seen as a means of 
inteipreting empirically observed phenomenon.^)
While the model of (5.6)-(5.11) provides a single coherent explanation of the 
workings of an industry’s supply side, we should mention here some reservations 
regarding its use. First, we note that the assumed bargaining process that underlies the 
Nash solution is a stylised one, relying on particular rules of play by the two parties in 
terms of the sequence of offers and counter-offers, and their concession behaviour. 
Moreover, the occurance of strikes, or lock-outs, is difficult to accommodate within this 
framework without assuming informational assymmetries in an ad hoc way. This does not 
sit easily with the (more realistic) discussion of the bargaining process covered in Chapter 
4, especially given the importance attached to such occurances in the discussion of the 
costs of negotiation. Moene (1988) notes the difficulties of using the Nash bargaining 
model without paying attention to the strategic elements in bargaining behaviour and the 
general bargaining environment, and provides a more comprehensive discussion of the 
way in which a union’s threat behaviour can affect fall-back utilities. These issues go 
beyond the scope of our work, but should be borne in mind when relating the applied 
work to the model description.
A second reservation on the above model derivation concerns its static nature. 
Throughout the work, we have emphasised costs of adjustment which explain and justify 
the observed stickiness in wages and prices. However, where such stickiness exists, 
current decisions have long lasting effects, and in recognition of this, wage, price, output 
and employment setting decisions will be the result of a game played over time. So, for 
example, the static labour demand relationship considered in out model description above 
would be replaced by a dynamic decision rule, as the firm maximises its (expected) 
discounted future stream of profits. In turn, the union would maximise its expected 
discounted future utility stream given the firm’s dynamic decision rule. In these 
circumstances, a time-consistent open-loop Nash equilibrium solution would be more 
appropriate, with forward-looking expectations playing a major role in the wage, price, 
output and employment outcomes. Again, we mention this reservation as a warning, 
noting that the model derivation is merely illustrative of the important influences in the 
process of wage determination, rather than providing a complete representation of reality.
Despite these reservations, the model derivation set out in this section provides a 
useful framework with which to examine the evolution of the labour market in a 
disaggregated setting. In the following section, we translate the stylised model into a form
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that can be investigated empirically, and apply this model to disaggregated data available 
for the UK economy. Before coming to the results of this empirical exercise, however, we 
briefly review some of the difficulties involved in the translation of the stylised model 
into a form that can be investigated empirically, and provide some justification for our 
approach to the econometric modelling of the supply side relationships outlined above.
5.2 Estimating the model
Modelling disaggregated supply side relationships
In what follows, the stylised model presented above will be investigated using 
data for 38 industries taken from a data set maintained by the Cambridge Growth Project 
(CGP). The industrial classification is based around the 1968 SIC, and is described in 
Table 5.1; the sample covers the years 1954-1981. Industry 4 (Petroleum and natural gas) 
has been excluded from the estimations on the grounds that the data period for this 
industry is so much shorter, and that the industry might be expected to behave erratically 
during its infancy. Aggregate variables to be used, where appropriate, have been built up 
from the disaggregate figures, so that the aggregate time paths are fully consistent with 
the industrial ones.
It is perhaps pertinent at this stage to consider the advantages of working at the 
level of disaggregation defined in Table 5.1, and to consider whether this is an 
appropriate level of disaggregation with which to examine supply side relationships. Of 
course, the ‘appropriate’ level of disaggregation will depend in practice on the issues that 
are under investigation. If an investigator is interested in economy-wide questions, then a 
higher level of aggregation is likely to be more appropriate than if questions relate to 
firm-specific institutions. In this analysis, we have a range of questions that we hope to 
address. On the one hand, we want to use the results as a guide to which of the theoretic 
explanations for price and wage rigidities, based at the micro level, are supported by the 
evidence, and this suggests a low level of aggregation. On the other hand, we are also 
interested in the macroeceonomic consequences of rigidities, and whether there is 
evidence to support the idea that there is a build-up of inertia at the macro level through 
interactions between sectors. This interest indicates a higher level of aggregation is 
necessary.
Given these arguments, the decision to use the CGP data is justifiable on the 
grounds that this databank provides the most disaggregated dataset which covers the UK 
economy comprehensively and on a consistent basis. It is clear that more disaggregated 
datasets, looking at company accounts or (like that discussed in chapter 4) looking at 
industry-wide bargaining arrangements, are the most appropriate if we want to look only
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Table 5.1
Thirty-nine sector Industrial Classification based on 1968 SIC
Industry title 1968 SIC MLH
1 Agriculture
2 Coal mining
3 Mining nes
4 Petroleum and natural gas
5 Food
6 Drink
7 Tobacco
8 Coal products
9 Petroleum products
10 Chemicals
11 Iron and steel
12 Non-ferrous metals
13 Mechanical engineering
14 Instrument engineering
15 Electrical engineering
16 Ship building
17 Motor vehicles
18 Aerospace euipment
19 Other vehicles
20 Metal goods nes
21 Textiles
22 Leather, clothing, etc.
23 Bricks
24 Timber and furniture
25 Paper and board
26 Printing and publishing
27 Other manufacturing
28 Construction
29 Gas
30 Electricity
31 Water
32 Rail
33 Road
34 Other transport
35 Communication
36 Distribution
37 Business services
38 Professional services
39 Miscellaneous services
001,002,003
101
102,103,109
104
211-219,221,229
231,232,239
240
261
262,263
271-279
311-313
321-323
331-339,341,342,349
351-354
361-369
370
381
383
380,382,384,385
390-396,399
411-419,421-423,429
431-433,441-446,449,450
461-464,469
471-475,479
481-484
485,486,489
491-496,499
500
601
602
603
701
702-704
705-707,709
708
810-812,820,821,831,832
861-866
871-879
881-899
\
at the microtheoretic explanations of rigidities, since this is the level at which decisions 
are taken. However, these do not cover comprehensively the whole of the UK economy, 
and are therefore not suitable for looking at the macroeconomic aspects of rigidities. The 
CGP databank can be used in this context, and because of the relatively high degree of 
disaggregation, it can also be used to provide (indirect) evidence on the microeconomic 
questions that we wish to address.
Of course, there remains the question of whether the analysis could take place at 
a higher level of aggregation and yet still be able to adequately reflect the macroeconomic 
properties under investigatioa A four sector split, looking at the Primary sector, Heavy 
and Light Manufacturing, and Services, for example, would still comprehensively cover 
the economy, and may be less susceptible to industry-specific shocks than the data of the 
CGP databank. Certainly it is true that the analysis of a smaller number of sectors is more 
easily managed and that the discussion of results can become unwieldy with a large 
number of sectors. However, there are good arguments why, a priori, the dataset with the 
greater degree of disaggregation is preferable. The model derivation discussed in the 
previous subsection illustrates clearly the sophistication and the volume of the feedbacks 
between sectors in the process of adjustment of the supply side, and as we aggregate up, 
we progressively eliminate these important interactions. Moreover, if there are differences 
in the form of the relationships across the sectors, then the properties of the model will 
alter if there are changes in the relative importance of particular sectors over time. These 
changes will only be captured by the analysis if the sectors involved are explicitly 
identified.
Further, these arguments are supported by empirical evidence on the statistical 
properties of the CGP dataset. A research programme on the usefulness of disaggregation 
in econometric modelling carried out at Cambridge on this dataset has established a 
number of statistical procedures for investigating this issue; see, for example, Pesaran, 
Pierse, and Kumar (1989), [PPK], and Lee, Pesaran and Pierse [LPP] (1990a, 1990b). 
While this econometric programme is not central to the work of this thesis, the two main 
elements of the analysis can be mentioned here in support of the use of the level of 
disaggregation described in Table 5.1. The first of these elements is the development of 
criteria on which to choose whether to use micro or macro equations to predict aggregate 
variables. Such criteria are developed in PPK and in LPP (1990b) and aim to establish 
whether the predictions of an aggregate variable obtained by aggregating over the fitted 
values of disaggregated equations are statistically superior to those obtained from the 
corresponding aggregate equation. The criteria developed in these papers relate to the 
estimation of a single relationship, and are not appropriate in the analysis of a system of 
equations of the sort set out in (5.6)-(5.11) above. However, in the papers it was 
demonstrated that disaggregated labour demand equations estimated according to the CGP
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classification were superior to their aggregate counterpart in predicting aggregate 
employment levels. Since this relationship constitutes one element of the system of 
equations of interest here, this suggests strongly that the system as a whole should be 
analysed at a disaggregated level.
This suggestion is compounded by the findings of the second element of the 
research which recognises that heterogeneity in the foim of relationships across sectors 
may generate biases in the estimation of the relationship using more aggregated data. This 
possibility is considered explicitly in LPP (1990a, 1990b). Here, statistical tests for the 
presence of aggregation bias are developed and applied to labour demand equations 
estimated for the UK over the CGP industrial classification. In the 1990b paper, for 
example, a mean wage elasticity of -0.5 is obtained over the preferred set of industrial 
equations, and this is compared (statistically) to an elasticity of -1.0 obtained in the 
estimation of an aggregate relationship based on the same data. The proposed test statistic 
firmly rejected the null hypothesis of no aggregation bias in the estimation of this wage 
elasticity. Other elasticities were also considered, but these did not appear to be affected 
by aggregation bias. Nevertheless, this provides good evidence that aggregation over the 
sectors described in Table 5.1 is likely to lead to inaccuracies in the estimation of the 
responsiveness of the variables of interest to changes in the explanatory variables. This is 
obviously undesirable in both the micro and macro analyses of rigidities to be undertaken 
on the basis of the model estimation.
The decision to study the labour market disaggregated by industry has been made 
with the implicit assumption that disaggregation across this dimension will be the most 
appropriate means of studying inertia at the micro level and its accumulation at the macro 
level. Such an assumption implies that changes in the structure of the labour market 
across other dimensions are either insignificant in their effects on wage and price 
rigidities, or can be accommodated within the industrial analysis of the labour market. So, 
while we recognise that there are important differences in the labour market across the 
regions of the UK, between male and female labour, between youths and adults, across 
different occupational groups, and so on, it is implicitly assumed in our analysis that, to 
the extent that they are significant in the relationships of interest, these differences are 
reflected in the disaggregated industrial equations.
As an illustration of these difficulties, we note that in the ten years following 
1970, the earnings of women rose by around 15% relative to men, while the relative 
employment of women (in terms of hours worked) rose from 43% to 53%. These figures 
illustrate clearly the substantial changes in work practices that took place over the period, 
and the fact that we will not distinguish between male and female labour in this study 
means that we cannot capture the impact of all of these changes within our analysis.
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However, it can be argued that many of the important features will be incorporated 
through the use of industrial data. In Borooah and Lee (1988), for example, we show that 
while institutional and legislative changes were important in explaining the rise in relative 
earnings over the period (through the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts and through 
the effects of the flat-rate incomes policies of that time), the primary explanation for the 
rise in relative employment was the change in the structure of employment towards 
industries which use female labour relatively intensively. Given the stability over the past 
twenty years of the ranking of industries in terms of the intensity with which male and 
female labour are employed, it may be reasonable to assume that our industrial 
disaggregation will accommodate many of the changes that have arisen in the labour 
market through this route, accepting that the (differential) effects of the industrial 
legislation will be among the factors incoiporated into the residual error in any statistical 
work.
Of course, similar comments apply to the regional, age, and occupational 
dimensions, as different industries concentrate in particular regions, as some industries are 
more inclined to take on and train young workers, and as particular occupational groups 
are found to a greater or lesser extent in different industries. However, there has perhaps 
been less stability in the links between the industrial classifications and these other 
dimensions than has been the case with the male/female split, and this will reduce the 
reliability of empirical work which concentrates exclusively on the industrial dimension. 
As an illustration, we note that throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, there was a substantial 
shift in the occupational structure of employment, as the number of workers in the groups 
‘plant and machine operatives’ and ‘craft and skilled manual occupations’ declined, and as 
the ‘professional* and ‘associate professional* groups expanded. Through the 1970’s, 
much of this shift was attributable to changing industrial structure, reflecting the growth 
in service sector employment and the relative decline in manufacturing employment, so 
that this aspect of changing occupational structure will be accommodated within our 
analysis. Since 1981, however, a much greater part of the occupational shifts reflect 
changing occupational structures within industries, as technological and organisational 
innovations impinge on the production process (see Lindley and Wilson (1989)). While 
our data set does not cover the latter period, these comments illustrate the difficulties 
involved in empirical work: those changes brought about within industries, as individuals 
are ‘upgraded’ to positions of greater responsibility, possibly at higher rates of pay and in 
more pleasant working conditions, for example, will not be captured within an empirical 
analysis disaggregated across industries alone. Of course, this will reduce the reliability of 
any applied work to the extent that changes of this sort represent the significant changes 
that take place in the labour market over time.
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Chart 5.1
Summary of Variable Definitions
The following list summarises the variable definitions provided in the text. Precise definitions, and 
sources of data, are provided in the Data Appendix.
INT = composite variable (derived from the labour demnad eqn) measuring the pressure on 
wages due to factors internal to the firm
o= measure of (aggregate) cyclic variation
comp = (aggregate) measure of international competitiveness
RR = replacement ratio
UP = measure of union power
inc = strength of the downward pressure exerted on wages through the successive periods of 
incomes policy
Variables refer to logarithms of industrial magnitudes unless otherwise stated. A ‘bar’ indicates 
that the variable is an aggregate magnitude. Hence,
p = aggregate price = weighted average of industrial prices
= E 0j p, where 0j are weights given by industrial output levels
w = aggregate wage = weighted average of industrial wages
= Z w, where |Xj are weights given by industrial employment levels
and so on.
y = output
q = price of material and fuel inputs
p = price of output
un = industrial unemployment rate
unr = average industrial unemployment rate
experienced over the previous two years
w = (nominal) wages 
k = capital stock 
n = employment
pm = price of imported industry product 
a= oligopoly power in the industry 
0= rel. firm/union bargaining power
*  _. p = aggregate price of imports
tl = (aggregate) ‘employers’ tax* rate
t2 = 1- (aggregate) rate of direct tax
t3 = (aggregate) rate of indirect tax
I components of the wedge 
I between the real consumption 
I wage and the real producer 
I wage
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Operationalising the model
These comments have important implications for the translation of the theoretic 
model of the industry set out in (5.6)-(5.11) into a model which can be investigated 
empirically, and for the measurement of the variables of interest in the model. Such a 
translation is given in (5.12)-(5.15) below, which shows the 4-equation system which we 
will estimate for each industry.
n = aQ + ajn(-l) + a2n(-2) + a3w + a4qe + a^k + a^y + ayt (5.12)
p — bQ + bjp(-l) + b2p(-2) + b3w + b^ q® + b^k + b^y + byt (5.13)
w = Yo + Yiw(-l) + y2( a4qe + a5k + a6y + a?t) +
Y3P+ Y4we^ge + Y5W<^  + Y6wa+ I*]®
= Cq + Cjw(-l) + C2We + C3( a4qe + 85k + a^y + ayt) +
c^inc + c^unr + Cyp6 + Cgwedge + C9RR + CjqUP (5.14)
y = d0 + djy(-l) + d2(p/pe) + d3(pm/pe) + d4a+ d5t (5.15)
Here variables are as defined previously (and as described in summary in Chart 5.1), and 
”(-i)" means that the variable is lagged i periods. Coefficients will be expected to take the 
signs as shown by the partial derivatives in (5.6)-(5.11), although b^ is ambiguously 
signed, following the earlier discussion on the cyclic influences on the price markup. An 
"e" superscript on a variable means that the variable is assumed to be unobservable at the 
time at which decisions are made, so that expectations have to be formed. Hence, in the 
model above it is assumed that material prices at time t are not observed until after each 
industries’ employment, pricing, wage, and output decisions are made, so that it is their 
expected value which enters into an individual industry’s labour demand and price 
equation. Equally, expectations of aggregate prices and aggregate wages to hold in the 
current period also have to be formed, and it is these variables which enter the wage and 
output equations. Expected values for these variables will be generated by subsidiary 
equations explaining the variables in terms of "relevant", observable variables. The 
implications of this estimation procedure are discussed below.
While the form of the equations at (5.12)-(5.15) is obviously closely related to the 
stylised model of (5.6)-(5.11), in the light of the discussion above, we should briefly 
comment on the limitations of this linear representation and on the difficulties 
encountered in quantifying the labour market features of interest in the model.
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For example, in what follows, we shall measure employment, n, simply by the 
numbers employed in the industry (including employees in employment and the self- 
employed). The measure of ‘wages’, w, is obtained on a comparable basis, dividing the 
total industrial labour costs (wages and salaries plus employers’ NIC’s) by the number 
employed, adjusting for the effects of overtime by deflating this figure according to the 
number of hours actually worked in excess of ‘normal’ hours (see the Data Appendix for 
more details). While these figures provide us with workable definitions of the terms in
(5.12)-(5.15), measuring labour input and its cost in terms of a "normal man-week", it is 
clear that such figures will not capture adequately all of the changes in composition and 
character of the ‘employed’, or its cost, that have occured over the sample period. Hence, 
we have already mentioned the rapid rise in the relative importance of women in the 
labour market, and clearly this element of realism is lost in our definitions. Similar 
problems are encountered if we recognise the growing significance of part-time working, 
or, most recently, of self-employment in the provision of labour services. Both of these 
developments are likely to have been engendered by a greater premium placed on 
flexibity in the workplace, this being driven in turn by the introduction of new 
technologies and work practices. These developments create problems in the measurement 
of ‘employment’, however, due to the difficulties of comparing the labour services of the 
part-time employee compared to the full-time employee, or of comparing the input of an 
employee performing a particular function compared with a self-employed contractor 
performing the same function, for example. Moreover, the costs incurred by the firm in 
obtaining these labour services will differ according to the nature of the person employed. 
So, for example, the firm substantially reduces it costs by subcontracting work as there is 
no longer any obligation on it to provide redundancy pay, health insurance, holiday pay, 
paid sick leave and so on. Similarly, labour costs to the firm can be reduced by the 
employment of a greater number of part-time workers relative to full-time workers since 
the former do not receive the fringe benefits and non-wage costs enjoyed the latter. 
Obviously, these sophistications will not be picked up by the simple measure of ‘wages’ 
described above, but data limitations make it infeasible to attempt to adjust these figures 
to accommodate these issues across our industries.
In a similar vein, the extent to which a "normal man-week" remains a consistent 
measure of labour input over the sample period is unclear, as the substantial reductions in 
the "normal" working week that occurred over our sample period (falling by around 10%) 
would be (at least partially) offset by changing production techniques influencing the 
"intensity" of work (through changes in the use of shift work, for example). Our treatment 
of overtime payments is rather simplistic, treating hours worked in excess of "normal" as 
exogenously-determined. Of course, in reality, the length of the "normal" working week 
will be determined through the firm/union bargaining process, with the union valuing a
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reduced working week, other things equal, and the firm recognising the role of overtime 
work as a means of obtaining flexibility in labour input (setting the cost of overtime 
premia against the presence of fixed labour costs, through flat-rate payroll taxes and hiring 
and firing costs, and so on). While this aspect of firm/union bargaining is frequently 
ignored, on the grounds that the level of "normal" hours are adjusted so infrequently, 
there have been considerable changes over the length of our sample, and it is recognsed 
that the omission of an explicit treatment of hours worked is a weakness of our analysis.
This brings us to the related issue of productivity growth. This concept was 
ignored in the stylised model derivation of the previous section, but is obviously of some 
significance in the real world. Productivity growth is described as the autonomous growth 
in output that would occur without growth in input quantities, and is associated with 
changes in managerial efficiency, in working practices, and in production technologies 
generally. Ideally, we might obtain a direct measure of technological change, looking at 
the level of expenditure on research and development, or the number of patents or product 
designs over the sample period, for example. Reliable series of this sort, however, are not 
readily available, and would still fail to address some of the difficulties associated with 
the quantification of technological innovation. For example, it has been argued that work 
in many industries has become increasingly technical and demanding, requiring the quality 
of labour inputs into production to improve. This may provide some explanation for the 
shift in occupational structures within industries which was described above. One possible 
means of measuring this change might be provided by the numbers of workers in 
possession of formal qualifications in the industry over time. Certainly this number has 
grown progressively over recent years, and this may reflect the proposed improvement in 
the quality of labour. On the other hand, this growth may simply reflect the fact that, as 
unemployment rises, workers attempt to improve their attractiveness to employers by 
obtaining these qualifications, even if the work carried out when employed is essentially 
unchanged from previously.
Clearly there are some difficulties associated with modelling changing production 
technology. In the model of (5.12)-(5.15), a simple time trend is included in the labour 
demand, price and wage equations to accommodate the effects of productivity growth, but 
again we should acknowledge the limitations of the model in this respect. Here, we 
implicitly assume that there is a trend productivity growth rate in each industry which is 
constant over the sample period, and exogenously determined. Both of these assumptions 
can be criticised: for example, the assumption of a constant growth rate has been widely 
investigated in the UK (see for example Mendis and Muellbauer (1983), Muellbauer 
(1986)), examining whether there have been periods in which productivity growth has 
slowed down (following the oil price shocks of the early 1970’s, for example) or
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accelerated (during the early years of the Thatcher administration, for example). These 
suggest that a more sophisticated specification may be necessary to fully accommodate the 
effects of the changing rate of technological progress, and it’s incorporation into 
production techniques, in an econometric analysis of the supply side.
Equally, the assumption that productivity growth is exogenously determined can 
be criticised on a number of grounds. First, it is clear that in reality, unions are actively 
involved in discussions on training, recognising the implications of training for the long 
run employment and pay prospects of its members. As such, a more realistic model of 
labour market behaviour than that considered above might include the provision of 
training (measured through the level of expenditure on training) and its effect on 
efficiency explicitly in the union’s and the firm’s objective functions (see Borooah and 
Lee (1986) for a model of the labour market in which such considerations are 
considered). Secondly, as the model was derived in the previous section, we have 
abstracted from the issue of utilisation rates. Gearly in practice, both employment and 
capital may be under-utilised and the extent of the under-utilisation is likely to vary over 
the cycle (again, see Muellbauer (1986)). And third, we note the considerable effects that 
macroeconomic conditions may have on worker effort. For example, we might assume 
that employees will work more intensively the higher the probability of being caught 
shirking, the higher the probability of being dismissed as a consequence, and the greater 
the cost of job loss to the worker. The second and third of these influences will depend 
on precisely those factors we have described as affecting the ‘reference’ and ‘fallback’ 
wage notions which affect the wage bargain, and will cause the level of worker effort to 
change over time. Thus, for example, movements in unemployment rates will have 
"worker discipline" effects so that productivity may rise in times of recession. Moreover, 
since the strength of this effect is likely to depend on the institutional environment of the 
worker (if the presence of a union reduces the probability of dismissal, for example), the 
extent to which productivity can be affected in this way will differ between industries, 
(see, for example, Green and Weisskopf (1990)). This highlights the point that 
productivity innovations are endogenously determined, and also that the extent of the 
potential biases involved in ignoring this endogeneity will differ from industry to industry.
A complete analysis of productivity effects would go beyond the scope of this 
work. The simple time trend introduced to capture the effects of technological change 
provides the model with some degree of flexibility, however, and clearly, in estimation, 
this effect can differ between industries. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the limitations of 
this approach, and note that results should be treated with appropriate caution.^)
Finally in this subsection, we should note some of the difficulties encountered in 
quantifying the pressures thought to be important in the wage equation. We have already
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discussed, both above and in Chapter 3, some of the data problems associated with the 
use of local (industry-specific) unemployment rates. In addition to the measurement 
problem, however, there is also the issue of the persistence of the effect of the 
unemployed on wage setting. The arguments that have been presented so far for the 
inclusion of the local unemployment rate in the wage equation have primarily emphasised 
the idea that higher rates reduce the probability of reemployment should a union member 
leave his current employment (so that higher unemployment reduces both the reference 
wage and the relative bargaining power of the union). However, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that members of the union who have become unemployed (but retained union 
membership) might also exert some direct influence on their unions to moderate their pay 
claims. In this case, local unemployment rates might continue to exert influence on wages 
for some time. For this reason, we use the average industrial unemployment rate over the 
previous two years, denoted ‘unr\ in the industrial wage equations of the applied work. 
This definition was chosen in the belief that such a measure would more adequately 
capture the downward influence of local unemployment on wages than the current rate.
A second difficulty in estimating the wage equation of the disaggregated industrial 
systems relates to the quantification of the effects of incomes policy. We have already 
commented, in the previous two chapters, on the various forms of incomes policy that 
were implemented in the UK throughout the 1960’s and 1970’s, differing according to 
their legal status (statutory or volunatary), their terms (‘freeze*, ‘flat-rate ceiling*, or 
‘proportional ceiling’), and their severity (comparing the rate of inflation and the declared 
‘norm’ set down by the policy). As shown in chapters 3 and 4, these different periods of 
policy had different implications for different industries, and we might therefore attempt 
to model separately the effects of each period of policy using time-specific dummies. 
Such an approach would use up a considerable number of degrees of freedom in the 
current exercise, however, and for this reason, we prefer to employ a single measure of 
the pressure exerted on wages by incomes policy here. Such a measure is given in 
Whitley (1986); here a variable is described which provides a quantitative and continuous 
measure of the impact of incomes policy reflecting both the extent of the downward 
pressure on wages exerted by policy (as indicated by the implicit or explicit ‘norms’ of 
the policy relative to inflation), and the attitudes of the government and the unions 
towards the policy. Of course, the use of an aggregate measure of this sort is very 
reasonable in the context of an analysis of the aggregate wage, and will provide an 
important explanatory variable in our analysis of the determinants of the expected 
aggregate wage. However, since we know that different industries respond differently to 
the successive forms of policy, it is important that we also include this variable separately 
in the industrial wage equations, as suggested in (5.11.1 ) above.
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Despite the reservations raised above, and the acknowledged difficulties associated 
with the measurement of the labour market variables of interest, the model set out in
(5.12)-(5.15) provides a useful system with which to examine the the supply side at a 
disaggregated level, and the rigidities generated through the interaction between sectors. 
We turn now to the estimation of these industrial systems.
The empirical work
The first stage in the estimation process is to generate time series for the expected 
variables, p6, we, and qe for each industry. This is done in a series of subsidiary 
regression exercises, carried out separately to the estimation, for each industry, of the 
4-equation system described at (5.12)-(5.15).^ This procedure has implications for the 
model which should be made explicit Specifically, it is noted that the current aggregate 
wage, for example, depends on all of the individual industries’ wages in the current 
period, so that a rationally-formed expectation of the aggregate wage based on full 
information would be influenced by the determinants of wages in every industry 
explicitly, and the expectation would be given by the mathematical expectation of the 
aggregate wage written in terms of all of its determinant in the model. As the discussion 
in chapter 2 made clear however, one of the major sources of inertia in a world with 
many industries, producing many heterogeneous product, is the cost of gaining 
informatioa In the particular case of wage determination, we noted Okun’s (1981) 
comment that if "it is difficult and costly to define and sample objectively a universe of 
reference wages, firms and workers may focus on a few key indicative wages as the basis 
for a pattern of emulation" (p. 94). The acceptance of informational inadequacies provides 
the reasoning behind the estimation procedure employed here; agents are assumed to look 
to particular (generally aggregate) variables to form expectations on aggregate wages and 
prices, and on their own industry’s material input prices, in an attempt to capture the fact 
that, in practice, agents rely on relatively sparse, and inexpensive, information sets.
The reduced form equations used to provide estimates for p6 and we are presented 
in Table 5.2. In this, the variables are again as described in Chart 5.1, with precise 
definitions provided in the Data Appendix. The results presented are the outcome of a 
specification search in which I started by including a wide range of variables which were 
potentially influential on the aggregate wage and price. Given the simultaneity of the 
formation of expectations on wage and price inflation, a single set of potentially 
exogenous variables was used in the specification search for each equation. This set 
included, in addition to the variables listed in Table 5.2, un(-l), and changes in w(-l), in 
p(-2), in the replacement ratio, in the rate of indirect taxation, and in the log of un; these 
extra terms were not found to contribute to the fit of either equation. Estimated 
coefficients in these equations are generally well-determined, and take the expected signs,
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Table 5.2
Reduced form aggregate price and aggregate wage inflation equations (1956-1981)
Dept, van
Ap = aggregate price inflation Aw = aggregate wage inflation
cons -0.0132 cons 0.0258
(1.089) (2.500)
Ap(-1) 0.6060 Ap(-1) 0.6496
(3.593) (3.636)
At2 -0.8178 Aun(-1) -1.6443
(1.801) (1.7963)
AUP 0.0334 inc 0.0084
(0.961) (1.796)
tim 0.0030 Atl 1.3474
(2.529) (1.768)
c 0.4215 At2 -0.6940
(1.093) (1.591)
Acomp(-l) 0.1997 AUP 0.0703
(1.849) (2.427)
tim 0.0026
(2.603)
o 0.4594
(1.387)
Acomp(-l) 0.1704
(1.731)
R2 0.8451 R2 0.8923
RSS 0.01402 RSS 0.00807
Durbin t 0.591 DW 2.104
Notes
(absolute t-stats in parentheses)
"Durbin t" is Durbin’s (1970) t-stat for AR(1); "DW" is the standard Durbin-Watson
statistic
although some of the (long run) elasticities appear rather high. The fitted values of the 
equations given in Table 5.2 provide our estimates for ApF and Awe to be used in the 
subsequent estimation of the industrial relationships.^)
The estimated equations for the price of materials for each industry are generated 
relatively mechanically, and do not involve any element of specification search. The 
dependent variable in each case is the price of inputs to the industry from domestic 
sources, q. For each industry, this variable is explained in terms of its own lagged values, 
the expected current aggregate price and wage levels (given by the fitted values of the 
aggregate price and wage equations), past aggregate prices, a time trend, c, and aggregate 
competitiveness. Once more, it is assumed that the fitted values of these industrial 
equations provides a measure of the industries’ expected input price; again the idea is that 
a relatively sparse, and inexpensive, information set is used in the construction of these 
expectations therefore.
To be quite clear on the implications of the estimation procedure, we can consider 
the following sequence of events. At the beginning of each period, unions and firms in 
each industry have to form expectations on the level of aggregate prices, on aggregate 
wages, and on the price of inputs into their own industry that will hold over the coming 
period. I have chosen an intentionally restricted set of variables on which these 
expectations are based, in an attempt to capture the effects of high costs of collecting 
informatioa The expectations that are formed are not rational in the sense that agents are 
assumed to be ignorant of the parameters and structure of the model, and are assumed to 
hold only a limited subset of the data that is potentially available to them, remaining 
uninformed on other industries’ developments except in so far as they effect aggregate 
variables. Having formed expectations on these key exogenous variables, firms and unions 
in each industry are able to determine industry wages and prices, output and employment, 
as described in the model of (5.12)-(5.15). These individual decisions can then be 
aggregated and summed to obtain the actual aggregate price level, aggregate wage level, 
and industrial input prices which hold in that period. Because expectations are formed on 
less-than-complete information, these actual figures may not be consistent with the 
expected values (although we would not expect systematic errors to be too widespread).
Of course, the main element of this process are the industrial relationships of
(5.12)-(5.15), and it is to these that I now turn. Tables 5.3 to 5.6 present the results 
obtained by estimating the model of (5.12)-(5.15) for each of the 38 industrial groups in 
our dataset. Given the simultaneity of the model, it was appropriate to estimate each set 
of 4 equations using three-stage least squares. The endogenous variables in each system 
are n, p, w, and y. Lagged values of these variables, along with expected aggregate 
magnitudes p6 and we and the aggregate variables influential in Table 5.2 provided the
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Table 5.3
Industrial labour demand equations 1957-1981
cons n(-l) n(-2) w q k y tim
1. Agric. 8.8970
(5.0292)
0.5435
(3.3689)
0.3580
(2.1041)
0.0182
(0.1636)
-0.0182
(0.0000)
-0.5079
(3.0858)
-0.4430
(20115)
0.0243
(4.1612)
2. Coal 1.6413
(2.4706)
1.1718
(9.5995)
•0.0698
(0.4213)
-0.2258
(3.0280)
0.2258
(0.0000)
-0.7020
(53108)
0.3258
(3.0247)
0.0287
(4.6042)
3. Mining 12.9578
(4.4973)
0.1578
(1.0160)
-0.0716
(03869)
-0.8269
(8.1296)
0.8269
(0.0000)
-1.2066
(26183)
03377
(3.9011)
0.0245
(2D772)
4. Petrol 0.2024
(0.4758)
0.8951
(4.7053)
0.0096
(0.0473)
-0.0211
(0.3399)
0.0211
(0.0000)
-0.0138
(1.0384)
0.1322
(13001)
-0.0127
(03803)
5. Food -2.3769
(1.2989)
0.8418
(3.8587)
-0.5839
(2.6989)
-0.0673
(0.7983)
0.0673
(0.0000)
0.4559
(12355)
0.7663
(4.2074)
-0.0396
(2.1076)
6. Drink 7.4237
(4.7641)
0.5302
(3.0553)
-0.2581
(13919)
-0.1544
(33958)
0.1544
(0.0000)
•03871
(26468)
0.1313
(21106)
0.0240
(2.4381)
7. Tobacco 1.9965
(0.6601)
0.3369
(1.5776)
03595
(1.0857)
-0.1070
(1.8157)
0.1070
(0.0000)
03029
(1.0552)
-0.3051
(1.2554)
-0.0334
(1.0563)
8. Coal Prds -0.4676
(0.2150)
-0.2493
(1.0365)
0.0669
(03252)
-0.6898
(5.9978)
0.6898
(0.0000)
0.1992
(03261)
1.0172
(5.6022)
0.0034
(0.1461)
9. Petrol Prda 0.1804
(0.0448)
0.4512
(3.4853)
-0.0100
(0.0873)
-0.1795
(24494)
0.1795
(0.0000)
0.4514
(0.7185)
0.0668
(0.3744)
-0.0374
(13579)
10. Chemi 3.2837
(1.4796)
0.7709
(4.2358)
■0.1870
(1.0392)
0.1376
(1.1427)
0.1376
(0.0000)
-0.1938
(03040)
0.2722
(3.0895)
-0.0001
(0.0085)
11. Iron 0.6354
(0.5720)
0.5903
(4.1280)
-0.1874
(13482)
0.0210
(0.1565)
-0.0210
(0.0000)
02847
(20965)
0.3816
(6.2778)
-0.0239
(2.9111)
12. Oth Metal* 4.0444
(4.6732)
0.6020
(6.9452)
-0.3631
(43863)
-0.0031
(0.0344)
0.0031
(0.0000)
-02377
(13098)
0.5297
(12.2793)
-0.0011
(0.2430)
13. Mech Eng. 1.1810
(0.1338)
0.8750
(4.9247)
-0.2511
(13122)
•0.3030
(20454)
0.3030
(0.0000)
0.0013
(0.0008)
0.3054
(1.9726)
-0.0001
(0.0018)
14. Inst Eng. 11.1047
(5.8935)
03232
(2.0504)
-0.4092
(3.1369)
•0.2374
(2.4382)
0.2374 
(0.0000)
•0.9097
(5.0677)
0.4084
(6.8902)
0.0325
(32410)
15. Elec Eng. 1.4112
(1.6983)
0.8239
(7.0026)
0.0325
(03644)
-0.4165
(4.0758)
0.4165
(0.0000)
-0.8581
(3.1270)
0.6641
(7.6478)
0.0304
(2.1605)
16. Ship* 4.8960
(2.0776)
03056
(53877)
•03634
(1.7497)
-0.4819
(3.9030)
0.4819
(0.0000)
-0.4060
(1.8954)
02052
(2.8486)
0.0034
(0.6876)
17. Motor* 3.0849
(4.2020)
0.4954
(4.4106)
-0.0154
(0.1407)
-0.1853
(25686)
0.1853
(0.0000)
-0.3752
(28822)
03340
(9.8559)
0.0122
(23747)
18. Aerosp. 8.0933
(4.6926)
0.6084
(3.6914)
-0.3622
(23704)
-0.2730
(24430)
0.2730
(0.0000)
-0.1605
(13599)
-0.0280
(0.6242)
-0.0053
(1.1186)
(....corn)
(Table 5.3 conL)
cons n(-l) n(-2) w q k y tim
19. Oth Veh. 3.6073
(2.0390)
0.3830
(23075)
0.1068
(0.7888)
-0.1194
(1.9092)
0.1194
(0.0000)
•0.4927
(24240)
0.5181
(7.0917)
0.0108
(23446)
20. Metal Od* 3.4543
(2i#92)
0.6710
(6.0721)
-0.2543
(21534)
0.0927
(1.0777)
-0.0927
(00000)
•0.1488
(03560)
0.4183
(7.9945)
-0.0032
(02438)
21. Textiles 1.4111
(0.6293)
03473
(6.2239)
0.1544
(14147)
-0.7421
(7.9230)
0.7421
(0.0000)
-0.7337
(3.1955)
0.7520
(15.7623)
0.0420
(5.6658)
22. Clothing -0.2524
(0.1776)
03047
(4.1369)
0.1868
(13724)
•0.0464
(0.3434)
0.0464
(OjOOOO)
-0.1135
(0.4713)
03250
(6.4324)
-0.0115
(14903)
23. Bricks 2.1812
(23977)
03543
(5.3973)
-02927
(21291)
-0.4007
(4.2455)
0.4007
(0.0000)
0.1205
(03927)
0.4005
(5.2103)
-0.0122
(0.7016)
24. Timber 5.1902
(4.8098)
0.2721
(29875)
•0.2804
(3J0184)
0.1058
(13570)
-0.1058
(OjOOOO)
0.4901
(43337)
0.2862
(11.3711)
-0.0366
(6.3576)
25. Paper -103209
(26113)
0.3009
(3.1054)
-0.0363
(03995)
-0.5447
(5.7647)
03447
(0.0000)
20123
(3.1459)
0.3663
(5.1603)
-0.0600
(25407)
26. Printing 5.2526
(27926)
1.1214
(8.9032)
-04179
(29453)
-0.1796
(27539)
0.1796
(0.0000)
0.7004
(20863)
0.3082
(5.2456)
0.0216
(1.7622)
Z7. Oth Manuf -1.1363
(0.8694)
0.6675
(5.8874)
0.0670
(04885)
•0.1168 
(0.9110)
0.1168
(0.0000)
-0.1695
(1.7152)
0.6187
(10.6574)
-0.0087
(1.0046)
28. Constr. 30764
(3.8797)
0.9483
(9.1076)
-0.3752
(3j0341)
-0.1541
(1.8692)
0.1541
(OjOOOO)
-0.3361
(23178)
0.4348
(63497)
0.0168
(22945)
29. Gas 6.0474
(4.4856)
0.9388
(3.7195)
-0.7880
(28933)
0.0444
(0.7311)
-0.0444
(0.0000)
02477
(23791)
-00800
(1.2795)
•0.0244
(3.6944)
30. Elec. 1.4566
(3.1365)
0.9744
(7.3313)
-02413
(14997)
-0.1795
(43490)
0.1795
(0.0000)
-03858
(43090)
0.6038
(6.4469)
-0.0169
(4.7123)
31. Water 17.8763
(24749)
02808
(1.7140)
-02957
(20839)
-0.4282
(4.7677)
0.4282
(0.0000)
-22726
(26859)
1.4698
(4.4032)
0.0296
(2.7306)
32. Rail -36.1956
(1.8618)
1.0049
(6.0243)
-0.2433
(14326)
-0.1804
(2.3824)
0.1804
(OjOOOO)
33033
(13324)
03231
(3.4601)
0.0043
(05015)
33. Road 0.6452
(0.3452)
0.4342
(1.8945)
-02512
(13352)
■00672
(13915)
0.0672
(OjOOOO)
0.6036
(33931)
0/4469
(6.1254)
-0.0413
(43344)
34. Oth Trans 11.4489
(2.9638)
03438
(5.1161)
-02850
(1.6329)
-0.0381
(1.4459)
0 j0381
(0.0000)
03516
(23866)
0.0730
(0.8217)
0.0030
(1.1136)
35. Comms 1.2172
(1.6749)
0.8179
(6.0611)
-0.1108
(0.7751)
-0.0755
(1.4011)
0.0755
(0.0000)
-0.2305
(3.1495)
04794
(4.2935)
-0.0056
(1.0372)
36. Dism -0.2173
(0.2205)
0.2828
(1.6972)
0.6907
(4.1168)
-03694
(5.1499)
0.3694
(0.0000)
-1.0986
(6.0667)
1.0412
(7.1288)
0.0415
(6.1866)
37. Bus.Serv 7.4045
(4.8091)
0.6326
(3.8617)
-0.5194
(3.1393)
0.0555
(1.1840)
•0.0555
(0.0000)
0.1706
(3.6372)
0.0072
(0.1380)
0.0105
(2.6079)
38. ProfLServ 8.0547
(4.1177)
0.4025
(23031)
-0.1871
(1.1166)
-0.1613
(28004)
0.1613
(0.0000)
•0.0066
(0.1341)
•0.0797
(1.3810)
0J0214
(43180)
39. Misc.Serv 1.2738 0.6286 0.1173 0.0015 -0.0015 -0.4095 0.5473 0.0114
(0.5654) (3.4835) (03380) (0.0254) (OjOOOO) (34283) (4.7830) (28288)
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Table 5.4 
Industrial price equations 1957-1981
cons P(-D P<-2) w q k y titq
1. Agric. 4.7106
(2.4794)
0.3653
(3.0619)
-03513
(2.8238)
03206
(43454)
0.4654
(0.0000)
03857
(1.7869)
•02551
(3.0001)
-0.0299
(4.7220)
2. Coal 14684
(1.7317)
0.7444
(5.3490)
•0.1439
(10928)
0.4614
(3.4813)
-0.0619
(0.0000)
-0.6768
(23888)
0.3741
(1.7688)
0.0149 
(IAS 13)
3. Mining 14005
(1.4901)
0.5506
(4.2228)
-0.2086
(1.9334)
-0.1817
(2.9946)
0.8397
(OjOOOO)
-0.2603
(05135)
-0.1297
(1.8461)
00122
(12946)
4. Petrol -1.1466
(4.4519)
0.0525
(1.2547)
0.0605
(1.7778)
13475
(26.7104)
-0.4605
(0.0000)
-0.0154
(12585)
-0.0282
(0.4753)
0.0605
(23354)
5. Food -8.5283
(3.3875)
-0.0605
(0.4214)
03928
(43337)
-0.9257
(6.1992)
13934
(0.0000)
3.0477
(43562)
-1.4520
(3.8186)
-0.0680
(3.1384)
6. Drink 13.5184
(3.7096)
0.7018
(5.3683)
-0.4856
(3.8314)
0.2026
(2.2693)
03811
(.OJOOOO)
-22280
(34364)
-0.0730
(0.4785)
0.1353
(3j0439)
7. Tobacco 13.0165
(2.7166)
0.5941
(5.9176)
-0.1272
(1.1043)
0.0264
(0.4169)
0.5067
(0.0000)
-0.9619
(1.0608)
-1.2121
(3.9731)
00605
(13201)
8. Coal Prds 3.4487
(1.2017)
03076
(1.8969)
-0.1435
(12072)
-03712
(26531)
1.2072
(0.0000)
-1.0281
(20910)
0.5838
(24611)
0.1040
(3.4960)
9. Petrol Prda 0.1991
(0.0468)
-0.3468
(2.6671)
02051
(23441)
0.5293
(53268)
0.6124
(0.0000)
03207
(0.7891)
-0.4964
(29025)
-0.0230
(0.7944)
10. Cbema 3.0741
(1.5616)
03101
(1.2061)
-0.0827
(0.8000)
0.0356
(0.2077)
0.8370
(0.0000)
-0.4419
(1.4834)
0.0838
(0.6853)
0.0038
(0.4374)
11. Iron 0.8557
(0.8429)
0.7644
(43500)
-0.3677
(3.0016)
0.1983
(1.0981)
0.4051
(0.0000)
•0.0638
(0.4679)
-00324
(0.4642)
-0.0024
(03489)
12. Oth Metals -9.7189
(4.2851)
03768
(3.0067)
0.2205
(1.8069)
-1.0565
(3.4951)
1.4592
(OjOOOO)
0.8048
(12854)
03780
(3.9248)
0.0092
(03789)
13. Mech Eng. 7.0355
(1.9362)
0.4806
(3.7924)
-0.1227
(1.6801)
03854
(4.9386)
0.2567
(0.0000)
■0.9707
(1.6563)
0.0342
(0.4381)
0.0152
(0.9650)
14. Inst Eng. 3.3308
(3.9999)
0.2259
(1.4178)
0.1083
(1.0267)
0.3278
(4.1296)
0.3380
(0.0000)
-0.4211
(2.9994)
-0.1705
(3.3511)
0.0168
(2.0228)
IS. Elec Eng. 0.3381
(0.4291)
0.1594
(0.6746)
0.0667
(0.4629)
0.3874
(3.3626)
03864
(0.0000)
-0.1643
(0.9045)
0.1499
(13455)
-0.0148
(1.6350)
16. Ships 9.4650
(2.7828)
03431
(2.2694)
-0.1952
(1.4315)
-02262
(0.9040)
1.0782
(0.0000)
•0.9520
(22497)
-03117
(22881)
-0.0195
(13695)
17. Motors 1.5506
(2.9256)
03128
(2.9910)
-0.0418
(0.3535)
-0.0181
(0.2532)
03471
(0.0000)
-0.2698
(21617)
0.0245
(0.4626)
0.0155
(2.7607)
18. Aerosp. 1.2106
(1.1630)
0.02^0
(0.1812)
0.0582
(0.6894)
0.2070
(1.9274)
0.7098
(0.0000)
-0.4005
(29963)
0.1270
(1.9180)
0.0190
(3.7062)
(.„.cont)
(Table 5.4 corn.)
cons P(-D P<-2) w q k y tim
19. Oth Veh. 1.3653
(1.0355)
0.2006
(1.7757)
-0.1407
(13763)
-0.0060
(0.1066)
0.9461
(0.0000)
-0.3678
(1.9385)
0.0546
(0.8520)
0.0249
(5.7703)
20. Metal Ods 63735
(2.1465)
0.0368
(0.1182)
0.0762
(04484)
0.3283
(2.0483)
03587
(0X1000)
-0.9723
(2X1343)
0X1301
(0.3693)
0.0261
(2.0224)
21. Textiles 0.0940
(0.0265)
03934
(3.3622)
-0.1391
(1X1797)
-0.4255
(3.2440)
03712
(0.0000)
-03996
(03110)
0.3070
(4.2404)
0.0244
(23247)
22. Clothing -1.0871
(0.9339)
0.8516
(3.0861)
-0.2344
(1.1722)
03474
(4.9092)
-0.1646
(ODOOO)
-03601
(1.1850)
0.4153
(6.2284)
•0.0219
(44343)
23. Brides 3.3087
(4.0822)
03040
(30075)
0.0783
(1X1269)
0.3240
(3.7126)
03938
(0.0000)
-03149
(13017)
•03496
(3.9091)
0.0103
(1.1806)
24. Timber -6.3151
(53712)
03848
(23746)
0.2286
(14235)
0.2693
(2.2247)
-0.0827
(0.0000)
13459
(5j0176)
0.0653
(1.1928)
-0.0602
(53819)
25. Paper -17.7176
(2.3988)
0.1933
(1.1240)
-0.1593
(13346)
-0.3669
(2.4707)
1.3329
(OjOOOO)
2.7679
(23630)
-03496
(1.8486)
-0X1756
(2.0622)
26. Printing -8.8600
(2.6093)
0.0834
(03507)
0.0947
(03914)
0.4125
(33551)
0.4094
(OjOOOO)
13565
(2.1728)
0.0410
(0.3147)
•0.0483
(2.4979)
27. Oth Manuf 3.8792
(6.4241)
•0.1483
(0.9583)
0.2126
(23734)
0.0084
(0.0725)
0.9273
(OjOOOO)
0.1571
(13886)
-0.6546
(73290)
0.0149
(24356)
28. Constr. -0.2200
(0.1783)
1.1106
(5.3937)
-0.7336
(3.6819)
0.1906
(1.1537)
0.4324
(OjOOOO)
-0.2125
(1.1311)
0.1745
(1.1105)
0.0114
(1.1198)
29. Gas 3.1684
(3.6255)
1.0412
(7.2447)
-04158
(3.1982)
0.1068
(1.9257)
03677
(OjOOOO)
-0.1608
(13469)
■03403
(2.7957)
0.0019
(0.4312)
30. Elec. -13921
(2.0839)
0.2594
(1.7184)
0.1873
(13944)
-0.1844
(2.4528)
0.7378
(OjOOOO)
-0.0346
(03360)
0.2342
(1.3775)
-0.0112
(1.7311)
31. Water -16.7479
(3.7316)
0.5268
(4.4788)
-0.3632
(33903)
03741
(4.1391)
03623
(OjOOOO)
13951
(34871)
0.0569
(0.2422)
-0.0284
(4.1873)
32. Rail 15.0842
(0.8996)
0.1083
(0.8267)
0.3621
(34627)
•0.0401
(0.6990)
03697
(OjOOOO)
-1.6808
(1J0323)
0.2153
(1.6785)
0.0034
(03014)
33. Road 4.0115
(0.8567)
03419
(1.8230)
•0.0261
(0.1347)
0.5094
(3.2316)
0.1747
(OXUOO)
0.0094
(0X1236)
-03016
(1.6683)
-0.0041
(03046)
34. Oth Trans 37.9283
(5.4878)
03336
(1.6813)
■03577
(23562)
0.7288
(8.3120)
0.2952
(OjOOOO)
-4.0758
(53709)
-0.0230
(0.1305)
-0.0048
(0.9157)
35. Comms 4.8797
(3.9107)
0.4039
(3.1265)
-0.2960
(33427)
0.7051
(7.9646)
0.1870
(OjOOOO)
0.2020
(13694)
-0.8461
(4.0771)
0.0132
(13944)
36. Distn -3.7185
(3.1642)
0.7162
(4.4168)
-0.3102
(33222)
0X1632
(0.7771)
03308
(0X1000)
0X1747
(04315)
0.3471
(2.0672)
-0.0141
(2X1463)
37. Bus.Serv -7.7262
(23828)
03718
(3.8319)
-03415
(13937)
0.9663
(4.8508)
-03966
(OjOOOO)
0.6395
(2.9492)
03695
(1.4067)
-0.0853
(33578)
38. PiofLServ 3.2566
(5.4618)
0.0669
(0.4798)
-0.0981
(0.8813)
03366
(3.9537)
0.6946
(0X1000)
0.0351
(0.6583)
-0.4094
(5.6612)
0.0009
(03306)
39. M isc3erv 2.9593
(2.9047)
0 j0410
(0.3687)
0.1104
(13766)
0.4703
(8.3127)
0.3783
(OjOOOO)
-0.1480
(1.4451)
-0.1714
(13655)
0.0061
(1.7260)
153
Table 5.5 
Industrial wage equations 1957-1981
cons w(-l) we int me unr P* t2
1. Agric. -7.9487
(3.1284)
1.0828
(9.2737)
-0.1671
(1.1329)
-1.0333
(3.0566)
0.0064
(14480)
-5.6977
(24350)
0.1568
(0.8988)
-0.5502
(08912)
3  Coal 0.8330
(0.5666)
-0.1690
(0.8742)
0.6467
(2.9336)
0.3500
(0.7053)
0.0158
(13984)
-5.6853
(32319)
0.6490
(2.3465)
-1.4464
(13042)
3. Mining 3.6386
(1.0400)
•0.0606
(0.2949)
-03390
(1.1840)
0.8425
(1.4618)
0.0030
(02193)
2.0759
(1X1251)
0.6304
(1.0399)
-5.1234
(33933)
4. Petrol -7.9227
(4.5883)
0.1148
(0.8545)
-4.6757
(33275)
03660
(03627)
-0.1015
(1.6044)
81.3961
(5.6212)
53655
(4.0133)
-10.6260
(1.7465)
3. Food 5.5197
(1.3128)
0.0311
(0.2816)
0.9540
(6.4383)
-0.6038
(1.3664)
-0.0065
(1.7120)
2.7800
(28286)
-0.1398
(1.3700)
-0.7968
(18043)
6. Drink -13.4148
(1.6246)
0.0127
(0.0762)
3.0417
(53036)
-10.7926
(1.9070)
0.0009
(0.0814)
54881
(1.4383)
-0.9427
(1.7069)
0.7776
(03619)
7. Tobacco -3.5346
(0.4217)
0.3285
(2.1828)
08232
(13532)
43155
(1.3727)
0.0232
(13065)
1.8515
(04183)
•0.3017
(03227)
1.1363
(03252)
8. Coal Prds 6.5229
(1.8443)
0.4439
(1.6312)
0.8190
(22901)
-0.7448
(1.8594)
0.0166
(10393)
-143940
(1.9954)
03511
(1.3155)
03531
(02709)
9. Petrol Prdf 2.6099
(0.8155)
02500
(1.7714)
0.9866
(33554)
-03422
(0.8364)
0.0043
(03794)
-9.9695
(3X1110)
0.0820
(0.2325)
0.8599
(0.7088)
10. Chems -0.2369
(0.6123)
-0.1224
(1.0992)
0.9147
(7.4662)
-0.2004
(0.4891)
0.0046
(14080)
08961
(03409)
0.1762
(2.6234)
•1.2698
(33690)
11. Iron 13391
(1.1112)
0.5011
(2.2678)
00647
(03005)
-0.4232
(1.8092)
0.0057
(0.7215)
2.7905
(18006)
02175
(1.3816)
-2.7122
(3.1432)
12. Oth Metals 0.2250
(0.3466)
0.5397
(3.6021)
0.1451
(0.7853)
-03000
(1.2725)
0.0141
(18753)
-0.8738
(0.6509)
02236
(2.0133)
-2.4503
(32547)
13. Mech Eng. -1.0092
(0.3322)
03940
(2.3699)
0.4083
(10285)
02713
(0.9934)
0.0023
(03145)
2.0197
(13650)
0.0940
(1.1971)
-0.9762
(1.7335)
14. Inst Eng. -0.0263
(0.0512)
03194
(2.7637)
0.2603
(12357)
0.3008
(1.1126)
0.0139
(2.6769)
-08778
(03084)
0.3345
(2.1823)
-2.5391
(38143)
13. Elec Eng. -0.1058
(0.0610)
0.2282
(1.3221)
00749
(0.4173)
1.2736
(4.0205)
0.0035
(0.7780)
-3.8172
(1.6931)
02562
(2.1863)
-0.9660
(18422)
16. Ships 0.2483
(0.2779)
-0.0485
(0.3420)
0.8554
(53653)
03841
(2.6425)
0.0037
(1X7218)
0.3595
(08907)
-0.1355
(1.1562)
-0.9588
(1.9523)
17. Motors 0.5827
(1.4051)
0.7613
(4.1569)
0.3314
(1.7653)
-0.4202
(23758)
0.0079
(1.7221)
3.2516
(2X1083)
-0.1100
(0.9056)
-1.0821
(1.9343)
18. Aerosp. 3.1323
(1.2197)
-0.4680
(1.8450)
12062
(3.9255)
22106
(1.9796)
-0.0119
(1.6472)
4.0035
(2.0976)
-13124
(2.4781)
1.3871
(13168)
( com)
(Table 5.5 com.)
cons tv (-l)
19. Oth Veh. -1.0966
(33418)
03005
(1.9307)
20. Metal Gds -0.6133
(0.7777)
0.7418
(3.3811)
21. Textiles -0.4082
(2.3812)
-0.1073
(0.8330)
22. Clothing 0.4188
(0.7216)
0.1043
(0.6731)
23. Brides -0.7030
(0.6016)
0.0381
(0.1865)
24. Timber -2.3272
(2.8836)
03630
(2.4406)
25. Paper •6.6841
(1.3150)
0.6555
(5.7677)
26. Printing -2.4876
(1.0788)
08617
(3.2149)
27. Oth Maniif -03145
(1.0384)
0.1974
(13377)
28. Coostr. -0.3119
(03781)
03371
(1.7022)
29. Gas -0.4672
(0.7163)
-0X1132
(0.0937)
30. Elec. -0.1622
(0.3301)
0.4674
(3.0692)
31. Water 0.8425
(03593)
0.3278
(3.1294)
32. Rail -233763
(1.4386)
0.2372
(1.4478)
33. Road 3.8712
(0.6178)
0X1292
(0.1442)
34. Oth Trans -9.9283
(1.7808)
-0.1106
(1.1043)
35. Comms •03304
(0.3021)
0X1732
(0.3245)
36. Distn -0.1952
(0.3291)
0.4306
(3.3967)
37. Bus.Serv -9.9431
(2.6847)
-0.3863
(2.0621)
38. ProLServ 0.2438
(0.3001)
03032
(3.7563)
39. M isc3erv -2.9879
(1.2764)
03342
(3.8228)
we int inc
0.4245
(1X1901)
-0.0007
(0.0023)
-0.0082
(0.7777)
0.0693
(04497)
0.1763
(0.6388)
0.0078
(1.1887)
0.9420
(74788)
0.0162
(0.1592)
0XX11S
(04548)
03743
(43479)
-0.0695
(0.4999)
00080
(18662)
03220
(23562)
0.0990
(0.3072)
0.0056
(0.9133)
0.4538
(3.1216)
03313
(2.3425)
0X1120
(28360)
0.1540
(0.6560)
0.4113
(1.4303)
0X1162
(4.1276)
0.1259
(04713)
-0.8132
(1.3178)
0X1072
(1X1141)
0.6624
(43845)
03029
(1.3687)
O.OQ52
(13463)
0.3209
(13511)
-0.1579
(0.3544)
0.0047
(0.7796)
0.9596
(33488)
0.1870
(0.2542)
-0X1061
(0.7813)
03006
(1.9040)
-0.1015
(0.2388)
0X1190
(38755)
0.9220
(3.7868)
0.0700
(0.4667)
0.0252
(63577)
13674
(5.1590)
0.6191
(1.7155)
-0.0135
(23582)
1.6704
(33285)
-03577
(0.6687)
0.0103
(13103)
13215
(9X1220)
-1.3757
(1.3843)
0.0067
(18898)
03531
(18259)
0.0269
(0.0275)
•0.0053
(0.7044)
04597
(2.9932)
0.6245
(3.3474)
0.0058
(1.7164)
-0.0691
(0.1435)
5.1321
(23447)
-0.0073
(13785)
0.1039
(03334)
13908
(13499)
-0.0053
(0.6679)
03523
(2X1316)
1.9360
(1.8542)
-0.0017
(0.1529)
unr r t2
6.1293
(1.9245)
-0.1933
(0.5268)
-3.8518
(33004)
-08674
(0.6018)
0.2000
(1.7798)
-1.4618
(2.1791)
13274
(13844)
0X1923
(1.3623)
-1.3045
(28755)
•1.9098
(14951)
0.4567
(4.8571)
-0.0393
(OJ06O7)
-0.2308
(0.1585)
04777
(4.0122)
-1.4389
(13657)
-1.7713
(13297)
0.3130
(3.2029)
-0.8629
(18203)
-7.7659
(34674)
0.1970
(1.7436)
-0.3206
(06143)
63240
(23921)
-0.0026
(0.0213)
-1.6350
(20210)
-3.6695
(37972)
0.2844
(3.3663)
-0.1875
(03890)
0.9782
(13322)
0.2023
(1.4904)
-1.9683
(26662)
5.6277
(18597)
-0.0029
(0.0191)
-0.8555
(10281)
6.0454
(3.1795)
0.1051
(0.9421)
-0.7643
(10248)
-3.7546
(18001)
-0.3756
(37804)
-0.0604
(0.1046)
3.1973
(13322)
-0.7068
(4.3933)
1.0162
(18684)
3.1454
(1X1493)
-1.0619
(38584)
-0.9445
(1.1717)
1X1480
(0.6162)
-03414
(43503)
-0.1663
(03371)
7.1975
(28432)
0.3300
(13035)
-1.0027
(1.1404)
-33484
(30034)
-0.1190
(1.8053)
•0.3019
(0.6308)
-13.6655
(24227)
1.1937
(32700)
19758
(29489)
4.4137
(03636)
-0.0983
(0.3781)
•0.3026
(03680)
-1.9865
(03579)
-0.1394
(0.7885)
0.1896
(0.1680)
Table 5.6
Industrial demand equations 1957-1981
cons y(-i) Pft pm/p a tim
1. Agric. 5.0762
(3.9931)
0.3748
(2.3797)
-0.1214
(1.8288)
0.0517
(2.1814)
15413
(2.4706)
1.1718
(95995)
1  Coal 3.7399
(2.6931)
0.5659
(3.3968)
03039
(2.Q227)
0.0243
(2D976)
12.9578
(44973)
0.1578
(1.0160)
3. Mining 4.5741
(6.5411)
0.2012
(15151)
-0.7890
(4.8307)
0.0166
(01948)
0.2024
(0.4758)
03951
(4.7053)
4. Petrol 0.2066
(0.2850)
0.5374
(3.7006)
0.0663
(0.7908)
-0.2261
(05641)
-23769
(11989)
0.8418
(3.8587)
5. Food 8.4003
(4.1946)
0.0353
(0.1529)
-0.0260
(0.3691)
00905
(35534)
74237
(4.7641)
05302
(3.0553)
6. Drink 2.8676
(2.6696)
05454
(3.2339)
-00837
(1.1748)
0.0976
(3.1083)
1.9965
(0.6601)
03369
(15776)
7. Tobacco 5.1315
(5.7799)
0.1957
(1.3722)
-0.2401
(4.6442)
■0.0255
(10493)
-04676
(01150)
-01493
(1.0365)
8. Coal Prds 3.7194
(3.1634)
03234
(1.5251)
0.4602
(4.0032)
0.2051
(3.6423)
0.1804
(0.0448)
04512
(3.4853)
9. Petrol Prdi 5.0529
(9.1125)
0.1838
(2.0306)
-0.7971
(9.9073)
0.3900
(45265)
31837
(14796)
0.7709
(4.2358)
10. Chetns 5.0573
(4.8779)
03051
(2.1522)
-0.0720
(05118)
01253
(41024)
0.6354
(05720)
05903
(4.1280)
11. Iron 6.7213
(5.1559)
0.1174
(0.6730)
-05022
(2.3944)
0.3805
(23108)
4.0444
(4.6732)
0.6020
(6.9452)
12. Oth Metals 6.6949
(8.1803)
0.0470
(0.4023)
-0.2346
(2.5981)
0.2099
(55895)
1.1810
(0.1338)
03750
(4.9247)
13. Mech Eng. 0.0856
(0.0860)
0.9838
(7.7227)
-0.4371
(10687)
0.0417
(0.9479)
11.1047
(53935)
0.3232
(2.0504)
14. Inst Eng. 1.8015
(2.6479)
0.6370
(4.6290)
0.2573
(1.0700)
0.0959
(2.4923)
14112
(1.6983)
0.8239
(7.0026)
13. Elec Eng. 3.9995
(4.6309)
0.4567
(3.9451)
05110
(3.7159)
0.0479
(1.9765)
4.8960
(2.0776)
0.8056
(55877)
16. Ships 1.2437
(1.4765)
03516
(7.2858)
-05208
(5.9498)
0.0092
(0.1974)
3.0849
(41020)
0.4954
(4.4106)
17. Motors 5.5031
(3.3086)
0.2051
(0.8473)
0.1445
(0.4963)
05080
(31121)
8.0933
(4.6926)
0.6084
(3.6914)
18. Aerosp. 8.2204
(5.3931)
-O.Q058
(0.0269)
1.9230
(4.6284)
-0.0595
(1.1107)
3.6073
(2.0390)
0.3830
(2.3075)
( cont)
(Table S.6 cont.)
cons y(-D Pf? pm/p a tim
19. Oth Veh. 5.2088
(5.9157)
0.3421
(2.9942)
1.3783
(8.6373)
0.0383
(2.0849)
3/4543
(20992)
0.6710
(6.0721)
20. Metal Ods 50495
(4.2593)
0.3589
(2.4146)
0.0446
(0.1737)
0.1631
(23664)
1/4111
(0.6293)
05473
(6.2239)
21. Textiles 2.2914
(2.0652)
0.7002
(4.6811)
-0.2666
(0.9997)
0.1466
(3j0476)
-03524
(0.1776)
05047
(4.1369)
22. Gothing 3.0151
(2.4624)
05971
(3.6220)
•03118
(1.3461)
0.0934
(2.6759)
11812
(25977)
0.6543
(5.3973)
23. Bricks 6.7844
(8.9977)
-0.0076
(0.0676)
-0.8231
(3.9556)
03020
(40599)
5.1902
(43098)
0.2721
(19875)
24. Timber 8.9749
(7.0059)
-0.2944
(15851)
0.1152
(05886)
03432
(50642)
-10.5209
(16113)
03009
(3.1054)
25. Paper 53287
(7.4920)
0.1555
(1.3631)
-0.9240
(55376)
03004
(5.1215)
5.2526
(17926)
1.1214
(8.9032)
26. Printing 6.3546
(9.4601)
0.0814
(0.8285)
0.1014
(0.8757)
03015
(5.1226)
-1.1363
(03694)
0.6675
(5.8874)
27. Oth Maniif 5.4758
(65627)
0.2724
(2.2354)
-1.1426
(7.2278)
0.0224
(05215)
3.0764
(33797)
0.9483
(9.1076)
28. Constr. 11976
(1.7148)
0.8256
(9.8919)
-0.6747
(7.2631)
0.0928
(2.7548)
6.0474
(4/4856)
0.9388
(3.7195)
29. Gas 0.8660
(0.9158)
0.8498
(7.1448)
-0.1671
(1.4726)
0.0293
(06947)
14566
(3.1365)
0.9744
(7.3313)
30. Elec. -05075
(1.1064)
1.0632
(183187)
0.2864
(3.0690)
0.0149
(2.0217)
17.8763
(24749)
03808
(1.7140)
31. Water 1.9589
(2.7009)
0.6509
(5.2932)
-0.1534
(1.8753)
00445
(2.7526)
-36.1956
(13618)
1.0049
(6.0243)
32. Rail 1.1933
(0.9667)
0.8214
(5.1658)
0.2636
(15029)
0.0110
(05005)
0.6452
(03452)
04342
(1.8945)
33. Road 1.9209
(1.7995)
0.7030
(45127)
-0.1204
(1.8630)
0.1147
(2.9979)
114489
(19638)
03438
(5.1161)
34. Oth Trans 4.0173
(4.9786)
0.4849
(4.7592)
-0.4221
(2.7689)
00896
(3.4079)
13172
(1.6749)
0.8179
(6.0611)
35. Comms 2.4671
(3.8134)
0.6462
(7.0386)
-0.1835
(3.2901)
0.0402
(23577)
-03173
(03205)
0.2828
(1.6972)
36. Distn 6.8857
(10.1766)
03457
(33121)
0.4048
(6.9938)
0.0045
(0.7264)
7.4045
(43091)
06326
(33617)
37. Bus.Serv 35580
(2.9746)
05321
(3.3444)
0.0563
(0.9848)
0.0356
(15216)
8.0547
(4.1177)
04025
(13031)
38. ProfLServ 5.4967
(4.2055)
0.2110
(1.2246)
-1.1945
(4.1717)
0.2782
(33119)
1.2738
(05654)
0.6286
(3.4835)
39. Misc-Serv 3.4641
(2.0379)
0.6208
(3.4125)
-0.0048
(0.0340)
00346
(1/4073)
0.7110
(24015)
0.0068
(14377)
Table 5.7
Estimated equation diagnostics
Industry Value 
objective 
fn. (L)
Employment eqn 
Price eqn 
Wage eqn 
Output eqn
RSS s. error 
regression
R2
1. Agric. 96.6746 0.0116
0.0176
0.0170
0.0091
0.0215
0.0265
0.0261
0.0191
0.9948
0.9973
0.9991
0.9849
2. Coal 96.5281 0.0175
0.0618
0.1015
0.1022
0.0264
0.0497
0.0637
0.0640
0.9954
0.9960
0.9940
0.9600
3. Mining 73.5158 0.0402
0.0113
0.0804
0.0357
0.0401
0.0213
0.0567
0.0378
0.9557
0.9987
0.9948
0.9668
4. Petrol 92.1953 1.0282
0.4341
2.2212
4.0472
0.2028
0.1318
0.2981
0.4024
0.9210
0.9980
0.9772
0.9791
5. Food(-*
Ln
U1
80.3856 0.0046
0.0134
0.0136
0.0042
0.0135
0.0232
0.0233
0.0130
0.9814
0.9985
0.9992
0.9876
6. Drink 88.4767 0.0110
0.0433
0.0880
0.0118
0.0210
0.0416
0.0593
0.0217
0.8751
0.9915
0.9957
0.9946
7. Tobacco 86.7310 0.0395
0.0586
0.2006
0.0130
0.0398
0.0484
0.0896
0.0228
0.8700
0.9919
0.9920
0.9279
8. Coal Prds 87.2913 0.0917
0.1866
0.2607
0.0824
0.0606
0.0864
0.1021
0.0574
0.9412
0.9902
0.9872
0.9142
9. Petrol Prds 85.5370 0.0712
0.0970
0.0921
0.0507
0.0534
0.0623
0.0607
0.0450
0.9158
0.9938
0.9954
0.9864
(cont...)
(Table 5.7 cont.)
L
10. Chems 88.8550
11. Iron 81.7949
12. Oth Metals 106.3582
13. Mech Eng 99.4264
14. Inst Eng 87.9474
15. Elec Eng 97.9396
16. Ships 90.8792
17. Motors 93.1323
18. Aerosp. 79.1975
19. Oth Vehs 78.5596
20. Metal Gds 87.5548
(cont..)
RSS s.e. R2
0.0070 0.0167 0.8661
0.0186 0.0272 0.9970
0.0111 0.0210 0.9993
0.0247 0.0314 0.9911
0.0265 0.0326 0.9771
0.0409 0.0404 0.9961
0.0316 0.0356 0.9981
0.1569 0.0792 0.7649
0.0071 0.0168 0.9848
0.0723 0.0538 0.9933
0.0379 0.0389 0.9976
0.0229 0.0303 0.8940
0.0102 0.0202 0.9620
0.0041 0.0127 0.9995
0.0173 0.0263 0.9990
0.0246 0.0314 0.9655
0.0096 0.0196 0.9152
0.0053 0.0146 0.9991
0.0262 0.0324 0.9984
0.0373 0.0386 0.9913
0.0094 0.0194 0.9199
0.0070 0.0167 0.9989
0.0165 0.0257 0.9989
0.0183 0.0270 0.9906
0.0121 0.0220 0.9905
0.1469 0.0767 0.9763
0.0096 0.0195 0.9994
0.0841 0.0580 0.8087
0.0086 0.0185 0.9694
0.0144 0.0240 0.9984
0.0320 0.0358 0.9981
0.0774 0.0556 0.9316
0.0180 0.0268 0.9823
0.0561 0.0474 0.9954
0.0307 0.0350 0.9983
0.4794 0.1385 0.0000
0.0263 0.0324 0.9906
0.0315 0.0355 0.9974
0.0668 0.0517 0.9948
0.1552 0.0788 0.8912
0.0080 0.0178 0.9511
0.0163 0.0255 0.9984
0.0219 0.0296 0.9985
0.0723 0.0538 0.7499
(Table 5.7 cont.)
L RSS s.e. R2
21. Textiles 115.7184 0.0096 0.01% 0.9955
0.0329 0.0363 0.9936
0.0252 0.0317 0.9986
U.0448 U.0423 0.8646
22. Clothing 90.1669 0.0084 0.0183 0.9930
0.0081 0.0180 0.9984
0.0160 0.0253 0.9990
0.0326 0.0361 0.8416
23. Bricks 86.2477 0.0094 0.0194 0.9838
0.0087 0.0187 0.9991
0.0374 0.0387 0.9979
0.0321 0.0358 0.%08
24. Timber 126.3911 0.0057 0.0151 0.9439
0.0165 0.0257 0.9982
0.0241 0.0311 0.9984
0.0513 0.0453 0.9050
25. Paper 85.3788 0.0139 0.0236 0.9582
0.0367 0.0383 0.9960
0.0210 0.0290 0.9990
0.0315 0.0355 0.9107
26. Printing 88.3784 0.0052 0.0144 0.9546
0.0191 0.0276 0.9982
0.0203 0.0285 0.9987
0.0112 0.0212 0.9855
27. Oth Manuf 90.8167 0.0058 0.0152 0.9652
0.0221 0.0298 0.9971
0.0136 0.0233 0.9992
0.0482 0.0439 0.9728
28. Constr. 85.2625 0.0077 0.0175 0.9443
0.0261 0.0323 0.9977
0.0201 0.0283 0.9985
0.0181 0.0269 0.9477
29. Gas 93.1742 0.0181 0.0269 0.9732
0.0238 0.0309 0.9943
0.0541 0.0465 0.9969
0.0259 0.0322 0.9950
30. Elec 88.1626 0.0117 0.0216 0.9823
0.0276 0.0333 0.9960
0.0322 0.0359 0.9985
0.0175 0.0264 0.9933
31. Water 98.6698 0.0382 0.0391 0.9163
0.0313 0.0354 0.9969
0.0301 0.0347 0.9980
0.0069 0.0166 0.9882
(Table 5.7 cont.)
L RSS s.e. R2
32. Rail 84.7460 0.0134 0.0232 0.9950
0.0101 0.0201 0.9986
0.0148 0.0243 0.9992
0.0182 0.0270 0.9050
33. Road 78.1239 0.0033 0.0115 0.9744
0.0767 0.0554 0.9920
0.0306 0.0350 0.9983
0.0187 0.0274 0.9777
34. Oth Trans 95.9489 0.0060 0.0155 0.9207
0.0251 0.0317 0.9966
0.0276 0.0332 0.9984
0.0140 0.0237 0.9892
35. Comms 88.6131 0.0045 0.0134 0.%50
0.0166 0.0258 0.9984
0.0443 0.0421 0.9973
0.0046 0.0135 0.9983
36. Distn 86.3651 0.0045 0.0135 0.9746
0.0102 0.0202 0.9986
0.0108 0.0208 0.9993
0.0030 0.0109 0.9942
37. Bus.Serv 73.5898 0.0049 0.0140 0.9945
0.0421 0.0410 0.9944
0.0075 0.0173 0.9995
0.0100 0.0200 0.9962
38. Prof.Serv %.8328 0.0092 0.0192 0.9747
0.0175 0.0265 0.9981
0.0498 0.0446 0.9971
0.1000 0.0632 0.9315
39. Misc.Serv 80.8692 0.0053 0.0145 0.9256
0.0083 0.0183 0.9992
0.0595 0.0488 0.9959
0.0110 0.0210 0.9711
\Table 5.8
Tests on restrictions in industrial systems
Value of minimised objective function
R Ul (R-Uj) u 2 (R-U2)
1 Agriculture 96.6746 76.8193 19.8553 84.5307 12.1439
2 Coal mining 96.5281 80.8458 15.6822 85.0016 11.5264
3 Mining nes 73.5158 70.9138 2.6019 69.2308 4.2850
5 Food 80.3856 79.4958 0.8898 76.2861 4.0995
6 Drink 88.4767 85.5285 2.9482 80.8528 7.6238
7 Tobacco 86.7310 77.5558 9.1752 80.3356 6.3955
8 Coal products 87.2913 80.6044 6.6869 83.3166 3.9747
9 Petroleum products 85.5370 82.8008 2.7362 84.1354 1.4016
10 Chemicals 88.8550 86.3575 2.4975 85.1746 3.6804
11 Iron and steel 81.7949 75.1254 6.6696 76.6428 5.1521
12 Non-ferrous metals 106.3582 99.2055 7.1526 79.0785 27.2797
13 Mechanical Engineering 99.4264 90.9970 8.4294 91.8031 7.6234
14 Instrument Engineering 87.9474 85.9149 2.0325 77.1049 10.8425
15 Electrical Engineering 97.9396 97.4993 0.4403 85.9477 11.9919
16 Ship building 90.8792 86.8102 4.0690 78.5411 12.3382
17 Motor Vehicles 93.1323 89.5607 3.5716 83.1914 9.9409
18 Aerospace euipment 79.1975 71.6462 7.5513 62.8739 16.3236
19 Other Vehicles 78.5596 74.0106 4.5490 74.6767 3.8829
20 Metal goods nes 87.5548 85.9540 1.6009 74.2130 13.3418
21 Textiles 115.7184 115.3965 0.3219 101.3062 14.4122
22 Leather, clothing, etc. 90.1669 83.7527 6.4142 71.6521 18.5148
23 Bricks 86.2477 79.7671 6.4806 73.0914 13.1563
24 Timber and furniture 126.3911 106.0004 20.3907 95.1125 31.2786
25 Paper and board 85.3788 83.6123 1.7666 80.9016 4.4772
26 Printing and publishing 88.3784 83.8097 4.5687 72.9316 15.4467
27 Other Manufacturing 90.8167 85.8266 4.9901 86.0894 4.7273
28 Construction 85.2625 82.1878 3.0747 75.7841 9.4784
29 Gas 93.1742 92.7327 0.4415 85.3596 7.8146
30 Electricity 88.1626 87.8166 0.3459 87.1297 1.0328
31 Water 98.6698 92.7842 5.8855 93.2222 5.4476
32 Rail 84.7460 81.3307 3.4153 74.9042 9.8418
33 Road 78.1239 74.9756 3.1484 74.4859 3.6380
34 Other Transport 95.9489 93.6919 2.2570 82.3833 13.5656
35 Communication 88.6131 83.8859 4.7272 73.7878 14.8254
36 Distribution 86.3651 85.2587 1.1065 78.9645 7.4006
37 Business services 73.5898 73.0020 0.5878 66.7217 6.8681
38 Professional services 96.8328 94.9893 1.8435 89.4515 7.3813
39 Miscellaneous services 80.8692 75.7834 5.0858 76.8708 3.9984
Notes
R is the restricted value of the minimised objective function (as in Tables 5.3-5.6),
Hi is the value of minimised objective function with price homogeneity lifted,
U2 is the value of the minimised objective function with additional explanatory variable 
in the wage eqns.
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additional instruments used in the estimation. Hence, the feedbacks from industrial prices 
to demand, from output levels to employment and prices, and from wages to prices are 
explicitly acknowledged in the estimation. Further, the cross-equation restrictions implied 
by the joint determination of wages and employment in the face of "internal" pressures 
(shifting the labour demand curve) are also incorporated, imposing the restriction that the 
(qe, k, y, and t) terms enter the wage equation in the same way as they enter the labour 
demand relation. The internal pressures are denoted INT = ( a4qe + a^k + a^y + a^ t ) in 
the descriptions of the estimated wage equations in Table 5.5.
The results described in Tables 5.3-5.6 represent the outcome of a relatively 
simple specification search. Given the number of estimated relations, it is not feasible to 
undertake a very detailed search for each of the industries in turn, so that the same 
specification has been estimated for every industry. This has the advantage that, in 
comparing estimated relationships, any differences found can be interpreted as resulting 
from different characteristics of the industries (rather of the estimated relations). Two sets 
of experiments were undertaken, however, to ensure that the general specification 
employed did not exclude possibilities that are important to many industries. Specifically, 
the price homogeneity of each system was investigated, and experiments on the inclusion 
of additional explanatory variables in the wage equation were considered. For these, a 
"quasi" likelihood ratio test was employed, comparing the values of the minimised 
objective function for each system under restricted and unrestricted conditions, (see 
Bemdt and Jorgenson (1980) for details). For the systems described in Tables 5.3-5.6, the 
value of the minimised objective function is provided in Table 5.7, along with selected 
estimated statistics.
The test on price homogeneity is very important, of course, since the theory on 
which the model is based predicts such a property. Explicitly, price homogeneity in the 
labour demand equation requires a3=-a4 (so that wage levels relative to other input prices 
are relevant to the employment decision), while long run homogeneity in prices in the 
price equation requires bj + b2 + bg + b4 = 1 (so that an x% increase in all input prices 
should, other things being equal, generate an increase of x% in prices). These restrictions 
are expected to hold if the cost function is (reasonably) homogeneous in prices. On the 
other hand, while the theory underlying the model would suggest that unions are 
concerned with real wages, there remains the possibility that the wage equation is not 
homogeneous in nominal magnitudes because of the ambiguities of the determinants of 
the fallback wage. For this reason, no homogeneity restrictions have been imposed on this 
equation.
The price homogeneity restrictions described above have been imposed to obtain 
the system estimates presented in Tables 5.3-5.6 (so that no t-statistic is reported for the 
coefficient on q in the labour demand or price equations), while results obtained for the
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industrial systems estimated without price homogeneity imposed are given in Tables A5.3- 
A5.7 of the Appendix. The tests on the restrictions are summarised, however, in Table 
5.8. These demonstrate that from the total of 38 industries, price homogeneity was 
accepted in 27, rejected at the 5% level in 8, and rejected at the 1% level in 3, where (R- 
Uj) is compared to X^(2).^) One possible explanation for the rejection of price 
homogeneity in some industries might be based on the problems involved in the formation 
of the material input price measure. As I noted earlier, this was constructed from 
industrial price movements using weights obtained from a single input-output table (that 
of 1979). Since there may have been significant changes in the composition of material 
inputs into some industries over time, the constructed input price measure might contain 
inaccuracies, and these might be the cause of our failure to find homogeneity.^ Given 
that the homogeneity restriction is accepted in the majority of industries, however, and 
given that the theory suggests so strongly that price homogeneity be imposed, the 
restricted estimates shown in Table 5.3-5.6 represent our preferred equations, and it is on 
these that subsequent analysis is founded.
The second set of experiments carried out to bring us to our preferred set of 
system estimates in Tables 5.3-5.6 involved comparison of these estimates with those in 
which an extended set of explanatory variables was included in the wage equation. This 
follows from our earlier discussion in which it was noted that, while there were many 
potential influences on the industrial wage (as shown in expression (5.14)), many of these 
would also influence the expected aggregate wage we, so that they might not show 
independently of their influence on this aggregate measure in estimates of the industrial 
wage equations. The model search began therefore with all of the potentially influential 
variables included in the wage equation; this included, in addition to those shown in 
Table 5.5, the other elements of the wedge, and measures of union power and the 
replacement ratio. For each of these variables, there were some industries for which the 
addition of one of these extra variables significantly improved the f i t  of the wage 
equation. On the other hand, for those four variables that have been dropped, there were 
only ten occasions in all industries in which the variable was significant and of the 
expected sign, so that their exclusion seems justifiable. Once more there is a summary of 
the "quasi" likelihood ratio test statistics, this time testing for the joint significance of the 
four excluded variables, provided in Table 5.8, where (R - iy  here is to be compared with 
X^(4). In this table we note that the exclusion restrictions are accepted in 24 of the 38 
industries, rejected at the 5% level for 6, and rejected at the 1% level in 8 i n d u s t r i e s . ^ )  
While this number of rejections may begin to raise questions on the validity of the 
imposed restrictions, the inclusion of any one of the excluded variables provided little 
overall improvement, while the inclusion of all of them reduced significance levels on all 
of the variables (because of collinearity) and, as explained above, added little to the
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economic interpretation of the results. The restricted results constituted the best set of 
estimates that could be obtained working with a single specification for each industry 
therefore.^ ^
Having discussed at some length the estimation procedure employed to obtain the 
preferred set of system estimates, and noted the potentially difficult industries, I now turn 
to the estimates themselves to consider whether the coefficients obtained are economically 
sensible.
5.3 Discussion of results
As the discussion above made clear, one of the major difficulties in working with 
disaggregated data and its analysis is the problem of presentation and discussion of 
results: while it is generally possible to make broad statements about the direction of 
influence of a particular explanatory variable, for example, there are almost invariably 
some industries for which one statement or another is untrue, so that often the thrust of 
an argument is lost under a series of qualifications. Of course, finding ‘exceptional’ results 
in some industries does not invalidate the conclusions derived from the majority of 
results, since some variation is to be expected. The difficulties arise in assigning statistical 
significance to the unexpected results obtained. These difficulties were apparent above in 
the discussion on the specification search employed to obtain our preferred estimated 
systems. How many industries have to fail a test on a particular set of restrictions for the 
set to be abandoned, and what if these failures result from different subsets of the 
restrictions for each industry? These difficulties become still more apparent when 
considering the estimated coefficients across the 38 industries, and so in the following 
discussion I shall attempt to keep to a minimum the number of qualifying remarks, and 
instead provide an overview of the results obtained. A useful presentational device is 
employed in Chart 5.2 in which the "average" long run industrial employment, price, 
wage, and output relationships are set out. Long run coefficients (obtained by deflating the 
estimated short run coefficients by [1 - Zcoeffs. on ldvs] ) are considered so as to abstract 
from the dynamic adjustments and to focus attention on the direction and order of 
magnitude of the different influences. The coefficients represent the mean of the long run 
coefficients calculated over the 38 industries (excluding some "outlying" industries to be 
defined below). The statistics in parentheses show the mean value of the t-statistics on the 
corresponding short-run coefficients, also calculated over these industries. These 
representative relationships demonstrate that, in general, the estimated coefficients are of 
the expected sign and are of a reasonable order of magnitude. However, there are a 
number of variables which show significantly in only some industries, and others for
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Chart 5.2 
Summary of industrial systems
"it = ao - 0.31 wjt + o L
o - 0.41 kit + 0.84 yit - 0.01 t
(s.r. t) (2.05) ( - ) (0.79) (4.95) (0.10)
Pit
II + 0.33 Wjt + 0.67 qft - 0.37 k|t + 0.03 yjt + 0.01 t
(s.r. t) (2.89) ( - ) (0.70) (0.27) (0.26)
wit = c0 + 0.82 wf + 0.40 INT + 0.85 unrjt
(s.r. t) (2.52) (0.53) (0.43)
+ 0.011 inc + 0.06 pf - 0.03 t2
(0.89) (0.56) (1.17)
y-n = d0 - 0.11 (pit - p£) + 0.19 (pmjt - p^ + 1.82 a + 0.03 t
(s.r. t) (0.77) (2.50) (2.59) (2.88)
Coefficients represent the mean long run coefficients obtained across the industrial results 
of Tables 5.3-5.6. The values in parentheses are the mean t-values on the corresponding (short 
run) coefficients.
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which there is contradictory evidence on the direction of influence. This shows in some of 
the low average t-values reported. The wide diversity of results obtained warrants some 
attention, and the individual equations are therefore considered in more detail below.
The labour demand, price and output equations
Looking first to the estimated labour demand equations presented in Table 5.3, it 
is noted that the estimated relations are generally of the form that might be expected. A 
negative coefficient is obtained on the wage term in 31 of the industries, 23 of which are 
significant, while none of the 7 positive coefficients are significant. Negative coefficients 
are obtained for the capital stock in 25 industries (20 significant), while 7 of the 
(unexpected) 13 positive coefficients are significant This variable is strongly trended for 
many industries and may interact with the time trend therefore. Indeed, of the 23 
industries for which the time trend shows significantly, only 7 have a negatively signed 
coefficient, and 5 of these coincide with one of the significantly positive capital stock 
coefficients. Finally, output levels show extremely strongly in the labour demand 
equations, taking a positive coefficient in 33 industries, and of these 29 are significant. 
Hence the direction of influence is by and large as we would expect in these equations, 
and as predicted by theoiy.
The inclusion of the second lagged dependent variable in the labour demand 
equations is important in 17 industries; 15 take a negative sign, implying that there are 
non-trivial dynamic adjustments underlying these equations. It is noted here that the 
(absolute value of the) sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variable lies 
comfortably between zero and one for most industries. However, industry 2 (Coal mining) 
shows dynamic instability with the sum of its coefficients exceeding one, while industries 
1 (Agriculture), 15 (Elec. Eng.), and 36 (Bus. Serv.) have coefficients whose sum is 
relatively large (exceeding 0.8).
To provide an overview of these results, and also to see the variability in the 
results that have been obtained across industries, the estimated Gong run) elasticities 
obtained in Table 5.3 are summarised in three histograms in Figures 5.1-5.3. Hence, in 
Figure 5.1, the long run employment elasticity with respect to wages, given by the 
estimated value of 83/(1' al"a2)» have been calculated for each industry, and the industry 
has then been classified to one of eight intervals to form a distribution of industries. In 
this case, the histogram classifications cover the interval [-1.26,0.64], which has been 
estimated to include all elasticity values lying within three standard deviations of the 
mean elasticity. Those elasticities which lie outside this interval have been classified as 
outliers, being industries with extreme values for ay  or with coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variables which are, in sum, close to one, so that the long run elasticity is very 
large. These industries are noted at the head of each histogram, and are classified into the
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Fig 5-1 I ^ ong run employment elasticity wrt wages
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Fig 5.2 Long run employment elasticity wrt capital 
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Fig 53  Long run employment elasticity wrt output 
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most extreme intervals in the histograms. Also provided at the head of each histogram is 
the mean long run elasticity, estimated once with all 38 industries, and once excluding the 
outlying industries. Hence in Figure 5.1 we see that the distribution of wage elasticities is 
(vaguely) normal-shaped, with a peak occurring in the interval [-0.31,-0.07], but with 
considerable variability also displayed. The mean elasticity obtained with all 38 industries 
is -0.73, but this value is dominated by the estimated elasticity from industry 36 (Bus. 
Serv.), whose value of -13.90 results from the estimates of the coefficients on its lagged 
dependent variables, the sum of which, as noted earlier, lie close to one. Excluding the 
outlying industries, we obtain a mean elasticity of -0.31. This figure is in line with that 
found in LPP (1990a,b), as described earlier, and is particularly interesting in view of the 
estimates of the wage elasticities of labour demand obtained in more aggregate studies, 
which have generally been higher than those reported here. As noted previously, the 
average disaggregated wage elasticity found in LPP was shown to be significantly lower 
than that obtained from a corresponding aggregate equation. Further, it was also 
significantly smaller than unity, which is important since many recent studies carried out 
at the aggregate level have come to a concensus view in which the long run wage 
elasticity is thought to be around this level (see, for example, the discussion in H.M.
Treasury (1985)). There is good evidence, therefore, that the heterogeneity in wage
elasticities across industries illustrated in Figure 5.1 will generate significant aggregation 
biases in woric carried out at the aggregate level. Certainly, these results confirm that 
further attention should be paid to the issue of aggregation in this context, especially 
given the significance that some policy-makers currently attach to wage adjustment in 
searching for a solution to unemployment^^
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show similar results for the elasticity of labour demand with 
respect to capital stock and output movements. Again, the distribution of estimated 
coefficients is uni-modal, centered around an elasticity which is correctly-signed and 
which is of a reasonable order of magnitude. In both cases, the mean elasticity obtained 
with the outlying industries omitted provides a sensible statistic, taking a value of -0.41
and 0.84 for capital and output elasticities respectively. Here too, however, there is
considerable variability between industries, as the histograms, generated to cover three 
standard deviations either side of the mean, are required to cover the intervals [-3.68,2.86] 
and [-1.52,3.19] for capital and output elasticities in turn.
The price equations described in Table 5.4 are also by and large as we might 
anticipate from the theory. The estimated long run elasticities here are presented in 
Figures 5.4-5.8, showing in turn the elasticity of prices with respect to wages, other input 
prices, capital, and output (Obviously, since price homogeneity has been imposed, 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 simply provide a mirror image of each other). As mentioned
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Fig 5.4 Long run price elasticity wrt wages 
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Fig 5.5 Long run price elasticity wrt material prices 
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Fig 5.6 Long run price elasticity wrt capital
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Fig 5.7 Long run price elasticity wrt output
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previously, the high correlation between wages and other input prices means that the 
estimates of the coefficients on these may be u n r e l i a b l e ^  ^ )t and in fact we note that in 
14 industries, one or other of the estimated coefficients on these variables are negative. 
On the other hand, as we see from Figures 5.4 and 5.5, the mean long run wage and 
material input price elasticities are (excluding outliers) 0.33 and 0.67 respectively; these 
are very reasonable figures and demonstrate well the relative importance of labour and 
non-labour inputs to the value-added at each stage of the production p r o c e s s . ( ^ )
Once more, the estimated coefficients on the capital stock in the equation are 
influenced by the correlation between this variable and the time trend; of the 38 
industries, 24 have a negative coefficient on the capital stock (11 significant), while 14 
have an (unexpected) positive coefficient. However, of these only 8 are significantly 
different to zero, and 7 of these are in industries in which the time trend takes a 
significantly negative coefficient.
More interesting are the estimated coefficients on the output term in the price 
equation. These have an ambiguous expected sign, because, while there may be upward 
pressure exerted on prices from increases in marginal costs through diminishing returns, 
these may be partially offset, or dominated, by changes in the markup of prices over 
marginal costs, which may move countercyclically. As it transpires, the results of Table 
5.4, illustrated in Figure 5.7, indicate that both influences are important, with their relative 
significance differing between industries to provide some degree of variability in estimated 
coefficients. The overall spread of the histogram, covering three standard deviations either 
side of the mean, ranges from -1.57 to 1.44, and 20 of the industries take a positive 
coefficient, while output shows negatively in 18. However, among these, there are only 20 
significant coefficients (7 positive, 13 negative), so that the offsetting influences of the 
cycle on prices are self-cancelling in nearly half of our industries. In this sense, then, real 
rigidities in pricing behaviour are very significant, since, with input prices given, 
industrial prices on average appear to be unresponsive to demand shifts. Cyclic effects 
were found among the determinants of expected aggregate prices (in Table 5.2), but these 
feed into wage determination, and industrial prices are not influenced by this means. As 
was discussed with reference to Blanchard’s (1987) paper in chapter 2, the effects of 
nominal rigidities on supply side adjustment will be exacerbated by this lack of 
responsiveness and the policy interventionist’s case thereby strengthened.
Skipping to the output demand equations in Table 5.4, and summarised in Figures 
5.8-5.11, we obtain once more a set of reasonable equations. As noted previously, 
industry 18 (Aerospace) performs very badly, providing no explanation for output demand 
in this industry, and we note here that industries 13 (Mech. Eng.) and 30 (Electricity), are 
also problematic in that their estimated equations are unstable (taking coefficient values of
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Fig 5.8 Long run demand elasticity wrt relative prices 
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Fig 5.9 Long run demand elasticity wrt import prices 
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Fig 5.10 Long run demand elasticity wrt aggregate demand 
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0.98 and 1.06 on their respective lagged dependent variables). The explanatory variables 
in the equations perform generally as expected, however: 24 industries take a negative 
coefficient on the relative price term, p/p, 17 of which are significant, although there are 
also 15 positive coefficients (7 of which are significant). Still more clear is the importance 
of international price competition and aggregate demand levels, with mean long run 
elasticities of 0.19 and 1.82 respectively. The price of foreign industrial output (relative to 
p) shows positively in 36 cases, 27 of which are significant, while the deviations from 
trend gdp, o, takes a positive coefficient in 34 industries, 23 of which are significant. In 
neither case are there any wrongly-signed coefficients which are significant.
The wage equations
Finally we turn to the estimated wage equations, which in some ways are the 
most interesting set of results, providing direct insights into the relative importance of the 
different influences on wage-setting behaviour discussed earlier, and therefore shedding 
light on the possibilities open to government to influence wages and hence unemployment 
rates. As the discussion of chapter 2 and the model derivation of section 5.1 above 
demonstrate, two (possibly complementary) sets of influences on wage-setting can be 
identified working within the framework of a labour market model in which trade unions 
are important. The first set of influences are those "internal" to the firm which directly 
affect the circumstances in which wage bargaining takes place. Changes in material 
prices, in available capital, in the demand for the industry’s output or in productivity will 
affect the firm’s demand for labour, and hence the constraint subject to which the union 
negotiates a wage to maximise its utility. The influence of internal pressures is captured 
here by the INT variable ( = ^ q  + a^k + a^y + a ^ t). The second set of influences are 
those generated outside the firm ("external" influences). Within this classification, three 
categories of influence have been mentioned. First, there are outside influences exerted on 
a union’s wage-setting behaviour via the direct effect these have on the union’s utility 
function. These include, for example, the effect of changes in the aggregate price level, or 
in one or more of the components of the ‘wedge’, which affect directly the real 
consumption wage from which unions derive utlity. Secondly, there are influences exerted 
on the reference wage which is of importance because of comparability considerations. 
Significant among these are, for example, variables determining the opportunities available 
to union members outside their own industry (this influence relates to expression (5.11.1) 
in the previous section). And thirdly, there are the external factors which influence the 
bargaining stance of the firm and union, affecting their fallback positions in the bargain 
and their relative bargaining strengths (these relate to the expression of (5.11.2) and 
(5.11.3)). It will be difficult to discriminate between the relevance of these three 
categories in terms of the variables which show significantly in the estimated industrial
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wage equations, because there is no clear one-to-one correspondence between the 
variables and the categories of explanation, but certainly some insights on their relative 
importance can be gained.
Looking to Table 5.5 and Figures 5.11-5.16, it is clear that, in the split between 
internal and external pressures, it is the latter which have performed most satisfactorily in 
explaining industrial wages. Figure 5.8 demonstrates that, excluding the outlying 
industries, the mean estimated coefficient on the "insider" variable is around 0.4, so that, 
on average, it takes its expected positive sign. However, of the 22 industries which take a 
positive coefficient on this variable, only 7 are significantly different from zero, which 
compares to 5 significant coefficients out of 16 which take (unexpected) negative 
coefficients. On the basis of these results, then, one could argue that the influences on 
wages that are internal to the firm in fact generate only weak pressures on industrial wage 
settlements.
In contrast, the variables entered to capture the external influences on wages have 
performed relatively well. As mentioned in the last section, a variety of potential external 
influences were considered at the outset, but those that failed to contribute to the fit of the 
equations were dropped in a specification search to leave the five external influences we, 
INC, unr, p6, and t2. Of these, we clearly provides the single most important explanatory 
variable in the industrial wage equations: this variable shows positively in 36 industries 
(24 significantly), and has a mean long run elasticity of 0.86. The incomes policy 
variable, INC, also performs well, taking its expected positive sign in 30 industries (10 
significantly). Given that the effect of policy on expected outside wages is already 
accommodated in the we term, this variable reflects differences in the extent to which 
wage-setters believe the policy can, and will, be enforced in their industry relative to the 
labour market as a whole. Hence, for example, we might expect the industries with strong 
government links to be more likely to impose wage restraint during periods of policy than 
those in which production takes place in many small firms (where policing the policy is 
most difficult).
The local unemployment rate term, unr, performs rather disappointingly on the 
whole; the coefficient on this variable is insignificantly different to zero in half of the 
industries, and of the remaining 18, 10 take the expected negative sign while 8 take a 
positive sign.(^) while different results might be obtained using more complicated 
unemployment measures, taking into account the long term unemployed, for example, 
these results indicate that the most important influence on wages from the unemployed is 
through the aggregate unemployment rate, which generates a depressing effect on 
expected aggregate wages levels, and that local unemployment rates generally fail to exert 
significant downward influence. Since only changes in the unemployment rate showed in 
the equation explaining the formation of aggregate wage expectations, the model also
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Fig 5.12 Long run wage elasticity wrt internal pressure 
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Fig 5.13 Long run wage elasticity wrt incomes policy pressure 
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Fig 5.14 Long run wage elasticity wrt unemployment rate (local) 
Mean: Outliers include
2.50927
0.85276 (Dropping outliers)
1 68.81334 
8 -26.24297
25 -22.54251
26 47.18324
3 1 6 8 10 6
34
33
24 32
23 28
39 22 21 38
36 20 18 35
31 16 13 29
25 27 14 7 19
9 15 12 5 11
8 37 2 10 3 6
30 26
17 1
-16.68 -12.30 -7.91 -3.53 0.85 5.24 9.62 14.00 18.39
171
Mean: Outliers include
0.00820
0.05960 (Dropping outliers)
1 -1.89372
1 4 0 6 6 9 9 3
35 25
30 24
28 23
39 38 27 22
34 36 21 14
33 31 29 15 12
32 19 26 13 11 37
18 17 16 10 3 20
1 6 7 5 9 2 8
-1.51 -1.20 -0.89 -0.57 -0.26 0.05 0.36 0.68 0.99
Fie 5.16 Lone run wace elasticity wrt direct tax rates
Mean: Outliers include
-1.37777
-1.31045 (Dropping outliers)
1 6.64518
26 -11.82447
1 6 2 4 16 8 0 1
36
35
34
33
31
29
27
25 39
22 37
20 21 32
19 16 18
17 30 15 9
12 24 10 8
11 28 23 5 7
26 3 14 13 2 6 1
-7.56 -6.00 -4.43 -2.87 -1.31 0.25 1.81 3.38 4.94
incorporates an element of unemployment hysteresis, and emphasises the role of 
expectation formation in explaining this phenomenon.
Finally among the external influences on wages, we note that pP and t2 show 
significantly in a number of industries. The variable t2 takes its expected sign in 31 
industries (18 significantly) showing the direct tax rate to be an important determinant of 
wages at the industrial le v e l /^  The expected aggregate price, p6, does not appear to 
perform very well in the results reported in Table 5.5, taking its expected sign in only 23 
industries (12 significantly), but this can partly be explained by its strong correlation with 
we, and certainly its exclusion from the equations reduces the fit of the system (as 
measured by the objective function) in very many industries.
To take an overview of the results of the wage equations, then, it appears that in 
most industries, external influences generally outweigh internal ones. Moreover, while we 
recognise that there is some ambiguity in interpreting the results, the performance of the 
incomes policy variable, set against the poor performance of the local unemployment 
variable suggests that, among the external influences, comparability considerations might 
be more important than competitive pressures across sectors.
5.4 Concluding comments
The woik described in this chapter provides us with a tool for the analysis of a 
variety of issues involving the supply side of the economy, as well as illuminating some 
issues in its own right. The theoretical background to the model has been clearly set out, 
and its advantages and disadvantages noted. In particular, it was recognised that the 
theoretical description of the model is based at the level of the firm, while the empirical 
work has been conducted at the industrial level. The validity of this procedure is by no 
means obvious, as the conditions for perfect aggregation are unlikely to be satisfied. In 
these circumstances, we must be cautious in inteipreting coefficients in the estimated 
model, as they will not have a one-to-one correspondence with the true elasticities that 
would be obtained in estimations at the level of the decision maker. One illustration of 
the importance of these qualifications was provided by the estimated elasticities of labour 
demand with respect to wages, which were seen to be somewhat lower in the estimated 
industrial equations than are generally achieved in more aggregated relations. If this 
finding results from some aggregation bias, then it is possible that bias from this same 
source arises in moving from the level of the firm to the more aggregate industry level 
too.
It has also been noted that the structure of the model has been imposed on the 
data, rather than tested against a series of alternative models of the supply side. Obviously
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this is a little unsatisfactory, and each of the four equations of each industrial system 
could be replaced with an alternative specification, based on a different view of the way 
in which the employment, pricing, wage-setting, or output decisions are made. On the 
other hand, there are advantages to be gained from estimating a system based on a single 
consistent framework, as carried out here. In particular, it has been possible to incorporate 
important cross-equation restrictions in the estimation of the system (such as those 
involving exogenous shifts in the labour demand equation, which also influence wages), 
as well as the feedbacks from one equation to the another. Moreover, the system itself is 
a fairiy general one, incorporating as a sub-model many of the alternative specifications 
that might be proposed. (For example, it is noted by Layard and Nickell (1985), that the 
model allows for the influence of both "Gassical" and "Keynesian" unemployment, 
because of the incorporation of imperfect competition and the sensitivity of the price 
markup to demand change). So, while the model has indeed been imposed on the data, it 
appears to be sufficiently general for it to accommodate a wide range of views on the 
functioning of the supply-side, and it provides a fairly broad framework within which to 
compare these opposing views and to investigate further some of the properties of the 
industrial systems and their interactions.
The results themselves showed the model to be fairly robust, performing well in 
most industries. As is sure to be the case when estimation involves around 160 equations 
and 700 variables, there are some results which are not anticipated, some of which cannot 
be explained. (For example, while the interaction between highly correlated, trended 
variables provides an explanation for some of the unexpected results, the positive relative 
price effect obtained in some of the industries’ output demand equations remains 
unexplained). However, the fit of the equations is very good in most cases, and the 
estimated coefficients are generally of the expected sign and order of magnitude.
Most interesting of the estimated results are those of the industrial wage equations 
in which two sets of influences are incorporated. Of the two, the internal, industry-based 
explanatory variables performed disappointingly compared to the external variables. This 
is in contrast to the results of, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald’s (1987) or Nickell 
and Wadhwani’s (1989) analyses of survey data in which internal features, such as 
profitability and productivity, appeared to be the most important influences on pay 
bargaining in a large sample of British firms. The strength of the external variables’ 
performance in our analysis does not, however, necessarily point to the existence of a 
classical competitive model of the labour market, in which free mobility of an 
homogeneous workforce works towards the gradual elimination of pay differentials 
between sectors. Rather, having worked through the wage-setting process within a union- 
based framework, it has been argued that these external pressures may influence pay 
claims through their effect on the industries’ "reference wages", the derivation of which
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may be an extremely complicated affair. Certainly, we have argued that the alternative 
wage, available outside the industry, may be important, and of course this would become 
very important in a perfectly competitive labour market. On the other hand, the issue of 
comparabilities has also been raised, and the influence of the framework and background 
against which bargaining takes place has also been noted. The good showing of the 
incomes policy variable relative to the local unemployment rate variable perhaps indicates 
that an "institutional” view of the labour market, stressing comparabilities, may have the 
more important role to play in understanding wage-setting behaviour than a view which 
emphasises the effects of competition in the labour market. However, by far the clearest 
source of influence on industrial wage setting came through the expectations on the 
aggregate wage level. This finding highlights the importance of understanding the process 
by which agents* aggregate wage expectations are formed, and in particular the way in 
which the effects of disaggregate wage setting decisions accumulate to influence this 
process. Certainly, this study provides good evidence to reassert the significance of wage- 
wage comparisons in wage bargaining.
These results have implications for our earlier discussion, in chapter 2, on the 
causes of real wage rigidities and the policy prescriptions necessary to eliminate them. In 
this discussion, it was noted that expansionary policy, for example, may generate upward 
pressure on real wages, both internal to the firm, by increasing the demand for the 
industry’s product, and external to the firm, by raising inflationary expectations or by 
reducing unemployment. The policy interventionist’s case is strengthened to the extent 
that labour market institutions close down these paths of influence.
There were a variety of explanations provided in chapter 2 for why internal 
pressures may not result in real wage adjustment, and obviously, in the light of the poor 
showing of INT in the estimated wage equations, the results obtained here provide these 
with some credence. Among these, we noted the argument, best illustrated in McDonald 
and Solow’s (1981) paper, in which "non-market" influences on the labour market (such 
as a convention of "fair shares") may react to offset changes in labour market conditions 
to keep the real wage relatively constant Equally, the presence of a group of insulated 
"insiders", responsible for wage setting decisions, may result in real wage rigidity as the 
union’s behaviour is dominated by the desires of this privileged group (papers by Carruth 
and Oswald (1986) and Borooah and Lee (1987) are cited to describe rigidities of this 
form). Clearly, given the poor showing of INT, the results obtained here are perfectly 
consistent with the belief that real wage rigidities may exist because of these sorts of 
bargaining procedures and labour market institutions.
Two explanations were considered for why rising unemployment may not generate 
downward pressure on real wages. The first also called on the idea of the presence of
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"insiders". Because of their superior position in terms of on- the-job training, these 
insiders may have no incentive to take into account the growing number of potential 
entrants to their industrial workforce among the unemployed. Alternatively, it was argued 
that real wage stability might be observed in the presence of high unemployment if a 
large proportion of these are long-term unemployed, who effectively drop out of the 
labour market and cease to influence the alternative wage. Again, the poor showing of the 
unemployment rate, and indeed the presence of a positive coefficient on this variable in 
some industries, provides some support for these arguments.
Given the strength of the influence of expected aggregate wages in the industrial 
wage equations, however, it might be argued that the "kinked" indifference curve 
scenario, associated with Oswald (1986), has been given most significance by the results 
obtained here. In this, wage rigidities will become more pronounced as aggregate wage 
expectations, around which aspirations may be formed, become less responsive to demand 
change. As it turns out, the clearest influence of aggregate demand shifts on wage setting 
comes through their impact on aggregate wage expectations, as shown by the significance 
of o  in Table 5.2. However, the presence of lagged variables in this Table also 
demonstrates the significance of informationally-inexpensive, but backward-looking data in 
expectation formation. If the responsiveness of wages to output is to be improved, 
therefore, it would appear that policy directed at the area of expectation formation and 
wage guidelines (as discussed in sections 2.5 and 2.6 with reference to Taylor’s (1983a,b) 
and Meade’s (1981) papers) might be most profitable.
There clearly exists some scope for developing the ideas raised above, working 
within the framework that has been set up. In particular, direct measures of wage 
expectations (such as those derived from questionnaire data, as in Carlson and Parkin 
(1975), for example) would provide a more reasonable indicator of we. This would enable 
us to accommodate some of the less-easily-measured influences on expectations in the 
industrial wage equations, and might allow some of the influences already included in the 
equations (which currently also help generate we) to show more strongly. Another 
development which will not be pursued here is the possibility of "explaining" the 
distribution of coefficients obtained in these estimated equations in terms of the 
characteristics of the bargaining process and the structure of production in the different 
industries. So, for example, I mentioned above two of the characteristics of an industry 
which might be important in explaining the responsiveness of wages to incomes policy in 
different industries (as captured by the coefficient on INC). In the same vein, and perhaps 
more interesting, might be an investigation of the characteristics of those industries for 
which the "insider-outsider" or the "comparability-based" explanations of wage-setting 
gain support. For example, we might expect that the "insider-outsider" scenario is more
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likely to hold either where there is a single strong union covering all of the employees in 
an industry, or where it is relatively difficult to replace the existing workforce with new 
entrants, in industries involving a good deal of training, for example. If we could classify 
industries according to these characteristics, therefore, we could then investigate whether 
there exists an association between industry with these properties and those with large 
coefficients on the variable INT. This would provide an obvious (indirect) test of the 
hypothesised description of wage-setting. While involving some considerable work in 
deriving and measuring accurately the characteristics of an industry’s bargaining and 
production processes, this extension to the work described here could provide us with 
valuable insights into the validity and usefulness of the theory underlying the models. 
Certainly it is clear from the empirical work that a more complete understanding of the 
formation of union aspirations, and of the influences on aggregate wage expectations, 
demands an increased research effort through which to understand the true basis for wage- 
setting behaviour.
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CHAPTER 6
Investigating Price Rigidities using the Industrial Dimension
In the following two chapters, the results of the disaggregated supply-side model 
are taken up to investigate directly the causes of rigidities in prices and wages. The 
analysis in each chapter will make use of the information that has been obtained by 
estimating the model across 39 industries, since these results both provide an extra 
dimension over which competing hypotheses on the causes of inertia can be examined, 
and also make it possible to identify the important interactions that exist between 
industries which may generate inertia. The analysis of this chapter concentrates on 
explaining the causes of price inertia, using the estimated price equations of the 
disaggregated model to obtain a measure of the degree of price inertia experienced in the 
different industries. There is then an attempt to explain these findings in teims of the 
nature and characteristics of the industries.
In section 2.2 of chapter two, it was noted how the existence of costs of adjusting 
prices could generate (possibly complicated) dynamic time paths for prices, and that there 
had been a variety of commentators suggesting possible sources for such costs. Despite 
this interest, however, there have been relatively few attempts to establish the relevance of 
these suggestions empirically, certainly compared to the work that has looked at wage 
inertia. An important exception to this generalisation, however, is Domberger’s (1979) 
analysis of the influence of market structure on price responsiveness in a sample of 
twenty-one manufacturing sectors in the U.K.. In this, price inertia in each sector is 
measured by the size of the coefficient on the one lagged dependent variable (ldv) in an 
estimated price equation for the sector. These measures are then used in a second stage of 
the analysis in which the degree of price inertia is itself explained, through regression 
analysis, in terms of an index of industrial concentration for the sector and a dummy 
variable which captures the hypothesised distinction in the speed of price adjustment in 
engineering and non-engineering sectors.
Domberger’s two stage procedure provides a direct means of comparing the price 
responsiveness of the different sectors, and of investigating the factors which effect this 
responsiveness, and so it is precisely this methodology that will be employed here. 
However, while the methodology is similar, the analysis differs in a number of important 
respects. First, it is noted that in order to allow for more complicated dynamics in the 
price equation, a second ldv has been allowed in the estimated industrial price equations 
of chapter five (a decision that was vindicated by the presence of a significant coefficient
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on this variable in 15 industries). In these circumstances, it is less clear how price 
responsiveness is to be measured; certainly it is not sufficient to consider only the 
coefficient on the first ldv, as used in the Domberger paper. A second obvious difference 
between the analysis here and that of Domberger shows in the level of disaggregation of 
the data used. Ideally, the work would be carried out at the level of the decision maker, 
looking at individual firms’ decisions to change prices just as specific wage negotiations 
were considered in chapter four. Given that some degree of aggregation is necessary, 
however, it has to be recognised that there are difficulties involved in choosing an 
"optimal" level of aggregation, and that these difficulties will be compounded when 
looking at the dynamic adjustments of these aggregates (see, for example, Lippi’s (1987) 
discussion of the problem of aggregation in modelling dynamic processes). Certainly there 
is no reason to expect that an intermediate level of aggregation, such as that used by 
Domberger, would be more appropriate than the industrial level employed here. In any 
event, it is noted that any aggregate of firms will bring together a (sometimes wide) 
diversity of products under a single classification, so that, by the nature of the data, only 
very broad comments about the characteristics of the industries can be made. In these 
circumstances, it is an advantage to have aggregates which cover as wide a spectrum of 
characteristics as possible, and from this point of view, the industrial data set used here, 
covering the whole economy, provides a very useful resource. Moreover, and this 
constitutes a third and most important difference between Domberger’s analysis and that 
presented here, the wide coverage of the current data set will enable us to investigate 
rather more characteristics of the sectors, and their influence on price responsiveness, than 
was possible on his less diverse data.
It is the issue of the measurement of industrial characteristics that is addressed in 
the section below, recalling some of the suggested sources of price inertia noted in 
chapter two, and attempting to quantify these ideas in terms of measurable industrial 
characteristics. Section 6.2 provides an analysis of the relationships between these 
measures, and section 6.3 summarises the results obtained.
6.1 Quantifying industrial characteristics
As noted above, Domberger’s (1979) analysis primarily considered the impact of 
industrial concentration on price responsiveness. In doing so, he attempted to discriminate 
between two diametrically opposed views. On one side, his own view is that industries 
with relatively few firms, or in which there are large dominant firms, experience low 
subjective costs of adjusting prices because of the ease of communicating pricing 
intentions, so that there is a positive link between concentration and responsiveness. On
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the other hand, the more traditional view, associated with the "administered price" 
hypothesis, argues that industries in which firms are not subject to the rigours of 
competition will demonstrate price inertia, as firms in these industries are able to engage 
in collusive action to avoid price competition and sustain relatively high profit levels. 
Domberger’s results supported the former of these views, and obviously it is important to 
test this finding on the more aggregated data set used here.
To do this, various measures will be employed to capture the degree of market 
power enjoyed by firms in an industry. The first corresponds directly to Domberger’s 
measure, and uses a weighted average of the concentration ratios (i.e. the proportion of an 
industry’s output produced by the five largest firms in the industry) of the three-digit 
industries that make up the industrial classifications. These figures can be derived for the 
22 industries in the manufacturing sector in any year from the Census of Production, and 
they are set out for two years, 1968 and 1979, in Table A6.1 of the Appendix (denoted 
"conc68" and "conc79" respectively). It is noted here that these variables give an 
indication of the degree of concentration in the 22 industries at a particular point in time. 
In fact, it is frequently observed that the 1970’s was a period of extensive merger and 
take-over activity which may have caused the degree of concentration in each industry to 
alter significantly. If price responsiveness is indeed influenced by the degree of industrial 
concentration, then this merger activity suggests that the price setting relationships of the 
industries, represented by their price equations, will have changed over time, so that a 
single price equation would not be adequate to explain price behaviour over the whole 
period (tests of structural stability would investigate this possibility). This idea is pursued 
no further here, given that the primary interest is in inter-industry comparisons, rather 
than the time series behaviour of any particular industry, but this point does raise the 
issue of whether the industries can be unambiguously classed according to their degree of 
maricet power, or whether, through merger activity, for example, industries have changed 
in character over the period. As a partial answer to this question, one can compare the 
figures obtained for the two years in Table A6.1 to see whether there has been any 
significant re-ranking of industries over this important period. As it turns out, there is 
some evidence that concentration ratios altered during the period; the observed fall in 
concentration ratios supporting the stylised fact that the extensive merger activity of the 
50’s and 60’s came to an end, and was reversed, in the mid-70’s. However, this seems to 
have been an economy-wide experience, and relatively little re-ranking of industries 
occurred. Spearman’s p for the two concentration measures, showing their rank 
correlation, is 0.893, so that it seems reasonable to argue that industries can be 
characterised as high or low concentration industries according to either of these 
measures.
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In fact, the concentration ratios, conc68 and conc79, provided in Table A6.1, and 
derived directly from the Census data, may be misleading in the sense that they take no 
account of international trade considerations. This point is made clearly in Kumar (1985), 
in which a variety of adjustments to Census concentration ratios are considered in an 
attempt to investigate the influence of international trade on these ratios. Kumar concludes 
that the impact of trade on the reported concentration ratios is "far from unambiguous, 
and that in certain cases concentration ratios based on Census data may be misleading” (p. 
125). For this reason, the measure of industrial concentration that will be used in the 
analysis is that given in Table A6.1 denoted "cone"; this measure takes up the 1979 
Census concentration ratio, conc79, and adjusts for imports and exports to obtain a more 
accurate measure of domestic concentration (precise details of the adjustment are given in 
the Data Appendix).
Having eliminated the influence of foreign trade from the measure of industrial 
concentration, it is recognised that this influence must nevertheless be included in the 
analysis of the determinants of price responsiveness. In an open economy such as the 
U.K., few industries are completely without the threat of import penetration or 
competition over exports, so that consideration of domestic market conditions alone could 
miss important influences on overall market power. To capture the extent to which an 
industry is vulnerable to foreign competition, the ratio of imports and exports to total 
domestic demand ("imrat" and "exrat" respectively) will be used in the second stage of 
the analysis; as these ratios increase, so the vulnerability of the industry to international 
trade rises, and market power is reduced. The inclusion of these three separate measures 
(cone, imrat, and exrat) enables us to discriminate whether the different sources of 
competition have differential impacts on price responsiveness, and counter to some extent 
Winter’s (1983) criticism of Domberger’s analysis that important international influences 
on competition had not been included.
In view of the difficulties that have been outlined in the use of the above 
measures of market power, it might be that a measure which is more directly related to 
the production of an industry’s output would provide a better indicator of the market 
structure of the industry. With this idea in mind, the industries’ capital-output ratios will 
also be used as a possible explanatory variable in the second stage of the analysis; a high 
capital-output ratio represents a significant barrier to entry into an industry, so that these 
would be found in industries where firms hold a relatively high degree of market power.
It is clearly necessary to investigate the contribution of market power to the 
explanation of price inertia, given its importance in the historical debate. However, the 
discussion of chapter two makes it very clear that there are other potentially important 
determinants of inertia, and in particular, Gordon’s (1982) discussion of the role of
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uncertainty in a world of many, heterogeneous products was noted. Gordon’s arguments 
emphasise the ease with which information can be extracted from observable shocks and 
incorporated into pricing decisions when there is uncertainty; relatively high uncertainty 
will be associated with relatively sluggish price responsiveness. These ideas can be 
investigated in the two stage analysis by using (separate) measures of uncertainty over 
demand and over costs for the 22 industries. Of course, as discussed in chapter four, there 
is rarely an obvious measure of uncertainty, although the variability of the variable is 
often seen as a reasonable proxy. Here, then, relative demand and cost uncertainty will be 
measured simply in terms of the variance of nominal demand (output price*output) and of 
input costs over the sample period. Again, details of the construction of these variables 
are provided in the Data Appendix, and the variables themselves, denoted "vardem" and 
"varcost", are set down in Table A6.1.
Finally here, Gordon’s, and subsequently Blanchard’s (1983, 1987), comments on 
the importance of an industry’s position in the chain of production as an influence on the 
speed of price adjustment in that industry are recalled. This influence has an ambiguous 
direction; Gordon’s information-based ideas argue that producers of final goods will leam 
about change earliest, and therefore respond relatively quickly, while Blanchard’s analysis 
emphasised the point that the price of final goods will be influenced by the costs of inputs 
that may have been produced substantially earlier, so that they will incorporate a larger 
element of inertia. Again the importance of these arguments can be investigated, this time 
using information contained in the input-output tables on the division of total sales 
between that going to other industries, and that going to satisfy final demand. The 
variable "prodpos" shows the proportion of output taken up by intermediate demand, so 
that a value close to zero indicates the production of final goods, while "primary" 
industries would take a value close to one. Again, details are provided in the Data 
Appendix and Table A6.1
Finally in this section, the measurement of industrial price inertia itself is 
considered. As noted in the introduction, this measure will be based on the coefficients on 
the ldv’s in the estimated industrial price equations of chapter five. In the Domberger 
paper, there was a clear one-to-one correspondence between inertia and the one ldv in his 
estimated price equations; with this coefficient lying in the interval [0,1], it is obvious 
that price responsiveness is unambiguously lower as the coefficient approaches unity, 
since the weight on last period’s price level rises, and past price decisions dominate. In 
the price equations of chapter five, however, there are two ldv’s, and the measure of 
inertia is less clear-cut. Some justification was provided for the inclusion of two ldv’s in 
section 2.2, where it was noted that a standard quadratic cost function could be 
generalised by the form
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Here, costs are incurred if the price level deviates from its target level, pt , and if price 
growth, pt-pt_|, deviates from a trend growth rate, gt. As an illustration, it was noted that 
if gt = pt_j - pt_2, cost minimisation would generate a price equation of the form
pt = (a/(a+b)).pt* + ICb/Ca+b)).?^! - (b/(a+b)).pt_2
= (l-(J))pt* + 2^ . !  - <J>pt_2 (6.1)
which captures the idea that a larger part of any adjustment in prices takes place
relatively quickly to set up institutions which reduce the cost of successive growth. The
dynamics of this equation are described by the roots of the corresponding characteristic
equation, which are given by <j> ± V( <J>^ - <J> ). The expression in brackets is necessarily
less than zero since <|> lies in the interval [0,1], so that the roots are complex expressions,
and one could expect to observe cycles in the time paths of prices in such an industry.
More generally, the trend rate of price growth over which costs are incurred might be
represented by a less obvious function of recent price growth (i.e. gt = g( pt_j, pt_2,
pt_3,...), while from the discussion above, the target price level may itself also depend on
$recent price levels (i.e. pt = f( Xt, pt.j, pt_2) ). For these reasons, some rather 
complicated price dynamics might be expected to be captured by the two ldv’s in the 
estimated price equations, and this is indeed observed, with many industries showing 
cyclic adjustment, and some experiencing "overshooting". These considerations make the 
task of obtaining a single measure of price inertia very difficult indeed.
Table 6.1 provides a brief summary of the dynamic properties of the estimated 
price equations set out in Table 5.5 of the previous chapter. As this table demonstrates, 
industries can be classed into one of four groups, according to the value of the (two) 
roots of the associated characteristic equation. It is noted here that both roots must be less 
than unity in absolute value to ensure convergence in the time path of prices, and that this 
is true of all 38 of the estimated equations/*) In 16 industries, the equations have two 
real and distinct roots; 2 of these have two positive roots, indicating that convergence will 
be monotonic, while the remaining 14 have one positive and one negative root. A great 
variety of movement is possible with these industries, therefore, although it is noted that 
in 11 cases the positive root dominates, so that the monotonic movement (eventually) 
swamps the improper oscillations generated by the negative root. This is not the case in 
industries 5 (Food), 9 (Petrol prds), and 27 (Oth Maunf), however, where convergence 
will be accompanied by rather unrealistic jumps around the new equilibrium. The 
remaining 22 industries each have complex roots to their characteristic equations, 
indicating that the time path of prices in these industries could be traced along a
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Table 6.1
Dynamic properties of industrial price equations of Table 5.5
Industries with real and 5 (Food), 9 (Petrol Prds), 12 (Non-ferr.Mets)
distinct roots (A > 0) 14 (Inst Eng), 15 (Elec Eng), 17 (Motors) 
18 (Aerosp.), 20 (Metal Gds), 23 (Bricks) 
24 (Timber), 26 (Printing), 27 (Oth Manuf), 
30 (Elec), 32 (Rail), 33 (Road),
39 (Misc.Serv)
of which:
Aj > 0, ^2 > 0 17, 33
Aj < 0, ^2 > 0 5, 9, 27
Aj > 0, ^  < 0 the remainder
Industries with complex 1 (Agric.), 2 (Coal), 3 (Mining),
roots (A < 0) 6 (Drink), 7 (Tobacco), 8 (Coal Prds)
10 (Chems), 11 (Iron), 13 (Mech Eng), 
16 (Ships), 19 (Oth Vehs), 21 (Textiles), 
22 (Clothing), 25 (Paper), 28 (Constr), 
29 (Gas), 31 (Water), 34 (Oth Trans),
35 (Comms), 36 (Distn), 37 (Bus. Serv), 
38 (Prof.Serv)
Characteristic equation: pt + apt_i + Ppt-2 = 0» where a  = -(coefficient on pt_j in Table 5.5), p 
= -(coefficient on pt_2 in Table 5.5)
Discriminant = A = a? - 4p, and A^ , ^  = roots of characteristic equation, X  ^ is the dominant 
root, i.e. lA^ I > lA^ I
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sinusoidal function with damped oscillations.
An illustration of the different ways in which prices might evolve under these 
various dynamic forms is given in Figure 6.1, where the time paths of the price equations 
of three representative industries (industries 6 (Drink), 33 (Road), and 39 (Misc Serv)) are 
plotted. Working with the homogeneous price equation pt = bjpt_j + t>2pt_2 + (1-bj- 
b2)Xt, where bj and b2 are taken from Table 5.5, the time path of prices is shocked from 
its original level at an arbitrary point in time (denoted here as period 7), following a 
sequence of periods without shocks and in which pt = 1 (i.e. pt= Xt= 1, t=l,..,6). 
Ultimately, prices rise to a new equilibrium level of 2 (Xt= 2, t=7,...). The paths taken to 
converge on this new level vary considerably, however. The most easily interpreted time 
path is that of industry 33, whose immediate reaction to the increase in Xt is the slowest 
of the three industries. The characteristic equation for this industry has two positive roots, 
and the evolution of prices is therefore smooth; prices rise monotonically and at a 
diminishing rate (as would be obtained where there was just one ldv), and the vast part of 
the convergence to the new equilibrium has taken place within 3 periods. The time path 
of industry 39 is rather erratic in comparison, starting with the largest price rise of the 
three industries in the period of the shock, a sharp fall in the rate of growth in the next 
period, and a slight resurgence in the following period. This movement will be typical of 
the evolution of prices in those industries noted in Table 6.1 for which the characteristic 
equation has one positive and one negative real root Here it is noted that ultimate 
convergence takes a little longer than in industry 33, despite the initial surge. Most 
dramatic amongst the three is the time path of industry 6, whose intermediate initial 
growth in the period of the shock continues into the next period to overshoot its ultimate 
equilibrium level. Prices fall over the next three periods, and the cycles continue until 
convergence is achieved after approximately 10 periods. This is precisely the sort of time 
path that might be expected where the characteristic equation corresponding to the 
industry’s price equation has complex roots, as obtained above in the description of 
equation (6.1), for example. (In the case of (6.1), it can be easily shown that the price 
level will overshoot in the period following the shock if <t>^ < 0.5; this might be 
reasonable in many cases).
Figure 6.1 illustrates clearly the idea that there are a number of possible 
alternative views of price responsiveness. The speed of adjustment of prices to the shock 
in the Figure might be judged in terms of the responsiveness of prices in the period of the 
shock only (i.e. the immediate response in period 7 in the above illustration), in terms of 
the adjustment in prices in the initial periods (say periods 7 and 8), or in terms of the 
speed with which convergence to the new equilibrium is achieved. In the case where there 
is only one ldv in the price equation, as in the analysis of Domberger described above, 
these three alternative views coincide. In this analysis, the character of the whole time
184
Figure 6.1
T i m e  P a t h s
2.0 -
1.5 -
1.0
205 10 15
T i m e
shows time path of industry 6 
shows time path of industry 33 
shows time path of industry 39
185
\
path of prices in a sector are captured by the coefficient on the one ldv, as both the size 
of the immediate change in prices following a shock and the rate of growth of prices in 
subsequent periods are fully represented by this one coefficient. In the more general case 
with two ldv’s, however, these views do not coincide since in this case, as is clear from 
the Figure, prices in one industry can rise at a faster or slower rate than those elsewhere 
at different times, so that the appropriate measure of price responsiveness depends on the 
time horizon over which adjustment is considered. So, for example, for the three 
alternative views mentioned above, the ordering of the three industries considered here 
would be (32, 6, 33), (6, 33, 32) or (33, 32, 6) respectively.
In order to make use of the industrial price equations and to proceed with the 
analysis of the causes of price inerda, three possible measures of price inertia are 
considered for use in the second stage of the empirical analysis. These are set out below:
(i) jcjj = price inertia in industry i
= -(change achieved in the first two periods following a shock 
as a proportion of total adjustment)
= -(l+b1)(l-b1-b2)
♦ o(ii) = £jJ°(Pt -Pt ) T = period of shock
(iii) 7C31 = LjJ°[l/(t-T+l)] (pt -pt*)2 T = period of shock
In some sense, the first two of these set out the extremes of the measures that 
might be used. Measure tcj emphasises the initial responsiveness of prices, concentrating 
on the adjustment achieved in the first two periods following a shock. This measure is 
intuitively sensible as inertia is equated with the stickiness of prices in moving from its 
initial equilibrium position in the face of a shock which requires adjustment. Measure 71^ ,
on the other hand, concentrates on the convergence criterion, (i.e. the speed with which
%the new p is achieved), defining inertia in terms of the inability of prices to move to this 
new position. 7C2 represents the opposite extreme in the sense that the industry’s prices at 
all times following the shock, stretching infinitely into the future, are used in constructing 
the measure. Gearly, both of these measures have their appeal, and TC3 represents a 
compromise between the two. Again, the convergence criterion is used as its base, but 
here the contribution of the deviation of pt from its new equilibrium is weighted 
according to the time passed since the occurrence of the shock (with declining weights 1, 
1/2, 1/3, 1/4,...). Although the choice of weights here is ad hoc, it is clear that this 
measure raises the significance of the initial adjustments emphasised in tcj, so that one 
might expect 7C3 to lie somewhere between this figure and 7^ .  In fact, for the 22
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industries of the manufacturing sector, on which the empirical work of this section will 
primarily be based, Spearman’s p can be calculated to obtain
p( Jti, 7C2) = 0.594, p( jclt 7C3) = 0.650, p( rc2, TC3) = 0.947.
These are all significantly greater than zero (the critical value at the 5% level is 0.48, and 
is 0.61 at the 1% level), indicating that there is a close relationship between the ranking 
of the industries produced by the three measures. Further, the correlation coefficients 
between the measures are 0.725, 0.784, and 0.942 respectively, so that the measures show 
a close cardinal relationship too. On these grounds, then, the analysis described below 
uses the single "compromise” measure, n ^ , as the indicator of price inertia in the 
industries; although one must bear in mind the fact that this single measure emphasises 
particular aspects of the responsiveness of prices over time, and is not the only possible
indicator, the evidence is that this measure provides similar figures, both quantitatively
and qualitatively, to those of the alternative measures considered.
6.2 The analysis
The preceding discussion raises a variety of hypotheses which can be investigated 
econometrically. As the discussion makes clear, many of the ideas involved are very 
difficult to measure, and by their nature, therefore, may be more susceptible to qualitative 
rather than quantitative investigation. On the other hand, the measures described above do 
provide figures to which quantitative techniques can be applied, so that sole reliance on 
qualitative methods would waste information. In what follows then, a series of analyses 
which make use of both type of technique are presented, starting with a simple qualitative 
analysis which uses the measures as indicators of the character of the industries, and 
moving to quantitative methods which use the measures as they stand. In anticipation of 
the results obtained, it is noted at the outset that, in view of the character of the data, 
results obtained through qualitative methods are in some sense more reliable, since these 
are less dependent on the precision of the measures of the industrial characteristics that 
are used. However, such results are less clearly defined and are more limited in the 
questions that they can address than those obtained through quantitative methods.
With these comments in mind, the first stage of the analysis of the determination 
of industrial price dynamics involves splitting the industries into broad groups for each of 
the characteristics of interest. In this analysis, attention is restricted to the 22 industries of 
the manufacturing sector (industries 5-26 listed in Table 5.1) since data for the 
concentration variable is only available for these industries. To group the industries, the
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range of values over which each of the characteristic variables of Table A6.1 varies was 
split into two or three intervals, and the 22 industries categorised as "high”, "medium", or 
"low" level industries for each variable according to the interval into which they are 
observed to fall. The intervals were necessarily chosen rather arbitrarily, but where 
possible, they correspond to the ‘natural’ groupings in the observed data series. Where no 
obvious breaks occur, intervals were chosen to obtain groups which are roughly equal in 
number. It is for this reason that some variables are split into two, and some into three 
intervals.
To illustrate the difficulties involved in choosing appropriate intervals, consider 
the inertia variable to be explained, Kyv (In what follows, the 3 superscript, necessary to 
distinguish this measure from its alternatives in the discussion earlier, will be dropped). 
As shown in figure 6.2, for this variable, 15 of the 22 industries are closely grouped 
together in the interval [0,16]. There is then a small gap before industry 21 (Leather), and 
a large interval between industries 17 (Motors) and 5 (Food). In choosing the intervals for 
classifying industries, there is a trade-off between grouping together just the most 
obvious/natural outliers (so that industries 5 (Food), 22 (Leather), 12 (Metals) and 24 
CTimber) would constitute the "high" inertia group), and attempting to obtain a more equal 
split of industries which will make the analysis of the categorical data more reliable. In 
this case, one could emphasise the first split at around tc=0.20 to obtain the larger "high" 
inertia grouping including industries 7 (Tobacco), 17 (Motors), and 21 (Textiles) also. 
Given the importance of the classification of the dependent variable both of these 
classifications are considered in the following analysis. (This will also provide an idea of 
the sensitivity of the analysis to the chosen definitions of the classifications). Details of 
the choice of interval for the remaining explanatory variables are provided in Table A6.2 
of the Appendix.
Next, a series of two-way contingency tables were constructed showing the cross­
classification of the industries according to the degree of inertia and each of the 
potentially influential industrial characteristics. Simple contingency table statistics were 
then computed to investigate the association between price inertia and the characteristics 
in turn. These are reported in Table 6.2, which shows the standard y}  test of the 
independence of the two classifications, Goodman and Kruskal’s y-statistic (which is a 
measure of the association between the classifications analogous to a correlation 
coefficient), and Kendall’s x (which also quantifies the degree and direction of 
association, but with an underlying probability distribution which enables a test of the 
significance of the statistic to be carried out).
This analysis provides some evidence to support the existence of an association 
between inertia and a number of the potentially influential explanatory variables. Most 
obvious is the (negative) association between price inertia and an industry’s capital-output
188
Figure 6.2
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Table 6.2(a)
Dependent variable: Tcgrpl "low” inertia where n < 0.20; 7tgrpl=0 
"high" inertia where n > 0.20; 7igrpl=l
Explanatory van X2 df sig y x sig
cone 0.43 2 0.81 -0.17 -0.09 0.34
kout 7.45 2 0.02 -0.63 -0.38 0.04
prodpos 1.15 2 0.56 -0.39 -0.21 0.15
imrat 0.00 1* 1.00 0.20 0.09 0.34
exrat 2.36 2 0.31 -0.51 -0.26 0.10
vardem 3.02 2 0.22 -0.53 -0.27 0.09
varcost 3.35 1* 0.07 -0.85 -0.49 0.01
Dependent variable: rcgrp2 
Explanatory var.
Table 6.2(b)
"low” inertia where n < 0.33; 7tgip2=0 
"high" inertia where n > 0.33; rcgip2=l
X2 df sig y x sig
cone 2.04 2 0.36 -0.65 -0.29 0.08
kout 16.02 2 0.00 -1.00 -0.62 0.00
prodpos 0.28 2 0.87 -0.11 -0.05 0.41
imrat 1.44 1* 0.23 0.77 0.38 0.04
exrat 1.40 2 0.50 -0.55 -0.23 0.13
vardem 1.50 2 0.47 -0.41 -0.17 0.21
varcost 2.75 1* 0.10 -1.00 -0.47 0.02
Notes
"*" values adjusted for Yates correction in 2x2 contingency tables.
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ratio. With industries grouped according to either of the inertia classifications, there is 
strong evidence to reject the hypothesis of "no association" considered by the y}  test. 
Instead, an unambiguously negative association is demonstrated by the y-statistic, 
indicating that inertia falls as the capital-output ratio, proxying market power, rises. This 
negative association is confirmed with a significantly negative estimate of Kendall’s x.
In comparison, the alternative measure of domestic market power, cone, shows 
less convincingly; y} statistics in table 6.2(a) and (b) are insignificant, although the sign 
on y is negative in both cases, and there is weak evidence (i.e. significant at the 10% 
level) that Kendall’s x is significantly less than zero in 6.2(b). Similarly weak evidence is 
obtained for the variables ‘exrat’ and ‘imrat’, for which y}  tests are consistently 
insignificant However, tests on Kendall’s x indicate the possibility of a negative 
association between industrial inertia and an industry’s reliance on exports, and a positive 
link between inertia and import penetration.
Relatively good evidence is provided for an association between inertia and 
’varcost’; the y}  test statistic is significant at the 10% level in both table 6.2(a) and (b), 
and the test on Kendall’s x shows a negative relationship which is significant at the 1% 
and 5% levels in (a) and (b) respectively. While rather weaker, there is also some 
evidence of an association between inertia and ‘vardem’, again negative, indicating that 
prices are more responsive in industries which face more uncertainty over input price and 
demand change. Finally here, it is noted that there is little evidence of any relationship 
between inertia and an industry’s position in the production process from the results of 
table 6.2.
The results of table 6.2 show the simplest tests of association between inertia and 
the explanatory variables; by dealing with groups of industries, the method makes least 
use of the measures of industrial characteristics that we have constructed, and insofar as it 
is believed that these measures are only indicative of the character of the industry, this 
might be as far as the analysis should be taken. On the other hand, transforming the 
measures to obtain categorical data wastes information since the constructed measures 
would allow us both to rank industries more precisely and to quantify the similarities and 
differences between all industries over these dimensions. Table 6.3 takes the analysis one 
stage further, therefore, and presents Spearman’s rank correlation, p, and the standard 
(Pearson) correlation coefficient, r, between n and each of the explanatory variables in 
turn.
Looking to the rank correlation results of column (1) first, it is noted that the 
strong negative association picked up by the categorical data analysis between inertia and 
‘kout’ and ‘varcost’ are confirmed, both coefficients being significant at the 5% level. 
Coefficients on ‘cone’, ‘exrat’, and ’vardem’ take the same signs as previously, but are
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Table 6.3
Correlation between n and explanatory variables
Explan. var. P rl r2
cone -0.18 -0.30 (0.09)* -0.27 (0.12)
kout -0.47 ** -0.19 (0.20) -0.41 (0.03)
prodpos 0.00 -0.03 (0.44) -0.01 (0.49)
imrat -0.02 0.22 (0.16) 0.19 (0.20)
exrat -0.23 -0.36 (0.05)** -0.43 (0.03)
vardem -0.22 -0.20 (0.18) -0.20 (0.20)
varcost -0.49** -0.41 (0.03)** -0.39 (0.04)
Notes
p = Speannan’s rank correlation; 10% sig level (p) = 0.28
5% sig level (p) = 0.36 
rj = Pearson’s correlation coefficient; n=22 (industries 5-26)
T2 = Pearson’s correlation coefficient; n=21 (industries 5-26, excl. ind 8)
indicates significance at 10% level 
"**" indicates significance at 5% level
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not significant at the 10% level, while there appears to be no association between inertia 
and ‘imrat’ or ‘prodpos’.
The correlation coefficients of columns (2) and (3) make full use of the 
information contained by the industrial measures. Column (2) uses data for all 22 
manufacturing industries once more, while column (3) drops industry 8 (Coal Products) 
from the sample. The reason for this is apparent if the results for ‘kout’ are considered, 
where despite the evidence found so far, the negative association found is reported to be 
insignificant Consideration of the data in Table A6.1 of the Appendix shows an 
extremely high value for ‘kout’ for industry 8, and the result obtained is dominated by 
this outlier. Omitting this observation provides the more consistent result of column (3), 
again providing evidence of a strong negative relationship. Similarly strong results are 
also obtained for ‘varcost’ and ‘exrat’, and weak evidence to support the negative 
association between inertia and ‘cone’ is also obtained.
The final stage of investigation here is shown in Table 6.4, where the results of a 
simple OLS regression analysis are presented.^) This analysis again uses the industrial 
character measures as a direct representation of the properties of the industry, but takes 
the work a stage further than the Pearson correlation coefficients in allowing for 
interactions between the variables. Of course, in running a regression analysis, a linear 
relationship is implicitly imposed between the variables involved, and in an attempt to 
obtain the highest degree of explanatory power in the regression, data transformations 
were also considered (to allow for potential non-linearities). To avoid excessive data- 
mining, a simple rule was employed that, for each explanatory variable x, either x, log(x), 
or exp(x) would be included in the regression, choosing that alternative which is most 
strongly related to n in teims of Pearson’s r. As the table indicates, this procedure 
suggested that log(kout) and log(conc) be used, along with the levels of the other 
explanatory variables.
Column (1) of table 6.4 shows the results of a simple OLS regression in which all 
of the potentially influential variables are included, and it is immediately clear that the 
negative relationships between price inertia and the capital-output ratio and export reliance 
show very strongly. Indeed, if we employ a specification search in which variables which 
do not contribute to the fit of the equation (i.e. Itl < 1) are successively dropped, column
(2) is achieved, where 60% of the variability in industrial price inertia is explained in 
terms of these two variables alone.
Of course, ‘kout’ was initially included in the list of potentially important 
variables as an alternative measure of market power to that based on 5-firm concentration 
ratios (’cone’). In fact, the correlation coefficient between these measures is 0.67, so that 
there is a close correspondence between the variables, and one would not expect both to
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Table 6.4
OLS regression analysis of industrial price inertia
Dependent variable: tcj
n=21; manufacturing industries 5-26, excluding industry 8.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
const 0.154 0.078 0.558 0.489 0.125
(0.42) (0.97) (1.63) (1.66) (1.14)
log(conc) -0.008 -0.117 -0.146 -0.179
(0.08) (1.30) (1.86) (2.35)
log(kout) -0.194 -0.216
(2.07) (4.39)
prodpos 0.030 0.080
(0.20) (0.50)
imrat 0.119 0.343
(0.40) (1.10)
exrat -0.780 -0.793 -0.780 -0.805 -0.841
(2.30) (2.81) (2.07) (2.31) (2.37)
vardem -0.038 -0.063
(0.19) (0.28)
varcost -0.150 -0.860 -0.656
(0.20) (1.16) (1.32)
R2 9 0.612 0.606 0.484 0.433 0.375adj R 0.404 0.562 0.263 0.333 0.305
RSS 0.3322 0.3376 0.4418 0.4855 0.535!
Note
t-ratios in parentheses
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show significantly in the regression results of column (1). Columns (3)-(5) show an 
equivalent specification search in which ‘kout’ is omitted from the outset, therefore, and 
in these the variable log(conc) does take a significantly negative coefficient. Once more, 
‘exrat* shows itself to be highly significant, and, as column (4) demonstrates, in the 
absence of ‘kout’, ‘varcost’ also contributes to the fit of the equation.
Finally in this section, before summarising and discussing these results, it is noted 
that while there has been little evidence to suggest that an industry’s position in the 
production process effects the speed of price adjustment so far, it might be argued that 
this is because attention has been limited to the manufacturing sector, any relationship 
that may exist between these variables may show more clearly if the distinction between 
primary, manufacturing, and tertiary sectors was made, say. In order to investigate this 
idea, a final cross-classification of industries was considered to include industries from the 
primary and service sectors too. Gassifying the industries to the three sectors as shown in 
Table A6.2, the results obtained for each of the inertia classifications described above 
were as follows:
Table 6.5
Contingency table analysis of inertia and position in the production chain
Explanatory variable: SECTOR = 1 if industry in primary sector
= 2 manufacturing sector 
= 3 if service sector
X^ df sig X z sig
Dependent variable: jrgipl 1.43 2 0.49 -0.14 -0.07 0.34
Dependent variable: 7tgip2 2.40 2 0.30 -0.62 -0.25 0.07
These results confirm those of table 6.2 based on the manufacturing sector alone: 
namely, that, insofar as an association exists, the relationship between inertia and 
‘prodpos’ is a negative one, so that industries producing relatively more final goods 
demonstrate more price inertia than those at the beginning of the chain. However, the
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results of table 6.2 and 6.5 indicate that the evidence for this relationship is, at best, only 
weak.
6.3 Summary of results and concluding remarks
This sequence of analyses provides results to build up a good picture of the 
relationship between the industrial characteristics that have been considered and price 
inertia. It has been noted that the measures of these characteristics are in some cases 
rather imperfect representations of the properties of the industries that they attempt to 
describe. One reason for this is the aggregate nature of the data used, which in some 
cases groups together firms which face a wide variety of different environments. In these 
circumstances, one might prefer to use the measures as indicators of broad characteristics 
of the industry only, and attention might then be concentrated on the categorical data 
analysis of the contingency tables and the rank correlations that were reported. The results 
of the first of these provided evidence that prices are more responsive to shocks in 
industries in which firms have a high degree of domestic market power, as proxied by a 
high capital-output ratio, and where input price variability is high. The rank correlation 
results confirmed these findings, and further suggested that a high level of demand 
variability, a high concentration ratio, and a heavy reliance on exports might also be 
related to price responsiveness, although these associations were relatively weak.
The latter two of these in particular increased in significance when measures of 
industrial characteristics were used directly to obtain Pearson’s correlation coefficients and 
OLS regression results. Export reliance showed most strongly in both of these, and the 
regression analysis demonstrated that, if export reliance is taken into account, the measure 
of domestic market power derived from concentration ratios was also highly significant. 
These results illustrate the advantage of the more quantitative techniques, which are able 
to investigate more sophisticated relationships, such as the interactions between variables, 
although they obviously rely more heavily on the particular measures of industry 
characteristics employed. ^
To link these findings to the earlier discussion, it is noted that Domberger’s 
discovery of a positive link between market power and price responsiveness is confirmed 
here, but only in the domestic market. This positive relationship was justified in terms of 
the ease of communicating pricing intentions and coordinating price movement in highly 
concentrated industries, and is illustrated in the work of the previous section through the 
consistently negative links between inertia and ‘kout’ and the significantly negative 
coefficient on log(conc) in Table 6.4(5). However, this is not the end of the story as far
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as market structure is concerned; market power is of course much reduced if there is a 
large export element in a firm’s output so that the firm has to compete internationally. 
Moreover, in a world market, there is much less scope for communication between 
producers to facilitate coordination of price movements, so that Domberger’s information- 
based ideas are less appropriate in these circumstances. Instead, the ’administered price’ 
theories of price inertia seem rather more relevant here, predicting that prices become 
more responsive as competition rises. The evidence presented here supports this case, 
finding that greater degrees of market power obtained through a low reliance on exports, 
are related to more stable prices in the face of shocks. This is an interesting finding that 
extends those of Domberger, but which provides further support for the argument that 
market structure is a primary determinant of industrial price responsiveness.
There is also some evidence that greater uncertainty over input prices (and, to a 
lesser extent, demand) is also related to greater price responsiveness, although, in view of 
Gordon’s (1982) discussion, this appears counter-intuitive. The argument there is that 
prices will be slower to respond to shocks where signals for change are obscured by high 
variability in the signals. This finding remains unexplained, then, although a justification 
might be obtained in terms of firms’ awareness of input price change and cost 
consciousness: firms facing relatively volatile input prices might become more sensitive to 
these movements than otherwise, and install institutions which respond more quickly to 
change, other things being equal, than in other industries.
These findings have interesting implications for the macroeconomy and for the 
design of economic policy. The corollary of price inertia in an industry is a profit 
squeeze, as price increases fail to match cost increases. This, together with the more 
obvious relative price effects which result from the differential speeds of price adjustment 
across industries, means that substantial structural change may be brought about, both in 
the short run and the long run, through the presence of price inertia. Specifically, we have 
noted that those firms operating in highly concentrated industries will respond more 
quickly in raising prices when faced with increased costs than those firms in more 
competitive industries. This will have two offsetting effects: on the one hand, as costs 
increase across all industries, prices will rise in more concentrated industries relative to 
those in more competitive ones. To the extent that there is a substitution effect in 
demand, this will cause demand to shift from the output of the concentrated industries 
towards that of the more competitive ones. Obviously, this effect may be reversed in the 
long run, as prices in the competitive industries more gradually reflect the cost changes, 
but to the extent that changes in real magnitudes persist (as in the case of unemployment 
hysteresis, for example) this will represent a long term structural consequence of nominal 
inflation. On the other hand, the squeeze on profits that is implied for the more
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competitive industries in the above scenario may have an offsetting impact on the 
economy’s structure. A protracted period of low profitability could reduce the level of 
investment in firms in the more competitive sectors, resulting in a long run shift in the 
structure of production towards the more highly concentrated industries. Of course, there 
are a variety of reasons why policy makers may have a view on the desired structure of 
the economy, so that these implications should be taken into account in forming 
macropolicy. Not least among these, however, is the significance of particular industries 
relative to others in terms of employment generation. Certainly, it would be unfortunate if 
policy makers ignored this consequence of inflation, allowing industrial demand to 
fluctuate ‘arbitrarily* across sectors, and passively accepting the employment consequences 
that result.
A related issue involves the propensity of firms to introduce new technologies in 
order to reduce costs. Given that firms in more competitive industries are less able to pass 
on cost increases in the form of price increases than those in more concentrated 
industries, it is possible that these firms will be more willing to look for innovative ideas 
in order to reduce costs. Certainly there is a widespread belief that monopolies and cartels 
are less efficient than their competitive counteiparts, as enshrined in the concept of 
X-inefficiency. Hence, while there is a macroeconomic argument which would call for 
policies aimed at the reduction of price inertia, so that adjustments to shocks could take 
place quickly and relatively painlessly (in terms of real magnitudes), it is clear that a 
policy which promoted a move towards increased industrial concentration would not be 
unambiguously beneficial. Indeed, pricing policies of the past have usually been concerned 
not only with price developments, but also with the encouragement of cost reductions 
through technical innovation. Hence, the National Board for Prices and Incomes, set up 
by the Labour Government in 1965, saw its primary function as providing a detailed 
analysis of the cost structure of enterprises that were referred to it so as to identify any 
potential for the absorbtion of cost increase through efficiency gains rather than through a 
price pass-on. Equally, the UK Price Commission, set up in 1973, operated an ‘allowable 
cost’ rule. In this, increases in some costs could be passed on in prices, but a productivity 
deduction was also enforced, by which a given proportion of any increases in wage costs 
was excluded from this pass-on in order to encourage the introduction of technological 
improvements and best-practice techniques. While we have not presented evidence in this 
thesis to examine the effectiveness of these policies on price setting, in view of the 
success of incomes policies on controlling the timing of wage change (evidence of which 
was provided in chapter 4), it seems likely that direct policy intervention of this sort 
might also be useful in controlling the speed of adjustment of prices. Certainly, a policy 
on prices would provide a useful counterpart to a wages policy, and one which would be 
necessary if policy is to address the sort of structural issues noted above.
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The analysis of this chapter provides information on the determinants of the 
timing of price change within an industry, and this complements the work of chapters 3 
and 4 on nominal wage change. However, the discussion above acknowledges the 
important feedbacks, highlighted in chapter 5, between wage, price, employment and 
output decisions made within an industry, and between these decisions made across 
industries. From this discussion, it is clear that a complete analysis of the causes and 
consequences of nominal and real rigidities requires an analysis of adjustment in the 
context of the full disaggregated system as set out in the previous chapter. It is to such an 
analysis that we turn in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7
Wage and price rigidities in a dynamic disaggregated model 
of the U.K. supply side
In this chapter, we once more take up the results of the disaggregated supply-side 
model described in chapter 5, but here we consider the model as a whole, and, through 
dynamic simulation exercises, we attempt to identify the interactions between industries 
that are influential in determining the time paths of prices and nominal wages in response 
to an exogenous shock. In so doing, the exercises will also show the determinants of the 
time path of real wages, and, in view of the interest in wage responsiveness and the 
related hysteresis debate, particular attention will be paid to the interaction between this 
variable and the level of unemployment generated through the disaggregate model.
The analysis primarily intends to demonstrate the importance of feedbacks and 
interactions between sectors of the economy in determining the extent of wage and price 
inertia. To this end, analysis will revolve around three simulation experiments making use 
of the model developed in chapter 5. Simulations are believed to be the most appropriate 
tool of analysis here because of the complexity of the model: even ignoring the problems 
created by the large number of relationships involved (4x40 plus), the summation of 
variables across industries to obtain aggregate magnitudes, on which expectations are 
foimed, introduces non-linearities which make algebraic analysis extremely difficult
The first two of the simulation experiments concentrate in turn on the contribution 
of disaggregation on two elements of unresponsiveness that have been discussed 
repeatedly through the work. The first considers a single exogenous shock to the system, 
and attempts to identify the determinants of the speed at which nominal magnitudes 
(prices and nominal wages) respond to this shock by building up the response through a 
series of simulations successively incorporating more of the feedbacks that may influence 
price and wage change. Complementing this, the second experiment emphasises real wage 
rigidities, and considers the feedbacks between the rate of unemployment and the real 
wage, and what is meant by the concept of the "natural rate of unemployment" in a 
model such as this. The third simulation concentrates on the structural changes that 
accompany these adjustments, and argues the case for a coordinated industrial strategy for 
employment and pay. These experiments are described below in sections 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. 
First, however, section 7.1 describes the method by which the simulations are obtained.
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7.1 The simulation method
The approach taken in the following analysis is to first obtain a dynamic 
simulation of an estimated version of the model described in the previous chapter which 
will track the time paths of actual industrial employment, prices, wages, and output over 
the sample period. The effects of shocks to the exogenous elements of the model can then 
be examined by comparing this "base" (actual) simulation with a new simulation obtained 
by incorporating the shock.
As a first step in this task, the model presented in chapter 5 has been reestimated 
to obtain a more parsimonious set of industrial equations, as presented in Tables 7.1-7.4. 
These tables represent the result of a specification search on the equations presented in 
chapter 5 (Tables 5.3-5.6) in which variables have been dropped in order to ensure that 
the model simulations behave reasonably/*) To this end, two sets of variables have been 
omitted: those whose coefficients take t-values which are (in absolute value) less than 
unity, and those whose coefficients take an "incorrect" sign (in the sense that it cannot be 
justified theoretically) even with t-values in excess of unity. The exclusion of the first of 
these sets is relatively uncontentious; while the inclusion of uninfluential variables leaves 
point estimates of coefficients unaffected, the inclusion of these variables can introduce 
unnecessary inaccuracies into dynamic simulations since the statistical (insignificance of 
the coefficients is not taken into account in simulation exercises. The inclusion of 
unimportant variables can result in poorly determined coefficients; hence, the equations of 
tables 5.3-5.6 include in many instances coefficients which are relatively large in absolute 
terms, but which are statistically not significantly different to zero. Because their lack of 
significance is ignored, however, these coefficients can have a disproportionate influence 
on the simulation results, introducing (possibly destabilising) variability.
To exclude variables whose t-values exceed unity is, of course, less easily 
justified, since their omission will reduce the fit of the overall model, and may introduce 
bias in the remaining coefficient estimates (the standard problem of specification error). 
On the other hand, as the discussion of chapter 5 made clear, the primary source of 
unexpectedly-signed coefficients in the model estimates appears to be through the 
presence of collinearity since, as is noted in Johnston (1972, ppl62-4), strong collinearity 
between variables may cause estimation errors of (approximately) equal and opposite 
magnitudes for the coefficients on the collinear variables. Hence, for example, there are 
14 industries in Table 5.4 in which either the industrial wage or the material input price 
variable takes a negative coefficient in its price equation. This is obviously difficult to 
justify on economic grounds, but may be explained in terms of the high degree of 
correlation between these two explanatory variables. In these circumstances, estimation 
may be better able to identify the sum of the coefficients on the collinear variables than it
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Table 7.1
Industrial labour demand equations 1957-1981
cons n(-l) n(-2) w q k y rim
1. Agric. 8.2293 0.5122 0.2492 -0.1020 0.1020 -0.6933 00209
(5.0848) (3.2073) (13925) (1.1783) - (54698) - (4.0642)
2  Coal 1.7374 1.1225 _ -03608 0.2608 -0.6800 0.2633 0.0284
(2.6392) (15.0209) - (3.5983) - (5.9169) (26395) (5.0860)
3. Mining 12.3386 0.1687 _ -0.7016 0.7016 -1.1788 03005 0.0234
(4.9377) (2.2286) - (8.6786) - (3.0458) (3.6656) (25912)
4. Petrol - - - - - - - -
5. Food -5.3672 1.1762 -0.4715 -0.2304 03304 0.9146 -0.0096
(2.9140) (5.8286) (24529) (26407) - - (6.9143) (1.3841)
6. Drink 4.1480 0.5389 -0.1709 •0.1659 0.1659 -0.1034 03569 _
(2.9180) (3.0881) (10600) (4.1925) - (2.7019) (3.4298) -
7. Tobacco 2.7242 03352 03795 -0.1184 0.1184 _ _ _
(1.7227) (1.8133) (13088) (3.0571) - - - -
8. Coal Prds •0.6153 _ _ -0.4749 0.4749 _ 1.1163 0.0134
(0.9520) - - (6.1697) - - (105617) (3.9208)
9. Petrol Prdt 4.0812 0.4511 _ -0.0662 0.0662 _ •0.0116
(5.8356) (4.8257) - (23482) - - - (45591)
10. Chems 2.0153 0.6921 _ •0.1578 0.1578 •0.1916 03933 _
(1.0827) (4.3747) - (1.9362) - (27376) (45639) -
11. Iron 1.2703 0.6827 -0.1436 _ _ _ 03924 -0.0102
(1.3113) (5.0576) (10030) - - - (7.4720) (4.4130)
12. Oth Metal* 4.0199 0.6123 ■0.3576 _ _ -0.2561 05280 _
(7.0333) (7.3544) (4.7413) - - (127731) (13.1812) -
13. Mecb Eng. 1.2587 0.8548 -0.2404 -0.3096 0.3096 _ 0.3086 _
(1.6616) (6.0075) (1.7856) (6.7067) - - (5.9304) -
14. Inst Eng. 11.7476 03069 -0.4158 -03036 0.2036 -0.9815 0.3931 0.0361
(6.2745) (1.9477) (3.1900) (21163) - (5.5399) (6.6316) (3.6219)
13. Elec Eng. 1.5783 03177 _ -0.3789 0.3789 •0.8407 0.6823 0.0278
(1.9995) (10.2673) - (3.8236) - (3.5523) (8.1281) (23347)
16. Ships 4.3126 03088 -03479 -04972 0.4972 •0.3579 03194 0.0052
(1.8503) (5.7674) (1.7512) (4.1534) - (1.6527) (3.1025) (1.0597)
17. Motors 3.0790 0.4969 _ -0.1804 0.1804 -0.4094 05429 0.0133
(4.4924) (4.9168) - (25054) - (4.0604) (11.4831) (33027)
18. Aerosp. 5.7226 0.6256 -0.2679 -0.4405 0.4405 _ _ _
(4.9821) (3.9650) (21628) (4.8000) - - - -
(.—cont)
(Table 7.1 conL)
cons n(-l) n(-2) w q k y rim
19. Oth Veh. 7.2731 0.3850 _ -0.1446 0.1446 ■0.8871 04599 0.0155
(4.5971) (5.1570) - (24168) - (4.8048) (9.0212) (4.3399)
20. Metal Ods 2.9598 0.7050 •0.2340 _ _ -0.1640 0.4169 _
(4.2757) (7.1439) (24247) - - (8.9607) (129879) -
21. Textiles 3.0643 05296 0.1803 -05625 05625 -0.9087 0.7178 0.0392
(1.4475) (6.1242) (1.7726) (7.4218) - (4.1471) (15.7410) (5.5460)
22. Clothing -0.6558 05154 0.1573 _ _ _ 0.5276 -0.0163
(0.7402) (4.6174) (14067) - - - (9.3402) (62605)
23. Bricks 22984 0.6714 -02651 -0.3986 03986 _ 0.4245 -0.0055
(3.0395) (5.9094) (23997) (4.2555) - - (8.7993) (1.4424)
24. Timber 3.0975 0.3914 _ _ _ _ 03589 -0.0094
(4.9113) (5.4752) - - - - (15.1499) (142727)
25. Paper 1.7578 0.3546 _ -0.2828 0.2828 _ 05061 _
(3.6345) (4.8107) - (122358) - - (102874) -
26. Printing 4.0415 10933 •04207 -0.1652 0.1652 -04566 0.2866 0.0127
(22306) (8.8103) (29855) (25989) - (14182) (5.0327) (1.0729)
27. Oth Manuf 0.0075 0.5487 _ _ _ _ 05852 -0.0226
(0.0152) (7.4432) - - - - (11.7760) (133344)
28. Constr. 30039 0.9562 -0.3794 -0.1552 0.1552 -0.3386 04398 0.0169
(3.7914) (9.1889) (3.0664) (1.8811) - (25347) (6.6427) (23178)
29. Gas 3.7734 05226 -02501 _ _ _ _ -0.0099
(45668) (4.9471) (14363) - - - - (45438)
30. Elec. 0.8545 1.1482 -02972 •0.1620 0.1620 -04140 05750 -0.0136
(21630) (9.3101) (21242) (4.1939) - (4.9123) (6.3393) (4.0000)
31. Water 26.2321 03228 •02838 -03770 0.3770 -3.3303 15466 0.0399
(3.9230) (1.9815) (20069) (4.2691) - (43210) (4.7143) (3.8785)
32. Rail -1.1340 0.7898 _ -0.1050 0.1050 _ 0.4287 _
(1.2976) (15.1589) - (1.6985) - - (4.0934) -
33. Road -0.2169 1.1374 -0.2977 -0.0559 0.0559 _ 0.2450 -0.0056
(0.1188) (8.0226) (15965) (1.3473) - - (4.9694) (25022)
34. Oth Trans 8.9089 06883 _ -0.0684 0.0684 -0.8642 0.2394 _
(4.1448) (6.6608) - (28942) - (35635) (3.4285) -
35. Comms 0.9358 0.8275 _ •0.1043 0.1043 -02773 0.4085 _
(15030) (13.3508) - (21611) - (4.8903) (6.9204) -
36. Distn 0.4146 02618 0.6557 -0.2797 02797 -1.1504 1.1005 0.0389
(0.4227) (15759) (3.9288) (3.9636) - (70394) (8.0731) (6.2859)
37. Bus.Serv 10.3378 06171 -0.6490 -00495 0.0495 _ _ 0.0277
(5.7945) (4.0086) (3.7617) (0.9990) - - - (5/4074)
38. ProtServ 7.1923 0.3837 -0.1495 -0.1582 0.1582 _ _ 0.0180
(5.1047) (23041) (10205) (4.1381) - - - (55153)
39. Misc.Serv 1.3178 0.7288 _ _ _ -03627 05204 0.0098
(0.9970) (8.3036) - - - (45317) (5.0995) (32676)
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Table 7.2 
Industrial price equations 1957-1981
cons P(-D P(-2) w q k y tim
1. Agric. 3.4336 0.3877 -04606 0.4474 0.6254 -0.3171 0.0262
(2.0225) (3.2937) (4.1232) (4.0928) - - (1.5863) (5.6159)
2. Coal 2.6010 0.7313 -0.1322 0.4222 -0.0213 -0.6655 0.3433 0.0149
(1.8275) (5.2792) (1.0126) (3.2185) - (23647) (1.6321) (1.4618)
3. Mining 1.4748 0.4324 _ _ 03676 _ -0.2506 0.0066
(7.0807) (9.6881) - - - - (7.0950) (5.8929)
4. Petrol - - - - 1.0000 - - -
5. Food 2.4224 03085 0.6915 •0.3819 0.0238
(1.9111) (5.3575) - - - (2.0191) - (2.7313)
6. Drink 14.4477 0.6875 •0.4455 0.2846 04734 -2.1803 03368 0.1355
(4.0572) (5.2713) (33599) (3.2821) - (34736) (13847) (3.1473)
7. Tobacco 10.2554 04855 _ _ 03145 _ -1.6311 0.0189
(8.6473) (10.5215) - - - - (8.6128) (8.1595)
8. Coal Prdi 4.5536 03434 -0.1800 _ 0.6366 -1.4733 10158 0.1214
(2.2476) (3.9492) (1.7139) - - (4.4402) (5.7899) (5.6804)
9. Petrol Prds 3.7374 -0.3536 0.1752 03802 03982 _ 0.4355
(6.5649) (2.8303) (2.4214) (7.4776) - - (6.3122) -
10. Cbema 2.4837 0.1027 _ _ 0.8973 -0.2784 _
(8.1316) (1.4201) - - - (73192) - -
11. Iron 0.8782 0.8697 -0.4312 0.1676 03940 -0.1067 _ _
(1.1474) (6.2113) (3.7101) (1.3081) - (1.1522) - -
12. Oth Metals -3.2908 03989 0.1883 _ 0.4128 -03350 0.6608 0.0298
(2.4816) (3.2185) (13596) - - (1.1875) (4.6203) (2.0320)
13. Mech Eng. 5.2933 0.4901 -0.1373 03827 0.2644 -0.6885 _ 0.0075
(3.1614) (4.3384) (1.9460) (4.9811) - (30396) - (1.3738)
14. Inst Eng. 3.5435 0.2128 0.1048 0.3357 0.3467 -0.4591 0.1756 0.0187
(4.2998) (1.3384) (0.9947) (4.2499) - (33127) (3.4682) (2.2676)
13. Elec Eng. 0.4267 0.2647 _ 0.3846 0.3507 •0.2452 03014 0.0118
(0.5565) (3.2980) - (4.0345) - (1.4274) (23782) (1.4012)
16. Ships 10.3928 03909 -0.1752 _ 0.8843 -0.9466 0.6171 0.0296
(3.6874) (2.0656) (14559) - - (2.4049) (33703) (4.6312)
17. Motors 1.1048 0.6883 -0.1277 _ 0.4394 -0.2495 00643 0.0134
(2.6820) (43181) (1.1907) - - (2.6333) (1.6902) (3.2139)
18. Aerosp. 2.2152 _ _ 0.2847 0.7153 -03102 0.0820 0.0199
(2.3500) - - (2.9185) - (4.1849) (1.3900) (5.1693)
( com)
(Table 7.2 com.)
cons K-l) P(-2) w q k y rim
19. Oth Veh. 2.9282 0.4671 -0.3670 _ 0.9000 -05654 _ 0.0266
(4.7806) (4.3594) (5.6030) - - (5.2675) - (7.9196)
20. Metal Ods 4.7327 0.1639 _ 0.2574 05787 -0.7081 _ 0.0196
(2.0907) (1.4752) - (1.7398) - (21233) - (23051)
21. Textiles 25411 0.4737 _ _ 05263 -05659 0.2087 0.0115
(0.9669) (3.4048) - - - (14853) (3.7093) (12610)
22. Clothing -15694 0.8432 -0.2188 05807 -02051 •02036 0.4159 -0.0243
(1.4700) (3.0633) (10963) (6.3475) - (12197) (7.0586) (6.1959)
23. Bricks 3.4802 0.1861 0.0923 0.3352 05864 -02503 -02426 0.0118
(4.5992) (1.9093) (12403) (3.8873) - (15055) (3.9454) (1.4286)
24. Timber •1.6384 05580 -02316 0.2073 0.0662 _ 02314 -0.0052
(3.9909) (4.6958) (20889) (1.8483) - - (4.6406) (15325)
25. Piper 0.1061 02822 -0.1560 _ 05738 _ _ 0.0050
(5.1965) (1.9449) (1.7692) - - - - (4.2797)
26. Printing -1.6958 0.1236 _ 0.4316 04448 _ 0.2414 -0.0078
(24153) (1.1748) - (3.9212) - - (27172) (23544)
27. Oth Manuf 4.0498 _ 0.1183 _ 04817 _ -05559 0.0214
(9.6387) - (24346) - - - (9.6901) (9.7182)
28. Constr. 0.5236 1.1415 -0.7506 0.1758 0.4332 -0.2228 02138 0.0120
(0.4275) (55593) (3.7694) (1.0692) - (1.1879) (1.3732) (1.1797)
29. Gas 3.1147 10117 -03787 0.1100 02571 -02087 •0.1696 _
(5.4256) (7.2135) (30053) (21218) - (2.4587) (26475) -
30. Elec. 0.6095 05799 _ _ 04201 _ 0.1119 -0.0108
(15122) (10.1674) - - - - (15690) (27418)
31. Water -15945 0.6606 -0.4425 0.3194 0.4625 _ 0.2763 -0.0093
(1.2674) (5.9409) (4.7086) (5.0439) - - (1.3833) (24409)
32. Rail 17.1059 _ 0.4528 _ 05472 -1.9174 02635 0.0026
(1.3693) - (115473) - - (15845) (23664) (12673)
33. Road 4.8384 03991 _ 0.4934 0.1075 _ •0.6053 _
(3.3692) (3.3739) - (4.6642) - - (3.3109) -
34. Oth Trans 38.9187 0.1850 -0.1972 0.7891 0.2231 -4.2030 _ -0.0055
(6.6226) (1.3614) (20274) (10.6022) - (65324) - (15524)
35. Comms 3.7327 0.6449 -0.4204 0.7754 _ _ -04398 _
(6.4559) (7.1645) (62200) (9.4415) - - (6.4139) -
36. Distn -3.7835 0.7875 -0.3969 02742 0.3352 _ 0.4422 -0.0206
(3.4135) (4.8659) (42341) (3.6761) - - (3.7691) (6.3932)
37. Bus.Serv 05764 0.6803 -0.2872 0.7951 -0.1881 _ _ -0.0237
(4.3752) (4.8780) (1.6360) (4.2305) - - - (34664)
38. Prof.Serv 28689 _ _ 0.3623 0.6377 _ -03285 _
(7.9396) - - (9.7700) - - (7.9605) -
39. Misc.Serv 2.8338 _ 0.1365 0.4736 03899 •0.1449 -0.1609 O.OQ59
(28302) - (29546) (8.7051) - (1.4328) (15130) (1.7020)
204
Table 7.3 
Industrial wage equations 1957-1981
cons w(-l) we int me im r P* t2
1. Agric. 0.0864 1.0308 •4.0470 -0.7872
(0.5052) (26.1826) - - - (1.8591) - (30877)
3  Coal 1.6427 _ 0.4765 0.5664 0.0179 -54514 03494 -1.3342
(1.0212) - (2.4528) (1.1837) (1.8272) (3.1777) (2.4373) (1.2421)
3. Mining -0.6769 _ _ _ _ _ 1.0100 -3.4787
(4.0990) - - - - - (18.4518) (6.1565)
4. Petrol - - - - - - - -
3. Food -0.1190 0.9582 -03781
(2.0426) - (67.0567) - - - - (23595)
6. Drink 0.4058 0.4027 0.7791 _ 0.0211 -5.7310 _ _
(3.5970) (3.3513) (53916) - (2.7923) (30654) - -
7. Tobacco 0.1715 0.2958 04919 _ 0.0212 _ 03681 _
(3.3287) (2.5011) (3.1505) - (2.3836) - (3.0386) -
8. Coal Prda 1.6920 0.7228 0.7761 _ 0.0194 -17.8326 _ 36537
(3.2991) (3.1280) (23765) - (1.2864) (23010) - (1.8168)
9. Petrol Prds 0.2109 0.2584 0.8768 _ _ -53435 _ _
(2.1036) (2.3415) (73461) - - (2.1535) - -
10. Cheats -0.3235 _ 0.8191 _ 0.0068 _ 0.1357 -1.2449
(3.8805) - (15.4814) - (2.6434) - (23901) (3.8883)
11. Iron -0.5781 0.6260 _ _ 0.0147 _ 03321 -37607
(3.9749) (5.0122) - - (2.8469) - (34432) (53484)
12. Oth Metals ■0.5697 0.6394 _ _ 0.0218 -1.9763 03248 -3.1148
(4.0573) (7.6169) - - (43907) (1.6021) (3.8302) (8.0263)
13. Mech Eng. -1.2553 0.4267 0.3704 03993 0.0043 _ 0.0992 -0.8758
(1.9486) (2.7214) (1.9056) (1.5965) (1.0468) - (1.3346) (1.7050)
14. Inst Eng. -0.5822 03265 0.3821 _ 0.0129 _ 0.2107 -23339
(3.6261) (2.8588) (23417) - (23098) - (30862) (3.9912)
IS. Elec Eng. -0.4246 0.3346 _ 1.4033 0.0060 •43481 0.2368 -1.1129
(0.2618) (3.1429) - (4.8906) (1.8257) (23356) (30205) (36444)
16. Ships -0.1744 _ 0.7596 0.3701 0.0065 _ _ -1.3920
(0.3174) - (15.2369) (2.9948) (23898) - - (4.8234)
17. Motors -0.0497 0.7698 03350 _ 0.0117 _ _ -0.7893
(0.4416) (5.0083) (14420) - (2.9619) - - (13732)
18. Aerosp. -0.0241 r 1.0157 _ _ _ _ _
(1.6164) - (114.8993) - - - - -
( cont)
(Table 7.3 cont.) 
cons w (-l) we int inc unr P* t2
19. Oth Veh. -0.8509 05545 0.1522 _ _ _ _ -3.6005
(4.7001) (4.6145) (1.6210) - - - - (5.4626)
20. Metal Ods -0.3673 0.7936 _ _ 0.0080 _ 0.1637 -1.8868
(4.0096) (9.3916) - - (23670) - (1.7724) (5.9243)
21. Textile* -0.1139 _ 0.9795 _ _ _ _ -0.6041
(1.8839) - (66.3189) - - - - (2.8687)
22. Clothing 0.1262 _ 0.6347 _ 0.0072 -1.7799 05100 _
(32051) - (15.4325) - (23006) (1.8749) (6.7273) -
23. Bricks •03310 _ 0.6456 _ _ _ 0.4292 -0.9385
(30295) - (7.7655) - - - (4.6237) (32743)
24. Timber •0.2313 03383 03478 _ 0.0070 _ 05149 -1.1608
(32326) (2.4782) (37067) - (1.9501) - (4.3910) (36897)
25. Paper -1.5411 0.9065 _ 05173 0.0124 -9.1363 03281 _
(32340) (15.7026) - (37457) (3.9270) (5.0113) (35560) -
26. Printing -0.1848 0.9675 _ _ 0.0104 _ _ -1.3241
(1.8152) (38.8554) - - (24144) - - (3.6536)
27. Oth Manuf -0.5732 03007 0.6822 0.1988 0.0040 -35891 0.2993 _
(1.0363) (1.7687) (6.1594) (1.4371) (1.1964) (33268) (3.4051) -
28. Constr. -0.1927 0/4311 0.4633 _ _ _ _ •0.9290
(32575) (37088) (3.1566) - - - - (38142)
29. Gas -0.4146 _ 03851 _ _ _ _ -1.8396
(3.6323) - (31.7817) - - - - (4.6107)
30. Elec. -0.0804 0.6179 0.4418 _ 0.0243 _ _ -0.8830
(0.7460) (4.9377) (30842) - (6.3842) - - (2.1424)
31. Water 0.0946 0.2943 10110 _ 0.0228 -1.8430 -0.4259 _
(30042) (39396) (7.1147) - (7.0495) (10644) (4.7063) -
32. Rail -0.0316 0.7860 0.2130 _ -0.0061 _ _ -0.5777
(0.3099) (7.0645) (13647) - (15375) - - (15957)
33. Road -5.4178 0.6614 0.1667 38091 0.0298 _ _ -1.8803
(3.6518) (5.8968) (0.9734) (36695) (4.7436) - - (36517)
34. Oth Trans -05128 0.3231 05741 _ 0.0153 __ _ -32123
(5.7236) (45501) (83549) - (4.9035) - - (65472)
35. Comms -0.2865 _ 0.7004 _ _ _ 0.3154 -0.9506
(30453) - (7.0213) - - - (39855) (1.8557)
36. Distn -0.3484 0.6049 03253 0.6658 0.0091 -34247 _ -0.9256
(05731) (5.0966) (1.9331) (3.6890) (30468) (2.1782) - (34498)
37. Bus.Serv -0.3342 _ 03157 0.4508 _ _ _ _
(3.1442) - (18.0544) (38249) - - - -
38. Prof.Serv -0.9300 0.4390 _ 31496 _ _ _ _
(4.0937) (3.7744) - (3.7474) - - - -
39. Misc.Serv -35482 05662 04199 30923 _ -37979 _ _
(32968) (4.3334) (3.6561) (25513) - (15021) - -
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Table 7.4
Industrial demand equations 1957-1981
cons y(-D P/p pm/p O tim
1. Agric. 5.6211 0.3055 -0.1158 0.0610 00180
(4.4774) (1.9613) (1.7655) (2.9242) - (4.0518)
7  Coal 3.3691 0.5919 _ 0.0095 _ -0.0158
(2.5444) (3.7429) - (1.0418) - (2.3487)
3. Mining 4.5977 0.2043 -0.8333 _ 2.7618 0.0179
(7.1126) (1.8085) (5.5957) - (5.6760) (6.0850)
4. Petrol - - - - - -
S. Food 8.7105 00921 03195 0.0233
(275.9102) - - (7.1419) (1.7433) (228725)
6. Drink 3.3872 0.4681 -0.0941 0.0993 1.0475 00294
(3.2617) (2.8705) (1.3350) (33074) (3.1036) (3.2926)
7. Tobacco 5.1872 0.1791 -0.2333 _ 03416 0.0082
(5.9931) (1.3006) (4.6320) - (2.1739) (53646)
8. Coal Prdi 1.3557 0.7490 _ 0.0479 1.3616 _
(1.3414) (4.1511) - (1.7588) (18501) -
9. Petrol Prdi> 4.9698 0.1943 -0.7735 0.4036 0.6468 00757
(9.3455) (2.2339) (10.3930) (5.3313) (14801) (7.9154)
10. Chems 4.9471 03157 _ 03254 13261 0.0520
(5.0046) (2.3387) - (4.6357) (33318) (50921)
11. Iron 7.6348 _ -03209 04234 3.7558 0.0308
(33.6199) - (23777) (4.4633) (3.5665) (3.8131)
12. Oth Metals 7.0116 _ -03659 03246 2.9738 0.0222
(105.4692) - (3.1409) (83108) (73963) (8.3534)
13. Mech Eng. -0.1960 1.0197 -0.4501 00319 18029 _
(0.5196) (243718) (2.1794) (23266) (48198) -
14. Inst Eng. 1.5290 0.7016 _ 0.0960 20550 0.0243
(2.4317) (5.7253) - (23035) (4.7567) (24580)
13. Elec Eng. 3.3982 0.5505 0.0694 10649 0.0234
(4.0246) (4.9016) - (Z9382) (33530) (3.7030)
16. Ships 1.3898 08330 -0.4982 _ _ -0.0112
(1.6996) (7.3146) (5.8833) - - (4.7300)
17. Motors 6.9788 _ _ 03946 _ 0.0582
(78.0278) - - (15.4316) - (18.2570)
18. Aerosp. 7.3167 , - _ _ _ 0.0061
(134.4495) - - - - (1.7630)
( cont)
(Table 7.4 cont)
cons y(-i) Pfp pm/p O ♦im
19. Oth Veh. 0.5448 0.9090 _ 0.0413 0.4095 _
(1.3423) (15.2982) - (25941) (1.1316)
20. Metal Gds 50821 0.3543 _ 0.1625 3.0283 0.0142
(4.3264) (2.4032) - (79655) (45755) (3.0450)
21. Textiles 1.6971 0.7898 •0.4245 0.1172 1.8238 _
(1.9404) (7.5796) (3.4461) (4.2816) (35353) -
22. Clothing 2.0710 0.7314 -0.4883 0.1001 14756 _
(2.3263) (6.4726) (3.2380) (30257) (37800) -
23. Bricks 6.7232 _ -0.7946 07055 1.9423 0.0429
(754233) - (4.1044) (5.0801) (5.7784) (125439)
24. Timber 6.7893 _ _ 05394 _ 00396
(77.9578) - - (97907) - (12.9869)
25. Piper 54292 0.2152 -08692 07746 74179 0.0324
(7.2390) (1.9537) (5.3387) (45445) (5.7230) (55273)
26. Printing 6.0912 0.1063 _ 0.2214 15314 00446
(9.2010) (1.0907) - (7.2678) (64393) (87918)
27. Oth Manuf' 5.6826 0.2538 -1.1917 _ 10352 0.0174
(7.7721) (25459) (8.2990) - (2.6099) (45101)
28. Constr. 0.7980 0.8794 -05822 00841 1.3996 0.0119
(1.0927) (108882) (75866) (25124) (48371) (44201)
29. Gas 1.4944 0.7738 •0.2312 _ _ 0.0097
(5.2784) (175788) (3.4091) - - (35515)
30. Elec. 0.3467 0.9610 _ 0.0066 05926 _
(1.1487) (26.7093) - (0.9910) (77997) -
31. Water 1.8961 0.6531 -0.2062 00547 _ 0.0167
(2.6331) (5.3681) (2.8139) (40324) - (38750)
32. Rail 0.9436 0.8668 _ _ 05698 _
(2.3766) (158342) - - (13809) -
33. Road 2.2839 0.6525 -0.1082 0.1184 04456 0.0180
(2.1744) (4.2519) (1.6894) (3.1190) (13273) (74718)
34. Oth Trans 4.1025 04813 -0.6503 00863 15560 0.0210
(5.4397) (5.0695) (45460) (33479) (5.4497) (5.2739)
35. Comms 3.0030 05628 -0.2382 0.0657 _ 0.0272
(4.9644) (65987) (4.4879) (55834) - (67794)
36. Distn 4.2074 05405 _ 0.0182 0.8812 0.0104
(8.1276) (95117) - (3.2116) (7.7978) (77153)
37. Bus.Serv 3.1556 05834 _ 00419 _ 0.0215
(2.7968) (3.8751) - (2.1395) - (76964)
38. ProtServ 4.8916 0.2956 -1.1330 0.2536 _ 0.0504
(4.1763) (1.9910) (4.3665) (4.1584) - (55840)
39. M isc5erv 3.4338 0.6237 _ 00365 0.7199 0.0089
(2.4055) (4.0187) - (1.7680) (24517) (25042)
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Table 7.5
Estimated equation summary statistics
Ind. Value 
objective 
fn. (L)
AL Employ, eqn 
Price eqn 
Wage eqn 
Output eqn
RSS s. error 
regression
R2
1. Agric. 115.5568 18.89 (7) 0.0110
0.0202
0.0277
0.0096
0.0209
0.0284
0.0333
0.0195
0.9950
0.9969
0.9985
0.9841
2. Coal 101.6654 5.43 (4) 0.0191
0.0642
0.1068
0.1215
0.0276
0.0507
0.0654
0.0697
0.9949
0.9959
0.9937
0.9525
3. Mining 89.2666 11.45 (10) 0.0454
0.0140
0.0964
0.0367
0.0426
0.0236
0.0621
0.0383
0.9501
0.9985
0.9937
0.9659
5. Food 128.9850 48.60 (11) 0.0056
0.0123
0.0157
0.0043
0.0149
0.0222
0.0250
0.0131
0.9773
0.9986
0.9991
0.9873
6. Drink 105.4111 16.93 (4) 0.0106
0.0499
0.1232
0.0127
0.0206
0.0447
0.0702
0.0225
0.8804
0.9902
0.9940
0.9943
7. Tobacco 93.2040 4.25 (10) 0.0418
0.0699
0.2845
0.0130
0.0409
0.0529
0.1067
0.0228
0.8626
0.9903
0.9887
0.9280
8. Coal pids 117.3634 30.07 (8) 0.0897
0.1914
0.3467
0.0909
0.0599
0.0875
0.1177
0.0603
0.9421
0.9900
0.9830
0.9051
9. Petrol prds 92.0606 6.52 (9) 0.0857
0.0950
0.0964
0.0475
0.0585
0.0616
0.0621
0.0436
(cont...)
0.8987
0.9940
0.9951
0.9873
(Table 7.5 cont.)
AL RSS s. error R2
10. Chems 93.5239 4.66 (10) 0.0075 0.0174 0.8558
0.0188 0.0274 0.9970
0.0106 0.0206 0.9994
0.0254 0.0318 0.9908
11. Iron 93.5837 11.79 (8) 0.0302 0.0347 0.9739
0.0398 0.0399 0.9962
0.0298 0.0345 0.9982
0.1546 0.0786 0.7684
12. Oth Metals 120.8037 14.45 (6) 0.0071 0.0168 0.9849
0.0861 0.0587 0.9920
0.0378 0.0389 0.9976
0.0240 0.0310 0.8890
13. Mech Eng 102.0063 2.58 (5) 0.0102 0.0202 0.9621
0.0042 0.0130 0.9995
0.0179 0.0267 0.9990
0.0252 0.0318 0.9646
14. Inst Eng 90.0900 2.15 (3) 0.0098 0.0197 0.9141
0.0053 0.0145 0.9991
0.0297 0.0345 0.9982
0.0411 0.0406 0.9905
15. Elec Eng 112.3206 14.38 (4) 0.0099 0.0199 0.9155
0.0074 0.0171 0.9988
0.0176 0.0265 0.9988
0.0211 0.0291 0.9891
16. Ships 94.2931 3.41 (6) 0.0123 0.0221 0.9904
0.1463 0.0765 0.9761
0.0107 0.0207 0.9994
0.0832 0.0577 0.8102
17. Motors 103.0741 9.94 (8) 0.0084 0.0184 0.9699
0.0160 0.0253 0.9983
0.0354 0.0377 0.9979
0.0795 0.0564 0.9298
18. Aerosp. 127.9204 48.73 (15) 0.0214 0.0292 0.9790
0.0519 0.0456 0.9958
0.0477 0.0437 0.9973
0.2065 0.0909 0.1809
19. Oth Vehs 161.1501 82.59 (9) 0.0270 0.0329 0.9903
0.0321 0.0358 0.9974
0.0751 0.0548 0.9941
0.0986 0.0628 0.9284
20. Metal Gds 90.3598 2.81 (8) 0.0077 0.0175 0.9529
0.0171 0.0261 0.9983
0.0226 0.0300 0.9985
0.0721 0.0537 0.7502
(cont..)
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(Table 7.5 cont.)
AL RSS s. error R2
21. Textiles 136.4933 20.77 (8) 0.0085 0.0184 0.9960
0.0283 0.0336 0.9946
0.0289 0.0340 0.9984
0.0433 0.0416 0.8692
22. Clothing 92.4117 2.24 (6) 0.0091 0.0191 0.9925
0.0080 0.0179 0.9984
0.0151 0.0246 0.9990
0.0341 0.0369 0.8343
23. Bricks 87.4104 1.17 (6) 0.0093 0.0192 0.9840
0.0086 0.0186 0.9991
0.0390 0.0395 0.9977
0.0314 0.0355 0.9617
24. Timber 203.7885 77.40 (9) 0.0061 0.0155 0.9434
0.0311 0.0353 0.9966
0.0300 0.0346 0.9980
0.1026 0.0641 0.8102
25. Paper 105.7651 20.40 (8) 0.0160 0.0253 0.9518
0.0375 0.0387 0.9959
0.0318 0.0357 0.9984
0.0307 0.0350 0.9135
26. Printing 99.6441 11.27 (7) 0.0053 0.0145 0.9538
0.0217 0.0294 0.9980
0.0243 0.0312 0.9984
0.0109 0.0208 0.9860
27. Oth Manuf 97.3199 6.51 (8) 0.0065 0.0161 0.9609
0.0239 0.0309 0.9969
0.0143 0.0239 0.9992
0.0514 0.0454 0.9710
28. Constr. 94.0268 8.77 (4) 0.0076 0.0175 0.9444
0.0259 0.0322 0.9977
0.0222 0.0298 0.9983
0.0180 0.0268 0.9503
29. Gas 114.5352 21.37 (11) 0.0268 0.0327 0.9604
0.0234 0.0306 0.9944
0.0607 0.0493 0.9965
0.0287 0.0339 0.9945
30. Elec 117.0610 28.9 (8) 0.0118 0.0217 0.9828
0.0278 0.0334 0.9960
0.0339 0.0369 0.9985
0.0139 0.0236 0.9947
31. Water 113.2109 ' 14.54 (4) 0.0427 0.0413 0.9075
0.0440 0.0420 0.9956
0.0326 0.0361 0.9978
0.0078 0.0176 0.9866
(cont...)
(Table 7.5 cont.)
AL RSS s. error R2
32. Rail 121.0427 36.3 (11) 0.0147 0.0243 0.9945
0.0125 0.0224 0.9983
0.0348 0.0373 0.9982
0.0179 0.0268 0.9062
33. Road 102.2944 42.17 (5) 0.0052 0.0144 0.9598
0.0793 0.0563 0.9918
0.0448 0.0424 0.9975
0.0188 0.0274 0.9776
34. Oth Trans 134.2575 38.31 (6) 0.0066 0.0163 0.9131
0.0318 0.0357 0.9957
0.0482 0.0439 0.9973
0.0194 0.0279 0.9851
35. Comms 111.0461 22.44 (9) 0.0045 0.0135 0.9644
0.0185 0.0272 0.9982
0.0531 0.0461 0.9968
0.0058 0.0152 0.9979
36. Distn 141.2515 54.89 (3) 0.0048 0.0138 0.9728
0.0125 0.0224 0.9983
0.0123 0.0222 0.9992
0.0045 0.0134 0.9912
37. Bns.Serv 96.4547 22.87 (11) 0.0048 0.0138 0.9946
0.0425 0.0412 0.9944
0.0174 0.0264 0.9988
0.0097 0.0197 0.9963
38. Piof.Serv 102.0084 5.18 (12) 0.0091 0.0191 0.9749
0.0165 0.0257 0.9982
0.0505 0.0450 0.9970
0.1030 0.0642 0.9293
39. Misc.Serv 82.0936 1.23 (7) 0.0054 0.0146 0.9240
0.0085 0.0184 0.9991
0.0611 0.0494 0.9958
0.0111 0.0210 0.9709
\
\
is to find precise estimates of the individual coefficients. The omission of one of two 
highly collinear variables in an equation will alter the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficient on the remaining variable, since this coefficient will now provide an estimate 
which is more closely related to the sum of the true coefficients on these variables in the 
model. In running simulations, the estimated restricted model will no longer be able to 
discriminate between the impact of movements in the individual variables, of course, and 
this reduces its usefulness in representing responses in the face of hypothetical shocks. 
However, simulations run on an unrestricted model in which errors in the estimated 
coefficients on collinear variables offset each other, is equally questionable, since error- 
based movements in variables may compound over time. On these grounds, then, it 
appears reasonable to leave in collinear variables where, as is true of the majority of 
cases, errors are not thought to be large. Where these errors are sufficiently large to cause 
a coefficient to take an economically unreasonable sign, however, the variable is dropped.
Table 7.5 shows, in the column headed AR, the change in the value of the 
objective function resulting from the imposition of the restrictions involved in moving 
from the estimates of Tables 5.3-5.6 to those of Tables 7.1-7.4. A test of the validity of 
the restrictions is given by comparison of this figure with the y} distribution, with degrees 
of freedom as indicated in brackets. In all, there are 17 industries in which the overall fit 
of the estimated model is significantly re d u c e d .^ )  it is clear therefore that, while these 
equations provide in most cases a good fit of the data in terms of standard errors, the 
imposition of the restrictions of Tables 7.1-7.4 involves the omission of important 
explanatory variables from (at least) one equation of the system in a fairly large number 
of cases. For the reasons given above, this may be a reasonable set of equations for 
simulation purposes, but the accuracy of the estimated coefficients may be questioned in 
these industries. It is for this reason that the original estimated coefficients for the 
equations, as presented in Tables 5.3-5.6, were employed in the analysis of section 6.1.
The simulations themselves are generated through a Fortran programme which 
picks up the estimated coefficients of tables 7.1-7.4, along with those for the expected 
aggregate wage and price equations and the expected material input price equations as 
described in chapter 5. Simulated time paths start two years into the sample period, in 
1956, providing initial values for the variables dated 1954 and 1955. Fully dynamic time 
paths are obtained as the model is solved period by period in an order that corresponds to 
the sequence of events which was described in the earlier discussion of the model 
estimation (section 5.2). Hence, at the beginning of each period, expectations are formed 
on aggregate wages and prices, and on the price of material inputs that will hold for that 
period. These expected values are obtained in the simulation by solving the relevant 
estimated equations using current values of exogenous variables, including lagged
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dependent variables taken at their base 1954-55 levels, or formed through the previous 
period model loop. These expected values are then used in the individual industrial 
equations which solve to give industrial employment, price, wage and output levels. This 
set of four equations is solved employing the Gauss-Seidel iterative technique, using 
convergence criteria of the order of 0.05% for the employment and output equations, and 
0.5% for the price and wage equations. Errors obtained in estimation are treated here as 
exogenous shocks, and are added back into the simulated values to ensure that the model- 
simulated values of all variables exactly track their actual time paths over the sample 
period when true values of the exogenous variables are employed. Finally, the industrial 
values are aggregated to obtain simulated aggregate (unemployment, wages, and prices, 
and industrial material input price indices. These variables are then taken as data in the 
model solution of subsequent periods. A copy of the Fortran programme used to generate 
such a simulation is presented in figure 7.1 of the Appendix.
7.2 Identifying sources of inertia in interactions between industries
As the description above indicates, there are a variety of feedbacks between wage 
and price-setting decisions made at different times and in different sectors, and it is of 
interest to try to identify which of these are most significant in explaining the speed of 
adjustment in the labour market. One means of doing this is to shock the system with a 
single once-and-for-all innovation in a particular exogenous variable and to trace through 
the consequences of this over the following years by means of a series of simulations. 
This is precisely the approach taken here where the consequences of a successful incomes 
policy, hypothetically imposed in 1971, are considered. This specific year was chosen 
because it represents a time during the sample when there was relatively little government 
pressure on wage-setting, and because it preceded a period of rapid inflatioa
Such a scenario is incorporated into the model by assuming that the exogenous 
variable "inct", measuring the strength of incomes policy in time t, takes a negative value 
in that year. Specifically, it is noted that inc^yj takes the value 0.5, demonstrating the 
fact that there was little effort made to restrain wage claims during the first 18 months of 
Heath’s Conservative administration (indeed, the "n-l strategy" adopted in Public Sector 
negotiations provided for some degree of wage growth). To assume that this variable 
takes a value of -4.5 in this year, for example, would therefore represent the imposition of 
a very restrictive and well-supported policy; one might have in mind a policy of the sort 
employed during Labour’s "Social Contract", during which Whitley’s (1976) incomes 
policy variable, used in the study, was calculated to take values in the range of -3.0 to 
-7.0. While this degree of restraint would probably not have been achievable at that time,
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given the political climate, such a figure remains within the limits of credibility, and will 
provide quite a substantial shock to the development of wages and prices, the effects of 
which can then be broken down into their component parts.
Figure 7.1 provides an illustration of the feedbacks that might be analysed through 
this simulation exercise. In the particular example described in the paragraphs above, 
there are two effects, labelled 1 and 2, initiated by a change in the exogenous variable 
"inc": first, and most directly, a change in incomes policy will influence industrial wage 
setting, and hence industrial prices, output, and employment (represented in the figure as 
set I); secondly, the announcement of a policy also influences expected aggregate wage 
levels (path 2), and this in turn influences the industrial variables of set I, directly (path 
4) and indirectly via expected material input prices (path 3). Alternative exogenous shocks 
might also influence expected material input prices, and/or expected aggregate prices (with 
subsequent influences along paths 5 and 6). Path 7 indicates the aggregation process in 
which industrial prices and wages are summed to obtain aggregate price and wage levels, 
along with the actual price indices of material inputs into each industry. Industrial 
employment levels are also summed here to obtain aggregate (unemployment levels in 
the current period.
Finally, paths 8-13 demonstrate the variety of ways in which these aggregated 
figures feed back into the earlier stages of the diagram in the following year. Lagged 
aggregate wages and prices effect the industrial variables of set I directly (path 8), and 
indirectly through expected input prices (9) and through expectations of aggregate wages 
and prices (10,11). Lagged material input prices of course influence current expected input 
prices (9’). and lagged unemployment levels feed back, directly and via wage and price 
expectations, to the variables of set I (paths 12 and 13). It is precisely these different 
paths of influence, then, that the simulation results aim to rank according to importance. 
Further, it is of interest to note the length of time taken for the once-and-for-all shock to 
work its way through the system, given the complexity of these interactions.
In what follows, seven artificial scenarios will be considered to illustrate the
importance of the various paths of influence detailed in figure 7.1; these are summarised
beneath the figure itself. Scenario 1 represents the simulation run in the absence of any 
shocks, and allowing all possible feedbacks; this records the actual time paths of all 
variables, therefore, and provides an important base against which to compare the other 
simulated results. Simulations 2-7 demonstrate the time paths of the variables following a 
shock, with successively more of the potentially important feedbacks initiated by the
policy imposition included in the response. Among these, scenario 2 is the most
restrictive, showing only the direct influence of the shock on the industrial parameters 
(through path 1 in figure 7.1), and allowing this to be passed on to the next time period 
through the paths labelled 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. Scenario 3 has the same restrictions on
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Figure 6.3: Feedbacks initiated by an imposed incomes policy
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Alternative scenarios
Scenario 1: history
Scenario 2: history + paths(l,7,8,9,10,ll,6)
Scenario 3: history + paths(l,7,8,9,10,ll,6) + paths(2,4)
Scenario 4: history + paths(lf7,8,9,10,ll,6,2,4) + paths(3,5)
Scenario 5: history + paths(l,7,8,9,10,11,6,2,4,3,5) + paths(8\9’,1 0 \ir )  
Scenario 6: history + paths(l,7,8,9,10,ll,6,2,4,3,5,8,,9,,1 0 ',ir)  + path(13) 
Scenario 7: history + (all paths) = full effects
2 1 1
influences over time, but also allows the indirect effect of the shock on we (through paths 
2 and 4). Scenarios 4 and 5 include for the first time the feedbacks observed through 
material input prices, the former including paths 3 and 5 of figure 7.1 (so that it 
incorporates the impact of changes in expected aggregate wage and price movements on 
material input prices), and the latter further including paths 8’, 9 \ 10’ and 11’, so that the 
accumulation of these effects over time is also admitted. Finally, scenarios 6 and 7 
incorporate the feedbacks associated with changes in unemployment generated by the 
shock. Scenario 6 adds in path 13 of figure 7.1, which demonstrates the indirect pressures 
exerted by the unemployed on industry decisions as higher unemployment rates are 
expected to depress aggregate wage inflation. Scenario 7 further includes path 12, so that 
the direct effects of changes in unemployment on industrial wage setting (and the other 
industrial variables of set I) are included. Scenario 7 therefore incorporates all of the 
possible feedbacks identified in figure 7.1, and represents the model’s prediction on the 
time paths that would have been observed in the face of the shock (labelled "Full effects” 
in what follows).
As a summary of the full effects of the proposed incomes policy shock, figures 
7.2-7.5 illustrate the simulated time paths relating to scenario 1 (the actual time path) and 
scenario 7 (full effects following the shock) for nominal wages, prices, real wages and 
unemployment rates at the economy-wide level. Figure 7.2 documents the very dramatic 
fall in nominal wage growth that would have been obtained on impact (a 4% fall in wage 
inflation in 1971). This is followed by two years in which wage growth converges to the 
original time path, and a very close correspondence between the new and the original 
wage growth paths from around 1974. Aggregate price responses, as shown in figure 7.3, 
are rather slower, generating a 1.5-2% reduction in price inflation in the year of impact, a 
further reduction in 1972, and a convergence by 1975. Interestingly, there are also more 
long term effects in aggregate price inflation, with a noticeably higher level of inflation 
under scenario 7 through from 1976 to the end of the sample period. Together, these 
shifts generate some fairly substantial shifts in real wage inflation, as illustrated in figure 
7.4. The movements in figure 7.4(a) again highlight the strong impact effect of the 
incomes policy shock as real wage growth falls by around 2-2.5% in 1971. This is 
followed in 1972 by a growth rate that is roughly equal to that obtained in reality, but is 
followed in 1973 by a rise in real wage inflation of around 6.5%, some 2.5% higher than 
the actual observed rate. A higher real wage growth is maintained in 1974, reflecting the 
relative persistence of the price inflation slowdown, until similar rates of real wage 
growth are established in 1974 and thereafter. The overall impact on real wages in the 
long run, as illustrated in figure 7.4(b), is to leave real wage levels relatively unchanged 
from 1973 onwards, stabilising at a level approximately 1% higher than was achieved in
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the absence of the policy shock. However, the time paths of the variables underlying 
these changes are important, as demonstrated in figure 7.5. In this, the time path of the 
unemployment rate generated by the simulated run including the incomes policy shock 
shows a reduction in the rate of unemployment of approximately 0.5% in the year of the 
shock and, moreover, this unemployment reduction is maintained throughout most of the 
remaining period. Such a simulation illustrates very clearly the impact effects of the 
reduction in the real wage obtained through the policy innovation. Further, given the fact 
that real wage levels are gradually reestablished, the simulation also demonstrates the 
"hysteresis" effects by which policies which succeed in obtaining a once-off reduction in 
unemployment levels might also expect to achieve longer-term benefits.
While these overall effects are of interest, the main point of this exercise is to 
identify the separate components of the overall changes. These issues are considered in 
diagrams 7.2.1-7.2.4, 7.3.1-7.3.4, and 7.4.1-7.4.4, where the time paths of aggregate 
nominal wages, prices, and real wages are plotted under the seven alternative scenarios 
described above. Differences between the scenarios that are captured in these plots are 
small in some cases, indicating that the extra feedbacks incorporated in the successive 
scenarios are relatively unimportant in these instances. On the other hand, it is also clear 
from these that the overall effects identified in the previous figures are in many cases 
built up from a variety of offsetting influences, and that there is some considerable change 
underlying the relatively stable patterns observed overall.
Perhaps least dramatic of the scenario sequences is that relating to aggregate 
nominal wages, illustrated in figures 7.2.1-7.2.4. The first of these figures, 7.2.1, illustrates 
the time path of aggregate nominal wages under scenarios 1 (the actual time path), 2, and 
3. Between these there are no alterations in the way in which the incomes policy effects 
are passed on over time, but they do illustrate well the joint influence of an exogenous 
shock to wages, which woik directly and indirectly through wet. Scenario 2 incorporates 
the effects of the hypothetical incomes policy in 1971, and nominal wages drop 
substantially below the actual path of wages, as expected. However, this scenario abstracts 
from the indirect effects of the policy, which cause further wage restraint at the industrial 
level, as captured in scenario 3, since aggregate wages are also expected to fall in the 
light of the policy. These simulations indicate that, although the difference in time paths 
are eliminated relatively quickly, as much as a third of the impact effect of the imposition 
of the policy takes place through the indirect route, confirming the importance of wage- 
wage comparisons in wage setting, and stressing the importance of credibility in the 
design of incomes policy. A similar, although less extreme, breakdown shows in the 
equivalent figure for price inflation, 7.3.1. It is noted here that, since lagged aggregate 
wages were not found to be influential in either the aggregate wage or the aggregate price
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equations, the influence of the policy change on prices comes about through the industrial 
price equations alone, as prices are jointly determined with industrial wages, employment 
and output. Taken together, these movements are reflected in figure 7.4.1 where, on 
impact, the policy results in around a 2% reduction in real wage inflation generated 
through the direct effects alone, and around a further 1% reduction obtained with the 
additional indirect effects captured in scenario 3.
Figures 7.2.2, 7.3.2, and 7.4.2 show once more the time paths associated with 
scenarios 1 and 3, but include in addition those generated in scenario 4, where the 
expected value of the cost of material inputs to industries are allowed to be influenced by 
the changes instigated by the policy innovation. This extra effect has a relatively small 
influence on nominal wages, as shown in 7.2.2, and the new time path is almost 
indistinguishable from that of scenario 3 except in 1973, where the downward pressure on 
prices shows in a slight reduction in wage inflation. Far more clear, however, is the effect 
on aggregate price inflation, in figure 7.3.2, in which significant reductions in price 
inflation are observed between 1971-1974. This simulation highlights two extremely 
important points. First, the interdependancies between industries that are established 
through the purchase and sale of intermediate goods are extremely important in 
understanding the dynamics of prices. In their absence, the effects of the innovation are 
limited to the year of policy change, as shown in figure 7.3.1. Incorporating these 
feedbacks increases the magnitude of the impact effects, and significantly extends the 
period of time over which the policy has influence. In figure 7.3.2 price inflation is 
clearly effected upto 1974, but there are further marked influences in this simulation upto 
1978. The second important point to note here is the significance of expectations of price 
movements; simulation 4 allows the expected value of material costs to respond to 
changes in p^, wet, and past values of (industry-specific and aggregate) prices and wages, 
opening up paths 3 and 5 in the diagram of figure 7.1. Feedbacks involving actual 
material input prices, labelled 8’,9’,10’, and 11’ in figure 7.1, are included in simulation 5 
(illustrated in figures 7.2.3, 7.3.3, and 7.4.3) but are not incorporated in simulation 4. As 
figure 7.3.3 illustrates, the inclusion of these additional path of influence has some effect, 
stretching the strong policy effects to 1975, but these are small in comparison to the 
expectational effects captured in simulation 4. It appears that, just as the anticipation of a 
fall in aggregate wages was sufficient to generate wage restraint at the industrial level, so 
the anticipation of reductions in material costs will encourage restraint in industrial 
pricing decisions.
Finally in this section, we consider the feedback effects of the changes in 
(un)employment, as captured for the first time in simulations 6 and 7 and illustrated in 
figures 7.2.4, 7.3.4, and 7.4.4. Simulations 2-5 are each run taking as given the
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unemployment rates which were actually observed. In contrast, simulations 6 and 7 use 
unemployment rates derived through the estimation and aggregation of industrial 
employment. As the description of the model estimation of chapter 5 made clear, the 
model makes use of both economy-wide and industrial unemployment rates, and in 
simulations it is important to be clear on which industry newly-employed workers come 
from when extra jobs are created, and where workers go to if they become unemployed. 
In simulations 6 and 7, a simple strategy was employed. Where an industry contracts and 
sheds labour, then the number of jobs lost are translated one-for-one into an increase in 
that industry’s unemployment figures. This corresponds precisely to the definition used in 
the published unemployment figures by industry, where the unemployed are classified 
according to the industry in which they were last e m p lo y e d .^ )  When an industry 
expands, however, it is less clear where the extra workers come from, and in these 
simulations it was assumed that 30% of the new jobs would be filled by that industry’s 
unemployed workers, while 70% would be filled from the unemployed in the rest of the 
economy.
Of course, although workers previously employed in an industry may have some 
advantage over others in regaining employment in that industry, because of their previous 
training and work experience, these figures may well overstate the size of the advantage. 
Indeed, it is clear that work skills are not generally specific to the industry within which 
an employee works, and that an analysis of labour supply disaggregated by occupational 
status would be likely to provide more insights here. Hence, a more elaborate model 
might allocate the reduction in unemployment resulting from an expansion in a particular 
industry across industries according to the similarities that exist between the occupational 
characteristics of these industries and those of the the growing industry. Further, it is well 
known that the labour force expands as jobs are created, as many extra jobs are taken by 
workers who had not previously been registered as unemployed. Once more, these new 
entrants are generally of a particular occupational status, so that this phenomenon is more 
likely to occur during the expansion of some industries than others (for example, a growth 
in the distribution industry might be associated with growth in the employment of women 
who were not previously searching for work). It is recognised therefore that the procedure 
employed in these simulations is rather ad hoc. In the absence of adequate data on these 
issues, however, the procedures used here provide reasonable and workable figures.^
These two final simulations demonstrate the relative insensitivity of wages and 
prices to unemployment rates, and it is clear that the reduction in the numbers of 
unemployed documented in figure 7.5 does not exert either a strong or a persistent 
downward pull on wages. Differences between scenarios 5, 6 and 7 are slight in most of 
the figures; a rise in nominal wage inflation of around 0.5% is discernible in 1972 in 
figure 7.2.4, and a further effect is noted in figure 7.3.4 where price inflation rates under
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scenario 7 falls by around 0.5% compared to scenario 6 in 1976. The first of these shows 
the effect of the fall in the unemployment rate in 1971 of around 0.5% as described 
earlier, so that there is evidence that changes in unemployment rates influence wage 
inflation, but the absence of any further deflationary pressure provides a clear illustration 
of the hysteresis effects that have been discussed previously. It is interesting to note that 
in both of these cases, the indirect effects of changes in unemployment, operating through 
agents expectations of wt (and captured for the first time in scenario 6), are again at least 
as important as the direct effects of the unemployed on industrial wage setting picked up 
in scenario 7.
There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from these simulation 
experiments. First, it is clear that the imposition of a once-and-for-all policy shock has 
implications for nominal wages and prices which continue for many years; the feedbacks 
incorporated into the model here are sufficiently complex for repercussions to be noted 
five and six years after the imposition of the hypothesised incomes policy shock. This of 
course raises doubt on the precision of much of the work carried out, using aggregate 
wage equations, to investigate the effects of incomes policies in the past. This typically 
considered the impact (and possibly some catch up) effects of policy, but rarely allowed 
for the long term effects found here, and was simply unable to capture the important 
inter-industry effects in its framework of analysis.
A second conclusion to be drawn from the simulations is that indirect, 
expectation-based feedbacks are in many cases at least as important as actual demand and 
cost changes. In the simulations, expectations on future aggregate wage change, on 
aggregate price inflation, and on cost changes were all shown to be influential in the wage 
and price setting decisions made at the industrial level. This relates back to the ideas of 
sections 2.1 and 2.4, and associated with Taylor (1983a,b), which suggest that 
governments might undertake to make the process of expectation formation more 
"rational", possibly through the provision of a credible and widely-available forecasting 
service. Certainly the simulations suggest that there is scope for influential government 
activity in this area, since, if agents believe other agents will take the policy seriously, it 
appears that inflation might be "talked down" through a credible incomes policy.
Thirdly, the simulations illustrate the difficulties in capturing empirically the 
dynamics of labour market adjustment without employing some degree of disaggregatioa 
Important inter-industry feedbacks were confirmed to exist both in wage setting, through 
wage-wage comparisons and the desire to maintain real purchasing power (relative to 
aggregate prices), and in price setting, through the aggregation of industrial prices into the 
cost of material inputs. Feedbacks from (un)employment levels, on the other hand, did not 
show strongly, as real wage inflation remained relatively unperturbed by movements in
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unemployment levels. This final point is of particular interest in view of the hysteresis 
debate and the continued scepticism over the usefulness of the concept of a "natural" rate 
of unemployment in labour economics. These issues are considered in some detail in the 
following subsection where the "natural" rate is investigated through simulation exercises.
7.3 Feedbacks between unemployment rates and wages and prices
In section 2.4, it was noted that the recent interest in models of wage 
determination based on explicit analysis of trade union behaviour had given rise to a 
number of explanations of why real wages might be unresponsive to labour market 
conditions. In particular, following the Phillips curve literature, the question was 
addressed of how the unemployed exert influence on wage setting in these circumstances, 
and some of the possible explanations of the current lack of responsiveness of real wages 
to high unemployment in the U.K. were noted. This discussion raised the issue of 
"unemployment hysteresis", in which the equilibrium level of unemployment is 
determined at least in part by the development of actual unemployment levels over the 
past In these circumstances, it becomes less clear how one defines disequilibrium in the 
labour market, since equilibrating pressures on wages will be initiated at different levels 
of unemployment at different times (depending on recent unemployment experiences). In 
this section, then, attention is concentrated on the "natural rate" of unemployment, and 
how this concept relates to the disaggregated model that has been discussed in the last 
chapters. In particular, we ask how one recognises the presence of disequilibrium in the 
labour market, and attempt to eliminate this in a simulation exercise in an attempt to 
identify the "natural" rate of unemployment.
The ideas to be investigated are best explained with reference to a simplified
version of the model described earlier, in which the industrial labour demand, price, and
wage equations are rewritten as follows:
(i) n = Oq + a^(w-p) + o^a
(ii) p = P0 + Piw + p2a
(iii) w = Yq + Yiwe + Y2P6 + y3u + y4z
Assuming for simplification that all industries are identical, so that parameters are 
the same across industries, w = w and p = p, and assuming that price and wage equations 
are homogeneous in prices (so that pj = 1, and Yi + Y2 = an(* can ^
rearranged with a fixed labour supply, 1, to obtain
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(iv) u = T-  n = T-  ag - a^(w - p) - o^p
(v) w - p = -p0 - P2°
(vi) w - p = y0 + yx(v/Q - p0) + y3u + y4z + (p0 - p)
or alternatively,
(vi)’ w - p = y0' - Yj’Cw - we) - (p - p0) + Yj TT + y4’z
where y0’ = Y(/(1-Yi), Yi’ = Y1/O-Y1). 1$ = Y3/U-Yi). and Y4 = Y4/(1-Yi>- From these it is 
clear that there are three equations in three unknowns, w, p, and u, explained by the 
exogenous variable list (a, z, p0, we, I). Note that while p0 and we can be treated as 
exogenous to the industrial systems, they can be endogenised also, and will themselves 
depend on (a, z, T).
Together, (iv) and (v) provide a relationship between u and (w- p) based on firms’ 
employment and pricing decisions:
(vii) w - p = [-P2O - Oq) - (X2Po]/[a2 - a iP2] + P2/[ct2 ‘ a lP2] *
=  Eq  +  e j u
This relationship complements that between u and (w - p) provided by (vi) which, 
in the tradition of the Phillips curve literature since Friedman (1968), emphasises wage 
and price surprises. Taken together, (vi) and (vii) provide a solution for the 
unemployment level which depends on the push factors z, the expected real wage level, 
and price surprises
(viii) u= [1/(6! - y3)] { (y0 - Eq) + Yi(we - \?) + Y4Z + (P6 - P) }
This can be illustrated diagrammatically as in figure 7.6, which corresponds closely to the 
figure in, for example, Nickell (1986, p. 102) showing equilibrium unemployment in the 
Layard-Nickell wage-price model. As there, the slope of the locus relating to (vii) is fairly 
shallow, since this is determined primarily by P2 (the responsiveness of the markup to 
demand change) which is ambiguously signed. The locus for (vi) is unambiguously 
negatively sloped.
The "natural rate" of unemployment is identified as that level of unemployment 
which is consistent with no wage or price level surprises. The presence of wage or price 
surprises therefore indicates that the observed level of unemployment is not the "natural" 
one, and indeed it can be interpreted as part of the adjustment process instigated to 
reestablish unemployment and wages at their equilibrium levels. There is a locus in (w- 
p), u space which corresponds to (vi) in which w = we and p = p0. Here, the real wage/ 
unemployment trade-off generated by wage setters is given by
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(vi)* w - p = Y0’ + 73^  + y4'z
and the unemployment rate at which wage setters’ decisions are brought into line with 
firms’ price and employment decisions is given by
(viii)* u* = [(l-y1)e0]/[Y3 - (I'Y i)^] - [74/^3 - (1-Yi)e1] z
=  8 q  +  5 j z
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. At any level of activity, and 
hence (unemployment, firms operate with a particular markup of prices over wages. This 
translates into the real wage relationship expressed at (vii). The real wage demanded by 
wage setters is also influenced by unemployment levels, as those with work realise that, 
should they become unemployed, the probability of reemployment is reduced by higher 
numbers of unemployed, for example. For given aggregate wage and price expectations 
and push factors, there is a single level of unemployment at which both firms’ pricing 
decisions and wage setters’ aspirations are brought into line, as expressed at (viii). Since 
the markup is unresponsive to changes in expectations or in the push variables, the 
achievable real wage is dominated by firms’ pricing decisions and the exogenous activity 
variable a. If there is an exogenous increase in wage or price expectations, then 
unemployment must rise to provide an offsetting downward pressure on the real wage in 
wage bargaining. Conversely if there is an exogenous fall in wage or price expectations, 
the unemployment rate must fall to bring wage setters decisions into line with the firms’ 
chosen markup.
In this model, there is a unique level of unemployment at which firms’ and wage 
setters* decisions correspond and at which wage and price expectations are accurate. This
j|c
provides the '’natural rate" of unemployment and, as shown in expression (viii) , this rate 
is determined by I  (through 5 q) ,  and by the push factors z. Note that, as pointed out in 
Layard and Nickell (1985), the elimination of wage and price surprises here requires that 
one of the "free" variables among the forcing variables ceases to be free. Given the 
monotonic transformation between u and a  provided by (iv) and (v), the expression at
3|C _
(viii) provides a relationship between the variables (o, z, 1) which has to be satisfied in 
order for wage and price expectations to be fulfilled. So, for example, for given levels of 
1 and z, there is a unique, "natural" level of demand which will eliminate wage and price 
surprises. The expression at (viii) provides the unique level of unemployment associated 
with this (a, z, T) combination.
The main difference between this description of equilibrium on the supply side 
and that presented in Nickell (1986), for example, is in its treatment of aggregate wage 
and price expectations. Since the aggregate wage relationship at (vi) is derived from many
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industrial relationships like that at (iii), in which we and p6 are reasonably assumed 
exogenous, it is unsurprising that wage and price expectations play the key role in
determining the level at which actual wages and prices locate in the disaggregated model. 
This is illustrated most clearly by the solution of the system (iv)-(vi) presented below:
(ix) u = A + Ba
(x) w = C + yjwe + (l-ypp6 + Y4Z + Da
(xi) p = C + Yiwe + (l-YpP6 + Y4Z + (D+P2)a+ Po
where A = I  - ocg + ccjPq , B = -( + a ^ ) *
C = Y3A + Yq, and D = -Y3B
Here unemployment levels are determined solely by T (through A) and a.
Increases in the push variables z, and in I , generate equiproportionate increases in both w 
and p, while increases in a  raise p by p2a  over increase in w. Thus the real wage 
((x) minus (xi)) is determined solely by a, set at the level given by the industrial price- 
setting equation (v).
Nominal magnitudes w and p are driven primarily by we and p6, the relative 
importance of these two influences depending on Yj» which determines the weights given 
to the expected aggregate wage and price deflators in the industrial wage equations. It is 
of course extremely important to know how expectations of w and p are formed if the 
model’s properties are to be fully understood. As an illustration, consider the assumption 
of Perfect Foresight, imposed by taking expectations on both sides of (x) and (xi) for 
example. Here the model is indeterminate for p and w individually since, as it stands, the 
model has no element of inertia built into the movements of nominal wages or prices, and 
both are able to move, in tandem, to any level as they take the values that they are 
expected to take (subject to the markup determined by a). More realistically, there are a 
variety of reasons, involving informational inadequacies, which might invalidate the 
Perfect Foresight assumption and introduce elements of inertia into the formation of 
expectations on w and p . ^  In these circumstances, we and p6 may be formed 
independently of the industrial systems, and the process by which expectations are formed 
then plays a central role in the determination of levels (and rates of change) in prices and 
wages. It is for this reason that wage and price expectation terms are kept explicit in the 
model description presented above.
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The estimated model of this chapter differs substantially from the stylised model 
presented above in a number of important respects. First, in the estimated model, price- 
setters also form expectations on material costs, so that (diagrammatically) we might 
locate off the (vi; p=fP) locus also. Second, in the absence of identical parameter 
estimates across all industries, it is clear that there will be structural effects incorporated 
in the economy’s response to unemployment which are not adequately captured in the 
stylised model; these effects will be compounded by the differing degrees of price 
homogeneity found to exist in the different industrial wage equations. Third, as the 
previous section illustrated, the interactions between industries are significant and 
complicated, introducing strong inter-dependencies and long delays in responding to 
shocks which are simply not considered in the stylised model. And finally, it is clear that 
the elimination of wage and price surprises is substantially more complicated in the 
estimated model than is implied by the stylised model. In the stylised model, we and p6 
can be assumed exogenous, and the combinations of (a, z, T) which are consistent with 
w=we and p^p6 can be identified. However, while wage and price expectations are treated 
as exogenous to the industrial systems in the estimated model, they are not exogenous to 
the model itself. For the purpose of estimation and simulation it was essential that 
subsidiary equations be estimated to provide measures of we and p6. This was done 
through the estimated aggregate wage and price inflation equations. However, these 
equations clearly provide a further path of influence on wages and prices for (a, z, T), so 
that in this case it may no longer be possible to obtain simple combinations of (a, z, 1) 
for which p=pe and w=we. ^
Of course, it remains of considerable interest to consider the time path of the 
"natural" rate of unemployment over the recent past, and the generation of simulations 
based on the estimated model provides one means of attempting this. The simulation 
method will clearly accommodate the feedbacks over time and the inter-industry 
dependencies that are mentioned above. However, the problem of finding a simple 
combination of (a, z, I )  which will eliminate both wage and price surprises 
simultaneously is difficult to overcome. Consider a situation in which price and wage 
levels have been higher than anticipated. An artificial increase in 1, for example, leaving 
the other two forcing variables z and a  unchanged, would raise unemployment (local and 
aggregate), and have a depressing effect on actual and expected wages and prices. In the 
stylised model presented above, the deflation on actual prices and wages will be more 
severe than that on expected wages and prices so long as the impact of higher 
unemployment on we and p6 are of similar magnitudes. This follows from the following 
expressions based on (x) and (xi):
(Sw/Sl) = (Swe/51) + { y3 + (Y1-l)[(Swe/51)-(8pe/51)] }
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(8p/a> = (Spe/Sl) + { y3 + (y1)[(8we/51)-(Spe/51)] )
These show that the impact of higher unemployment on we and p° is compounded by any 
direct effect on wage setting, captured by the (negative) term 73. In these circumstances, 
there will be a level to which lean be raised which is sufficiently high to ensure that 
p^p6. This increase in Twill also serve to reduce (w-we) and, if aggregate wage and price 
expectations are formed in a way that is consistent with the industrial systems, then a 
coincidence of p^p6 and w=we will be forced to emerge. However, if expectations on w 
and p are formed without such consistency, as is the case in the estimated model 
presented in this chapter, then it is recognised that these equalities will not coincide, so 
that there will be no (a, z, T) combination which gives zero wage and price surprises 
simultaneously. In this situation, and in what follows, the forcing variables will be 
manipulated to attempt to achieve ^ p 6 (allowing w < we), and the level of 
unemployment corresponding to the derived (a, z, T) combination will be identified. 
While this is not the standard interpretation of the "natural" rate of unemployment, it is 
obviously closely related and it will provide some idea of the development of the 
"natural" rate over the recent past.
In the following paragraphs, this scenario, in which 1 is manipulated to eliminate 
price surprises, is investigated over the period 1954-1981 through a model simulation. The 
decision to manipulate I  is not an obvious one to make since in practice governments 
might aim to stabilise inflation through monetary and fiscal policy, or through an incomes 
policy, so that a  or elements of z would be the control variables used. However, as the 
discussion above explains, there is a symmetry about altering any of the forcing variables 
(a, z, T), and in the simulations, it is rather easier to achieve no price surprises through 1 
manipulation than through either of the other variables, and the interpretation of results is 
clearer.
The extent to which the chosen forcing variable should be altered to eliminate 
price surprises is by no means obvious because of the complicated feedbacks between 
industries and across time which are incorporated in the model. Manipulation of the 
forcing variable in one period will have repercussions on the economy for many years 
after, and subsequent manipulation has to take this into account. As an illustration, 
assume that I  is controllable and is used to raise and lower unemployment rates directly. 
It is noted that because the growth in the unemployment rate is important in the formation 
of price and wage expectations, the elimination of a sequence of positive price surprises 
will involve successively larger increases in T. An increase in T in the first year will raise 
unemployment over its former level and exert downward pressure on (p-p6) and on (w-
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we). However, with no further manipulation of 1, this will reduce unemployment growth 
below its former level in the second year, and the simulated values of (p-p6) and (w-we) 
will rise. Where there is a sequence of positive price surprises then, T must be raised not 
only to eliminate the price surprise, but also to offset the effects of the previous changes 
imposed on T.
These dynamic problems complicate the issue of choosing appropriate levels of 
adjustment in T, but the task would be still more complex if a or z was the chosen 
control variable. While T affects only unemployment rates directly (and through these 
wage and price expectations plus industrial wage setting), a has a direct, and often 
conflicting, influence on wage and price expectations, and on the equations explaining 
industrial wages, prices, and employment. Because such complicated feedbacks are 
involved, the main point of the exercise, which is to identify the "natural" rate of 
unemployment, would be obscured. It is for this reason that only T manipulations are 
considered here, answering the question "What levels of unemployment would have been 
required to eliminate price surprises over the period 1954-81 given the developments of o 
and z during that time?".
Figure 7.7 provides the specific answer to this question obtained through model 
simulation, illustrating the actual time path of the unemployment rate over the sample 
period and that achieved after manipulation of T (termed the "natural" simulation on the 
diagram). In fact, T was altered to attempt to obtain values of (p-p6) which lie in the 
interval (-0.05,0.05) since any further degree of fine-tuning was not possible. As it is, the 
figure demonstrates once more the lack of responsiveness of nominal values to 
unemployment rate movements, since relatively large swings in the unemployment rate 
are necessary to achieve the targets set. Indeed, as demonstrated in figure 7.10, it was 
simply not possible to achieve price surprises in the target band in 1964, 1966 and 1969 
because aggregate unemployment rates had already been reduced to just 0.05%, and 
further reduction seemed simply unreasonable.
While the simulated paths of figure 7.7 appear rather volatile, the underlying 
trends observed are quite consistent with previous studies in this area. Figure 7.8 smooths 
out the unemployment rate paths in figure 7.7, plotting a five year moving average of the 
actual and "natural" simulated unemployment rates.^ Over the period 1956-66, the 
"natural" rate of unemployment was on average just 0.34% above the actual rate, 
according to this simulation, and this discrepancy rose to 0.84% through the period 1967- 
74 (during which, the natural rate was in the region 3.46%). The largest gap between the 
two rates occurred during the period 1975-79 when the natural rate rose to around 5.66%, 
which was some 1.20% higher than the actual rate. This trend was sharply reversed in the 
last two periods of the sample, 1980-81, however, where the gap had reduced to its
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lowest level of 0.30%, with the natural rate rising to 6.96%. These figures correspond 
closely to those in Layard and Nickell (1985), although they are not directly comparable 
since the measurement of unemployment employed differs from that used here. Moreover, 
their analysis was able to extend the sample period upto 1983, and it is estimated that 
actual unemployment rates rose above the natural rate, on average, during this (extended) 
final period, 1980-83. Of course, given the sample period used in the current study, this 
can neither be confirmed nor rejected, but the very sharp reversal in trend that is already 
noted is of course perfectly consistent with these calculations.
Perhaps the most interesting result obtained through this simulation is the close 
association that is found between the time paths of the actual rates of unemployment and 
the "natural" rates that have been calculated. In a simple regression, some 71% of the 
variability in the (moving average) representation of the "natural" rate can be explained in 
terms of the actual unemployment rate lagged one period. This indicates that the rate of 
unemployment below which downward pressure on wages is initiated is determined to a 
large extent simply by the rate of unemployment experienced last period. Obviously, the 
tendency for the labour market to adjust freely to eliminate unemployment is, at best, 
only very weak; in these circumstances, there is clearly an incentive for active 
government intervention in the labour market to stimulate employment and reestablish 
equilibrium unemployment rates at a new lower level.
7.4 The structure of industrial feedbacks
In both of the sections above, we have emphasised the significance of inter­
industry interactions in understanding the process of adjustment in the labour market. The 
simulations make clear the importance of both direct industry-to-industry links, and 
indirect links through expectations formed on aggregate developments. However, although 
the disaggregated nature of the analysis is central to the results obtained, the discussion so 
far has focussed on their impact on aggregate variables only. Of course, underlying the 
changes documented above are important structural developments which we could also 
consider, and we comment on these in this section, i
Figure 7.11 illustrates this point. Here, the 38 industries are classed into one of 
four groups according to the Manufacturing/Non-Manufacturing split, and according to the 
level at which wage bargaining takes place. Among the manufacturing sector, industries 
11-20 (which might be termed ‘heavy manufacturing industries’) are assigned to group A, 
as wage settlements in these industries have tended to be more affected by industry wide 
agreements than elsewhere in the manufacturing sector. Among the Non-Manufacturing
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sector, the agriculture, energy, and transport industries (i.e. industries 1-3, and 29-32) 
were assigned to the corresponding ‘centralised bargaining* group, A. While this 
assignment of industries is a little arbitrary, some justification for the choice is provided 
by figures given in Brown (1981) on the proportion of establishments in an industry in 
which industry wide agreements were the most important level of wage negotiation. 
Moreover, this four sector classification allows us to consider in a more tractable way the 
structural changes that underlie the adjustment of the supply side to shocks. Specifically 
here, for example, the division enables us to examine the hypothesis that wages set in 
industries where wage bargaining takes place at a high level of centralisation may be 
more responsive to incomes policy than those set in industries using highly decentralised 
bargaining procedures (where enforcement may be more difficult to implement). If this is 
the case, then one would expect relative wages to fall in the former industries (groups A) 
in the face of an incomes policy shock.
Figure 7.11 shows that this is indeed the case, plotting both the actual evolution 
of wages in these sectors relative to the aggregate wage and that obtained in the 
simulation above in which an incomes policy effect is imposed in 1971. So, for example, 
the simulated paths of relative wages are substantially lower than those actually observed 
over most of the period following the shock in both Figures 7.11.1 and 7.11.3, which 
show relative wages in Manufacturing group A and Non-Manufacturing group A 
respectively. Relative wages remain comparatively unchanged in Manufacturing sector B, 
but there are considerable increases in relative wages in Non-Manufacturing group B, as 
shown on Figure 7.11.4. Of course, this is only a very simple look at the role of 
bargaining arrangements in the implementation of incomes policy, but it provides a good 
illustration of the sort of structural changes that underlie the simulations described above.
This simple example illustrates the fact that different sectors exhibit different 
characteristics, and respond differently to policy measures. It is in recognition of this fact 
that a case can be made for an industrial strategy in which policy is designed taking 
explicit account of these structural considerations. This case is a strong one, since policy 
measures can be directed at areas where they will be most beneficial and will therefore be 
most cost-effective. On the other hand, the simulations above illustrate also the 
complexity of the interactions between sectors that are observed in response to policy 
action. These interactions mean that the impact of policy on any sector is more difficult 
to assess, and must take into account the feedbacks initiated by adjustments made by 
sectors elsewhere in the economy in response to policy innovations. This of course 
includes those adjustments which move in the opposite direction to that which the policy 
aims to push the economy. For example, imagine that a policy is designed to achieve 
employment growth in a particular sector of the economy. Imagine also that this is
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achieved with little cost in terms of inflationary pressure in the sector. It is possible that 
the reduction in unemployment that is achieved causes an increase in inflationary pressure, 
through its impact on expected aggregate wage movements, throughout the economy. The 
ultimate effect of the increase in wage costs may offset the direct effect of the policy in 
the initial sector, while unemployment may also rise elsewhere in the economy. Of 
course, this example does not negate the case for structural policies, but it does 
demonstrate the need for well devised plans which involve coordinated structural policies 
for employment growth and wage control.
Figures 7.12 and 7.13 provide a good illustration of the usefulness of structural 
policies and the need for some sophistication in the specification of these policies in the 
face of complicated sectoral adjustments. In these figures, we aim to demonstrate the 
structural effects on employment and wages of a change in the levels of industrial capital 
that might be achieved through a policy to increase capital investment. Specifically, we 
use the model described earlier in the chapter to simulate the effects of a 0.5% increase in 
the level of capital in all industries in 1971, obtained through the introduction of a capital 
grant scheme, say. We then examine the employment consequences in the four sectors 
described above, distinguished according to the Manufacturing/ Non-Manufacturing split 
and the level of centralisation at which wages are generally set Two simulations are 
considered. In the first, while prices, wages and employment in the various industries are 
allowed to change, unemployment levels are assumed to remain unaltered from their 
actual levels (as though any new jobs created are filled by people previously not in the 
labour force, and as though any people losing a job simply leave the labour force). In this 
first scenario, therefore, changes in the level of capital in a particular sector affect 
employment in that sector directly through capital labour substitution, and indirectly 
through it’s impact on prices and, hence, output levels. The price effects also have 
repurcussions that go beyond the initial sector, and these feedbacks are also captured in 
the first scenario. Of course, in general, a second path of influence from one sector to 
another is that generated through the unemployment rate, as changes in the level of 
employment in a particular sector alters the tightness of the labour market both locally 
and across all industries. By assuming that employment changes are reflected entirely by 
changes in the labour force in the first scenario, this path of inter-industry interaction is 
eliminated. It is reintroduced in the second scenario, however, here, the employment 
change is accomodated in the model as described earlier in the chapter, and employment 
growth will now affect wages through the influence of local labour market slack on 
industrial wage setting and through its effects on aggregate wage expectations.
Concentrating initially on the first scenario, we note first that there are substantial 
structural differences in the effects of the introduction of the capital grants, and secondly 
that the full implications of the introduction of the grants are seen only over a
236
Pe
r 
ce
nt
 
Pe
r 
ce
nt
-1  -
- 2
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
SCEN1
SCEN2
Figure 7.12.1: Prop, change in employment (Manuf. grp A)
3
2
1
0
■1
-2
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978
SCEN1
SCEN2
Figure 7.122: Prop, change in employment (Manuf. grp B)
+>a
Vo
-8  -
-1 0
1970 1972 1976 1978 1980
Figure 7.123: Prop, change in employment (Non-Manuf. grp A)
-1  -
a ~2~Voh« _T _cu 3 .
- s  -
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
Figure 7.12.4: Prop, change in employment (Non-Manuf. grp B)
SCEN1
SCEN2
SCEN1
SCEN2
23
7
M
33►
13PS
1.05
X
1.00
0.95
I960 1970 1972 1974 197b 1978 1980
Actual
SCEN1
SCEN2
Figure 7.13.1: Wages in Manuf. grp A relative to aggregate wages
.04
g, 1-82 a 
►
43 1.00«
0.98
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
A ctual
SCEN1
SCEN2
Figure 7.132: Wages in Manuf. grp B relative to aggregate wages
Re
l 
wa
ge
 
Re
l 
w
ag
e
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
19721970 1974 1976 1978 1980
Actual
SCEN1
SCEN2
Figure 7.133: Wages in Non-Manuf. grp A relative to aggregate wages
1.08
1.06
1.04
1.02
1.00
1.98
1.96
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980
A ctual
SCEN1
SCEN2
Figure 7.13.4: Wages in Non-Manuf. grp B relative to aggregate wages
23
3
\
considerable length of time, with adjustment to the policy changes still apparent after ten 
years in some cases. In Figures 7.12.1- 7.12.4, for example, we plot the changes in the 
level of employment relative to the actual level of employment observed in each of the 
four sectors of the economy described above. Scenario 1 is shown in each case by the 
solid line, and indicates that employment falls initially in every case in response to the 
imposed increase in capital in 1971. While employment recovers in the Manufacturing 
sectors (both A and B) over the following ten years, however, it remains low relative to 
that which was actually observed in both of the Non-Manufacturing groups. These 
developments can be explained in terms of the characteristics of the groups themselves, 
and indicate clearly the usefulness of selective capital grant aid in policy design. 
Specifically, inspection of the coefficients of tables 7.1-7.5 indicates that the scope for 
capital-labour substitution is greater in the Non-Manufacturing sector industries than in the 
Manufacturing industries, as implied by larger estimates of the elasticity of demand for 
labour with respect to capital in the former industries. Increased capital investment results 
in an initial fall in employment in all sectors, therefore (as less labour input is required 
for a given level of output), but this shake-out of labour is most pronounced in the 
service sectors. Of course, the effects of capital-labour substitution are offset to some 
extent since these developments are associated with a reduction in prices, and 
consequently, with growth in output demand. In the simulation of scenario 1, aggregate 
price inflation in 1971 is 6.6%, compared to the 8.6% which was actually observed. In 
1972, inflation is again around 2% lower in the simulated run than was actually observed. 
It is 1% lower in 1973, and it is of a comparable order thereafter. The associated price 
reductions are spread fairly evenly over all industries, but the responsiveness of output to 
the price changes differ considerably. Specifically, it is the manufacturing sectors which 
benefit most in terms of increased output demand as prices fall, as industries in these 
sectors show the largest (domestic and imported) price elasticities in their output demand 
equations. As a consequence, output grows more quickly in these sectors (so that the 
proportion of total output produced rises from 45.7% to 46.8% by the end of the sample 
period), and employment grows also. Although the output elasticity of demand for labour 
is relatively high in the Non-Manufacturing sector, the responsiveness of output to price 
reductions is low, so that there is less employment growth obtained through this source in 
these sectors, and employment levels in the simulated run remain low relative to their 
actual levels.
The first scenario indicates very clearly the usefulness of selective capital grants 
as the long run effects are far more satisfactory in the Manufacturing sector than in the 
Non-Manufacturing sector. (Indeed, the overall effects of the increase in capital levels in 
scenario 1 is, because of the large reductions in employment in the Non-Manufacturing 
sectors, to reduce total employment levels. Of course, such an extreme outcome may be
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moderated if the installation of the new capital results in productivity gains and further 
improvements in competitiveness which are not accomodated in the simulations. 
Nevertheless, the significance of the structural effects remains clear). Moreover, even 
within the manufacturing sector, there are gains from selectivity. Specifically, the scope 
for capital-labour substitution appears lower in Manufacturing group B than in 
Manufacturing group A, while the price responsiveness of output demand in the former is 
larger, so that the expansionary effects described above are more pronounced in group B 
than in group A, even within the manufacturing sector. Moreover, although the impact of 
the ‘internal* effects on wages are relatively small throughout the economy, these are 
slightly greater among the industries in Manufacturing group A than Manufacturing group 
B. Hence, as the internal pressures for employment growth are felt, there is more upward 
pressure on wages in this group than elsewhere. This is reflected in Figure 7.13.1, where 
wages in the sector, measured relative to the aggregate wage level, are shown to rise 
slightly during the period. This effect is small, and indeed one can see that relative wages 
are little affected in all of the groups in this first scenario, but it will contribute to the 
observed slowdown in employment growth in Manufacturing group A which is not 
observed in Manufacturing group B.
Turning now to the second scenario, we note that at the aggregate level, the 
changes in prices observed in scenario 1 are less pronounced than those found in scenario 
2, in which the impact of employment changes are reflected in changes in unemployment 
levels. Hence, aggregate price inflation in scenario 2 falls by 2% (compared to its actual 
level) in 1971, as in scenario 1, but this is followed by a fall of 3.3% in 1972, growing to 
4.4% in 1974 and 1975, before falling back to a 2% reduction by the end of the period. 
Clearly, the effects on price inflation are far more pronounced, and extend over many 
more years than in the first scenario. These developments are explained if we recognise 
the feedbacks from unemployment to nominal wages, and then to prices. In scenario 2, 
the fall in employment documented above raises the aggregate unemployment rate in 1971 
by 1.9%, as the simulated unemployment rate of scenario 2 is 4.8%, and this is compared 
to the actually observed rate of 2.9%. This simulated increase falls to 1.2% by 1974, but 
this additional level of unemployment in maintained until the end of the period. Of 
course, higher rates of unemployment exert downward pressure on nominal wages 
(directly at the level of industrial wage settlements, and indirectly through expectations of 
future aggregate wage inflation), and this in turn reduces prices, so that the reduction in 
price levels noted in scenario 1 are exacerbated. As we shall note below, there are some 
differences in the extent to which these price reduction were distributed across the sectors 
of the economy (as relative price movements partially reflect differential movements in 
wages). However, the price reductions are fairly evenly spread across the industrial
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sectors, improving international price competitiveness throughout the economy. Moreover, 
as noted above, this will improve the demand for manufacturing output, reflecting the 
heavy reliance of these sectors on trade, and hence employment prospects in these sectors 
(particularly in Manufacturing group B). Certainly the fall in prices will help explain the 
improvement in employment levels observed in scenario 2 in all sectors over that 
observed in scenario 1, as documented in Figures 7.12.1-7.12.4.
Even more significantly, however, Figures 7.13.1-7.13.4 show that while there are 
only moderate movements in relative wage in scenario 1, there are more noticable effects 
on relative wages found in scenario 2. Underlying these relative changes is the tendency 
for rather more wage moderation in those industries in Manufacturing and Non- 
Manufacturing groups A (i.e. those with a more centralised wage bargaining structure) 
than in those industries in the corresponding group B classes. Hence, by 1975, simulated 
nominal wage levels in scenario 2 are some 11.8% lower than their ‘true’ levels in 
Manufacturing group A, compared to 7.8% in Manufacturing group B, while in the Non- 
Manufacturing group (where the local unemployment rates grow most quickly for the 
reasons described above) nominal wages are 16.5% and 13.3% lower in groups A and B 
respectively. These disparities become even more marked by the end of the period: 
nominal wages in Manufacturing group A and B are 26.5% and 17.7% lower than their 
‘true’ levels, while those in Non-Manufacturing sectors A and B are 23.8% and 18.4% 
lower respectively. These changes are clearly reflected in the relative wage movements 
documented in Figures 7.13.1-7.13.4. Moreover, although relative price movements show 
a similar pattern across the sectors (and this in turn is reflected also in material input 
price changes), the price of labour inputs relative to material inputs, which is of 
importance in the labour demand decision, also falls in the group A industries compared 
to the group B industries. Obviously, some part of the extra wage moderation observed in 
the group A sectors reflects the severity of the changes experienced in the local labour 
markets following the policy implementation; we have already noted that the group B 
industries in the Manufacturing sector will benefit more in terms of employment than the 
corresponding group A industries, and Figures 7.12.3 and 7.12.4 show that the 
employment shake-out in Non-Manufacturing group A is more severe than that in group 
A in scenario 1. However, the ultimate employment effects of the policy change, when 
the relative wage movements are included, indicate that the group A industries fare well 
relative to the group B industries, so that the relative wage movements more than offset 
the direct effects of the policy captured in scenario 1. Hence, we note that falling wages 
in Manufacturing goup A in the period 1975-1978 results in employment growth which 
substantially outpaces that observed in scenario 1. Equally, in Non-Manufacturing group 
A, continually falling wages throughout the period 1972-1977 results in employment 
growth which almost offsets the capital effects documented in scenario 1. In contrast, the
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large increases in relative wages observed to occur in 1974-1976 in Manufacturing group 
B are reflected in a lower rate of growth in scenario 2 than observed in scenario 1, and 
ultimately the employment gains achieved in scenario 1 are by and large lost. Finally, we 
note the initial fall in relative wages in Non-Manufacturing group B observed over the 
period 1973-74 which is associated with rising employment in the sector (relative to 
scenario 1). This is followed by a progressive rise in relative wages over the period 1975- 
1978, however, and this is reflected in a falloff of employment from 1976 onwards, so 
that this sector ultimately loses more jobs than any other sector in the economy.
Of course, the four-sector division used above is too coarse a classification for use 
in actual policy prescription. However, the simulations do illustrate the difficulties 
involved in constructing an industrial strategy when there are inter-industry interactions 
initiated by industries’ adjustment to the policy. This does not mean that an industrial 
strategy is not workable, but means that there needs to be a coordinated industrial strategy 
on pay and employment. In the above example, directing investment grants to the 
Manufacturing sectors is clearly preferable to a blanket coverage of the economy in terms 
of the jobs that can be created. On the other hand, such a policy will not be as successful 
as might be hoped if there is not also a policy on wages which can hold in check the 
wage inflation that will ensue if the investment programme is successful, especially in 
those sectors in which higher levels of unemployment had been exerting reasonable 
downward pressure on wages prior to the policy (i.e. group A industries in the example 
above). Innovative policies are needed which could tie these two aspects of adjustment 
together. For example, in order to generate more jobs, a scheme can be envisaged in 
which investment grants are awarded only to those industries in which there is likely to 
be a substantial employment benefit. In the light of the above discussion, it might also be 
reasonable to insist that the award is offered only if the industry also adopts a training 
scheme which will offset the sort of labour market shortages which could subsequently 
generate upward wage pressure in the industry. Alternatively, the awarding of a grant 
might be tied to changes in the wage bargaining institutions of the industry. Such policy 
prescriptions require further consideration, and go beyond the scope of this work. 
Nevertheless, the simulations above demonstrate clearly the need for more sophisticated 
industrial policies in order to reduce the level of unemployment without incurring higher 
inflation.
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7.5 Concluding comments
The results of sections 12-1A  provide a reminder of the usefulness of 
disaggregation in investigating the processes of adjustment involved in the labour market 
and illustrate the importance of various paths of influence which are often overlooked in 
more aggregate empirical studies. These insights often arises not because of any new 
developments obtained at the theoretical level, nor because of the availability of more 
information, but simply because emphasis is placed on rather different issues in 
disaggregate work, both in discussion and in analysis, than in aggregate work. So, for 
example, in emphasising disaggregation in the discussion of wage setting behaviour, it 
became clear that individuals may use an aggregate wage rather than an aggregate price 
deflator in assessing the real worth of their negotiated nominal wage, and indeed, the 
whole notion of wage-wage comparisons in wage bargaining was raised in importance and 
highlighted. Equally, given the time and effort involved in the estimation of the 160+ 
equations of the model presented here, the problem of informational inadequacies in the 
formation of expectations was clearly illustrated in the disaggregate work. The assumption 
that expectations may be formed on the basis of readily available, aggregate information 
only is made far more acceptable with these difficulties in mind. Of course, both of these 
issues can be accommodated into aggregate empirical work, and they have been in the 
past However, such issues have a much clearer intuition at the disaggregate level and this 
results in this shift in emphasis.
Perhaps still more significant in the results of this chapter, however, are the gains 
in information and the possibility of examining extra mechanisms of adjustment that are 
achievable in this disaggregated work. So, for example, the transmission of price change 
along the chain of production examined in our disaggregate model simply could not have 
been accommodated into an aggregate analysis of price movements by construction of the 
model. Equally, while the importance of structural change can be investigated through the 
use of an aggregate index measuring such change, this approach is unlikely to be 
sufficiently flexible to be able to capture the effects of both the different rates of change 
of variables across industries and of the different degrees of responsiveness of industries 
to these changes (as captured by different parameter estimates in the disaggregated 
model).
The practical significance of many of these issues has been demonstrated in the 
empirical work of this chapter. For example, on the basis of the results of section 7.2, it 
was argued that nominal wages would be a reasonable target for manipulation through 
government policy. Here, expectations of aggregate wages were seen to be the single most 
influential factor in the determination of industrial wages and, it was argued, the provision 
by the government of a high-profile, credible wage target could provide it with a useful
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policy tool through which to influence wage expectations and hence wage setting in 
general. Further, it was argued that policies which rely on free adjustment of the labour 
market to eliminate unemployment were unlikely to succeed, as strong hysteresis effects 
were observed, as demonstrated graphically in section 7.3. Moreover, the disaggregate 
structure of the model suggested a rather novel source for these hysteresis effects, 
emphasising the importance of expectation formation. The simulation experiments 
illustrated that the deflationary effects of unemployment growth, influencing the formation 
of aggregate wage expectations, were at least as important as the direct effects of local 
unemployment rates damping down industrial wage settlements, and it is the former effect 
which has been identified with the hysteresis phenomenon.
As has been stressed throughout the last two chapters, the process by which 
expectations are formed is not the central issue of this work, and the subsidiary equations 
used to generate we and p6 in the simulations were simply the best statistical 
representations to be obtained if only aggregate information was to be used. However, it 
would be most interesting to investigate more thoroughly the process of expectation 
formation, perhaps through the use of direct, survey-based measures of expectational 
variables, and in particular it would be of interest to investigate more formally the 
responsiveness of the direct measures of wage expectations to levels and changes in the 
unemployment rate. It is instructive to recall the tone of the press coverage of the 
unemployment figures in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s and compare this to the relatively 
tolerant attitude taken to high, but falling, unemployment experienced over the recent past. 
On this informal basis, there appears to be a good case for the argument that changes in 
unemployment have more impact on people’s perceptions of the state of the labour market 
than actual unemployment levels. Certainly, in the light of the findings of the simulation 
experiments, a study of how individuals form their views on the "tightness" of the labour 
market would provide important information on the time paths of any targets to be 
established if active government intervention in wage setting was to be attempted.
Finally in this chapter, we noted the case for an industrial strategy in the 
construction of government policy. This acknowledges the wide variation in industrial 
characteristics that exists, and, consequently, the varied reactions which will ensue 
following the implementation of government measures. In this, however, we also 
emphasised the complexities of inter-industry interactions, highlighting in section 7.4 the 
effects that policy-induced changes in one sector have elsewhere in the economy. It is 
argued that these interactions should be explicitly accomodated in policy formulation, 
noting that measures designed to promote employment growth must be coordinated with 
those aiming to reduce inflationary pressures, with each directed at those industries which 
will be most responsive to policy.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions
In this final chapter of the thesis, we provide an overview of the ideas and 
findings expressed in the previous chapters, reflecting first on the discussion and evidence 
presented on the causes of inertia, and then considering the consequences of inertia that 
have been identified in the course of the work. Finally, we focus on some of the policy 
implications that have been drawn out of these. In doing so, we note that the work has 
concentrated on two related themes, both of which are shown to be important through the 
empirical work in understanding the evolution of the UK supply side over the past, and in 
constructing policy measures to help reduce unemployment and to fight inflation.
The first of these themes emphasises the institutional detail involved in the 
workings of the supply side, since these provide reasonable explanations for the existence 
of wage and price rigidities. So, for example, in chapters 2 and 5 we noted the 
importance of the internal organisation of unions in affecting negotiation costs in wage 
bargaining, and hence nominal wage inertia. Similarly, we noted how the nature of the 
product being sold affects ‘shopping costs’, and hence price inertia, through the costs 
incurred by a producer in responding to changes in costs or demand conditions with price 
adjustments. Finally, as another example, in looking at real wage rigidities, the discussion 
of union based models of wage determination showed how the institutional arrangements 
of the players involved in wage bargaining, or indeed the bargaining framework itself, 
could affect the wage outcome, and the responsiveness of wages to local and aggregate 
labour market conditions. In each of these examples, it is real world institutions which 
provide the explanation for the cause of rigidities.
The second theme of the thesis stresses the issue of disaggregation. This issue is 
significant on a number of fronts: first, it is argued that many of the important 
institutional arrangements involved in wage and price setting reflect the difficulties faced 
by any individual unit in interacting with others and anticipating their actions (good 
examples of this are provided by the discussion of the influences of market structure on 
individual firms’ price setting behaviour, or by the discussion of the significance of wage 
comparabilities in wage setting); second, it is argued that the inertia generated at the level 
of the individual unit is compounded for the economy as a whole as units interact and 
recognise the inflexibility shown elsewhere in the economy; and third, it is recognised that 
the presence of (differing degrees of) wage and price inertia across sectors means that 
there may be substantial structural changes implied by any real or nominal shock 
(including policy-induced shocks).
245
\
Both of these broad themes were encountered in our discussion of the causes of 
inertia. However, it is the role of supply side institutions which arises most regularly in 
the analyses of chapters 4, 5, and 6, which provide the most direct studies of the 
microeconomic causes of wage and price rigidities. In chapter 6, for example, price inertia 
was shown to be systematically related to various industrial characteristics. In particular 
among these, inertia was demonstrated to be primarily determined by the market structure 
of the industry, as prices respond more quickly in industries in which firms enjoy a high 
degree of domestic market power, and where there is a low degree of international 
competition. These findings confirm, and extend, those expressed previously in the 
literature, and fit well with the theoretic discussion of the possible causes of inertia 
presented in chapter 2.
Equally, chapter 4 provides evidence to support the view that wages are set in 
open-ended contracts which are renegotiated periodically as the negotiable wage reaches a 
critical level, as would be predicted by microeconomic theory. The frequency with which 
the critical bound is reached varies stochastically, as the determinants of the negotiable 
wage also vary stochastically, but will be systematically influenced by labour market 
conditions. (Indirect evidence in support of this view was of course also provided in 
chapter 3). In particular amongst these, evidence was found of a positive relationship 
between negotiation frequency and price inflation (once the pattern of past settlements is 
adequately taken into account in the empirical work), and successive periods of incomes 
policy were shown to have had a significant influence on the timing of wage settlements.
Finally, in chapter 5, evidence was presented on the (lack of) responsiveness of 
wages to changes in demand conditions. Industrial wage equations presented in that 
chapter showed that ‘internal*, industry-specific variables exert relatively little influence on 
wage setters, so that contracting demand for an industry’s product is not reflected in 
rapidly falling wages. Equally, rising local unemployment rates were shown to exert little 
downward influence on wages in the industrial wage equations. The clearest indication of 
aggregate demand effects on wages was observed to take place through the impact on 
expectations, as falling demand caused expectations of aggregate wage and price inflation 
to be moderated. However, as these effects were shown to take place only slowly over 
time, this path of influence was also shown to be weak. Taken together, these findings 
provide some insights into the working of the labour market, emphasising the importance 
of those labour market institutions which close down the potential paths of influence from 
labour market conditions to wage setting decisions. As examples of these, we mentioned 
the possible importance of ‘insiders’ in wage setting, the ‘discouraged worker’ effect 
caused by prolonged periods of unemployment, and the importance of wage-wage 
comparabilities in wage setting. Whatever the precise cause of the unresponsiveness of 
wages to demand conditions, it is clear that much of the explanation lies in the
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institutional detail of the workings of the supply side.
While the discussions of chapters 4, 5 and 6 help to identify some of the causes 
of inertia in wages and prices, the consequences of inertia are best illustrated in chapters 
2, 3 and 7. In chapter 2, for example, we provide a simple algebraic model which 
illustrates the macroeconomic consequences of nominal wage inertia in a two sector 
economy. In this illustration, nominal wage inertia is modelled through the use of 
negotiation probabilities. The use of this technique for modelling inertia is given some 
justification by the empirical work of chapter 4. The probability of negotiation reflects the 
probability that the negotiable wage reaches the (s,S) critical bound, and is endogenously 
determined. In particular, rising inflation is likely to be reflected by a rising probability of 
negotiation, although so long as the responsiveness of negotiation probabilities to inflation 
is not too high, these probabilities will remain below one for moderate inflation rates, so 
that instantaneous adjustment in any sector is unlikely. Since the two sectors* wage 
setting decisions are interrelated (through their respective influence on the aggregate price 
level), the inertia generated directly in each sector, as wages fail to adjust every period, is 
compounded at the economy-wide level. This follows from the fact that wages do not 
fully reflect the underlying change in exogenous variables even when they are reset 
because of the known inflexibly in wages in the other sector. Moreover, in the case of a 
monetary disinflation, for example, there will be a real output loss throughout the period 
during which prices remain high relative to the nominal money stock, due to the real 
balance effect. The fact that wage adjustment in the face of shocks may take substantially 
longer than the duration of any single settlement provides the government with the 
potential for relatively long-lasting effective intervention. Further, this conclusion holds 
despite the endogeneity of nominal inertia in this example.
In the simulation exercise of section 7.2, we considered the impact of an incomes 
policy shock on the disaggregated supply side model of the UK economy that had been 
developed in chapter 5. Two results were highlighted in this exercise which emphasise the 
relevence of the algebraic illustration described above to the UK economy. In the first, it 
was noted that because of the complexity of the interactions that take place between 
sectors, the repurcussions of the shock could still be identified in aggregate wages and 
prices six years after the imposition of the shock. This period would clearly straddle a 
number of wage settlements in any sector, and therefore mirrors the properties of the 
algebraic model described above. The conclusions for the scope for policy intervention 
based on the algebraic model of chapter 2 are equally relevent here therefore. The second 
result related to the paths through which the sectoral interactions were observed to take 
place. The algebraic exercise shows clearly that the existence of more than one sector and 
the recognition that, within any sector, negotiation will take place only periodically in the
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future, means that there is a forward-looking element in wage negotiations. In the absence 
of perfect foreseight, this ensures that expectation formation is important, and indicates 
that simple announcements of future policy by government could have an impact on 
current wage settlements if the announcements were believed. In the simulation exercise 
of section 7.2, expectations on aggregate wages, on aggregate prices, and on material 
costs were shown to be extremely important in the process of adjustment as captured by 
our model of the UK economy, with these expectation-based feedbacks being at least as 
important as those caused by the actual changes in these variables. The implication of this 
finding is that, if the government could exert influence on the process of expectation 
formation, then this would provide a useful policy instrument for government exactly as 
in the algebraic model.
The simple algebraic model of chapter 2 provides some insights into the 
consequences of inertia, but it is recognised that this is a relatively simple model, in 
which nominal shocks are eventually offset through wage and price adjustment, with the 
real economy experiencing no long term effects. Of course, in reality, the impact of 
shocks in an economy in which inertia is found may have persistent effects, if there are 
structural changes instigated by the shock which reduce the level of output to which the 
economy ultimately returns to one which is below that from which the economy originally 
started. Examples of such effects are provided by the explanations for ‘unemployment 
hysteresis*, as described in section 2. The simulation of section 7.3 provided a graphic 
illustration of this phenomenon, as the imposed incomes policy shock was seen to reduce 
unemployment throughout the remainder of the sample period. One source of this 
hysteresis was identified with the impact of unemployment on aggregate wage 
expectations, as these were found to be moderated only by changes in unemployment 
rates. These issues were further explored in section 7.4 in which a simulation exercise 
was carried out to identify the ‘natural rate’ of unemployment (identified as that rate 
associated with zero price suiprises). In this experiment, we found that large changes in 
unemployment were required to eliminate price suiprises, reflecting the low degree of 
responsiveness of wages to aggregate demand discussed above. In fact, the ‘natural rate’ 
that was identified changed over time, rising from a level of around 1.5% between 1956- 
1967 to 3.5% between 1968-74, to 5.7% over 1975-79, and upto around 7% by 1981. 
Moreover, some 71% of the variability in our (moving average) representation of the 
natural rate was explained by actual unemployment lagged one period, showing a very 
strong hysteresis effect. Gearly the presence of such an effect reinforces the arguements 
for active government intervention in offsetting the effects of adverse shocks to the 
economy.
Finally, we note here that the presence of inertia has been shown to have far- 
reaching consequences not only for the macroeconomy as a whole, but also for the
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structural composition of the economy. The empirical work of chapter 3, for example, 
demonstrated clearly the impact of changes in the inflation rate, and of successive periods 
of incomes policy on wage relativities across industries. Again, in chapter 6, it was noted 
that those industries which respond slowly to changes in costs will face a relatively severe 
profit squeeze in times of inflation compared to those who are able to pass on cost 
increases more rapidly. Changes in the structure of demand are brought about not only 
through changes in relative prices, therefore, but also through the more long term effects 
on investment behaviour across sectors caused by the squeeze on profits. More generally, 
we noted that the estimated employment, price, wage, and output equations of chapter 5 
showed that there is considerable heterogeneity across industries in the responsiveness of 
these variables to changes in their determinants. This means that economy-wide shocks, 
including those that are policy-induced, can have very different repurcussions in the 
different sectors. Such effects were illustrated in the simulation exercises of section 7.5. 
Here we considered the structural consequences of an incomes policy shock and of a 
hypothesised scheme for increasing investment, and showed the wide disparities in 
reaction to the shocks across a simple four sector classification of the industries of our 
disaggregated model. Moreover, because of the dynamics of the model, and because of 
the complexity of the interactions between sectors, we noted that some evidence of 
structural change was still apparent some eight years after the imposition of the shock.
These results, I believe, provide some support for the interventionists case, and in 
particular, the work has demonstrated a useful role for some form of incomes policy. The 
empirical work of chapters 3 and 4 showed that the successive periods of incomes policy 
in the past had a significant impact on wage setting behaviour, especially on the timing of 
wage settlements. The algebraic model of chapter 2 was employed in chapter 4 to 
illustrate some of the possibilities for policy measures in this area. For example, if the 
government were able to reduce negotiation costs (through legislative change affecting 
bargaining institutions, for example, or through an incomes policy which reduced the 
bargaining zone, and hence the scope for disagreement), then this would clearly reduce 
the degree of inertia, and limit the pain involved for the macroeconomy in adjusting to 
shocks. Alternatively, the government could accept the degree of inertia faced by 
individual firms, but attempt to manipulate this inertia to the benefit of the economy. 
Hence, a simple illustration is provided in which adjustment costs are reduced because the 
government is assumed to be able to time its policy implementation to coincide better 
with the wage setting decisions of the private sector. Equally, a policy designed to take 
out the stagger from wage bargaining, possibly by increasing negotiation costs, would 
result in a reduced adjustment cost for the economy as a whole, as a more complete 
adjustment to any shock could be made by each unit when entering into wage
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negotiations (recognising that others are simultaneously renegotiating wages elsewhere in 
the economy). In both of these latter cases, the gains to be obtained come from the 
manipulation of the timing of wage setting, and, as the empirical work of the thesis has 
demonstrated, incomes policy provides a realistic means of achieving this aim.
On a related theme, we have noted on a number of occassions the potential gains 
to be achieved through the use of guidelines on pay and incomes, especially as they affect 
the process of expectation formation and wage-wage comparabilities. These could have an 
effect both on nominal rigidities (given the backward looking nature of the equations 
explaining expectation formation in the applied work) and, in the light of the discussion 
of unemployment changes on expectations, on real rigidities. Throughout the work, we 
have noted the possibility, following Taylor (1983a), of making expectations formation 
more ‘rational* through the provision of a credible and widely-available forecasting 
service provided by government. This could complement the introduction of legislation 
designed to alter wage-fixing institutions to improve the performance of the 
macroeconomy. One example of such change that has been cited is Meade’s suggestion of 
‘almost-compulsory arbitration*. Such a system would be likely to reduce the bargaining 
zone involved in wage negotiations, and hence reduce inertia. Further, by identifying the 
promotion of employment growth as an important criterion on which wage claims would 
be judged, this sytem would provide a means by which some of the wider implications of 
wage setting decisions could be ‘internalised’ by individual decision makers, improving 
the responsiveness of industrial wages to local demand conditions. And the provision of 
guidelines for wage increases, either stated explicitly or inferred from the decisions on 
disputes taken to the Arbitral body, would provide an important source of information on 
which to base expectations on current and future aggregate price developments.
Apart from these suggestions on the usefulness of policies directed at wage and 
prices setting, the work of this thesis indicates also that the presence of rigidities provides 
the scope for effective demand management policies, offsetting shocks which would 
otherwise involve protracted and painful adjustment, at the least, and which may result in 
persistently higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of output. It is suggested that 
such policy would be most effective if it was seen as part of an industrial strategy for pay 
and employment which explicitly takes into account the heterogeneity in supply side 
relationships shown across industries. This strategy would involve sophisticated linkages 
which tie expansionary policy measures, aimed at sectors most likely to generate extra 
jobs, with the implementation of the sort of policies on wages and prices which have 
been suggested for limiting the inflationary consequences of these measures. Only if the 
policies on pay and employment creation are coordinated in this way can policy makers 
ensure that the benefits of the policies are not offset by the complicated intersectoral 
interactions instigated by sectors’ adjustment to policy.
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Our understanding of the operation of the supply side of the economy has 
improved rapidly in recent years, as high unemployment has directed much academic 
attention to the issue. However, the reliance on theory based on abstract, stylised models, 
and on empirical work based at the aggregate level may have obscured some of the detail 
of the adjustment process. Explicit analysis of union behaviour, labour market institutions 
and the interactions of individuals across industries, occupations and regions seems 
essential in building a more sophisticated understanding of the workings of the labour 
market. More work at a lower level of disaggregation may provide the scope for the 
development of more imaginative and informed policies to defeat unemployment This 
thesis should be viewed as an attempt to encourage work in this direction.
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NOTES
Chapter 2
(1) Put briefly, the NRH argues that there is no money illusion and that agents base 
their decisions on relative price movements only. Assuming that prices and 
quantities are determined at each point in time in competitive equilibrium, this 
means that only one level of employment can be generated in the labour market if 
all agents are fully informed. In the short run it is feasible that employment might 
not be at this "natural" level since agents may form incorrect expectations of the 
relevant price level, and set nominal wages at an inappropriate level. This is not 
possible in the long run however, when expected prices are assumed to be equal to 
actual ones. Attempts by governments to raise employment beyond the natural level 
would therefore fail in the long run and show only in increased inflation.
(2) In the 1973 paper, Lucas sets out an algebraic interpretation of Friedman’s analysis 
which illustrates that in this framework there will be a trade-off between the degree 
of price variability in an economy and the responsiveness of the level of activity to 
government policy. As an indirect test of this idea, he considers 18 countries, 
estimating for each the relationship between output (relative to trend levels) and 
growth in nominal income. From here, he is able to plot price variability against the 
responsiveness of output to policy (as given by the size of the coefficient on 
nominal income growth in his estimated equations) for each country. Lucas finds 
that there is indeed some evidence for the predicted trade-off, with output 
responsiveness in stable-price economies shown to be higher than in volatile-price 
countries, although the reliance of the results on two outlying volatile-price 
countries reduces the impact of these results.
Barro’s empirical work on the US, and the equivalent studies of Attfield, 
Demery and Duck for the UK, provided more direct evidence in support of the 
"policy-is-ineffective" arguments by employing a two-stage method which attempts 
to quantify explicitly the unanticipated component of government policy. So, for 
example, in Barro (1977) the growth in US money is explained in terms of the level 
of government expenditure relative to normal, lagged unemployment, and recent 
money growth rates. The residuals from this first stage regression are then used as a 
measure of unanticipated monetary policy in a subsequent regression analysis of 
unemployment. The finding that this unanticipated policy helped to explain 
unemployment levels, while the anticipated element of money growth did not, was
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seen as good evidence in support of the theoretical models of Lucas, and Sargent 
and Wallace (LSW).
(3) For example, debate on the validity of the assumption of the neutrality and super- 
neutrality of money, see Buiter (1980), questioned the underlying base of the
Natural Rate Hypothesis. Equally, there have been numerous criticisms of the
assumption that agents form expectations rationally (see, for example, Pesaran 
(1988)). Others chose to present their arguments woridng within the LSW 
framework, however, modifying some of the less realistic assumptions made in their 
stylised models. Examples of this approach are given by Weiss (1980), or Begg 
(1982), in which the importance of the assumptions on information sets in the LSW 
models are highlighted. In the first of these, an active feedback rule for money 
growth is shown to be superior to a constant x% growth rate rule when "capitalists" 
are assumed to know the profitability of investment one period in advance, while 
"workers" learn of it only in the current period. In the second, the informational 
advantage that the government may hold over workers, who have less access to up- 
to-date information, is used to demonstrate another situation in which active 
government policy can be used to influence real magnitudes.
(4) Substituting (3) into (1) and (2) gives
p = X [  |Xp(-l) + (l-p)w ] + (1-A,)m
w = x[ rjw(-l) + (l-ri)p ] + (l-x)m
where X  = (1+a)"*, and x = (1+p)”*. High values of \l and X  emphasise the 
backward-looking nature of wages and prices within the square brackets. Further, as 
a,p ->0, then X,x -»1, and the influence of the square bracket is increased relative 
to the current money supply.
(5) While I will make some reference to the determinants of the responsiveness of the 
price markup (i.e. the value of a) later in section 2.3 and in chapter 5, the focus of 
my attention will be on real rigidities generated in the labour market.
(6) This is given some empirical credence by Cecchetti (1985) who finds that the 
frequency of price change in the US (derived from observations on the dispersion of 
inflation over sectors of the economy) rises during periods of high inflation.
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(7) Such a smoothing may be justified in an ad hoc way on the grounds of aggregation 
over many small discrete movements.
(8) While these models provide a useful insight into the effects of lump sum costs for 
individual firms, it is important to recognise that the results obtained do not 
necessarily provide simple conclusions for the aggregate economy. Rotemberg
(1987) points out that if the aggregate price level is growing at a constant rate, there 
may be an equilibrium in which the "average" firm’s price rises at the given 
aggregate rate even though there exist some firms whose price is unaltered. This has 
serious implications for the policy interventionist since the presence of fixed prices 
is in this case quite consistent with policy neutrality. Such possibilities are shown to 
be very sensitive to the assumption of monotonic growth in aggregate prices, 
however, and would be eliminated either if this growth rate altered, or if there was 
a once-and-for-all shift in the aggregate price level (since this would effect the 
distribution of firms at different stages of the adjustment process). Hence, while the 
BSW model provides a useful indication of the consequences of adjustment costs 
for the frequency of individual price movements, care must be taken in extrapolating 
individual firms’ strategies to those of the economy as a whole.
(9) For a more detailed consideration of influence of these variables on strike behaviour, 
see Shorey (1976), or Blanchflower and Cubbin (1984).
(10)This methodology is explained in Heckman (1979).
(11)See, for example Azariades (1975), Baily (1974) or Hart (1983) for discussion of 
the implicit contracts literature. Also see Pissarides (1985), and Solow (1979) for 
reviews on search and efficiency wage models.
(12) See, for example Oswald’s (1982) consideration of the ’utilitarian’ union or Booth’s 
(1984) analysis of the influence of the organisational structure of the trade union.
(13) A similar approach is taken in Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983) and in Carruth 
and Oswald (1986).
(14) See, for example, Brenner’s (1979) paper in which Keynes’ view is explained in 
terms of workers’ concept of justice.
(15) Wage rigidity in this context does not refer just to the inflexibility of real wages in
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the face of shifts in demand for the firm’s output as discussed above. Indeed, the 
extreme case of insider power might be characterised through an indifference curve 
mapping for the union in which indifference curves are vertical at the the level of 
employment achieved in the previous period. In this case, an increase in the demand 
for labour shows entirely in a rise in real wages and employment levels are 
completely unresponsive. Here, however, we refer to the lack of responsiveness of 
real wages to the presence of external pressures, as well as to internal pressures of 
the type more generally considered. For example, we noted above the possibility 
that aggregate demand expansion may create upward (external) pressure on real 
wages as reduced unemployment levels raise unions’ fallback wages. If wages are 
set independently of local labour market circumstances, then this path of influence 
from aggregate demand to real wage levels is closed down, and the policy 
implications of real wage rigidities described earlier will apply exactly as they 
would in the case of inflexibilities in the face of internal pressures.
(16) It should be noted that, in the context of the hysteresis debate, the persistence of 
high unemployment levels follows from the fact that higher levels will have 
correspondingly higher numbers of long-term unemployed, who effectively raise the 
natural rate of unemployment.
(17) An additional requirement for such an assumption to be justified is that the decision 
to negotiate is ‘memory-less* in the sense that past decisions do not impinge on the 
current decision. If this were not the case, then the timing of past settlements would 
effect the current decision, and the assumption would be justified only if 
negotiations were synchronised.
(18) By setting 7Cat+j = we abstract from the disaggregated nature of wage/price
setting to some extent, although the accumulation of inertia across sectors is 
accomodated in the coefficients E, F, and G in (2.9).
(19)If 1 > b(2 - ea(l + ea)‘b(g2 * £i)» then X^  lies in [0,1], and the solution in the text 
is appropriate. If b is large, however, then Xj < -1, and X2 > 1, and no convergent 
solution to (2.9) exists.
(20) Similar conclusions are noted in Buiter and Miller (1985) in the context of 
continuous time models. Again, it is recognised that if expectations are formed 
rationally, a disinflation package can be successfully implemented with no output 
costs, even in the presence of price-level inertia. Output costs will arise only in the
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presence of inertia in the inflation process, as generated by the existence of fixed- 
length, staggered contracts, but these can be minimised by the announcement of 
(credible) future disinflation programmes.
(21) Benefits will also be gained from this change if, as a result, real wage aspirations 
are also formed on more relevant and more complete information.
(22) Brown (1988) makes a strong case for a policy involving more centralised 
bargaining achieved not through a more coordinated union movement, but through a 
more powerful employer confederation. His argument is that an equality of strength 
is a prerequisite for any sort of "negotiated incomes policy" since this would make 
restraint on the union side more feasible, and would make the arrangement less 
dependent on the presence of a government which is sympathetic to the union 
movement.
Chapter 3
(1) Hamermesh’s ideas on informal indexing would also be captured explicitly in the 
model by allowing the coefficients y  and a  to adjust with the level of inflation 
uncertainty.
(2) Some recent attempts have been made to address the issue of what determines n 
empirically, as noted in chapter 2; see for example, Pencavel (1982) and 
Christofides (1985). From these, it is clear that industries do face different 
negotiation costs, so that in reality 7Cjt *7Cjt, i *j. Further, it is likely that 7Ujt is itself 
dependent on yjt.
(3) Of course, the convergence of industry-specific yj’s to unity as informal indexation 
occurs remains an alternative possible explanation.
(4) Wage rates rather than earnings series would be more appropriate to the analysis 
here, but such series are not available in the detail required. Information on actual 
and normal hours worked are available by industrial sector, however, so that the 
figures could be adjusted to obtain a reasonable approximation to the wage rate 
series, (the adjustment is described in Layard and Nickell (1985)). Results obtained 
with the adjusted data were very similar to those presented, however, and are
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therefore not reported.
(5) Of course, ’proportional’ policies may effect wage growth variability if the stated 
maximum becomes influential in the calculations of a target rate of wage growth for 
many sectors.
(6) See for some recent discussion on these issues Jackman and Roper (1987), Wood
(1988), and Jackman and Kan (1988).
(7) The insignificance of unanticipated price change indicates that y  is close to zero, and 
that wages are set in accordance with anticipated price change only.
(8) It has been noted that there are two extreme values in the wage growth series in 
1974(2) and 1975(1). Calculation of the "leverage” and the D-statistics (see Cook 
(1979)) for these observations shows them to be close to the ’rule-of-thumb’ border­
line for acceptability in terms of their (disproportionate) influence on the estimated 
relations. On the other hand, these periods were ones in which record levels of 
inflation occurred so that one would expect them to provide more information than 
observations in other periods, and certainly a priori there are no legitimate reasons 
for their exclusion from the sample.
Chapter 4
(1) Note that a  and ‘costs’ could be assumed to be constant over the period between 
negotiations, while changes in w might be adequately proxied by changes in p; 
changes in these terms will disappear in the explanation of negotiation frequency in 
this chapter therefore.
(2) The analysis presented in Danziger, as in the Sheshinski and Weiss papers, assumes 
monotonic growth in aggregate inflation, as more sophisticated assumptions on the 
time path of aggregate prices greatly complicates the optimal strategy (specifically, 
more than two parameters are required with more sophisticated time paths for the 
aggregate deflator, as the s,S bounds themselves vary over time in this case). 
Clearly unless the unanticipated shocks are small relative to the expected average 
growth rate, this assumption may be violated, and the clear cut results of Danziger 
and Sheshinski and Weiss will no longer hold. Even here, however, one can assert
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that a related strategy, in which negotiations occur only when real wages fall to a 
critical limit, is likely to hold. Hence in the real world, it is likely that only those
shocks which reduce the real wage below that which was bargained for will cause
wage negotiations to occur.
(3) In this, and the next section, we will restrict our attention to simple movements in 
labour market influences between the current period and some previous period, even 
though, as noted in the illustration of section 2.5 of chapter 2, the negotiable wage 
in any period, Zj, is not determined just by current values of these variables, but by 
the entire set of past, present, and expected future values of these variables weighted 
according to their relevance to the period over which would hold. Obviously, on 
this basis, changes in the negotiable wage would be correctly measured by the 
change in the whole profile of past, present, and expected future values of labour 
market variables from one negotiation to the next However, it is clear that correctly 
modelling the expected future movements of all relevant influences will be difficult 
and time-consuming, even ignoring the difficulties of finding the appropriate (and 
possibly changing) weights, so that this ’correct* measure will not be used. In fact 
so long as the weightings do not alter too greatly over time and there are few jumps
in then (Xt-Xt_s) will serve as an adequate proxy, although we stress the
limitations of this measure, particularly in this section where we are working in a 
linear setting with (Xt-Xt_s) further proxied by (Xt-Xt^ )  and Tt.
(4) F-tests of the joint significance of changes in real GDP (Agdp), in direct and 
indirect taxes (Adt, Ait), and in the replacement ratio (Areprat), along with profit 
levels, strike activity, and trade union membership are given below for each of the 
uncertainty measures used:
UNCERT1: F = 0.706, UNCERT2: F = 0.766, UNCERT3: F = 0.642 
all of which are to be compared with F7 19.
Where aggregate demand change is alternatively measured by changes in 
world trade (Awdtd), in competitiveness (Acomp), and in government spending (Ag), 
the F-statistics are
UNCERT1: F = 0.684, UNCERT2: F = 0.649, UNCERT3: F = 0.574 
each of which is compared to Fg yj.
(5) This table replicates some of the information given in Table 3.2 of the previous 
chapter, but provides the quarterly timings of the policies, and pays more attention 
to the policies involving proportional guidelines.
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(6) F-tests of the significance of UNCERT1, UNCERT2, and UNCERT3 are given by F 
= 0.268, F = 0.772, and F = 1.495 respectively, e ach compared to F ^ g .  F-tests on 
the joint significance of the five variables excluded from column (1) of Table 4.3 to 
achieve column (3) are F = 1.563, F = 1.991, and F = 3.007, to be compared with
f5,26-
(7) Equivalent tests to those shown in note 4 on the extended data set are
UNCERT1: F = 1.604, UNCERT2: F = 0.711, UNCERT3: F = 1.001 
to be compared with F-7,818, and
UNCERT1: F = 1.267, UNCERT2: F = 0.416, UNCERT3: F = 0.678 
to be compared with Fg gj^.
(8) F-tests of the restrictions implied in the move from column (1) to (2) in Table 4.5 
are F = 8.727, F = 3.273, and F = 0.133 for UNCERT1, UNCERT2, and 
UNCERT3 respectively (each compared to F | §25)- F-tests of the restrictions 
implied in the move from column (1) to (3) in the table are F = 2.579, F = 3.122, 
and F = 8.263, to be compared with F5 g25-
(9) Tests of the joint significance of the cost variables and the exogenous aggregate 
demand measures (Acomp and Ag) are given below for uncertainty measure 
UNCERT1:
L = 3216.84 - 3207.07 = 9.77, cf. x2(7).
(10) A likelihood test of the restriction Oj = a^, where (Xj and are the coefficients on 
the change in indirect and direct tax rates respectively, is given by
L = 2(log likelihood with Adt and Ait entered separately)
- 2(log likelihood with (Adt + Ait) entered)
= 0.85, cf. x2d).
(11)The use of incomes policy dummies C1,C2,..C5 in place of C1INC,C2INC,..C5INC 
leaves the results of the regression analysis qualitatively unchanged.
(12) An equivalent test to that in note (9) for the model including drepi is
L = 3185.75 - 3191.08 = 6.67, cf. x2(7).
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Chapter 5
(1) So, for example, we have noted that the unresponsiveness of real wages to demand 
shifts (i.e. real wage rigidity) is most important in determining the speed of supply 
side adjustment We have seen how demand shifts may influence labour demand 
and, hence, wage bargaining through its effects on the labour demand constraint. 
Equally, there are indirect effects experienced as unemployment consequences (fail 
to) feed through to wage decisions. A sophisticated model is necessary to capture all 
of these important paths through which influences might be exerted.
(2) The "normal cost" pricing hypothesis is one such theory.
(3) Oswald (1982), or Booth (1984), provide examples of the former approach.
(4) Moreover, in recognising the wide variety of paths of influence that can exist in the 
disaggregated model, this description casts some doubt on the power of some of the 
tests that have been used to discriminate between the ‘efficient bargain* models and 
those in which firms locate on their labour demand schedules. This follows because 
these tests rely on the (in)significance of the external factors in applied worie, 
working within a much more tightly defined labour market framework than that 
described here, with fewer potentially important paths of influence. (A similar point 
is made in Burgess and Delado (1989), who introduce further paths of influence to 
those envisaged by the standard models through variable adjustment costs incurred 
as employment levels are altered).
(5) On a related issue, we note here that the price of material inputs to an industry, q, 
is calculated in this work using prices of domestic product to the home market by 
industry and the 1979 input- output tables (again see the Data Appendix for further 
details). It is acknowledged here that the use of a single set of input-output tables to 
obtain the weights for the use of the material input price measure will introduce 
some inaccuracies since this assumes that material inputs are used in the same 
proportions throughout the sample period. This eliminates by assumption the 
possibility of substituting one material input for another as their relative price alters. 
To the extent that such changes occur continuously over time, these effects may be 
picked up by the time trend.
Finally, we should note also the inclusion of a time trend in the output 
demand equation, (5.15). This is again included to provide the model with additional 
flexibility, this time picking up the possible effects of changes in tastes and non-
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quantifiable changes in product quality which occur continuously over time.
(6) There has been some interest shown in the literature on the appropriate procedures 
to apply in the estimation of models involving expectations (see, for example, Pagan 
(1984)). In particular, there has been some criticism of the "two-stage" procedures 
employed in the early applied work, and indeed subsequently, in this area. In this, 
the first stage (OLS) regression is used to explain the variable on which 
expectations are formed, and the expectation of the variable is then identified as the 
fitted value of this regression. The fitted values are used in a subsequent (OLS) 
regression of the relationship of interest involving the expected variable. This 
procedure has been criticised on the grounds that its coefficient estimates are 
inefficient if some of the second stage regressors are excluded from the first stage 
information set, although consistency is achieved. Moreover, since the error term in 
the second stage consists of two elements (one of the usual form plus an "error-in- 
measurement" term introduced through the use of the generated regressor rather than 
the true expected value), the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the second 
stage regression coefficients obtained through OLS will generally be inconsistent, 
and inferences based on these therefore invalid. The use of 2SLS or IV estimation 
techniques can eliminate this problem, however, although again it is assumed that 
the second stage regressors form part of the first stage information set.
Despite these difficulties, a two-stage estimation procedure is appropriate 
here. One of the primary means of interaction between sectors may be, as we saw 
in Chapter 2, through individuals’ expectations of what others are about to do. 
These expectations may be based on incomplete information, based on simple 
aggregates of the disaggregated data, for example, and this may have important 
implications for supply side adjustment Both of these elements are incorporated into 
this model through the use of expected aggregate wages and prices in the industrial 
relationships. It is of course important that we constrain all individuals to have the 
same view of the expected variables (since to allow industry-specific expectations 
would make the model unwieldy). Moreover, in order to identify, and simulate, the 
important feedbacks that affect supply-side adjustment, we need to be able to 
consider and model the way in which expectation formation itself is influenced by 
supply-side developments. It is for this reason that we generate series for expected 
aggregate wages and prices.
As we shall see, IV techniques are employed in the subsequent analysis of 
the industrial systems, but in these the generated regressors are used, and not the 
actual values for aggregate wages and prices (as suggested in the literature). This is 
justified if one assumes that the true expected variables are equal to the generated
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regressors apart from random errors (with zero mean). This assumption does not 
have the support of the theoretical argument that the actual value of the variable 
must deviate unsystemmatically from the expected value (if these are formed 
rationally), but is made so that the expectation formation process can be identified 
explicitly. Having made this assumption, the use of IV techniques ensures the 
consistency of the estimated parameters.
(7) The results in Table 5.2 are not homogenous in price inflation, and indeed the 
imposition of homogeneity was not accepted by the data. While this is perhaps 
surprising, we felt that homogeneity should not be imposed on this equation for this 
reason. Of course, these equations reflect the process by which expectations are 
formed and not the determination of actual wage and price levels. As we shall see, 
price homogeneity is imposed in the industrial price and wage equations in which 
the actual levels are determined.
(8) Price homogeneity is rejected in industries 7 (Tobacco), 8 (Coal prds), 11 (Iron), 12 
(Mon-ferrous mets), 13 (Mech. eng), 18 (Aerospace), 22 (Leather, etc), 23 (Bricks), 
at the 5% level, and rejected at the 1% level in industries 1 (Agric.), 2 (Coal), 24 
(Timber).
(9) On this theme, and perhaps raising doubts about this explanation, it is interesting to
note that those industries for which price homogeneity was rejected appear to be
ones which would be placed at the beginning of the chain of production, producing 
goods for intermediate rather than final demand.
(10) The exclusion restrictions are rejected at the 5% level in industries 1 (Agric.), 2
(Coal), 14 (Inst, eng.), 15 (Elec. eng.), 16 (Ships), 17 (Motor vehs), and rejected at
the 1% level in industries 12 (Non-ferr. mets), 18 (Aerospace), 19 (Other vehs.), 20 
(Metal gds nes), 21 (Textiles), 22 (Leather, etc), 23 (Bricks), 35 (Communications).
(11) Before coming to a discussion of the estimates themselves, I should note that there 
were some industries for which convergence in estimation was more problematic 
than others; this is of interest since later we will wish to use these estimated 
systems for (dynamic) simulation purposes, and so we should be aware, before 
starting this exercise, of those industries which might cause problems. Specifically, 
while the great majority of industries achieved convergence in the minimisation of 
the objective function within ten to fifteen iterations (using a convergence criterion 
of 0.001 in their estimation), industries 7 (Tobacco), 18 (Aerospace), 34 (Oth.
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transport), and 37 (Bus. serv.) took considerably longer. Industries 7 and 37 
achieved the convergence criterion in 27 and 37 iterations respectively, but 
industries 18 and 34 had still failed to converge after 40 iterations (their respective 
movements in their final iteration equalled 0.06 and 0.006). Industry 18 (Aerospace) 
is clearly most problematic, and inspection of the statistics in Table 5.8 for this 
industry show the estimated demand equation to be the source of the problems, with 
a zero for this equation. Of course, this industry is in its relative infancy, so that 
there may have been some justification for its exclusion from the sample as with 
industry 4, Petroleum and Natural Gas. However, the employment, price and wage 
equations appear to perform adequately for this industry, so I have included their 
estimates in the reported results. Care must obviously be taken in their interpretation 
and subsequent use however.
(12) It should be noted that the aggregate studies have usually considered the estimation 
of 'Teduced-foim" employment equations, where the output term has been 
substituted out (so that we would expect the wage elasticity to be higher). 
Nevertheless, the discrepancy between the wage elasticities obtained in aggregate 
and disaggregate studies seems large, and certainly warrants further attention.
(13)Johnson (1972, ppl60-62) explains the circumstances in which potentially large and 
opposite errors might arise in the estimation of coefficients on collinear explanatory 
variables.
(14) The point was made in chapter two that incomes policy, aimed at reducing wage 
pressure on prices, can have only a gradual influence since relatively large 
reductions in the rate of growth of wages are necessary to obtain significant effects 
on the overall rate of inflation at any one stage, given the low proportion of value 
added from labour inputs.
(15)These results are in contrast with those reported in Nickell and Kong (1987) who 
estimated industrial wage equations in a related, though different, framework to that 
developed in this chapter. In their paper, an "internal productivity" term, of a similar 
form to INT, showed significantly in all equations. However, the influence of 
aggregate wages is constrained to enter the Nickell and Kong specification in a 
different way to that considered here, so that direct comparisons cannot be made. 
The disparity in results illustrates the sensitivity of the estimates to model 
specification, however, and emphasises the care that has to be taken in 
accommodating the influence of aggregate developments in disaggregate work.
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(16) The presence of a slight positive influence of local unemployment on industrial 
wage determination is also reported in Nickell and Kong (1987) and in Beckerman 
and Jenkinson (1989). These note that this may in fact provide some support for the 
insider-outsider scenario, as rising unemployment may reduce the number of insiders 
and this may result in upward pressure on subsequent wage demands.
(17)This is beyond its influence on we of course. Note that tj, the employer tax rate, 
was seen to influence wc, but does not add to the fit of the industrial equations, 
while 13, the indirect tax rate, has not shown significantly in any of these equations.
Chapter 6
(1) Note that the discussion here considers the estimated coefficients of the equations 
irrespective of significance levels. The equations set out in the previous chapter 
represent our preferred representation of the price setting process and its dynamics. 
Different dynamics would be obtained if a monotonic adjustment was imposed by 
including just one ldv, although in the case where a second ldv is insignificant, the 
differences would not be large.
(2) It is recognised that because the k measures are derived from the price equations 
estimated in the first stage of the analysis, some prior information exists on the 
precision of the measures through the estimated standard errors of these equations. 
This information might be incorporated into a GLS regression analysis at this stage 
(see Winter’s (1981) criticism of Domberger’s (1979) work). It has been noted 
already, however, that the measures used here may only be sufficiently accurate to 
be used as indicators of an industry’s characteristics, and in these circumstances, 
such sophistication seems misplaced. Moreover, the measure of inertia used here (=rc 
= weighted accumulation of the (square) deviation of actual prices from target in the 
face of a shock) is a complicated function of the estimated coefficients of the price 
equations, so that the implied variance-covariance matrix to be used in GLS is not 
at all clear. For these reasons, simple OLS regression analysis has been employed.
(3) Of course, these interactions between variables can also be investigated when 
working with categorical data through a log-linear transformation of the problem. 
However, given that information is already lost (through working with categorical 
data), and given the complexities of the sequence of tests that need to be considered
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in log-linear models, a sample of size 22 is simply inadequate to carry out such an 
investigation.
(1) The equations estimated here are used primarily to obtain a model of the U.K. 
supply side which will provide some quantitative information on the importance of 
inter-industry feedbacks. The equations of chapter 5 are preferred as statistical 
representations of the industrial relationships.
(2) Of the 17 industries in which the overall fit is significantly reduced, two are at the 
5% level (industries 12 and 25), and twelve are at the 1% level (1, 5, 6, 8, 15, 18, 
19, 24, 30-36).
(3) We have already discussed the difficulties involved in measuring and using sectoral 
unemployment data in Chapter 3.
(4) Experiments were carried out using alternative assumptions on the split between 
jobs taken up by those previously employed within the industry and the rest. These 
made little qualitative difference to the results.
(5) It is precisely this element of indeterminacy that it is suggested could be 
manipulated by a centralised, coordinating wage setting body in the conclusions to 
the analysis of section 7.2.
(6) Again it requires knowledge of the process by which expectations are formed to 
understand whether any combination of (o, z, I)  is able to ensure no wage or price 
surprises. The assumption of perfect foresight once more provides a useful 
illustration, since under this assumption the industrial systems themselves provide 
the basis on which expectations are formed. From (x) it is noted that
Chapter 7
so that 
and hence
w - p = C + YjCw6-^ )  + (p^p) + Y4Z + Da
we - p6 = C + YiC^-p0) + Y4Z + Da
we - = C/O-Yj) + [Y4/OYi)]z + [D/(1-Yj)]a
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Equally, taking expectations through (v) provides
we - P® = -Po ■ P20
These two equations provide a relationship linking the variables (a, z, T), and in 
this case there is a unique, "natural” level of demand for any (z, T) combination. 
Clearly, where there is less than perfect foresight, the model is unlikely to have this 
property.
(7) By considering changes in the "natural" rate of unemployment between four selected 
intervals (1956-66, 1967-74, 1975-79, and 1980-83), Layard and Nickell (1985) 
employ a similar smoothing exercise.
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APPENDIX
Appendix to Chapter 2 
We can write E(xat - xQt) and E(lat - lQt) as follows:
E(xat ” xoP = ^  1 2 (za t " Wbt-P " xot^
+ Icbt I i <zat - zbt) - xotl
+ (1 - nft+l) ( d  - *lt>d - *!t+i) I i (zat - wbt-l>'  xotl
+"bt 0  - *lt> 1 5 <zat - zbP - xotl
+ ngt+1 [ 5 (zat - zt+l> 1 )
= ( K t  - xot> ( 1 + (1 - "ft+l) + O - *ft+l>d - "lt+2> +
+ ( -  i wbt.]) { (1 - itgt) + (1 - i t |t)(l - Jt|t+l)d '  "bt+l>
+ ( -  i zb t ) ( "bt + " l td  ‘ "lt+l>d - "lt+ l) +  )
= (5 zat - xot> pd) + ( '  i  wbt-l> pd ) + (- i  4 t  > pd ) + -
while
E(!at - lot) = (mt + ut) + d  - " It+ d K + l + uf+l> +
d - "!t+l)d - "at+2)(mf+2 + u?+2> + -•
+ [ - 5 d - Y)(zat' W  1 p(d + [ - 5 d - Y)wbt-i ] p(2) + 
[ - i d -  Y)zbt 1 p(3) + -
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In deriving (2.9) in the text, we first note that the expected time path of aggregate 
wages is given by:
(0 wt_! =
(ii) wf
(iii) wf+1 =
... etc.
where we recall that 7rfjt+j = 7c^ t+j, and expectations are formed on the basis of the 
Government’s (impoverished) data set, in which the outcome of neither union’s decision 
on whether to negotiate in time t is known, as described in the text.
Next, expressions for z®t and z |t+j are derived simply from (2.8): z |t can be seen 
immediately as the RHS of (2.8), with the ‘e’ superscript denoting expectations formed on 
the basis of the Government’s information set, while z®t+j is obtained by simply 
rewriting (2.8) in time t+1 and taking expectations. Exactly equivalent expressions can of 
course be obtained for zj^ and z^t+j, and since these expectational terms are all based on 
the same information set, they will be directly comparable. Substitution of these 
expressions into (i), (ii), and (iii) above provides us with (2.9).
To obtain the linearised version of the wage equation discussed in the text, we 
first write = mt + ot - [ 1Q - (1 - 0)0"*(1 + y) xQ ], and then use (2.9) to define the 
following
Z(wt+1, wt, Wj.j) = wt+1 - Fwt - Ewj.j - Guj = 0
i (wat-i + wbt-l>
(1 - jc|t)(l - Jtgt) \  (Wat.! + Wjjt.j) + 7tgt(l - 7tft) k (wat_! + zgj)
+ "at<' ■ " it) j <wb t - i + zIt> + "It " it  5 (z!t+ zit>
1 (1 - Jt|t) (wat. j  + wbt_i) + 1 Jt|t (z |t+ zgt)
5 (1 - *StXl - tcft+l) (Wat. l  + Wbt.j) + I It|t(l - 1t|t+ l) (z |t+ zgt)
+ 5 "lt+i<zi t + i + zit+i>
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The Taylor Series expansion of Z around the point w provides the following 
approximation for Z:
Z = Z(w, w, w) + (5Z/5wt+1)l^(wt+1-w) + (5Z/5wt)l-(wt-w) + 
(SZ/Sw^l^Cw^-w)
If probabilities are given by (2.10), then noting, for example, that 
5F = 20b tc2(2-7c)
and that
5w*
nlw
(1+Y)(1-7C), 
exp( a + b{w-w} ) = e‘
1 + ec1 + exp( a + b{w-w) ) 
this expansion provides the linear approximation given in the text
If the dynamic time path of wages is described by the linearised version of (2.9) 
given in the text, then the derivation of the solution for wages in the face of a general 
form describing the evolution of money over the future is provided below. Here, noting 
that with expectations formed rationally we can write
W, = wf + £lt
tWt+l = Wt+1 +
where E(ejt /  Govt, info set) = 0 
E(£2t /  Govt, info set) = 0 
and putting <ot =wt.j,  we can rewrite (2.9) in the text as
n S
elt 
^ t
"®t+l = ‘ o 1 '© t  ' +
" o o  0
- twt+l - .E F  . - wt ■ . G -F 1 .
co.
wt J
+ r  Qt
In this form, the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) methodology for the solution of 
linear difference models is applicable; oOj is a pre-determined variable in the sense that its
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current value cannot respond to ’news’ becoming available in time t, while wt is non­
predetermined. With F and E as given, there exist two real and distinct roots to the 
characteristic equation of (2.9), Xj and one of which is greater then unity, and one of 
which lies between zero and one. This ensures the existence of the following unique 
solution:
©t =
and
w, =
(o0
B i i A'iB i i " lfl)t - i  +  r iQ t- i  ■
^  11^ 1^12 + B 12^2^ 22) C22‘*(term in discounted future
forcing variables)
- ^ 22* ^ 21©^  - ^ 2 2 * (term *n discounted future
forcing variables)
, t = 0
, t > 0
(A2.1)
, t > 0
(A2.2)
where the "term in discounted future forcing variables" is 
“  -i-l/rv ,-riio  ^2"" (C21r l + C22r 2)Q t+i’
and
C = C11 C12 II1
U B11 B12 , and CAC"* =
1
>>
 
1—» 0
 
__
_
1
- C21 C22 - - B21 B22 - L0 X2 J
, Xj>1, ^2<1
While the specifics of this solution may not be important, the form of the solution 
demonstrates the complicated inter-relationship between variables over time, even when 
the probability of negotiation in each period is fixed. Specifically, the nominal wage 
holding last period, wt.j  will depend on some initial condition ©0, on the actual values of 
the forcing variables Qt between tQ and t-1, and on the expectations, formed at each point 
in time s between t and t-1, of all values of Qt beyond s. These influences from the past 
effect the current wage level wt only through their effect on wt_j, although wt is also 
dependent on anticipations of all future values of the forcing variables, i.e. £jt, e^t, u®,
ut+l» -
The ability of government policy to influence real magnitudes is also clearly 
demonstrated by the solution (A2.1) and (A2.2) above. For example, any announcement 
over future money supply changes (or alternatively, over any future changes in the 
exogenous aggregate demand term, a t+j) will generate an immediate response: unions
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recognise that there is a finite probability that they will not negotiate over wages again 
before the future change occurs, and so take into account the consequences of the changes 
in their current negotiations. In our example, an announcement of a future increase in the 
money supply which was previously unanticipated will cause wage rates to rise in the 
current period, and given that firms operate on their demand for labour schedules, (3), at 
each point in time, this will result in a fall in employment
The size of any changes in wages in response to announcements of future money 
supply adjustments will depend on the extent of the adjustment, and the length of time 
until the adjustment will occur. Figure A2.1 illustrates this point; the difference equation 
at (2.10) provides us with one locus of points in wt_j, wt space for which wt_j-wt = 0 
(Wj=0), while the 45° line clearly provides us with another. The line aa is the saddle-path 
provided by our solution at (A2.1) and (A2.2) above; only when the wage lies on aa will 
it converge to the steady-state position at A. Given that wt-1 is a predetermined variable, 
there exists a unique choice of wt which will situate the economy on the convergent path 
aa to ensure that an explosive path for wages is avoided. Now, in Figure A2.2, as an 
example, we consider an announcement at t0 that the money supply will rise in tj. At tj, 
the new saddle-path a’a’ will be appropriate, and at time tQ, wt will jump from the 
previous steady state A to a point B, off the existing saddle-path aa and directly above 
point A with wt_j fixed. Over the period tQ to tj wages will follow the divergent path B 
to C, arriving at point C on the new saddle-path at the time of the money supply change. 
Convergence is ensured as wages now move along a’a’ to the new steady state wages at 
A’. This time path for the wage is shown in Figure A2.3, involving an initial jump and 
then gradual adjustment, first at an increasing rate, then at a decreasing rate. Clearly, the 
presence of a forward-looking element in wage determination, resulting from the existence 
of negotiation probabilities which are less than one, generates complicated time paths for 
wages which will be difficult to recognise and to model econometrically.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
The following demonstrates the derivation of var(wjt) when wages are set 
according to (3.4) of chapter 3, to obtain the expression at (3.5). The derivation of (3.3), 
when wage setting is described by the expression at (3.1), follows simply by setting tc=1.
(3.4) => E(w) = n | (p+ay) g(y) dy, where p = pe + ypu, and y* = -(p/a).
y*«
Hence,
var(w) = % r°°(p+ay)2 g(y) dy - tc2 [ f°°(p+ay) g(y) dy]2
y’fc* y+«
= Ttp2 f°°g(y) dy + 2rcpa f°°y g(y) dy + na2 f °°y2g(y) dy
y^* yit'1' yfc*
- n2[ p f °°g(y) dy + a  f °°y g(y) dy ]2 
= 7C(1-7C){ p2(l-G)2 + 2p(l-G)a f°°y g(y) dy + [a f °°y g(y) dy]2 }
+ 7tp2G(l-G) + 7t2pa f°°y g(v) dy G(l-G) + 7tG(l-G)a2[ f °°y g(v) dy ]2
1-G y**' 1-G
where 1-G = 1-G(y*) = r°°g(y) dy
ySfc*'
= 7C(1-7C)(1-G)2[ p + a  f °°y g(y) dy ]2 + 7t(l-G)a2 var(>0 
y*J l-G
+ tc(1-G)G [ p + a  f°°y g(y) dy ]2 
y* 1-G
= rcO-G^^arty) + tc(1-G)[ 1- rc(l-G) ] { p + a  f°°y g(v) dy }2
y*J 1-G
= 7t(l-G)a2var(y) + tc(1-G)[ 1- 7t(l-G) ] {E(w)}2 
= (3.5)
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Appendix to Chapter 4
Table A4.1
Dependent variables = Pjt: I = (all production industries), 1964i-75iv (n = 48)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Po-Tt
Const 1.371 1.344 0.390 1.719 1.345 0.396
(2.174) (2.455) (5.769) (2.758) (2.455) (5.215)
pit-l -0.373 -0.373 -0.196 -0.444 -0.373 -0.117
(2.502) (2.547) (1.478) (2.841) (2.547) (0.917)
Pit-2 -0.139 -0.142 -0.153 -0.117 -0.142 -0.078
(1.089) (1.165) (1.189) (0.955) (1.165) (0.594)
D74iv 0.578 0.581 0.626 0.524 0.581 0.698
(3.710) (3.843) (4.351) (3.340) (3.843) (4.922)
CATFR1 0.065 0.063 0.097 -0.014 0.063 0.113
(0.362) (0.361) (0.591) (0.076) (0.361) (0.657)
CATFR2 0.209 0.213 0.285 0.267 0.213 0.230
(1.266) (1.353) (1.867) (1.648) (1.353) (1.390)
Xt-Xt_4
Awhpr 2.956 2.889 _ 3.446 2.889 _
(2.473) (3.129) (3.372) (3.129)
Afc -1.228 -1.220 - -1.149 -1.220 -
(1.970) (2.013) (2.326) (2.013)
A prody 1.470 1.498 - 0.380 1.498 -
(0.699) (0.732) (0.171) (0.733)
Ct
stocks -0.055 -0.053 _ -0.074 -0.053 -
(1.368) (1.543) (1.945) (1.543)
un -0.035 -0.036 - -0.019 -0.036 -
(0.727) (0.794) (0.402) (0.794)
qi 0.131 0.128 0.033 0.164 0.128 0.040
(1.707) (1.845) (0.606)) 2.190) (1.845) (0.695)
q2 0.054 0.053 0.013 0.064 0.053 0.003
(0.738) (0:750) (0.233) (0.911) (0.750) (0.048)
q3 -0.047 -0.045 -0.056 -0.047 -0.045 -0.083
(0.804) (0.834) (0.971) (0.881) (0.834) (1.413)
dfl -0.137 -0.139 -0.165 -0.109 -0.139 -0.178
(1.577) (1.708) (2.222) (1.298) (1.708) (2.321)
df2 -0.162 -0.158 -0.172 -0.162 -0.159 -0.194
(1.317) (1.369) (1.772) (1.412) (1.369) (1.923)
(cont...)
Table A4.1 cont.
Cl
C2
C3
C4
C5
0.124
(1.512)
0.173
(1.387)
-0.015
(0.254)
0.178
(1.009)
-0.042
(0.338)
0.124
(1.540)
0.172
(1.412)
-0.016
(0.272)
0.175
(1.030)
-0.042
(0.346)
0.127
(1.778)
0.072
(0.732)
-0.077
(1.422)
-0.103
(1.287)
-0.077
(0.710)
0.158
(1.870)
0.247
(1.822)
0.020
(0.312)
0.215
(1.251)
0.147
(0.752)
0.124
(1.540)
0.172
(1.412)
-0.016
(0.272)
0.175
(1.030)
-0.042
(0.346)
0.077
(1.162)
0.045
(0.442)
-0.096
(1.718)
-0.039
(0.537)
’0.042
(0.210)
x?
UNCERT2
UNCERT3
-0.171
(0.090)
1.998
(1.585)
-0.025
(1.222)
-0.004
(0.201)
RSS 0.340405 0.340510 0.470712 0.321993 0.340510 0.508185
SE 0.1144 0.1123 0.1232 0.1113 0.1123 0.1280
R2 0.758 0.758 0.666 0.771 0.758 0.639
DW 2.26 2.26 2.42 2.29 2.26 2.28
Notes
absolute t-values in parentheses.
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Table A4.2
Values of SIC-specific dummies in equation reported 
in Table 4.5(1). in Table 4.6(1) and Table 4.6(2)
Dummy coefficient
SIC Classification
4.6(3)
Table 4.5(1) Table 4.6(1) Table
Mining and quarrying 0.018
(0.300)
Food drink and tobacco 0.021 0.208 0.259
(0.344) (1.49) (2.25)
Coal, petroleum, chemicals 0.044 0.379 0.400
(0.715) (3.21) (3.52)
Metal manufacture 0.031 -0.132 -0.085
(0.503) (0.35) (0.14)
Engineering and elec. goods -0.016 -0.474 -0.457
(0.257) (2.89) (2.62)
Shipbuilding 0.020 0.331 0.370
(0.332) (0.67) (0.84)
Vehicles 0.034 -0.025 0.145
Metal goods nes
(0.552)
-0.137
(2.239)
(0.01) (0.30)
Textiles -0.087 0.247 0.275
(1.425) (1.70) (2.08)
Leather, leather goods and fur -0.079 0.295 0.351
(1.291) d .o i) (1.41)
Clothing and footwear -0.066 -0.050 0.000
(1.084) (0.01) (0.00)
Bricks, etc. -0.028 0.231 0.263
(0.453) (1.55) (1.99)
Timber, furniture, etc. 0.031 0.075 0.128
(0.503) (0.10) (0.29)
Paper, printing and publishing -0.008 0.067 0.089
(0.137) (0.14) (0.24)
Other manufacturing industries -0.059 0.082 0.189
(0.972) (0.08) (0.40)
Construction
Gas, electricity and water 
Transport and communication
0.095
(1.550)
0.021
(0.348)
Notes:
absolute t statistics reported in parentheses for coefficients related to Table 4.5 (cf 
t<x> )• X statistics reported for those related to Table 4.6 (cf Xj). 
indicates baseline industry.
276
\
Table A4.3
Dependent variable = Pjt = (0. 1)
I=(103 industries engaged in unconstrained negotiations 
in the private sector): 1964ii-75iv (n=333)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.236 (0.36) 2.061 (0.98) -0.487 (0.05)
Plus 13 SIC-specific dummies in each case
-0.235 (0.01)
^it"^it-s
Awhpr
Afc
Aprody
Atax
Awdtd
5.608 (7.36) 
-7.495(24.80) 
11.301 (3.21) 
-11.647 (3.21) 
3.443 (9.51)
10.760(21.83) 
-8.297(30.18) 
8.062 (3.43) 
-31.102(16.02) 
2.228 (3.69)
5.608 (7.36) 
-7.495(24.80) 
11.301 (6.98) 
-11.647 (3.21) 
3.443 (9.51)
10.760( 21.83) 
-8.297(30.18) 
8.062 (3.42) 
-31.102(16.02) 
2.228 (3.69)
Cit
un
dtl
dt2
-0.871 (1.48) 
-1.955(79.42) 
-2.582(62.03)
-1.238 (2.96) 
-1.932(77.14) 
-2.471(57.39)
-0.175 (0.05) 
-1.955(79.42) 
-2.584(62.03)
-0.311 (0.15) 
-1.932(77.14) 
-2.471(57.39)
Aprofits - 5.662(25.60) 5.662(25.60)
X“
UNCERT2 0.222 (0.36) 
UNCERT3
0.296 (0.63)
-0.132 (0.36) -0.177 (0.63)
Time dummies:
Separate time dummies for each period in each case
-21ogL 3216.84 3191.08 3216.84 3191.08
FRAC 0.780 0.785 0.780 0.785
RANK 0.572 0.581 0.572 ’0.581
Notes:
See footnotes to Table 4.6 in text, x in parentheses.
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Table A4.4
Time-specific dummies relating to Table 4.6, Columns (1) and (2)
Period Table 4.6(1) Table 4.6(3)
1964 ii -1.817 (1.236) -2.341 (1.239)
iii -8.437 (12.978) -9.198 (12.928)
iv -3.119 (1.156) -3.839 (1.165)
1965 i -1.875 (0.964) -2.633 (0.978)
ii -1.405 (1.029) -2.134 (1.041)
iii -0.535 (1.000) -1.257 (1.013)
iv -1.403 (0.977) -1.923 (0.988)
1966 i -0.175 (1.007) -0.487 (1.012)
ii -0.750 (1.561) -0.670 (1.568)
iii -2.898 (1.560) -2.692 (1.566)
iv -7.416 (7.575) -6.717 (7.574)
1967 i -1.807 (1.747) -0.939 (1.759)
ii -1.235 (1.364) -0.333 (1,381)
iii 0.440 (0.969) 1.098 (0.978)
iv 1.076 (1.209) 1.831 (1.216)
1968 i 1.342 (1.246) 1.695 (1.249)
ii -1.180 (0.747) -1.304 (0.743)
iii -0.184 (0.736) -0.470 (0.739)
iv 0.366 (0.734) 0.018 (0.744)
1969 i 0.127 (0.650) -0.423 (0.669)
ii -1.283 (0.872) -1.881 (0.892)
iii -0.242 (0.639) -0.889 (0.659)
iv 0.634 (0.575) 0.211 (0.587)
1970 i 1.399 (0.520) 1.404 (0.527)
ii 0.088 (0.662) 0.286 (0.667)
iii 1.236 (0.591) 1.749 (0.602)
iv 1.237 (0.540) 2.044 (0.561)
1971 i -0.245 (0.522) 0.059 (0.525)
ii
iii
iv
Cont...
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1972
1973
1974
1975
i 0.517 (0.432) 0.533 (0.436)
ii 0.064 (0.469) 0.022 (0.470)
iii 0.731 (0.413) 0.646 (0.414)
iv -0.929 (1.084) -0.810 (1.087)
i 0.381 (0.618) 0.288 (0.619)
ii 2.602 (0.733) 2.385 (0.736)
iii 2.455 (0.785) 2.046 (0.787)
iv 2.194 (1.087) 1.537 (1.093)
i 2.685 (2.162) 2.226 (2.171)
ii 0.871 (3.469) 0.472 (3.479)
iii -0.277 (3.537) -0.652 (3.548)
iv 2.657 (3.642) 2.357 (3.653)
i 0.852 (4.025) -0.137 (4.043)
ii 0.252 (4.606) -0.605 (4.626)
iii 1.559 (4.784) -2.114 (4.805)
iv -1.891 (6.663) -2.611 (6.691)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
indicates baseline periods.
\
Appendix to Chapter 5
Tables A5.3-A5.7 provide industrial labour demand, price, wage, and output 
demand equations estimated without restriction. They correspond to Tables 5.3-5.7 in the 
text.
Appendix to Chapter 6
Tables A6.1 and A6.2 relate to the analysis of industrial price inertia of chapter 6.
Appendix to Chapter 7
Figure A7 provides a printout of the Fortran programme used to generate the 
simulations of sections 12-1 A.
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Table A5.3
Industrial labour demand equations 1957-1981
cons n(-l) n(-2) w q k y tim
1. Agric. -03625
(0.5205)
0.4251
(52.0944)
0.4547
(23118)
-0.0743
(0.7035)
0.2383
(34114)
0.1453
(10467)
0.0862
(0.6681)
•0.0198
(37147)
2. Coal 3.9641
(3.6137)
0.8475
(4.9900)
-0.2729
(13515)
-0.1821
(2.3946)
0.3802
(4.1124)
•0.1982
(0.9864)
0.2843
(36545)
-0.0186
(1.0834)
3. Mining 163309
(4.5534)
0.2123
(1.3305)
-0.2456
(1.1457)
-0.8428
(8.2535)
0.7069
(53224)
-1.4526
(39911)
0.1610
(1.0752)
0.0435
(24520)
4. Petrol 8.8621
(3.6610)
0.2975
(1.1851)
-0.1978
(0.9357)
-0.1507
(2.1242)
2.6036
(3.6503)
-0.0074
(03603)
0.1125
(1.2853)
-0.1434
(2.8770)
3. Food -5.0558
(0.9396)
0.9245
(3.2228)
-0.5605
(2.4066)
-0.0015
(0.0126)
0.0520
(0.6166)
0.5504
(1.4517)
0.8921
(39633)
-0.0510
(2.1843)
6. Drink 7.7324
(4.0836)
0.5402
(3.0929)
-0.2430
(1.4415)
-0.1611
(33789)
0.1920
(3.1872)
-03912
(1.7667)
0.2295
(1.7261)
0.0327
(1.9776)
7. Tobacco -9.9277
(1.9474)
0.1734
(0.7173)
0.1870
(0.7749)
•0.0868
(1.4024)
-0.1661
(1/4033)
23129
(3.0526)
0.0226
(0.0804)
-0.1650
(30078)
8. Coal Prdi -5.9457
(0.9571)
-0.2111
(0.7187)
0.0626
(03007)
-0.6613
(5.5540)
0.8325
(33837)
0.8762
(0.8973)
1.1028
(5.3714)
-0.0461
(0.6694)
9. Petrol Prd* 5.4858
(1.7371)
03020
(3.9070)
0.0126
(0.1043)
-0.4150
(2.6083)
0.0720
(1.1505)
-0.1462
(03387)
-0.2500
(1.4723)
0.0508
(1.2833)
10. Cbems . 5.7793 
(13167)
0.7342
(3.8395)
•03060
(1.3862)
-0.1819
(1.3724)
0.1354
(1.1197)
•03840
(1.1376)
0.2212
(2.0206)
0.0114
(0.6980)
11. Iron 0.7579
(0.3694)
0.5763
(3.9846)
-0.2530
(13491)
0.0757
(0.5254)
-0.0461
(03373)
03468
(34757)
0.4186
(5.8381)
-0.0313
(33573)
12. Oth Metals 11.3650
(5.1367)
0.4529
(4.5768)
-0.6855
(5.4962)
0.0478
(0.5365)
-0.2772
(2.4876)
-03705
(3.9525)
0.2948
(3.6301)
0.0244
(2.9186)
13. Mech Eng. 6.3561
(0.7834)
0.9586
(5.4485)
-0.6062
(23288)
-0.5711
(3.1820)
0.4021
(2.6744)
-0.3166
(0.1998)
03172
(1.4343)
0.0313
(0.6581)
14. Inst Eng. 10.9960
(4.7913)
03250
(1.9780)
•0.4384
(2.6923)
-0.2659
(2.6709)
0.2029
(18290)
-0.7753
(3.9319)
0.3367
(33181)
0.0344
(2.8401)
13. Elec Eng. 0.0819
(0.0382)
08427
(6.9502)
0.0667
(04721)
•0.4160
(4.0336)
0.4543
(3.9804)
-0.7701
(23646)
0.7031
(63538)
0.0211
(10849)
16. Ships 6.3028
(2.4401)
0.6776
(4.2154)
-03300
(2.1150)
-03390
(2.3615)
0.4490
(33785)
-0.3044
(13522)
03338
(3.1746)
-0.0147
(13527)
17. Motors 3.8568
(3.2544)
03182
(43160)
•0.0246
(0.2188)
-03424
(34841)
0.1649
(2.1727)
-03041
(37679)
03029
(7.4279)
0.0262
(1.6363)
18. Aerosp. 8.7721
(4.9011)
0.7345
(4.9485)
-0.4220
(2.7849)
-0.2392
(2.3224)
0.1614
(1.8579)
-0.4051
(37488)
-0.0325
(1.1740)
0.0076
(0.9897)
(.—cont)
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cons n(-l) n(-2) w q k y rim
19. Oth Veh. 33740
(1.9788)
0.3731
(2.2419)
0.1246
(0.9071)
•0.0958
(1.3168)
0.1215
(1.6063)
-04669
(1.7356)
0.5004
(5.4545)
0.0075
(03292)
20. Metal Ods 48537
(2.1811)
0.6430
(53240)
-0.3246
(24589)
0.0413
(0.4176)
-0.0838
(0.9730)
-0.2042
(04767)
03987
(7.2062)
0.0028
(0.1936)
21. Textiles 1.9281 
(0.7960)
03602
(5.2586)
0.1670
(1.2766)
-0.7057
(5.7695)
0.7274
(7/4987)
-0.8602
(23285)
0.7769
(10.3711)
0.0435
(4.7590)
22. Clothing 3.4625
(1.6791)
04020
(3.1268)
0.0102
(00665)
-0.0342
(0.2521)
-0.0376
(02704)
-0.2430
(0.9797)
0.4920
(5.8189)
-0.0118
(13006)
23. Bricks 6.1911
(3.4385)
03606
(4.4158)
-03100
(12366)
-0.4291
(43129)
03746
(23801)
-03339
(0.9292)
0.3273
(3.9954)
0.0247
(1/0721)
24. Timber 7.0983
(6.3289)
-0.0399
(0.3367)
-03601
(3.8885)
-0.1294
(1.5847)
-0.0235
(03459)
1.0481
(60244)
0.1087
(2.9072)
-0.0437
(6.7500)
25. Paper -5.9363
(1.0327)
0.2821
(2.7786)
-00363
(03438)
-03922
(5.1635)
03018
(43851)
1.4515
(13665)
0.2658
(2.0856)
-0.0300
(0.9095)
26. Printing 4.3332
(0.9385)
1.1222
(7.6410)
-0.4272
(23249)
-0.1716
(2.0280)
0.1852
(24322)
-03743
(12715)
0.3299
(2.8023)
0.0153
(0.6276)
27. Oth Manuf -0.2045
(0.1478)
0.6198
(5.3725)
0.0155
(0.1111)
-0.2444
(1.4474)
0.1830
(1.2594)
-0.1521
(13361)
03695
(8.2776)
0.0023
(0.1856)
28. Constr. 1.8895
(1.4041)
0.9815
(9.1061)
■0.3506
(17781)
-0.0272
(0.1906)
0.1170
(13192)
-0.3457
(23809)
03252
(4.8375)
0.0071
(0.6275)
29. Gas 5.8471
(4.1025)
0.8963
(3.4361)
-0.7205
(14267)
-0.0096
(0.0945)
-0.0338
(03407)
0.2013
(1.6862)
-0.0442
(0.5769)
-0.0192
(1.8612)
30. Elec. 0.8616
(0.7182)
0.9195
(5.4020)
-0.2065
(13251)
-0.1449
(1.8613)
0.1994
(3.7221)
-03447
(23441)
0.6797
(4.0053)
-0.0276
(13348)
31. Water 33.2689
(3.4157)
0.1802
(1.0302)
-03005
(2.0219)
-0.6370
(5.0268)
0.4068
(43122)
-3.7997
(33542)
1.1480
(3.2078)
0.0622
(33301)
32. Rail -38.6526
(1.9774)
1.1319
(6.2801)
-0.3415
(1.9387)
-0.4894
(23813)
03153
(2.9654)
33142
(13476)
0.7143
(33210)
0.0338
(18913)
33. Road 2.6221
(1.1450)
04670
(2.0330)
-03106
(1.6146)
•0.1210
(2.2060)
0.0322
(03650)
0.4910
(23702)
03940
(2.3623)
-0.0239
(1.6083)
34. Oth Trans 13.8191
(2.9754)
03114
(4.8696)
-01946
(1.6740)
0.0241
(0.3146)
0.0121
(03015)
-1.0449
(23356)
00630
(0.6800)
-0.0004
(00766)
35. Comma 3.0712
(2.3731)
0.7663
(5.4030)
-0.2196
(13732)
-0.0475
(0.8377)
-0.0054
(00769)
-0.1380
(13140)
0.3184
(2.4698)
0.0014
(03385)
36. Distn -0.8074
(0.4265)
0.2553
(13162)
0.7023
(4.1804)
-03432
(3.3044)
0.3656
(43356)
-0.9931
(34611)
1.0351
(7.0750)
0.0341
(1.9071)
37. Bus.Serv 7.4918
(43741)
0.6309
(3.8217)
-0.5099
(30825)
0.0935
(1.0506)
-0.0778
(12695)
0.1533
(2.6626)
0.0126
(0.2478)
0.0090
(20385)
38. ProCServ 8.2709
(3.7075)
0.3902
(2.0819)
-0.1958
(1.1261)
•0.1664
(2.2570)
0.1615
(24682)
-0.0103
(0.1241)
-0.0805
(1.2616)
0.0225
(23255)
39. M isc3erv 0.9229
(0.3893)
03134
(17285)
0.0132
(00589)
0.0802
(1.1270)
0.0661
(03184)
0.0358
(0.1412)
04847
(4.1476)
•0.0198
(13411)
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Industrial price equations 1957-1981
cons P(-l) P(-2) w 4 k y tim
1. Agric. -53431
(12066)
0.2827
(11603)
-0.2917
(12272)
0.4990
(4.3018)
0.6901
(3/4680)
1.1915
(4.1110)
-0.4102
(15961)
-0.0810
(5.6776)
3  Coal 0.3192
(0.2155)
03762
(10188)
•03145
(23042)
0.1068
(0.6406)
1.2278
(3.0854)
0.0236
(0.0731)
-0.0213
(0.0920)
-0.0151
(1.1845)
3. Mining 2.4765
(1.2044)
0.5466
(4.1322)
-0.2004
(18376)
-0.1790
(2.8153)
0.8270
(8.1300)
-0.2634
(0.8160)
-0.1417
(1.3941)
00131
(1.1045)
4. Petrol -0.1220
(0.2483)
00428
(1.0193)
0.0285
(0.7794)
13773
(26.5421)
0.0505
(0.2353)
-0.0046
(0/4925)
-0.0489
(0.8201)
0.0249
(0.8829)
S. Food -4.2752
(0.7123)
-0.0688
(0.4804)
05723
(4.1896)
-1.0076
(5.8005)
1.4247
(105385)
2.5948
(2.6736)
-1.6144
(3.9260)
-0.0360
(0.7560)
6. Drink 8.8551
(10029)
0.6525
(4.8703)
-0.4297
(33878)
0.1486
(15098)
0.4083 
(25970)
-0.9014
(03313)
-05515
(1.7918)
0.0807
(15372)
7. Tobacco 27.8747
(4.1055)
05528
(5.4713)
•00952
(08067)
•0.0043
(0.0654)
0.8119
(5.6843)
-2.9549
(26470)
-1.7390
(4.8879)
0.2103
(26255)
8. Coal Prds -13.1404
(1.8459)
0.0603
(0.3216)
•0.0168
(0.1308)
-0.3699
(36322)
1.8504
(53645)
1.0783
(1.1193)
0.8638
(3.3458)
-0.0448
(0.6837)
9. Petrol Prd* 4.0513
(0.6444)
-0.3770
(18815)
0.1914
(11373)
0.3604
(30858)
0.5705
(6.6419)
0.1604
(0.1852)
•0.7483
(3.3258)
0.0364
(05603)
10. Cbetni 1.1807
(0.4865)
0.1457
(0.8045)
-0.0029
(0.0241)
0.1472
(0.7713)
0.8156
(4.4077)
•0.1950
(05507)
0.1231
(0.9809)
-0.0220
(10456)
11. Iron
NJ
-0.9383
(0.7521)
05095
(2.5257)
-03133
(15245)
0.4399
(31619)
0.4522
(13719)
0.1065
(0.6836)
0.0942
(1.0934)
-0.0286
(23279)
00
ro  12. Oth Metals -10.3558
(3.7209)
03824
(19863)
0.2197
(1.6933)
-1.0768
(35265)
1.4940
(45988)
0.9466
(2.1841)
05629
(2.2340)
0.0011
(00500)
13. Mech Eng. 3.6550
(0.8075)
0.4688
(3.6941)
-0.0711
(08154)
0.4530
(4.8550)
0.2096
(1.9647)
-05024
(0.7152)
O.Q56S
(0.7153)
-0.0054
(03403)
14. Inst Eng. 3.0422
(3.5458)
0.1991
(1.2323)
0.1226
(1.1581)
0.3083
(3.8407)
0.3042
(33500)
-0.2769
(16295)
-0.2594
(3.1449)
0.0190
(2.1892)
IS. Elec Eng. -0.1944
(0.0701)
0.1554
(0.6518)
0.0734
(0.4839)
0.3923
(3.1858)
0.3929
(2.7982)
-0.0847
(0.1898)
0.1577
(15572)
-0.0206
(0.6908)
16. Ships 11.4845
(17250)
03588
(13195)
-03326
(1.4356)
-0.4858
(1.2118)
1.2531
(3.6354)
-13694
(23486)
-05886
(23657)
-0.0066
(03155)
17. Motors -0.2897
(0.2502)
0.4263
(13859)
•0.0011
(0.0092)
0.0777
(0.8487)
0.6765
(5.1616)
-0.0065
(0.0333)
0.0896
(1.3950)
-0.0141
(0.7926)
18. Aerosp. 11999
(1.2649)
0.0395
(0.2856)
0.0717
(08414)
0.0825
(0.6030)
0.7151
(4.4080)
•0.6568
(1.9062)
0.1528
(22082)
0.0373
(1.9015)
( corn)
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cons P(-D p(-2) w <1 k y tim
19. Oth Veh. 2.4362
(1.7261)
0.2319
(2.0312)
-0.1940
(22122)
-0.1011
(1.3916)
0.9099
(7/4311)
-0.7078
(25323)
0.1281
(1.7225)
0.0496
(33865)
20. Metal Ods 23842
(0.3137)
0.0385
(0.1236)
0.1478
(0.7591)
0.3428
(2.0242)
05339
(25858)
-0.3475
(03029)
0.0289
(0.3540)
0.0024
(0.0568)
21. Textiles 1.1656
(0.2891)
0.6105
(3.4125)
-0.1320
(1.0159)
-0.3574
(20254)
0.9144
(43492)
-05817
(0.9771)
0.3522
(3.0641)
0.0247
(23470)
22. Clothing -1.1243
(0.7536)
0.7854
(2.8017)
-0.1494
(0.7354)
05448
(4.7829)
-0.1787
(1/4043)
-0.2673
(1.1026)
0.4250
(4.7883)
-0.0212
(30113)
23. Bricks 4.4126
(2.0710)
0.2229
(2.1729)
0.0763
(05251)
0.3216
(3.2685)
03329
(33018)
-03921
(10381)
-03674
(3.9216)
0.0239
(0.8796)
24. Timber -6.0331
(3.6973)
05962
(2.6159)
0.1822
(0.9909)
0.2131
(1.1150)
-0.0188
(0.0844)
13231
(2.8848)
0.0292
(0.2635)
-0.0552
(4.6162)
25. Paper -9.4344
(1.0402)
0.1539
(0.8328)
-0.1378
(1j0290)
-0.4508
(2.7406)
13593
(65097)
1.7607
(13383)
-0.4800
(2.1120)
-0.0200
(03856)
26. Printing 25042
(0.3975)
-0.0569
(0.3442)
00580
(05388)
0.3289
(2.6866)
0.4670
(33798)
-0.2501
(03747)
-0.1565
(0.9784)
0.0296
(0.7176)
27. Oth Manuf 4.2596
(65353)
-0.0870
(05506)
0.1383
(13547)
-0.1299
(0.7546)
1.0075
(63015)
0.0765
(05270)
-0.6829
(7.3101)
0.0314
(23052)
28. Constr. 2.6290
(1.0907)
0.8768
(3.2818)
•0.8001
(33070)
-0.1407
(0.4809)
0.7717
(23928)
-0.3404
(1.6309)
-0.1194
(0.4478)
0.0517
(1.6683)
29. Oas 3.1738
(3.6219)
10441
(7.1180)
-0.4190
(30037)
0.0902
(0.8796)
03664
(35730)
-0.1810
(1.6058)
-03234
(23752)
0.0037
(04092)
30. Elec. -1.6750
(0.8883)
0.2448
(15470)
03026
(15934)
-0.1743
(1.6635)
0.7543
(63942)
-0.0045
(0.0217)
0.2580
(1.2813)
-0.0155
(0.6798)
31. Water -10.1103
(1.8133)
0.4769
(3.8466)
-0.3484
(3/4031)
0.1635
(1.8931)
05687
(53584)
13401
(13379)
-0.1584
(0.6468)
-0.0011
(0.0681)
32. Rail 16.1886
(0.9598)
0.1076
(0.8166)
0.3621
(33678)
-0.0363
(0.2166)
05679
(55430)
-1.7821
(10924)
0.2020
(1.2034)
0.0029
(0.1990)
33. Road 9.7292
(1.2261)
0.2368
(1.0667)
-0.1346
(05941)
0.3410
(1.4089)
0.2007
(1.0420)
-0.4041
(0.6644)
-0.9978
(15738)
00591
(03102)
34. Oth Trans 40.1265
(55544)
0.1564
(1.0196)
-03776
(2.7248)
0.7084
(5.2429)
0.3568
(3.7088)
-4.3167
(53898)
-0.0386
(0.2182)
0.0011
(0.0992)
35. Comma 6.3558
(3.9480)
0.3536
(2.6410)
-0.2733
(23726)
0.6971
(7.8687)
0.1631
(13419)
0.2818
(13701)
-1.1613
(4.0909)
00286
(2.1567)
36. Distn -2.2132
(0.8006)
0.7482
(45015)
-0.3351
(33466)
-0.0097
(0.0672)
05502
(45592)
-0.1087
(03122)
0.3370
(1.9943)
0.0002
(0.0089)
37. Bus.Serv -6.8068
(2.1128)
0.6279
(3.6374)
-03742
(1/4224)
1.1393
(3.7921)
•03888
(13444)
0.4543
(13316)
05011
(15196)
-0.0920
(3.9404)
38. ProLServ 3.4371
(5.6147)
0.0630
(0.4514)
-0.1166
(10400)
03870
(3.0784)
0.6623
(6.4430)
-00668
(0.7190)
-03802
(5.0390)
0.0157
(13362)
39. M isc3erv 1.6614 0.0323 0.1246 0.4713 0.4168 0.0286 -0.1825 -0.0049
(0.7802) (0.2878) (1.5182) (8.3293) (4.7973) (0.1049) (1.6507) (03065)
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Table A5.S
Industrial wage equations 1957-1981
cons w (-l) w° int inc tinr P° t2
1. Agric. -35980
(1.6458)
0.9395
(75054)
0.7645
(2.4545)
2.2878
(2.0539)
0.0026
(0.4961)
-4.3994
(15491)
-1.0654
(2.9535)
-0.1931
(03902)
2. Coal -0.2658
(0.6846)
-0.1721
(0.8762)
0.3947
(0.6931)
•0.2059
(0.2752)
0.0162
(15956)
-4.3241
(25048)
1.0652
(1.4844)
-1.9623
(18641)
3. Mining 7.2328
(1.2893)
-0.0085
(0.0390)
-04343
(14086)
1.0478
(15538)
0.0056
(0.4052)
2.6679
(1.2475)
0.5053
(0.7613)
-5.4007
(34779)
4. Petrol -6.2815
(1.5304)
0.0530
(0.3941)
-3.7735
(15701)
0.4796
(0.3867)
-0.1010
(15996)
84.4161
(5.0538)
3.7619
(0.6986)
•10.1948
(1.6719)
S. Food 7.0483
(1.5479)
0.0169
(0.1508)
0.9418
(65423)
-0.6500
(1.4590)
-0.0070
(1.8466)
2.7031
(2.7600)
•0.1464
(1.4139)
-0.7098
(15647)
6. Drink -11.6135
(1.4983)
•0.0443
(0.2523)
2.6903
(45283)
-6.4681
(1.7923)
0.0019
(0.1828)
6.0150
(15542)
-1.0604
(2.6697)
05406
(03958)
7. Tobacco -32.0002
(2.0743)
0.2890
(1.9347)
08163
(1.9211)
2.2350
(20524)
0.0214
(14206)
18966
(0.4449)
0.1355
(0.4110)
1.1748
(05229)
8. Coal Prdf 7.1011
(1.4135)
0.4238
(1.5467)
05466
(15062)
-0.5003
(1.4251)
0.0288
(1.7390)
-14.8649
(2.0337)
0.7224
(1.7254)
-0.4441
(03106)
9. Petrol Prda 2.2579
(0.7597)
0.1761
(1.0967)
1.0970
(38375)
0.7297
(0.8447)
-0.0043
(0.4870)
-8.7099
(2.0549)
-0.3831
(1.1556)
1.4084
(1.1850)
10. Cheras -0.4623
(1.1909)
-0.0837
(0.7066)
0.8676
(6.0490)
-0.1923
(0.4072)
0.0056
(1.6214)
1.1464
(0.6991)
0.1876
(2.7098)
-1.3829
(35321)
11. Iron 05475
(0.2739)
0.4628
(2.0911)
00101
(0.0467)
-0.2075
(0.9315)
0.0062
(0.7879)
3.3661
(2.1440)
03561
(2.2028)
-38431
(33121)
12. Oth Metals -0.9911
(1.2087)
05766
(2.3308)
0.3809
(18485)
■0.8121
(3.0843)
0.0069
(0.9443)
-13377
(1.0087)
0.0005
(0.0037)
-1.2814
(15145)
13. Mech Eng. -0.3209
(0.0590)
05845
(2.1467)
0.1785
(0.7032)
05343
(15593)
0.0036
(0.7845)
1.0719
(0.7440)
0.1745
(1.6027)
•08923
(15190)
14. Inst Eng. 0.0347
(0.0693)
0.3286
(2.8331)
0.1552
(0.6467)
0.4333
(1.3776)
0.0147
(2.7928)
•0.9174
(05233)
04154
(2.3200)
-36321
(3.8647)
15. Elec Eng. -1.0255
(0.4934)
0.2388
(1.3717)
0.1304
(0.6699)
1.1997
(3.8327)
0.0036
(0.7873)
-3.7631
(1.6698)
03077
(15205)
-0.8893
(1.6736)
16. Ships -0.0229
(0.0281)
-0.0134
(0.0988)
0.9924
(50229)
05117
(25677)
0.0040
(1.0959)
0.4781
(1.1355)
-03164
(1.4131)
-1.1171
(23729)
17. Motors 0.0997
(0.2536)
0.7341
(3.9787)
0.2896
(15026)
-0.2981
(15487)
0.0090
(1.9610)
2.0113
(1.0609)
-0.0025
(0.0178)
-1.1318
(2.0165)
18. Aerosp. 10.9452
(3.2291)
-05902
(2.2635)
2.6017
(3.7670)
4.0858
(2.9054)
-0.0057
(0.7422)
2.4574
(1.1162)
-18424
(3.4223)
1.3798
(1.4953)
(._.cont)
(Table A55 com.)
cons w (-l)
19. Oth Veh. -1.1416
(35498)
03624
(32856)
20. Metal Ods ■05772
(0.7423)
0.7567
(3.4535)
21. Textiles -0.4038
(37169)
-0.1100
(0.8474)
22. Clothing 03536
(0.7571)
0.0589
(0.3779)
23. Bricks •03668
(1.1063)
0.0655
(0.3174)
24. Timber •5.8312
(5.6710)
0.4018
(36894)
25. Paper -3.6114
(0.8418)
0.6355
(55671)
26. Printing -15813
(05772)
08580
(3.1605)
27. Oth Manuf -0.4143
(0.8070)
03086
(1.6127)
28. Constr. -0.1386
(0.1376)
03253
(15972)
29. Gas -0.6570
(0.8624)
-0.0277
(0.1937)
30. Elec. -0.1058
(0.1356)
0.4469
(37500)
31. Water 0.8832
(0.2801)
0.3406
(3.2489)
32. Rail -27.1601
(1.7139)
0.2119
(1.2951)
33. Road 3.2700
(05701)
0:0438
(0.2229)
34. Oth Trans -11.7597
(1.9335)
-0.0902
(0.8927)
35. Comma -15143
(0.7721)
0.0358
(0.1561)
36. Distn -0.6748
(05171)
0.4404
(3.4290)
37. Bus.Serv -10.3858
(37318)
-03894
(30477)
38. Prof.Serv 0.2819
(0.3520)
05163
(3.8352)
wc int inc
0.2322
(05700)
-0.0700
(0.2273)
-0.0045
(04280)
0.0605
(03931)
0.2109
(0.7336)
0.0077
(1.1883)
0.9417
(74701)
0.0176
(0.1694)
0:0012
(03723)
05786
(4.6664)
-0.0805
(0.3826)
0.0081
(18776)
05332
(31377)
0.0192
(0.0456)
0.0057
(0.9159)
0.3447
(31132)
1.0094
(4.4184)
0.0149
(33567)
0.2233
(0.7835)
0.3111
(0.9384)
0:0157
(4X1153)
0.1191
(04398)
-0.7556
(1.2345)
0.0078
(1X1801)
0.6507
(40865)
0.1722
(1.1066)
0.0046
(1.1851)
0.3222
(13905)
-0.1935
(0.4661)
0.0044
(0.7190)
0.9814
(33792)
03830
(0.4121)
-0.0062
(0.7890)
05212
(1.9469)
-0.0830
(0.2080)
0.0190
(3.7920)
0.9292
(34961)
0.0293
(0.2242)
0.0252
(6:0797)
0.9995
(34170)
0.6762
(2.0585)
-0.0120
(25650)
1.7261
(3.1713)
•0.6156
(0.6252)
0.0106
(15484)
13948
(6.6490)
-1.2886
(15241)
0.0070
(1.9886)
0.3581
(05378)
0.7155
(05463)
-0.0053
(0.7185)
04710
(30425)
0.6337
(3.3049)
0X1057
(1.7024)
-0.0520
(0.1078)
5.8102
(2.2501)
-0.0077
(14162)
0.0931
(03077)
15040
(15276)
•0.0050
(0.6205)
unr r t2
5.6989
(1.7953)
■0.0253
(0.0663)
-4.2186
(35657)
-1.1798
(08014)
0.2263
(1.8110)
-1.4435
(2.1505)
1.6659
(18949)
0.0930
(1.3699)
-1.3038
(28715)
-23503
(1.8151)
0.5209
(5.2916)
0.0616
(0.1258)
0.1298
(0X1828)
0.4493
(3.3667)
-1.4461
(18709)
-3.0410
(2.1866)
0.3452
(3.1956)
0.0389
(0.0764)
-74829
(34026)
0.1710
(1.3086)
-0.3181
(0.6168)
6.0081
(2X1128)
-0.0026
(0.0196)
-1.6576
(2.0488)
-34212
(25614)
0.2S24
(2.7104)
-0.1615
(05329)
1X1197
(13991)
0.1929
(15043)
-1.9088
(24881)
5.2447
(1.7088)
0.0128
(0.0790)
-0.9082
(1X1646)
5.8111
(28125)
0.1035
(0.9250)
-0.7350
(0.9610)
-3.6217
(18819)
-0.3740
(25533)
0.0093
(0X1159)
13882
(05123)
-05855
(3.6838)
1.1083
(2.0103)
3.0525
(0.9824)
-1.1094
(34338)
-0.9045
(1X1935)
04690
(03648)
-04869
(35808)
0.0153
(0X1296)
7.7506
(2.9306)
05689
(15370)
-1.1230
(15042)
-35115
(2.0831)
■0.1234
(1.8566)
-0.2740
(05714)
-14.1203
(24521)
1.3389
(31186)
1.8969
(2.7740)
2.8447
(03303)
•0.0681
(0.2512)
•0.2402
(0.2130)
39. M isc5erv -7.9424 05114 0.7296 1.7626 -0.0045 0.2256 -0.2644 -0.0805
(1.6326) (3.6844) (25661) (1.6578) (0.4290) (0j0678) (1.4208) (0.0681)
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Table A5.6
Industrial demand equations 1957-1981
cons y(-D PG pm/p O tim
1. Agric. 3.0638
(3.9603)
0.3768
(2.3784)
-0.1004
(-13007)
0.0464
(1.9459)
3.9641
(3.6137)
0.8475
(4.9900)
2. Coal 4.0244
(2.9119)
0.5347
(3.2247)
03251
(2.1599)
0.0235
(2.0293)
163309
(43534)
0.2123
(1.3305)
3. Mining 4.5602
(6.5163)
0.2063
(1.5523)
-0.7997 
( -4.8883)
0.0103
(0.1818)
8.8621
(3.6610)
03975
(1.1851)
4. Petrol 0.4049
(0.5573)
0.5092
(3.5005)
0.0856
(1.0187)
-0.3637 
( -1.0642)
-50558 
(-0.9396)
0.9245
(3.2228)
S. Food 8.4926
(4.2353)
0.0246
(0.1065)
-0.0210 
( -0.2980)
0.0916
(33924)
7.7324
(40836)
0.5402
(3.0929)
6. Drink 2.7390
(23326)
0.5639
(3.3241)
-00925 
( -1.2931)
0.1008
(3.2099)
-93277 
( -1.9474)
0.1734
(0.7173)
7. Tobacco 4.7591
(5.1166)
0.2573
(1.7194)
-0.2282 
( -4.3634)
-0.0336 
( -13636)
-5.9457 
(-03571)
-03111 
( -0.7187)
8. Coal Prda 4.0103
(3.3955)
0.2671
(1.2528)
0.4438
(3.8531)
0.2145
(3.8022)
5.4858
(1.7371)
03020
(3.9070)
9. Petrol Prdl 5.0396
(8.8297)
0.1841
(1.9754)
-0.7984 
( -93701)
0.3966
(43769)
5.7793
(13167)
0.7342
(3.8395)
10. Chems 5.1998
(4.9717)
0.2875
(2.0127)
-0.0974 
(-0.6745)
03279
(43390)
0.7579
(03694)
03763
(3.9846)
11. Iren 6.6420
(5.0939)
0.1284
(0.7363)
-03197
(-2.4606)
03722
(2.7448)
113650
(5.1367)
0.4529
(43768)
12. Oth Metals 6.7231
(8.2118)
0.0451
(0.3856)
-0.2223
(-2.4519)
0.2042
(5.4038)
63561
(0.7834)
0.9586
(5.4485)
13. Mech Eng. 0.3574
(0.3537)
0.9495
(7.3448)
-04725 
(-2.2173)
0.0498
(1.1175)
10.9960
(4.7913)
0.3250
(1.9780)
14. Inst Eng. 1.7954
(2.6127)
0.6385
(4.5980)
0.2613
(1.0868)
0.0945
(24489)
0.0819
(0.0382)
03427
(6.9502)
13. Elec Eng. 3.9930
(4.6236)
0.4575
(3.9516)
06069
(3.6633)
0.0484
(1.9922)
6.3028
(14401)
0.6776
(4.2154)
16. Ships 1.2508
(1.4606)
0.8502
(7.2384)
-03403 
(-6.1275)
0.0132
(03524)
3.8568
(33544)
03182
(43160)
17. Motors 5.4093
(3.2505)
0.2194
(0.9058)
0.1316
(0.4515)
0.4974
(3.1419)
8.7721
(4.9011)
0.7345
(4.9485)
18. Aerosp. 8.2042
(5.3788)
-0.0140 
( -0.0654)
13558
(4.4019)
-0.0396 
(-0.7057)
33740
(1.9788)
0.3731
(2.2419)
(....cont)
(Table AS.6 cont.)
cons y(-D P/? pm/p O tim
19. Oth Veh. 4.8979
(5.4873)
0.3792
(3.2816)
1.3035
(7.9724)
0.0431
(23032)
4.8537
(2.1811)
0.6430
(5.5240)
20. Metal Gds 4.7307
(3.8107)
0.4014
(23657)
0.0502
(0.1949)
0.1462
(24517)
13281
(0.7960)
00602
(5.2586)
21. Textiles 2.3249
(2.0918)
0.6946
(4.6314)
-0.2618 
(-0.9804)
0.1509
(30931)
3.4625
(10791)
04020
(3.1268)
22. Clothing 3.4550
(2.7852)
03366
(3.2131)
-0.3343 
( -1.4139)
0.1065
(23627)
6.1911
(34385)
00606
(4.4158)
23. Bricks 6.7323
(8.8665)
•0.0009
(-0.0077)
-0.7933 
(-3.7957)
0.2047
(4.1016)
7.0983
(63289)
-0.0399 
( -0.3367)
24. Timber 90167
(7.0018)
-0.2949 
( -13820)
0.2107
(1.0716)
03270
(43057)
-5.9363 
( -10327)
0.2821
(2.7786)
25. Paper 5.6514
(7.1167)
0.1790
(13420)
-0.9471 
(-5.6478)
03984
(50781)
4.3332
(03385)
1.1222
(7.6410)
26. Printing 6.4674
(93659)
0.0694
(0.7029)
0.1109
(0.9565)
0.1941
(4399(9
-03045 
( -0.1478)
00198
(5.3725)
27. Oth Manuf 5.8024
(6.7706)
0.2219
(1.7684)
-1.1987 
( -7.4202)
0.0394
(03947)
1.8895
(14041)
0.9815
(9.1061)
28. Constr. 12382
(1.6204)
0.8323
(9.8763)
-0.6678 
( -7.1542)
00918
(2.7230)
5.8471
(4.1025)
0.8963
(3.4361)
29. Gas 0.8297
(0.8738)
0.8545
(7.1516)
■0.1647 
( -1.4496)
00307
(p.7254)
00616
(0.7182)
0.9195
(5.4020)
30. Elec.
(
•03173
-1.1260)
1.0644 
( 18.3143)
0.2824
(2.9271)
0.0153
(20553)
33.2689
(3.4157)
0.1802
(1.0302)
31. Water 1.9775
(2.7379)
0.6475
(5.2857)
•0.1534 
(-1.8719)
00450
(2.7820)
-38.6526 
( -13774)
1.1319
(6.2801)
32. Rail 1.2384
(1.0028)
0.8154
(5.1255)
0.2825
(1.6056)
0.0100
(04569)
2.6221
(1.1450)
04670
(2.0330)
33. Road 1.8707
(1.7417)
0.7101
(43307)
-0.1222 
(-1.8846)
0.1140
(23693)
130191
(23754)
00114
(4.8696)
34. Oth Trans 4.1494
(5.0742)
0.4684
(43344)
•0.4427 
(-2.8804)
00913
(34501)
30712
(23731)
0.7663
(5.4030)
35. Comms 2.7534
(4.1680)
0.6037
(6.4286)
-0.1794 
( -3.2129)
0.0486
(33313)
-00074
(-04265)
0.2553
(13162)
36. Distn 6.8642 
( 10.1183)
0.2483
(3.3368)
0.4052
(6.9972)
0.0037
(03699)
7.4918
(40741)
0.6309
(3.8217)
37. Bus.Serv 33215
(3.0189)
0.5228
(3.2750)
0.0547
(0.9532)
0.0388
(10125)
83709
(3.7075)
03902
(2.0819)
38. ProLServ 5.3914
(4.1169)
0.2219
(1.2862)
-1.1742 
( -4.0951)
0.2857
(33913)
0.9229
(03893)
03134
(2.7285)
39. MiscOerv 3.2928
(1.8650)
0.6400
(3.3810)
-0.0024 
(-0.0170)
0.0313
(13504)
0.6965
(4.6992)
0.0082
(0.0002)
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Table A5.7
Estimated equation diagnostics
Industry Value 
objective 
fn. (L)
Employment eqn 
Price eqn 
Wage eqn 
Output eqn
RSS s. error 
regression
R2
1. Agric. 76.8193 0.0069
0.0117
0.0124
0.0091
0.0166
0.0216
0.0223
0.0190
0.9969
0.9982
0.9993
0.9849
2. Coal 80.8458 0.0128
0.0415
0.0928
0.1032
0.0226
0.0408
0.0609
0.0642
0.9966
0.9973
0.9945
0.9597
3. Mining 70.9138 0.0345
0.0113
0.0805
0.0359
0.0371
0.0213
0.0567
0.0379
0.9620
0.9987
0.9947
0.9666
4. Petrol 73.3697 0.4573'
0.3308
2.2316
3.8760
0.1352
0.1150
0.2988
0.3938
0.9649
0.9985
0.9771
0.9800
5. Food 79.4958 0.0046
0.0146
0.0131
0.0042
0.0136
0.0242
0.0229
0.0130
0.9813
0.9984
0.9992
0.9875
6. Drink 85.5285 0.0107
0.0409
0.0889
0.0116
0.0207
0.0404
0.0596
0.0216
0.8780
0.9920
0.9957
0.9947
7. Tobacco 77.5558 0.0235
0.0414
0.2008
0.0127
0.0307
0.0407
0.0896
0.0226
0.9228
0.9942
0.9920
0.9294
8. Coal Prds 80.6044 0.0845
0.1673
0.2638
0.0792
0.0581
0.0818
0.1027
0.0563
0.9458
0.9912
0.9870
0.9175
9. Petrol Prds 82.8008 0.0560
0.1106
0.0816
0.0505
0.0473
0.0665
0.0571
0.0450
0.9343
0.9930
0.9959
0.9865
(cont...)
(Table A5.7 cont.)
L RSS s.e. R2
10. Chems 86.3575 0.0072 0.0169 0.8633
0.0165 0.0257 0.9974
0.0105 0.0205 0.9994
0.0243 0.0312 0.9912
11. Iron 75.1254 0.0272 0.0330 0.9765
0.0316 0.0355 0.9969
0.0271 0.0329 0.9984
0.1572 0.0793 0.7644
12. Oth Metals 99.2055 0.0066 0.0163 0.9858
0.0723 0.0538 0.9933
0.0331 0.0364 0.9979
0.0228 0.0302 0.8948
13. Mech Eng 90.9970 0.0081 0.0180 0.9700
0.0033 0.0115 0.9996
0.0161 0.0254 0.9991
0.0247 0.0315 0.9653
14. Inst Eng 85.9149 0.0087 0.0186 0.9228
0.0054 0.0147 0.9991
0.0255 0.0319 0.9985
0.0373 0.0386 0.9914
15. Elec Eng 97.4993 0.0093 0.0193 0.9206
0.0069 0.0166 0.9989
0.0163 0.0256 0.9989
0.0183 0.0271 0.9905
16. Ships 86.8102 0.0099 0.0199 0.9923
0.1487 0.0771 0.9758
0.0099 0.0199 0.9994
0.0866 0.0589 0.8034
17. Motors 89.5607 0.0084 0.0184 0.9700
0.0124 0.0223 0.9986
0.0309 0.0352 0.9982
0.0775 0.0557 0.9315
18. Aerosp. 71.6462 0.0187 0.0274 0.9816
0.0567 0.0476 0.9954
0.0206 0.0287 0.9988
0.4796 0.1385 0.0002
19. Oth Vehs 74.0106 0.0261 0.0323 0.9906
0.0277 0.0333 0.9977
0.0654 0.0512 0.9949
0.1468 0.0766 0.8965
20. Metal Gds 85.9540 0.0070 0.0167 0.9570
0.0152 0.0247 0.9985
0.0222 0.0298 0.9985
0.0706 0.0531 0.7552
(cont...)
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(Table A5.7 cont.)
L
21. Textiles 115.3965
22. Clothing 83.7527
23. Bricks 79.7671
24. Timber 106.0004
25. Paper 83.6123
26. Printing 83.8097
27. Oth Manuf 85.8266
28. Constr. 82.1878
29. Gas
30. Elec
92.7327
87.8166
31. Water 92.7842
RSS s.e. R2
0.0094 0.0195 0.9956
0.0314 0.0354 0.9939
0.0250 0.0316 0.9986
0.0451 0.0425 0.8639
0.0060 0.0155 0.9950
0.0074 0.0172 0.9986
0.0155 0.0249 0.9990
0.0329 0.0363 0.8407
0.0080 0.0179 0.9861
0.0085 0.0185 0.9991
0.0369 0.0384 0.9979
0.0314 0.0354 0.9617
0.0036 0.0119 0.9651
0.0161 0.0254 0.9982
0.0155 0.0249 0.9990
0.0525 0.0458 0.9029
0.0128 0.0226 0.9614
0.0387 0.0393 0.9958
0.0212 0.0291 0.9989
0.0317 0.0356 0.9102
0.0052 0.0145 0.9542
0.0144 0.0240 0.9986
0.0202 0.0284 0.9987
0.0110 0.0210 0.9858
0.0057 0.0151 0.9657
0.0247 0.0314 0.9968
0.0131 0.0229 0.9993
0.0503 0.0449 0.9717
0.0072 0.0170 0.9476
0.0285 0.0338 0.9974
0.0200 0.0283 0.9985
0.0180 0.0268 0.9482
0.0160 0.0253 0.9763
0.0230 0.0303 0.9945
0.0535 0.0463 0.9969
0.0258 0.0321 0.9950
0.0114 0.0214 0.9826
0.0272 0.0330 0.9961
0.0321 0.0358 0.9985
0.0175 0.0264 0.9933
0.0335 0.0366 0.9266
0.0247 0.0314 0.9975
0.0298 0.0345 0.9980
0.0068 0.0165 0.9882
(cont...)
(Table A5.7 cont.)
L RSS s.e. R2
32. Rail 81.3307 0.0135 0.0232 0.9950
0.0100 0.0200 0.9987
0.0129 0.0227 0.9993
0.0183 0.0270 0.9044
33. Road 74.9756 0.0032 0.0113 0.9751
0.0752 0.0549 0.9921
0.0307 0.0351 0.9983
0.0187 0.0274 0.9776
34. Oth Trans 93.6919 0.0063 0.0159 0.9172
0.0245 0.0313 0.9967
0.0266 0.0326 0.9985
0.0141 0.0237 0.9891
35. Comms 83.8859 0.0042 0.0130 0.9666
0.0162 0.0254 0.9984
0.0432 0.0416 0.9974
0.0045 0.0135 0.9984
36. Distn 85.2587 0.0043 0.0131 0.9759
0.0105 0.0205 0.9985
0.0109 0.0209 0.9993
0.0030 0.0109 0.9942
37. Bus.Serv 73.0020 0.0050 0.0141 0.9944
0.0415 0.0407 0.9945
0.0074 0.0172 0.9995
0.0099 0.0199 0.9962
38. Prof.Serv 94.9893 0.0093 0.0193 0.9745
0.0167 0.0259 0.9982
0.0496 0.0446 0.9971
0.1001 0.0633 0.9315
39. Misc.Serv 75.7834 0.0044 0.0133 0.9374
0.0084 0.0184 0.9992
0.0586 0.0484 0.9960
0.0109 0.0209 0.9713
\
Table A6.1 
Measures of Industrial Characteristics
ind Pr conc68 conc79 cone kout prodpos imrat exrat vardem varcost
5 .3789 70.4 51.8 .41 .16 .3225 .21 .06 .7180 .4370
6 .0887 69.8 58.4 .48 .41 .0815 .19 .22 .6810 .5200
7 .2238 99.7 99.0 .92 1.06 .0 .07 .20 .5990 .4610
8 .0294 93.7 95.0 .95 10.87 .7430 .00 .00 .6590 .7360
9 .0385 86.8 68.3 .51 1.00 .9329 .25 .15 .8698 .7931
10 .0171 72.1 58.5 .46 .70 .7017 .22 .03 .8400 .5700
11 .1636 98.3 63.9 .55 .47 .9668 .14 .17 .4190 .5690
12 .4205 74.9 55.1 .34 .23 .9610 .39 .22 .5070 .4570
13 .1288 52.3 32.9 .23 .27 .4844 .31 .44 .6050 .5320
14 .1209 48.1 33.1 .15 .25 .1823 .56 .51 .9040 .4650
15 .0539 77.3 62.3 .40 .25 .4733 .36 .28 .7520 .5240
16 .0278 57.4 73.0 .54 .32 .2060 .26 .13 .1930 .4850
17 .2326 90.8 65.3 .44 .28 .3323 .33 .29 .5860 .5200
18 .0078 94.3 78.0 .44 .27 .0758 .44 .45 .8660 .4890
19 .0079 86.5 89.7 .37 .53 .6734 .59 1.39 .3940 .5200
20 .0144 54.7 31.6 .20 .24 .8610 .38 .33 .5230 .5310
21 .2107 53.0 46.5 .33 .41 .6268 .28 .26 .1880 .4670
22 .4034 28.4 24.7 .17 .15 .1233 .30 .18 .3540 .3580
23 .0846 65.4 48.3 .43 .36 .8675 .12 .14 .7210 .5410
24 .8579 23.6 14.7 .11 .08 .5428 .24 .05 .5760 .4830
25 0 .0072 52.4 43.2 .30 .54 .0897 .32 .08 .5530 .4900
26 .0348 30.6 23.9 .23 .59 .6598 .05 .11 .8010 .5090
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Table A6.2
Intervals for classification of industries by characteristics 
(as used in the analysis of Tables 6.2 and 6.5)
Var. Low Medium High
rcgrpl <0.20 >0.20
rcgip2 <0.33 >0.33
cone <0.25 ]0.25,0.48] >0.48
kout <0.20 ]0.20,0.37] >0.37
prodpos <0.34 10.34,0.75] >0.75
imrat <0.18 >0.18
exrat <0.10 10.10,0.27] >0.27
vardem <0.43 10.43, 0.76] >0.76
varcost <0.52 >0.52
SECTOR Primary Manufacturing Tertiary
industry 1-4 5-26 32-39
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0 Firurc A7Fortran pipjriiniiM racd for generation of liinulationi
INTEGER T.TL.TLL
REAL IOJPPRLUPLRRLnLT2LT3JNCPOLLKLjaiLSMA,MULSI 
DIMENSION W27(39),P27(39).AGGW(28),WTD(28/10),WTMC(28/10),
+ IO(40,40),UNI(28/10),UNRSEC(28)»AGGP(28),DGDP(28)tTIM(28),
+ TSQ<28).UNR(28)LUP(28)LRR<28)LT1(28)LT2(28)JLT3(28).
+ INCPOL(28),WRONG(28),COMP(28).LKL(28)£MI(2839).WI(2839),
+ PNI(2839).KI(2839y,MI(2839).PI(2839).YI(2839).DLUP(28),
+ DLRR(28),DINPOL(28).DAGGW(28).DAGGP(28).DTl(28).DT2(28),
+ DT3(28),DCOMP(28XEXPDW(28)EXPW(28)EXPDP(28)JEXPP(28).
+ B(3039).TOTVAL(28),TOTWVL(28).TOrnr(28).PDCX(2839),
+ WDCX(2839).VAL(2839).WVAL(2839).XXAGGP(28XXXAGGW(28X 
+ WTDC(2839).PRNI(2839).P22(39)JPPR(2839)LSI<2839).
+ XXUNR(2839),XXTLS(28)JCXTUN(28),XXTUNR(28XDEFL(28),T1(28),
+ T2(28).T3(28).DDEFL(28),DKI(2839).DPNI(2839),DYI(2839).
+ DWI(2839)LSMA(2839).UNRMA(2839)J3LSMA(2839M)URMA(2839). 
+ PNB(939),XXWI(2839)1XXPI(2839).XXEM1(2839),XXY1(2839),
+ XXPN(2839).XDAGGW(28)3CDAGGP(28).XXUNI(2839),
+ XXLSMA(2839),XUNRMA(2839),TLS(28),TUNR(28),TUN(28).
+ EREI(2839)ERPI(2839)ERWI(2839)ERYI(2839).
+ XB(2839XXErTUNR(28).DTUNR(28).XDURMA<2839).
+ DRAGW(28)3CDRAGW(28),
+ DIVPPR(39),XXLSI(2839XXXPNI(2839).EMPG(28)JCXTEMP(28)
C Read in the data, and the pammetem 
READ(20.*XW27(I)>139)
READ(21 ,*XP27(I)>139)
READ(22,*XAGGW(D,T-138)
100 FORMAT(8F10.5)
99 FORMAT(S3123)
DO 101 1-1,40
101 READ(16.100XWTD(TJ),T-138)
DO 1021-1/40
102 READ(16.100XWTMO(TJ).T-138)
DO 103 1-1/40
103 READd6,100XIO(JJ)3-l/l0)
DO 104 1-139
READ(8.99XUNI(TJ),T-138)
104 CONTINUE 
DO 10S 1-139
READ(18*XPNB(KJ)3C-1 $)
READ(18,»XXB(IJ)J-138)
105 CONTINUH 
DO 500 1-139 
DO 501 N -M  
B(NJ>XB(NJ)
501 CONTINUE 
B (5JK B (4J)
DO 503 N-^,12 
NL-N-1
B (NJ>X B(NU )
503 CONTINUE
B(13 J)-1-XB (9^XB (10 J>XB(11J)
( x ) DO 502 N-1430 NL-N-2
B(NJ>XB(NLJO 
502 CONTINUE 
500 CONTINUE
READ(8,99XUNRSEC(T).T-1,28)
READ(9.100XAGGP(T).T-138) 
READ(9.100XDGDP(T),T-138) 
READ(9,100XTIM(T).T-138) 
READ(9,100XTSQ(D,T-138) 
READ(9,100XUNR(T),T-138) 
READ(9,100XLUP(D.T-138) 
READ(9.100XLRR(T),T-138)
READ(9.100XLT1 CD.T-138) 
READ(9.100XLT2(D,T-138) 
READ(9,100XLT3(T).T-138) 
READ(9.100XINGPOL(T),T-138)
REAEX9.100XWRONG(T),T-l 38) 
READ(9,100XCOMP(r),T-l 38) 
READ(9.100XLKLCT),T-138)
DO 106 1-139
READ(9,100)(EMI(TJ),T-138) 
READ(9,100XWI(TJ).T-138) 
READ(9.100XPNICrj).T-138) 
READ(9.100XKI(TJ).T-138) 
READ(9,100XPMI(TJ),T-138) 
READ(9.100XPKTJD,T-1.28) 
READ(9,100XYI(TJ).T-138)
106 CONTINUE
C Conatruct aggregate wagpa and aggregate prioea from
C actual mdnatrial wagee and prioea
DO 113 T-1,28 
TOTVALfD-aO 
TOTWVLCI>aO 
TOTYCO-0.0 
113 CONTINUB 
DO U O T -138  
DO 111 1-139
P1XX(TJ>-EXP(PI(T J))*P27 (I)
WDCX(T3)-EXP(WI(TJ)rW27(I)
VAL(TJVPIXX(TJ)*EXP(YI(TJ))
WVAL(TJ>WIXX(TJ)*EXP(YKTJ))
TOTYO>TOTY(T)+EXP(YI(TJ))
TOTVAL(T>.TOTVALa>VAL(rjO
TOTWVL(T)-TOTWVL(r)+WVAL(TJ)
111 CONTINUB 
XXAGGP(T>TOTVAL(TVrcrrY(T) 
XXAGGW(T)-TOTWVLCryrOTY(T)
110 CONTINUE
XXPDIV-XXAGGP(27)
XXWDIV-XXAGGW(27)
DO 112T -138
XXAGGP(T>.ALOG{XXAGCP(T)/XXPDIV)
XXAGGW(T>ALOG(XXAGGW(TyXXWDIV)
112 CONTINUE
©
DO 800 T -238  
TL-T-1
XDAGGP(T)-XXAGGP(T>XXAGGP(TL) 
XDAGGW(T>»XXAOGW(T>XXAGGW(TL) 
DAGGP(T>AOGP(T)-AGGP(TL) 
DAGGWn>AGGW(T)-AGGW(TL) 
DRAOW(T>DAGGW(I>DAGGP(D 
800 CONTINUE
C Nob that xaaggp and xaaggw will be overwritten later
C with figa built from induatrial fitted vahiea
C
C Conatruct input prioea within the programme 
DO 117 1-139 
P22(I)-EXP(PI(22J))
DO 118 T -138
WTDO(TWTD(TJ)*EXP(PI(rJ))/P22(I) 
PRNl(TJ>WTDCrrj>+WTMCCTJ)
118 CONTINUB 
117 CONTINUB
DO 122 T -138 
DO 123 1-139 
ippR (T j)-ao
123 CONTINUB 
122 CONTINUB
DO 119 T-1,28 
DO 120 1-139 
DO 121 J-139
IPPR(T J>IPPR(TJ)+(PRNI(TJ)*IO(I J))
121 CONTINUB 
120 CONTINUE
119 CONTINUB 
DO 124 1-139 
DIVPPR(1>IPPR(27J)
DO 125 T-1,28
IPPR(TJ)-ALOG(IPPR(rjyDIVPPR(I))
125 CONTINUB
124 CONTINUE 
C
C Generate aggregaB and local tmemploymenl ratea within pmg 
DO 127 T-1,28 
DO 128 1-139
LSI(TJ)-EXP(EMI(TJ))+UNKTJ)
XXUNR(TJ)-(LSiaJ)-HXP(EMI(TJ))VLSI(TJ)
TLS(T>TLS(D+LSI(TJ)
TUN(T>TUN(D+UNI(TJ)
128 CONTINUE
TUNR(T>TUN(TyTLS(D 
127 CONTINUE 
C Some data manipulation.
DO 129 T-1,28
n c n - L T i r n
T20>ALOG(l-LT2(T))
T3(T>ALOG( 1 +LT3(T))
DEFL(T)-AGGP(T)+T1 0>T2O >T 3(T ) 
UNRfI>EXP(UNRCT))
©
129 CONTINUB 
DO 130 T -238  
TL-T-1
DDEFL(1>DEFL(T)-DEFL<TL)
DLUP(I>LUP(T)-LUP(TL)
DLRRd>LRRn>LRR(TL)
DINPOL(T>INCPOL(D-INCPOI/rL)
DAGGWn>AOGW(T)-AGGW(TL)
DAGGP(T>AGGP(T)ACGP(TL)
DTI (T>T1 (T)-T1 (TL)
DT2CI>T2(T)-T2(TL)
DT3(T>T3(T>T3(TL)
DCOMPfI>COMP(T)-COMP(TL)
DTUNRO>TUNR(T)-TUNR(TL)
130 CONTINUB 
DO 140 T -238 
DO 141 1-139 
TL-T-1
DKI(TJ>KKTJ)KI(TLJ)
DPNI(T J)«PNI(T J)-PNI(TL J)  
DYI(TJ>YKTJ)-YI(TLJ)
DWI(TJ)-WKrj>WI(TLJ)
141 CONTINUE 
140 CONTINUE
DO 142T -338 
DO 143 1-139 
TLL-T-2 
TL-T-1
LSMA(TJ)-03*(EXP(EMI(TLJ))+EXP(EMI(TLLD)) + 
+ a5*(UNI(TLJ)+UNI(TLLJ))
UNRMA(TJ)-0.5*(UNI(TLJ)+UNI(rLLJ))/LSMA(TJ) 
LSMA(TJ>ALOG(LSMA(TJ[))
143 CONTINUE
142 CONTINUE 
DO 144 T-4,28 
DO 145 1-139 
TL-T-1
DLSMA(TJ>LSMA(TJ)-LSMA(TLJ)
DURMA(TJ>»UNRMA(TJ)-UNRMA(rLJ)
145 CONTINUE
144 CONTINUE 
NSCEN-0
C
c  • • • • • —•
C Return here if wiah to nm altemarive aeenarioQ — «*
C
701 CONTINUE
NSCEN-NSCEN+1 
804 IF (NSCEN £ Q . 1) GO TO 700 
WRITE(27,710)
710 FORMAT(lX,'SC£NARIO TWO")
INCPOL(19K4.5 
INCPOU20)—43  
GO TO 702
289
s>
700 WRTTE(27P711)
711 PORMATOX.’SCENARIO ONE')
702 CONTINUB 
WRITE(27,8S1)
851 PORMAT(lX.'EXPDP+EXPDW, DAGGP+DAOOW EACH TIME ROUND LOOP1) 
C
C Be tin the -i-mlat—— period by-period
C
C Set the (tarring valuee 
XXAOOW(2>AGGW(2)
XXAGGP(2>AGGP(2)
XDAGGP(2>AGGP(2)-AGGP(1)
XXTUNR(2>UNRSEC<2)
XXTUNR(3)-UNRSEC(3)
XDrrUNRI2>DTUNR(2)
XDrrUNR(3>»DTUNR(3)
XXTUN(1>»TUN(1)
XXTUN(2>-TUN(2)
XXTUN(3>»TUN(3)
DO 175 1-139 
XUNRMA(3J>UNRMA(3J)
XUNRMA(4J>UNRMA(4J)
XXPNI(1J>*PNI(1J)
XXPNI(2J>PNI(2,D 
XXPNI(31I>PNI(31D 
XXEMI(1 J>EMI(1 J)
XXEMI(2J>-EMI(2J)
XXEMI<3PI>-EMI(3PI)
XXYK1J>YK1J)
XX Y X 2J>Y iai)
XXYI(3J>YX3J)
XXWIdJVWIOJ)
XXWX2JVWIOI)
XXWI(3J>WI(3J)
XXPKljmOJ)
XXPK2JHTOJ)
XXPK3JH>K3J)
XXP«4,I)-P«41D 
XXUNI(1 J>»UNI(1J)
XXUNI(2J)-UNI(2J)
XXUNI(3J>-UNI(3J)
175 CONTINUB 
C eeeeeeee 
q  eeeeeeee
C Tbne path nark here 
DO 162 T-338  
WRITE<281614)T 
wRrrEa7.6i4)T 
614 P 0 R M A T ( 1 X , T I M E  IS* ,16)
TL-T-1
TLL-T-2
C Generate moving avenge aectonl unemployment n e t  f n n  within png  
IF O’ LE. 4) GO TO 803 
DO 177 M 3 9
XXLSMA(T.I)-OJ»(EXP(XXEMI<TL.D>tEXPCXXEMI(TLLJ))) +
+ a5*(30{UNI(TLJ>+XXUNI(TLLJ))
XUNRMA(TJ)-0.5*(XXUNKTLJ)+XX UNKTLUOVXXLS MA(TJ) 
XDURMA(TJ>-XUNRMACrj)-XUNRMA(TLJ)
XXLS MA(T J>ALOG(XXLSMA<TJ))
177 CONTINUE 
803 CONTINUE
C Generate eapecled wigp end price change 
EXPDW(T>AGGW(T>AGGW(TL)
EXPDPO>AGGP(T>AGGP(TL)
WRITE(27 •)DGDP(T)
160 CONTINUE
XTTDW-EXPDW(T)
XITDP-EXPDPCT)
CALL EDW ( EXPDW(D3CDAGGPCTL)^DrUNRCTL)JNCPOL(T)J7nfr).
♦ DT2(T)J3LUP(T).TIM(DX>GDP(T)JXX)MP(TL))
CALL EDP ( EXPDP(T)pXDAGGP(TL)pET2(T)pDLUP(T)p
+ TIM(T)JXj DP(T),DCOMP(TL))
WRITE(27*)EXPDP(D£XPDW(TU)AGGP(TLDAGGWCr) 
EXPW(T>XXAGGW(TL)+EXPDW(T)
EXPP(T>XXAOGP(TL)+EXPDPa)
C Now genome valuee far expected input price*.
DO 150 1 - 1 3  
XXPN(TJ>
+ PNB(lJ)+(PNB(2J)»XXPNIfrLJ))+(PNB(3J)*XXPNI(TLLJ)>+
+ (PNB(4J)»EXPP(D)+(PNB<5J)»XXAGGP(TL)MPNB(6J)*EXPW(T))+
+ (PNB(7J)*TIM(D}+{PNB(8J)*DGDP(T)>+<PNB(9J)*COMP(T))
150 CONTINUE
IF (T EQ. 3) GO TO 162 
C Obtain wage, price, output, and employment for each induatry 
C in turn
DO 153 1 - 1 3  
XXW Icrj^W XTJ)
3CXPKT J>PI(T J)
XXEMI(TJVEMIfTJ)
XXYKTJ>YKTJ)
ITERCT-0 
550 CONTINUB
rrE R C T -rrE R cr+1 
IF (I EQ . 4) GO TO 153 
XITW-XXWI(TJ)
XTTP-XXPKTJ)
XnY-XXYI(TJ)
XTTEM-XXEMI(TJ)
CALL WAG (B( 17 J )3 ( l  8J )3 ( l  9 J)3 (2 0 J)3 (5  J)3 (6 J),
♦ B (7J)3 (8J)3 (21J)3 (22J)3 (23J)3 (24J).
+ 3CXWI(TJ)^XW1(TLJ)£XPWCDXXPN<TJ)XI(TJ).
+ XXYI(TpI)1TIM(T)pINCPOL(r)pXUNRMA(T.I)pEXPP(T)p
+ T2CD)
IF (NSCEN m  1) GO TO 790
ERwicrjvwicr.D-xxwKTJ)
790 CONTINUB
XXWI(TPI>XXWI(T.D+ERWKTPI)
CALL PRI (B (9 3 3 (1 0 J)3 (1 1 3 3 (1 2 J)3 (1 3 J)3 (1 4 3 .
+ B(1533(16J)3XPIfrjWD{PiaLJ)30CPIfILL3.
+ XXWICTJXXXPNCTflJaaAXXYXTJD,
<2>
*  TIMfT))
IF (NSCEN Jffi. 1) GO TO 791 
ERPKTJVPvrjyxxPKTfl
791 CONTINUE 
XXPI(TJ>XXPI(TJ)+ERPI(TJ)
CALL DEM (B (2 5 J)3 (26J)3 (2733(28J)3 (2933(30J).
+ XXYI(TJ)30(YI(TLJ)JCXPI(TJ)£XPP(T)3Mia'J)1
+ DGDP(D.TIM(T))
IF (NSCEN .NE. 1) GO TO 792 
ERYI(TJ)-YI(TJO-XXYKTJ)
792 CONTINUB
XXYI(TJ>XXYI(TJ)+ERYI(TJ)
CALL EMP (B(l J )3 ( 2 J ) 3 (3 J ) 3 (4 J ) 3 (5 3 3 ( 6 3 3 ( 7 3 .
+ B(8J)3XEMI(T33XEMI(rLJWOCEMl(TLLJ03XWI(TJ)p
+ XXPN(TPDPKKT1I)XXYI(TPDpn M ( D )
IF (NSCEN J4E. 1) GO TO 793 
EREI(TJ)-EMI(TPD-XXEMin'PI)
793 CONTINUE 
XXEMiaJ>XXEMI(TJ>+EREICrj)
522 FORMAT(lX,'INDUSTRY •J33F10.4) 
CRITl-AMAXl(ABS(XITW-XXWI(TPD)PABS(XrrP-XXPI(TJ)))
IF (C R m  .GT. 0.005) GO TO 550
CRTT2-AMAXl(ABS(XrTEM-XXEMlCrpI))PABS(XrrY-XXYIfTJ))) 
IF (CRIT2 .GT. 0.002) GO TO 550 
IF (NSCEN .NE. 3) GO TO 524 
WRITE(28322)LEMI(TJ)P I(T1D.WI(TJ)fYKTpI)pUNI(TL3 
WRITE(28323)XXEMI(TPDJCXPI(TpI)pXXWI(rpI)pXXYI(rpI)p 
+ XXUNI(TLJ)jrERCT
523 FORMAT(13X.4FlQ.4pF12.4I6XJ8)
524 CONTINUB 
153 CONTINUB
C Coatxiruct aggregate wagea and aggregare price*
C from generated indue trial wage* and price* (to he
C tned next time raimd the time loop)
TOTVAVD-0.0
TOTWVL(T)-aO
TOTY(T>-0.0
XXAGGP(T>a0
XXAGGW(T)-a0
DO 164 1-139
PIXX(TJ^EXP(XXPI(TJ))*P27(I)
WKX(T.I>-EXP(XXWI(TJ))*W27(I)
VAL(T1I>PIXX(T1I), EXP(XXYKTpD)
W VAL(TJ)-WDCX(TPI)*EXP(XXYI(TPI)) 
TOTY(T>TOTY(D+EXP(XXYI(TpI))
TOTVALfI>TOTVAL(T)+VALfT J)  
TOTWyLCrhTOTWyLCO+WVALCrj)
164 CONTINUE
XXAGGP(T)-TOTVAL(T)/TOTY(T)
xxAGCW (T>-TarrwvL(TyrarY(T)
X3CAGGPO>ALOG(XXAGGP(D/XXPDIV)
XXAGCW(T>ALOG(XXAGGW(TyXXWDIV)
XDAGGW(T>XXAGGW(T>XXAGGW(TL)
X DAGGPa>XXAGGPO>XXAGGP(TL) 
XDRAGW(1>XDAGGW(D-XDAGGP(T)
DEPCR-AMAXI(0l06.0106+0i75*(XDAOGP(TL)-0.06)) 
WRITE(27P*)DG DPfT)
C Generate aggregate and local tateznpioyment tale* within prog 
C Theae can be need next tim- a ro u n d  loop far complete dynamixm 
XXTEMP(D-0.0 
EMPGO>a0 
XXTUN(T)-0.0 
XXTLS(T>a0 
DO 198 1 - 1 3
GAIN -  EXP(XXEMI(r,I))-EXP(EMI(TJ))
IF (GAIN .GT. ttO) EMPG(T>EMPG(DtGAIN 
198 CONTINUE 
ADDTOT-0.0 
DO 770 1 - 1 3
ADD-(OJ*(EXP(XXEMKTJ)>EXP(EMI(TpI))))
+ +<0.7*( EMPGfT)*UNI(TpiyrU N(T)))
+ -UNIfrj)
ADDTOT-ADDTOT+AMAX1 (0.0.ADD)
770 CONTINUB
EMPG(T>EMPG(r)+ADDTOT 
DO 170 1 - 1 3
GAIN-EXP(XXEMI(TpI))-EXP(EMI(T1D)
UNLOSS -  (03*GAIN) +(a7*EMPG(TrUNKTJ)/TUN(D)
IF (GAIN .GT. ttO) XXUNIfTJ) -AM AXl(a0, (UNIfT,!) - UNLOSS)) 
IF (GAIN XB. 0.0) XXUNI(TJ>UNI(TPD - GAIN - 
+ (0.7*EMPG(D»UNI(TpiyTUN(T))
XXLSI(T J>*EXP(XXEMI(T J))+XXUNI(T J) 
XXUNR(TJMXXLSI(TJ)EXP(XXEMI(TJ))yXXLSI(TJ) 
XXTUNO>XXTUN(T)+XXUNI(TpI) 
XXTLSO>XXTLS(T)+XXLSI(TpI)
170 CONTINUE
XXTUNRO>XXTUN(T)/XXTLS(T)
XDrrUNR(T>X3CTUNR(D-XXTUNR(TL)
814 CONTINUE
IF (NSCEN EQ. 2) GO TO 772
C
C Cons true l input price* within the programme
C Theae can be used next tune round thev loop
C
DO 1 9 0 1 -1 3
WTDC(TJ>WTD(TJ)*EXP(XXPI(TpI)VP22a)
PRNI(TPI>»WTDO(TPD+WTMC(T10
190 CONTINUE 
DO 191 1 - 1 3  
XXPNI(T.D-a0
191 CONTINUB 
DO 192 1 - 1 3  
DO 193 J - 1 3
XXPNI(T J>XXPNI(TJ)r(PRNI(TJ)*IO(I J))
193 CONTINUB
192 CONTINUB 
DO 194 1 - 1 3
XXPNI(TJ>ALOG0CXPNKTjyDIVPPR(I))
194 CONTINUB 
DO 905 1 - 1 3
230
6> 999 PORMAT(1X.3F10.5)
90S CONTINUB
772 CONTINUB
162 CONTINUBC •««««•*«
c »*»»*>**
C WritD oil the nnd«
WRITE(27t708)
70S PORMAT('DGDP')
WRTTEfr7*XDGDP(D.T-2^8)
WRITE(27,606) _____
606 P0RMAT(1X,'ACTUAL (READ AND CONSTRUCTED), FITTED TOT UN RATES 
+ AFTER LOOP)
WRITE(27I630)
630 FORMATCUNRSEC)
WRITE(27*XUNRSECCT),T-2^8)
WRITE(27,631)
631 FORMATCTUNR’)
WRTTE(27,»XTUNR(D.T“ 2^8)
WRITE(27,632)
632 FORMATCXXTUNR')
WRITE(27*XXXTUNR(T).T-23)
WRTTE(27,852)
852 FORMAT( IX.'XDAGGP+DAGGP, XDAGGW+DAGGW AFTER LOOP) 
WRITE(271900)
900 FORMATCXDAOGF)
WRITE(27*XXDAGOP(T)1T -2^8)
WRTIE(27.901)
901 FORMAT(’DAGGP)
WRTTE(27*XDACX3PCD.T-2£8)
WRITE(27.902)
902 PORMATCXDAGGW’)
WRITE(27.*XXDAGGW(T),T-238)
WRITE(27.903)
903 PORMATCDAOGW)
WRITE(27,*XDAGOW(T),T-238)
WRITE(27.913)
913 FORMATCXDRAOW*)
WRITE<27*XXDRAOWCr).T-2^8)
WRITE(27,914)
914 PORMATT'DRAGW)
WRITE(27*XDRAGW(D.T-2^8)
WRITE(273S3)
853 FORMATdX.’FINALLY, THE INDUSTRIAL FIGURES')
DO 600 1-139
WRITE(27t1000) I
1000 FORMAIT'BMDCX’JI)
WRITE(27*XXXEMICrj),T-4^8)
WRTTE(27,1001) I
1001 PORMATTEMr.il)
WRITE(27*XEMICrj).T-4^8)
WRTTE(27I1002) I
1002 FORMATCPTXX’JI)
WRTTE(27*XXXFI(TJ).T-4128)
WRITE(27,]003) I
1003 FORMATCPI'JI)
WRITE(27*XPICrj).T-4^8)
WRITE(27,1004) I
1004 FORMATCWDOCJl)
WRITE(27*XXXWICrj).T-428)
WRITE^.IOOS) I
1005 FORMATCWT.il)
WRTTE(27»XWI(rj).T-4^8)
WRTTEC27.1006) I
1006 FORMATCYDCX’J l)
WRITE(27,*XXXYICrj),T«4i8)
WRTTE(27,1007) I
1007 FORMATCYT.il)
WRITE(27«XYICrj),T-428)
600 CONTINUB
IP (NSCEN EQ. 1) GO TO 701 
IF (NSCEN EQ. 2) GO TO 701 
STOP 
END
SUBROUTINE EDW (EXPDW.DAGGPL.DUNL JNCPOUDT1 XTT2JX.UP,
+ TIM.DGDP3COMPL)
REAL INCPOL
EXPDW-0.02576950 + a6496389*DAGGPL - 1.644326*DUNL +
+ 0.008385303*INCPOL + 1347447*OT1 - O6940334*DT2 +
+ 0.0703516*DLUP + 0.002343638*TIM + 0.4593500*DGDP +
+ 0.1703555*DCOMPL
RETURN 
END
SUBROUTINE EDP (EXPDP,DAGGPL,Drr21DLUP,
+ TIM.DGDP.DCOMPL)
EXPDP-0.01317044 + 0.6059075PDAGGPL - 08177866*1712 +
+ 0.03339065* DLUP + 0003049686*TIM + 0.4214501*DGDP +
+ 0.1997418*DCOMPL
RETURN 
END
SUBROUTINE EMP (A0.A1.A2>3.A4.A5,A6IA7EM£MLEMLL,WEPN,
+ K.Y.TIM)
REAL K
EM»A0 + A1*EML + A2*EMLL + A3*W + A4*EPN + A5*K + A6*Y + A7*TTM
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINB PRI (B0313233.B435.B6373.PL.PLL.WEPN,
+ K.Y.TIM)
REAL K
P-B0 + B1*PL + B2*PLL + B3*W + B4*EPN + B5*K + B6*Y +
+ B7*TIM 
RETURN 
END
SUBROUTINB WAO (C0jC1.C21C3.A4.A5,A6>7,C6,C7.C8,C10.W1WL,
+ BXPWEPNJC.Y.TIMJNCUNRMAEXPP.T2)
REAL KJNC
W -  CO + C1*WL + C2*EXPW + C3*(A4*EXPN+A5*KI+A6*YI+A7*TIM) +
+ 06* INC + C7*UNRMA + C8*EXPP + C10*T2
RETURN 
END
s>
SUBROUTINE DEM (D0J31.D2J33J34J35.Y.YL3EXPP3M.SIO.TIM) 
Y-D0 + D1*YL + D2*(P-EXPP) + D3*(PMEXPP) + D4*SIO + D5*TTM 
RETURN 
END
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Data Appendix
Chapter 3
The primary source of data used in the analysis of Chapter 3 is McMaster and Pissarides
(1984). A nineteen sector disaggregation of the economy is employed here, as documented in
Table DAI. The original data set provides quarterly observations for the years 1963-82, and was
obtained as follows:
Vacancies (V): end of quarter monthly data upto the second quarter of 1976. Quarterly data for 
1976Q3 onwards. Source: Department of Employment Gazette (DEG ).
Unemployment (U): end of quarter monthly data. Individuals are classified according to the 
industry in which they last worked. Source: DEG .
Employment (E): end of quarter monthly data for all employees in employment. Source: DEG .
Wages (W): end of quarter monthly data for the Average Earnings Index, all employees. Series 
for sectors ‘Coal, petrol, and chems’ and ‘Engineering and electrical goods’ were obtained 
from the data on their component SIC orders (IV+V, and VIII+X respectively), using 
employment as weights. Source: DEG .
Output (Y): quarterly data of the Index of Industrial Production for all sectors except ‘Misc. 
Services’. For this sector, the quarterly index of output at constant factor cost is used. Output 
figures are seasonally adjusted. Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics (MDS ).
Prices: as described in the text, the price series employed is the consumer price deflator employed 
in the National Institute’s macromodel. Twelve month forward expectations are derived from 
the model itself.
Incomes policy: bi-annual, zero/one dummies are employed to capture the impact of incomes 
policy (zero means ‘policy-off*, one means ‘policy-on’). Details provided in Table 3.2 of the 
text.
Actual and Normal Hours: derived from the more disaggregated industrial database maintained by 
the Cambridge Growth Project. See details of data used in Chapter 5 below.
Chapter 4
As described in the text, the data on the timing and frequency of wage settlements used 
in the analysis of chapter 4 was provided by the University of Aberdeeen, and was collated from 
the Department of Employment publication "Time rates of pay and hours of work". See Elliott, 
Steele, and Bell (1977) for details.
Data used in the explanation of wage bargaining frequency was obtained as follows:
WHPR: Wholesale price index for manufacturing output Source: Economic Trends Annual
Supplement, ETAS .
FC: Wholesale price index for materials and fuels. Source: ETAS .
PRODY: Aggregate and sectoral output-per-man. Source: measures derived from the
employment and output series used in Chapter 3 above.
Tl: The ‘employment tax’ faced by the firm. Source: Layard and Nickell (1985) (LN).
T2: Income tax rate (annual figures). Source: LN.
T3: Indirect tax rate (annual figures). Source: LN.
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Table DAI
Nineteen-sector Industrial Classification based on 1968 SIC
Industry title SIC Order(s)
Mining and quarrying II
Food, Drink, and Tobacco III
Coal, Petroleum, Chemical and allied products IV-V
Metal Manufacture VI
Engineering and Electrical goods VII-IX
Ship building X
Vehicles XI
Metal Goods nes XII
Textiles XIII
Leather, Leather Goods, and Fur XIV
Clothing and Footwear XIV
Bricks, Pottery, and Glass XVI
Timber, Fuumiture, etc. XVII
Paper, Printing and Publishing XVIII
Other Manufacturing XIX
Construction XX
Gas, Electricity and Water XXI
Transport and Communications XXII
Miscellaneous Services XXVI
WDTD: Deviation of world trade from trend. Source: LN.
COMP: International competitiveness. Source: LN.
AD: Adjusted deficit as a proportion of potential GDP. Source: LN.
RR: Replacement ratio. Source: LN.
STOCKS: Stock of finished goods at 1975 prices relative to total output. Source: ETAS .
UN: Aggregate unemployment rate. Source: ETAS .
UP: The measure of union power is given by the level of trade union membership as a
proportion of total unemployment. Source: Annual Abstrct of Statistics(AAS ).
STRIKE: Strike activity; number of stoppages beginning in the year (all industries). Source: AAS
PROFITS: Profits for ICC’s. Source: Wadhwani (1984).
UNCERT1: Square of the standard error of a sliding regression of price inflation on its own 
lagged values.
UNCERT2: Variance of price inflation over the proceeding four quarters
UNCERT3: The absolute gap between the actual and expected inflation rate as defined by the 
National Institute’s macromodel.
Incomes policies: Quarterly, zero/one dummies are employed to capture the impact of incomes 
policy (zero means ‘policy-off*, one means ‘policy-on’). Details provided in Table 
4.4 of the text.
Chapter 5
The data used in the empirical work of Chapter 5 are, in the most part, based on annual 
observations on 39 industrial groups for the UK obtained from the Cambridge Growth Project 
databank. The industrial groups are closely related to the groups distinguished in the 1968 
Standard Industrial Classification, although the precise Classes and Groups of the 1968 SIC used 
in the construction of the data set are described in Table 5.1 of the text. Full details of the 
industrial data are provided in Barker and Peterson (1987).
The original data on industry man-hours, employment, wages and salaries, and employers’ 
contributions were provided by the Institute for Employment Research at the University of 
Warwick. Data on normal hours and overtime rates were obtained from the Department of 
Employment publication Time Rates of Wages and Hours of Work. The data on industry output 
were obtained from the Central Statistical Office’s commodity flow accounts adjusted for the CGP 
classification. The data on producer price indices of industry output were obtained from a number 
of published sources, including the Department of Trade and Industry’s publication British 
Business, AAS , MDS , and the Department of Energy’s Energy Trends.
The employment variable, n, employed in the regression analysis is the number (000’s) 
employed in the industry, including the self-employed. Nominal wage rates in the industry are 
obtained by dividing total industrial labour costs, including both employees’ wages and salaries 
and employers’ national insurance contributions (£m), by the number employed in the industry. 
An adjustment is then made to take into account overtime payments. In this, wage rates are 
obtained by deflating hourly earnings using the overtime premium paid on the number of hours 
worked in excess of normal hours. The industrial price indices (1975=1.00), p, provide the price 
of home sales by home producers. Indices for the price of material inputs, q, are constructed as a 
weighted average of the price of domestic industrial output, with weights obtained from the
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Business Monitor Input-Output Tables\919. Industrial capital stock measures, k, represents an 
accumulation of gross investment (measured in 1975 prices £1975m) in the industry, assumed to 
depreciate at a rate of 10% pa. Industrial output, y, is gross value added by industry in 1975 
prices (£1975m).
Finally, turning to aggregate variables employed in the analysis, variables Tl, T2, T3, UP, 
UN, RR, and COMP are as defined above (under chapter 4). The incomes policy variable 
employed here, INC, is constructed in Whitley (1986) and attempts to provide a quantitative and 
continuous measure of incomes policy effects which reflects both the size of the downward 
pressure on wages exerted by policy, but also the government’s and the unions’ attitudes towards 
the policy. Finally, c, deviations from trend GDP are obtained as the residuals from a regression 
explaining GDP in terms of a cubic in time.
Chapter 6
The following variables were constructed for use in the analysis of Chapter 6, and are
listed in Tables A6.1 and A6.2
conc68 Weighted sum of three-digit industrial cioncentration ratios derived from the 1968
Business Monitor Report on the Census of Production.
conc79 As above, with concentration ratios derived from the 1979 Business Monitor Report.
cone Figures for ‘conc79’ are adjusted to provide the proportion of the total domestic
output of a product that is produced by the five largest firms in the industry 
following Kumar (1985).
kout industrial capital-output ratios measured in 1968, using the industrial figures described
under chapter 5 above.
prodpos proportion of total gross output taken up by intermediate demand, as given in the
Business Monitor Input-Output Tables\919.
imrat ratio of imported industrial product to total domestic demand, both measured in £1975
and evaluated in 1979.
exrat ratio of exported industrial product relative to total domestic demand, both measured
in £1975 and evaluated in 1979.
vardem variance of nominal demand in the industry over the sample period, 1954-1981.
varcost variance of material input costs to the industry, measured as described under chapter 5
above, over the sample period, 1954-1981.
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